

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Thomas F. Torrance.

LECTURES

ON

RHETORIC

AND

BELLES LETTRES.

By HUGH BLAIR, D.D. & F.R.S. Ed.

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IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

THE SIXTH EDITION.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR A. STRAHAN, AND T. CADELL; AND W. CREECH, EDINBURGH:

And Sold by T. CADELL Jun. and W. DAVIES, (Succeſſors to Mr. CADELL,) in the Strand.

1796.

(*Drawback.*)

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LECTURE XVIII.

FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE—GENERAL CHARACTERS OF STYLE—DIFFUSE, CONCISE—FEEBLE, NERVOUS—DRY, PLAIN, NEAT, ELEGANT, FLOWERY.

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HAVING treated, at considerable length, of the Figures of Speech, of their origin, of their nature, and of the management of such of them as are important enough to require a particular discussion, before finally dismissing this subject, I think it incumbent on me, to make some observations concerning the proper use of Figurative Language in general. These, indeed, I have, in part, already anticipated. But, as great errors are often committed in this part of Style, especially by young writers, it may be of use that I bring together, under one view, the most material directions on this head.

I BEGIN with repeating an observation, formerly made, that neither all the beauties, nor even the chief beauties of composition, depend upon Tropes and Figures. Some of the most sublime and most

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pathetic paſſages of the moſt admired authors, both in proſe and poetry, are expreſſed in the moſt ſimple Style, without any Figure at all; inſtances of which I have before given. On the other hand, a compoſition may abound with theſe ſtudied ornaments; the language may be artful, ſplendid, and highly figured, and yet the compoſition be on the whole frigid and unaffecting. Not to ſpeak of ſentiment and thought, which conſtitute the real and laſting merit of any work, if the Style be ſtiff and affected, if it be deficient in perſpicuity or preciſion, or in eaſe and neatneſs, all the Figures that can be employed will never render it agreeable: they may dazzle a vulgar, but will never pleaſe a judicious eye.

In the ſecond place, Figures, in order to be beautiful, muſt always riſe naturally from the ſubject. I have ſhown that all of them are the language either of Imagination, or of Paſſion; ſome of them ſuggeſted by Imagination, when it is awakened and ſprightly, ſuch as Metaphors and Compariſons; others by Paſſion or more heated emotion, ſuch as Perſonifications and Apoſtrophes. Of courſe they are beautiful then only, when they are prompted by fancy, or by paſſion. They muſt riſe of their own accord; they muſt flow from a mind warmed by the object which it ſeeks to deſcribe; we ſhould never interrupt the courſe of thought to caſt about for figures. If they be ſought after coolly, and faſtened on as deſigned ornaments, they will have a miſerable effect. It is a very

very erroneous idea, which many have of the ornaments of Style, as if they were things detached from the ſubject, and that could be ſtuck to it, like lace upon a coat: this is indeed,

> Purpureus late qui ſplendeat unus aut alter
> Aſſuitur pannus *. —— ARS POET.

And it is this falſe idea which has often brought attention to the beauties of writing into diſrepute. Whereas, the real and proper ornaments of Style ariſe from Sentiment. They flow in the ſame ſtream with the current of thought. A writer of genius conceives his ſubject ſtrongly; his imagination is filled and impreſſed with it; and pours itſelf forth in that Figurative Language which Imagination naturally ſpeaks. He puts on no emotion which his ſubject does not raiſe in him; he ſpeaks as he feels; but his Style will be beautiful, becauſe his feelings are lively. On occaſions, when fancy is languid, or finds nothing to rouſe it, we ſhould never attempt to hunt for Figures. We then work, as it is ſaid, "invitâ Minervâ;" ſuppoſing Figures invented, they will have the appearance of being forced; and in this caſe, they had much better be omitted.

IN the third place, even when Imagination prompts, and the ſubject naturally gives riſe to Fi-

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* "Shreads of purple with broad luſtre ſhine,
"Sew'd on your poem." FRANCIS.

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gures, they muſt, however, not be employed too frequently. In all beauty, " ſimplex munditiis," is a capital quality. Nothing derogates more from the weight and dignity of any compoſition, than too great attention to ornament. When the ornaments coſt labour, that labour always appears; though they ſhould coſt us none, ſtill the reader or hearer may be ſurfeited with them; and when they come too thick, they give the impreſſion of a light and frothy genius, that evaporates in ſhew, rather than brings forth what is ſolid. The directions of the ancient critics, on this head, are full of good ſenſe, and deſerve careful attention. " Voluptatibus " maximis," ſays Cicero, de Orat. L. iii. " faſti- " dium finitimum eſt in rebus omnibus; quo hoc " minus in oratione miremur. In qua vel ex " poëtis, vel oratoribus poſſumus judicare, con- " cinnam, ornatam, feſtivam ſine intermiſſione, " quamvis claris ſit coloribus picta, vel poëſis, vel " oratio, non poſſe in delectatione eſſe diuturnâ. " Quare, bene et præclare, quamvis nobis ſæpe " dicatur, belle et feſtive nimium ſæpe nolo *." To

* " In all human things, diſguſt borders ſo nearly on the moſt " lively pleaſures, that we need not be ſurpriſed to find this " hold in eloquence. From reading either poets or orators we " may eaſily ſatisfy ourſelves, that neither a poem nor an oration, " which, without intermiſſion, is ſhowy and ſparkling, can pleaſe " us long.—Wherefore, though we may wiſh for the frequent " praiſe of having expreſſed ourſelves well and properly, we " ſhould not covet repeated applauſe, for being bright and " ſplendid."

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the ſame purpoſe, are the excellent directions with which Quinctilian concludes his diſcourſe concerning Figures, L. ix C. 3 "Ego illud de iis figuris "quæ vere fiunt, adjiciam breviter, ſicut ornant "orationem opportunæ poſitæ, ita ineptiſſimas eſſe "cum immodice petuntur. Sunt, qui neglecto re- "rum pondere et viribus ſententiarum, ſi vel inania "verba in hos modos depravarunt, ſummos ſe ju- "dicant artifices; ideoque non deſinunt eas nectere; "quas ſine ſententia ſectare, tam eſt ridiculum "quam quærere habitum geſtumque ſine corpore. "Ne hæ quidem quæ rectæ fiunt, denſandæ ſunt "nimis. Sciendum imprimis quid quiſque poſtulet "locus, quid perſona, quid tempus. Major enim "pars harum figurarum poſita eſt in delectatione. "Ubi verò, atrocitate, invidiâ, miſeratione pug- "nandum eſt; quis ferat verbis contrapoſitis, et "conſimilibus, et pariter cadentibus, iraſcentem, "flentem, rogantem? Cum in his rebus, cura ver- "borum deroget affectibus fidem; et ubicunque "ars oſtentatur, veritas abeſſe videatur *," After theſe

* "I muſt add concerning thoſe Figures which are proper in "themſelves, that as they beautify a compoſition when they are "ſeaſonably introduced, ſo they deform it greatly if too fre- "quently ſought after. There are ſome, who, neglecting ſtrength "of ſentiment and weight of matter, if they can only force their "empty words into a Figurative Style, imagine themſelves great "writers; and therefore continually ſtring together ſuch orna- "ments; which is juſt as ridiculous, where there is no ſentiment "to ſupport them, as to contrive geſtures and dreſſes for what

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theſe judicious and uſeful obſervations, I have no more to add, on this ſubject, except this admonition:

In the fourth place, that without a genius for Figurative Language, none ſhould attempt it. Imagination is a power not to be acquired; it muſt be derived from nature. Its redundancies we may prune, its deviations we may correct, its ſphere we may enlarge; but the faculty itſelf we cannot create: and all efforts towards a metaphorical ornamented Style, if we are deſtitute of the proper genius for it, will prove awkward and diſguſting. Let us ſatisfy ourſelves, however, by conſidering, that without this talent, or at leaſt with a very ſmall meaſure of it, we may both write and ſpeak to advantage. Good ſenſe, clear ideas, perſpicuity of language, and proper arrangement of words and thoughts, will always command attention. Theſe are indeed the foundations of all ſolid merit, both in ſpeaking and writing. Many ſubjects require nothing more; and

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"wants a body. Even thoſe Figures which a ſubject admits, "muſt not come too thick. We muſt begin with conſidering "what the occaſion, the time, and the perſon who ſpeaks, render "proper. For the object aimed at by the greater part of theſe "Figures is entertainment. But when the ſubject becomes "deeply ſerious, and ſtrong paſſions are to be moved, who "can bear the orator, who, in affected language and balanced "phraſes, endeavours to expreſs wrath, commiſeration, or earneſt "intreaty? On all ſuch occaſions, a ſolicitous attention to words "weakens paſſion; and when ſo much art is ſhown, there is ſuſ-"pected to be little ſincerity."

thoſe

thoſe which admit of ornament, admit it only as a ſecondary requiſite. To ſtudy and to know our own genius well; to follow nature; to ſeek to improve, but not to force it; are directions which cannot be too often given to thoſe who deſire to excel in the liberal arts.

When I entered on the conſideration of Style, I obſerved that words being the copies of our ideas, there muſt always be a very intimate connection between the manner in which every writer employs words, and his manner of thinking; and that, from the peculiarity of thought and expreſſion which belongs to him, there is a certain Character imprinted on his Style, which may be denominated his manner; commonly expreſſed by ſuch general terms, as ſtrong, weak, dry, ſimple, affected, or the like. Theſe diſtinctions carry, in general, ſome reference to an author's manner of thinking, but refer chiefly to his mode of expreſſion. They ariſe from the whole tenour of his language; and comprehend the effect produced by all thoſe parts of Style which we have already conſidered; the choice which he makes of ſingle words; his arrangement of theſe in ſentences; the degree of his preciſion; and his embelliſhment, by means of muſical cadence, figures, or other arts of ſpeech. Of ſuch general Characters of Style, therefore, it remains now to ſpeak, as the reſult of thoſe underparts of which I have hitherto treated.

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That different ſubjects require to be treated of in different ſorts of Style, is a poſition ſo obvious, that I ſhall not ſtay to illuſtrate it. Every one ſees that Treatiſes of Philoſophy, for inſtance, ought not to be compoſed in the ſame Style with Orations. Every one ſees alſo, that different parts of the ſame compoſition require a variation in the Style and manner. In a Sermon, for inſtance, or any harangue, the application or peroration admits more ornament, and requires more warmth, than the didactic part. But what I mean at preſent to remark is, that, amidſt this variety, we ſtill expect to find, in the compoſitions of any one man, ſome degree of uniformity or conſiſtency with himſelf in manner; we expect to find ſome predominant Character of Style impreſſed on all his writings, which ſhall be ſuited to, and ſhall mark, his particular genius, and turn of mind. The orations in Livy differ much in Style, as they ought to do, from the reſt of his hiſtory. The ſame is the caſe with thoſe in Tacitus. Yet both in Livy's orations, and in thoſe of Tacitus, we are able clearly to trace the diſtinguiſhing manner of each hiſtorian; the magnificent fulneſs of the one, and the ſententious conciſeneſs of the other. The "Lettres Perſanes," and "L'Eſprit de Loix," are the works of the ſame author. They required very different compoſition ſurely, and accordingly they differ widely; yet ſtill we ſee the ſame hand. Wherever there is real and native genius, it gives a determination to one kind of Style rather than another.

another. Where nothing of this appears; where there is no marked nor peculiar character in the compoſitions of any author, we are apt to infer, not without reaſon, that he is a vulgar and trivial author, who writes from imitation, and not from the impulſe of original genius. As the moſt celebrated painters are known by their hand, ſo the beſt and moſt original writers are known and diſtinguiſhed, throughout all their works, by their Style and peculiar manner. This will be found to hold almoſt without exception.

The ancient Critics attended to theſe General Characters of Style which we are now to conſider. Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus divides them into three kinds; and calls them the Auſtere, the Florid, and the Middle. By the Auſtere, he means a Style diſtinguiſhed for ſtrength and firmneſs, with a neglect of ſmoothneſs and ornament; for examples of which, he gives Pindar and Æſchylus among the Poets, and Thucydides among the Proſe writers. By the Florid he means, as the name indicates, a Style ornamented, flowing, and ſweet; reſting more upon numbers and grace, than ſtrength; he inſtances Heſiod, Sappho, Anacreon, Euripides, and principally Iſocrates. The Middle kind is the juſt mean between theſe, and comprehends the beauties of both; in which claſs he places Homer and Sophocles among the Poets; in Proſe, Herodotus, Demoſthenes, Plato, and (what ſeems ſtrange) Ariſtotle. This muſt be a very wide claſs indeed, which

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which comprehends Plato and Ariſtotle under one article as to Style*. Cicero and Quinctilian make alſo a threefold diviſion of Style, though with reſpect to different qualities of it; in which they are followed by moſt of the modern writers on Rhetoric; the *Simplex*, *Tenue*, or *Subtile*; the *Grave* or *Vehemens*; and the *Medium*, or, *temperatum genus dicendi*. But theſe diviſions, and the illuſtrations they give of them, are ſo looſe and general, that they cannot advance us much in our ideas of Style. I ſhall endeavour to be a little more particular in what I have to ſay on this ſubject.

One of the firſt and moſt obvious diſtinctions of the different kinds of Style, is what ariſes from an author's ſpreading out his thoughts more or leſs. This diſtinction forms, what are called, the Diffuſe and the Conciſe Styles. A conciſe writer compreſſes his thought into the feweſt poſſible words; he ſeeks to employ none but ſuch as are moſt expreſſive; he lops off, as redundant, every expreſſion which does not add ſomething material to the ſenſe. Ornament he does not reject; he may be lively and figured; but his ornament is intended for the ſake of force, rather than grace. He never gives you the ſame thought twice. He places it in the light, which appears to him the moſt ſtriking; but if you do not apprehend it well in that light, you need not expect to find it in

* De Compoſitione Verborum, Cap. 25.

any

any other. His ſentences are arranged with compactneſs and ſtrength, rather than with cadence and harmony. The utmoſt preciſion is ſtudied in them; and they are commonly deſigned to ſuggeſt more to the reader's imagination than they directly expreſs.

A DIFFUSE writer unfolds his thought fully. He places it in a variety of lights, and gives the reader every poſſible aſſiſtance for underſtanding it completely. He is not very careful to expreſs it at firſt in its full ſtrength; becauſe he is to repeat the impreſſion; and what he wants in ſtrength, he propoſes to ſupply by copiouſneſs. Writers of this character generally love magnificence and amplification. Their periods naturally run out into ſome length, and having room for ornament of every kind, they admit it freely.

EACH of theſe manners has its peculiar advantages; and each becomes faulty when carried to the extreme. The extreme of conciſeneſs becomes abrupt and obſcure; it is apt alſo to lead into a ſtyle too pointed, and bordering on the epigrammatic. The extreme of diffuſeneſs becomes weak and languid, and tires the reader. However, to one or other of theſe two manners, a writer may lean according as his genius prompts him: and under the general character of a conciſe, or of a more open and diffuſe Style, may poſſeſs much beauty in his compoſition.

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For illuſtrations of theſe general characters, I can only refer to the writers who are examples of them. It is not ſo much from detached paſſages, ſuch as I was wont formerly to quote for inſtances, as from the current of an author's Style, that we are to collect the idea of a formed manner of writing. The two moſt remarkable examples that I know, of conciſeneſs carried as far as propriety will allow, perhaps in ſome caſes farther, are Tacitus the Hiſtorian, and the Preſident Monteſquieu in "L'Eſprit de Loix." Ariſtotle too holds an eminent rank among didactic writers for his brevity. Perhaps no writer in the world was ever ſo frugal of his words as Ariſtotle; but this frugality of expreſſion frequently darkens his meaning. Of a beautiful and magnificent diffuſeneſs, Cicero is, beyond doubt, the moſt illuſtrious inſtance that can be given. Addiſon alſo, and Sir William Temple, come in ſome degree under this claſs.

In judging when it is proper to lean to the conciſe, and when to the diffuſe manner, we muſt be directed by the nature of the Compoſition. Diſcourſes that are to be ſpoken, require a more copious Style, than books that are to be read. When the whole meaning muſt be catched from the mouth of the ſpeaker, without the advantage which books afford of pauſing at pleaſure, and reviewing what appears obſcure, great conciſeneſs is always to be avoided. We ſhould never preſume too much on the quickneſs of our hearer's underſtanding; but

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but our Style ought to be ſuch, that the bulk of men can go along with us eaſily, and without effort. A flowing copious Style, therefore, is required in all public ſpeakers; guarding, at the ſame time, againſt ſuch a degree of diffuſion as renders them languid and tireſome; which will always prove the caſe, when they inculcate too much, and preſent the ſame thought under too many different views.

In written Compoſitions, a certain degree of conciſeneſs poſſeſſes great advantages. It is more lively; keeps up attention; makes a briſker and ſtronger impreſſion; and gratifies the mind by ſupplying more exerciſe to a reader's own thought. A ſentiment, which, expreſſed diffuſely, will barely be admitted to be juſt, expreſſed conciſely, will be admired as ſpirited. Deſcription, when we want to have it vivid and animated, ſhould be in a conciſe ſtrain. This is different from the common opinion; moſt perſons being ready to ſuppoſe, that upon Deſcription a writer may dwell more ſafely than upon other things, and that by a full and extended Style, it is rendered more rich and expreſſive. I apprehend, on the contrary, that a diffuſe manner generally weakens it. Any redundant words or circumſtances encumber the fancy, and make the object we preſent to it, appear confuſed and indiſtinct. Accordingly, the moſt maſterly deſcribers, Homer, Tacitus, Milton, are almoſt always conciſe in their deſcriptions. They ſhew

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us more of an object at one glance, than a feeble diffuse writer can show, by turning it round and round in a variety of lights. The strength and vivacity of description, whether in prose or poetry, depend much more upon the happy choice of one or two striking circumstances, than upon the multiplication of them.

Addresses to the passions, likewise, ought to be in the concise, rather than the diffuse manner. In these, it is dangerous to be diffuse, because it is very difficult to support proper warmth for any length of time. When we become prolix, we are always in hazard of cooling the reader. The heart, too, and the fancy run fast; and if once we can put them in motion, they supply many particulars to greater advantage than an author can display them. The case is different, when we address ourselves to the understanding; as in all matters of reasoning, explication, and instruction. There I would prefer a more free and diffuse manner. When you are to strike the fancy, or to move the heart, be concise; when you are to inform the understanding, which moves more slowly, and requires the assistance of a guide, it is better to be full. Historical narration may be beautiful, either in a concise or a diffuse manner, according to the writer's genius. Livy and Herodotus are diffuse; Thucydides and Sallust are succinct; yet all of them are agreeable.

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I OBSERVED that a diffuſe Style generally abounds in long periods; and a conciſe writer, it is certain, will often employ ſhort ſentences. It is not, however, to be inferred from this, that long or ſhort ſentences are fully characteriſtical of the one or the other manner. It is very poſſible for one to compoſe always in ſhort ſentences, and to be withal extremely diffuſe, if a ſmall meaſure of ſentiment be ſpread through many of theſe ſentences. Seneca is a remarkable example. By the ſhortneſs and quaintneſs of his ſentences, he may appear at firſt view very conciſe; yet he is far from being ſo. He transfigures the ſame thought into many different forms. He makes it paſs for a new one, only by giving it a new turn. So alſo, moſt of the French writers compoſe in ſhort ſentences: though their Style, in general, is not conciſe; commonly leſs ſo than the bulk of Engliſh writers, whoſe ſentences are much longer. A French author breaks down into two or three ſentences, that portion of thought which an Engliſh author crowds into one. The direct effect of ſhort ſentences, is to render the Style briſk and lively, but not always conciſe. By the quick ſucceſſive impulſes which they make on the mind, they keep it awake; and give to Compoſition more of a ſpirited character. Long periods, like Lord Clarendon's, are grave and ſtately; but, like all grave things, they are in hazard of becoming dull. An intermixture of both long and ſhort ones is requiſite,

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requiſite, when we would ſupport ſolemnity, together with vivacity; leaning more to the one or the other, according as propriety requires that the ſolemn or the ſprightly ſhould be predominant in our compoſition. But of long and ſhort ſentences, I had occaſion, formerly, to treat, under the head of the Conſtruction of Periods.

THE Nervous and the Feeble, are generally held to be characters of Style, of the ſame import with the Conciſe and the Diffuſe. They do indeed very often coincide. Diffuſe writers have, for the moſt part, ſome degree of feebleneſs; and nervous writers will generally be inclined to a conciſe expreſſion. This, however, does not always hold; and there are inſtances of writers, who, in the midſt of a full and ample Style, have maintained a great degree of ſtrength. Livy is an example; and in the Engliſh Language, Dr. Barrow. Barrow's Style has many faults. It is unequal, incorrect, and redundant; but withal, for force and expreſſiveneſs, uncommonly diſtinguiſhed. On every ſubject, he multiplies words with an overflowing copiouſneſs; but it is always a torrent of ſtrong ideas and ſignificant expreſſions which he pours forth. Indeed, the foundations of a nervous or a weak Style are laid in an author's manner of thinking. If he conceives an object ſtrongly, he will expreſs it with energy: but if he has only an

indiſtinct view of his ſubject; if his ideas be looſe and wavering; if his genius be ſuch, or, at the time of his writing, ſo careleſsly exerted, that he has no firm hold of the conception which he would communicate to us, the marks of all this will clearly appear in his Style. Several unmeaning words and looſe epithets will be found; his expreſſions will be vague and general; his arrangement indiſtinct and feeble; we ſhall conceive ſomewhat of his meaning, but our conception will be faint. Whereas a nervous writer, whether he employs an extended or a conciſe Style, gives us always a ſtrong impreſſion of his meaning; his mind is full of his ſubject, and his words are all expreſſive; every phraſe and every figure which he uſes, tends to render the picture, which he would ſet before us, more lively and complete.

I OBSERVED, under the head of Diffuſe and Conciſe Style, that an author might lean either to the one or to the other, and yet be beautiful. This is not the caſe with reſpect to the Nervous and the Feeble. Every author, in every compoſition, ought to ſtudy to expreſs himſelf with ſome ſtrength, and, in proportion as he approaches to the Feeble, he becomes a bad writer. In all kinds of writing, however, the ſame degree of ſtrength is not demanded. But the more grave and weighty any compoſition is, the more ſhould a character of ſtrength predominate in the Style. Hence in hiſtory, philoſophy, and ſolemn diſcourſes, it is ex-

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pected moſt. One of the moſt complete models of a Nervous Style, is Demoſthenes in his orations.

As every good quality in Style has an extreme, when purſued to which it becomes faulty, this holds of the Nervous Style as well as others. Too great a ſtudy of ſtrength, to the neglect of the other qualities of Style, is found to betray writers into a harſh manner. Harſhneſs ariſes from unuſual words, from forced inverſions in the conſtruction of a ſentence, and too much neglect of ſmoothneſs and eaſe. This is reckoned the fault of ſome of our earlieſt claſſics in the Engliſh language; ſuch as Sir Walter Raleigh, Sir Francis Bacon, Hooker, Chillingworth, Milton in his proſe works, Harrington, Cudworth, and other writers of conſiderable note in the days of Queen Elizabeth, James I. and Charles I. Theſe writers had nerves and ſtrength in a high degree, and are to this day eminent for that quality in Style. But the language in their hands was exceedingly different from what it is now, and was indeed entirely formed upon the idiom and conſtruction of the Latin in the arrangement of ſentences. Hooker, for inſtance, begins the Preface to his celebrated work of Eccleſiaſtical Polity, with the following ſentence: "Though for "no other cauſe, yet for this, that poſterity may "know we have not looſely, through ſilence, per-"mitted things to paſs away as in a dream, there "ſhall be, for men's information, extant this "much, concerning the preſent ſtate of the church "of

"of God eſtabliſhed amongſt us, and their careful "endeavours which would have upheld the ſame." Such a ſentence now ſounds harſh in our ears. Yet ſome advantages certainly attended this ſort of Style; and whether we have gained, or loſt, upon the whole, by departing from it, may bear a queſtion. By the freedom of arrangement, which it permitted, it rendered the language ſuſceptible of more ſtrength, of more variety of collocation, and more harmony of period. But however this be, ſuch a Style is now obſolete; and no modern writer could adopt it without the cenſure of harſhneſs and affectation. The preſent form which the language has aſſumed, has, in ſome meaſure, ſacrificed the ſtudy of ſtrength to that of perſpicuity and eaſe. Our arrangement of words has become leſs forcible, perhaps, but more plain and natural: and this is now underſtood to be the genius of our language.

The reſtoration of King Charles II. ſeems to be the æra of the formation of our preſent Style. Lord Clarendon was one of the firſt who laid aſide thoſe frequent inverſions which prevailed among writers of the former age. After him, Sir William Temple poliſhed the language ſtill more. But the author, who, by the number and reputation of his works, formed it more than any one, into its preſent ſtate, is Dryden. Dryden began to write at the Reſtoration, and continued long an author both in poetry and proſe. He had made the language his ſtudy; and though he wrote haſtily, and often

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incorrectly, and his Style is not free from faults, yet there is a richneſs in his diction, a copiouſneſs, eaſe, and variety in his expreſſion, which has not been ſurpaſſed by any who have come after him *. Since his time, conſiderable attention has been paid to Purity and Elegance of Style: But it is Elegance rather than Strength, that forms the diſtinguiſhing quality of moſt of the good Engliſh writers. Some of them compoſe in a more manly and nervous manner than others; but, whether it be from the genius of our language, or from whatever other cauſe, it appears to me, that we are far from the ſtrength of ſeveral of the Greek and Roman authors.

HITHERTO we have conſidered Style under thoſe characters that reſpect its expreſſiveneſs of an author's meaning. Let us now proceed to conſider it in another view, with reſpect to the degree of ornament employed to beautify it. Here, the Style of different authors ſeems to riſe, in the following

* Dr. Johnſon, in his Life of Dryden, gives the following characters of his proſe Style: "His prefaces have not the formality of a ſettled Style, in which the firſt half of the ſentence betrays the other. The clauſes are never balanced, nor the periods modelled; every word ſeems to drop by chance, though it falls into its proper place. Nothing is cold or languid; the whole is airy, animated, and vigorous; what is little, is gay; what is great, is ſplendid. Though all is eaſy, nothing is feeble; though all ſeems careleſs, there is nothing harſh; and though, ſince his earlier works, more than a century has paſſed, they have nothing yet uncouth or obſolete."

gradation;

gradation: a Dry, a Plain, a Neat, an Elegant, a Flowery manner. Of each of these in their order. LECT. XVIII.

First, a Dry manner. This excludes all ornament of every kind. Content with being understood, it has not the least aim to please, either the fancy or the ear. This is tolerable only in pure didactic writing; and even there, to make us bear it, great weight and solidity of matter is requisite; and entire perspicuity of language. Aristotle is the complete example of a Dry Style. Never, perhaps, was there any author who adhered so rigidly to the strictness of a dictatic manner throughout all his writings, and conveyed so much instruction, without the least approach to ornament. With the most profound genius, and extensive views, he writes like a pure intelligence, who addresses himself solely to the understanding, without making any use of the channel of the imagination. But this is a manner which deserves not to be imitated. For, although the goodness of the matter may compensate the dryness or harshness of the Style, yet is that dryness a considerable defect; as it fatigues attention, and conveys our sentiments, with disadvantage, to the reader or hearer.

A plain Style rises one degree above a Dry one. A writer of this character employs very little ornament of any kind, and rests, almost, entirely upon his sense. But, if he is at no pains to engage us by the employment of figures, musical arrange-

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ment, or any other art of writing, he ſtudies, however, to avoid diſguſting us like a dry and a harſh writer. Beſides Perſpicuity, he purſues Propriety, Purity, and Preciſion, in his language; which form one degree, and no inconſiderable one, of beauty. Livelineſs too, and force, may be conſiſtent with a very Plain Style: and therefore, ſuch an author, if his ſentiments be good, may be abundantly agreeable. The difference between a dry and plain writer, is that the former is incapable of ornament, and ſeems not to know what it is; the latter ſeeks not after it. He gives us his meaning, in good language, diſtinct and pure; any further ornament he gives himſelf no trouble about; either, becauſe he thinks it unneceſſary to his ſubject; or, becauſe his genius does not lead him to delight in it; or, becauſe it leads him to deſpiſe it*.

This laſt was the caſe with Dean Swift, who may be placed at the head of thoſe that have employed the Plain Style. Few writers have diſcovered more capacity. He treats every ſubject which he handles, whether ſerious or ludicrous, in a maſ-

* On this head, of the General Characters of Style, particularly the Plain and the Simple, and the characters of thoſe Engliſh authors who are claſſed under them, in this and the following Lecture, ſeveral ideas have been taken from a manuſcript treatiſe on rhetoric, part of which was ſhewn to me, many years ago, by the learned and ingenious author, Dr. Adam Smith; and which, it is hoped, will be given by him to the Public.

terly

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terly manner. He knew, almoſt, beyond any man, the Purity, the Extent, the Preciſion of the Engliſh Language; and therefore, to ſuch as wiſh to attain a pure and correct Style, he is one of the moſt uſeful models. But we muſt not look for much ornament and grace in his Language. His haughty and moroſe genius made him deſpiſe any embelliſhment of this kind as beneath his dignity. He delivers his ſentiments in a plain, downright, poſitive manner, like one who is ſure he is in the right; and is very indifferent whether you be pleaſed or not. His ſentences are commonly negligently arranged; diſtinctly enough as to the ſenſe; but without any regard to ſmoothneſs of ſound; often without much regard to compactneſs or elegance. If a metaphor, or any other figure, chanced to render his ſatire more poignant, he would, perhaps, vouchſafe to adopt it, when it came in his way; but if it tended only to embelliſh and illuſtrate, he would rather throw it aſide. Hence, in his ſerious pieces, his Style often borders upon the dry and unpleaſing; in his humorous ones, the plainneſs of his manner ſets off his wit to the higheſt advantage. There is no froth, nor affectation in it; it ſeems native and unſtudied; and while he hardly appears to ſmile himſelf, he makes his reader laugh heartily. To a writer of ſuch a genius as Dean Swift, the Plain Style was moſt admirably fitted. Among our philoſophical writers, Mr. Locke comes under this claſs; perſpicuous and pure, but almoſt without any orna-

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ment whatever. In works which admit, or require, ever ſo much ornament, there are parts where the plain manner ought to predominate. But we muſt remember, that when this is the character which a writer affects throughout his whole compoſition, great weight of matter, and great force of ſentiment, are required, in order to keep up the reader's attention, and prevent him from becoming tired of the author.

What is called a Neat Style comes next in order; and here we are got into the region of ornament; but that ornament not of the higheſt or moſt ſparkling kind. A writer of this character ſhows, that he does not deſpiſe the beauty of Language. It is an object of his attention. But his attention is ſhown in the choice of words, and in a graceful collocation of them; rather than in any high efforts of imagination, or eloquence. His ſentences are always clean, and free from the incumbrance of ſuperfluous words; of a moderate length; rather inclining to brevity, than a ſwelling ſtructure; cloſing with propriety; without any tails or adjections dragging after the proper cloſe. His cadence is varied; but not of the ſtudied muſical kind. His figures, if he uſes any, are ſhort and correct; rather than bold and glowing. Such a Style as this, may be attained by a writer who has no great powers of fancy or genius; by induſtry merely, and careful attention to the rules of writing; and it is a Style always agreeable. It imprints

prints a character of moderate elevation on our compoſition, and carries a decent degree of ornament, which is not unſuitable to any ſubject whatever. A familiar letter, or a law paper, on the drieſt ſubject, may be written with neatneſs; and a ſermon, or a philoſophical treatiſe, in a Neat Style, will be read with pleaſure.

An Elegant Style is a character expreſſing a higher degree of ornament than a neat one; and, indeed, is the term uſually applied to Style, when poſſeſſing all the virtues of ornament, without any of its exceſſes or defects. From what has been formerly delivered, it will eaſily be underſtood, that complete Elegance implies great perſpicuity and propriety; purity in the choice of words, and care and dexterity in their harmonious and happy arrangement. It implies, farther, the grace and beauty of imagination ſpread over Style, as far as the ſubject admits it; and all the illuſtration which Figurative Language adds, when properly employed. In a word, an elegant writer is one who pleaſes the fancy and the ear, while he informs the underſtanding; and who gives us his ideas cloathed with all the beauty of expreſſion, but not overcharged with any of its miſplaced finery. In this claſs, therefore, we place only the firſt-rate writers in the Language; ſuch as, Addiſon, Dryden, Pope, Temple, Bolingbroke, Atterbury, and a few more: writers who differ widely from one another in many of the attributes of Style, but whom we now

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now claſs together under the denomination of Elegant, as in the ſcale of Ornament, poſſeſſing nearly the ſame place.

When the ornaments, applied to Style, are too rich and gaudy in proportion to the ſubject; when they return upon us too faſt, and ſtrike us either with a dazzling luſtre or a falſe brilliancy, this forms what is called a Florid Style; a term commonly uſed to ſignify the exceſs of ornament. In a young compoſer this is very pardonable. Perhaps, it is even a promiſing ſymptom in young people, that their Style ſhould incline to the Florid and Luxuriant: "Volo ſe efferat in adoleſcente fæcunditas," ſays Quinctilian, "multum inde decoquent anni, multum ratio limabit, aliquid velut uſu ipſo deteretur; ſit modo unde excidi poſſit quid et exſculpi.—Audeat hæc ætas plura, et inveniat et inventis guadeat; ſint licet illa non ſatis interim ſicca et ſevera. Facile remedium eſt ubertatis: ſterilia nullo labore vincuntur*." But, although the Florid Style may be allowed to

* "In youth, I wiſh to ſee luxuriancy of fancy appear. "Much of it will be diminiſhed by years; much will be corrected by ripening judgment; ſome of it, by the mere practice of compoſition, will be worn away. Let there be only ſufficient matter, at firſt, that can bear ſome pruning and lopping off. At this time of life, let genius be bold and inventive, and pride itſelf in its efforts, though theſe ſhould not, as yet, be correct. Luxuriancy can eaſily be cured; but for barrenneſs there is no remedy."

youth, in their firſt eſſays, it muſt not receive the ſame indulgence from writers of maturer years. It is to be expected, that judgment, as it ripens, ſhould chaſten imagination, and reject, as juvenile, all ſuch ornaments as are redundant, unſuitable to the ſubject, or not conductive to illuſtrate it. Nothing can be more contemptible than that tinſel ſplendor of Language, which ſome writers perpetually affect. It were well, if this could be aſcribed to the real overflowing of a rich imagination. We ſhould then have ſomething to amuſe us, at leaſt, if we found little to inſtruct us. But the worſt is, that with thoſe frothy writers, it is a luxuriancy of words, not of fancy. We ſee a laboured attempt to riſe to a ſplendor of compoſition, of which they have formed to themſelves ſome looſe idea; but having no ſtrength of genius for attaining it, they endeavour to ſupply the defect by poetical words, by cold exclamations, by common-place figures, and every thing that has the appearance of pomp and magnificence. It has eſcaped theſe writers, that ſobriety in ornament is one great ſecret for rendering it pleaſing; and that, without a foundation of good ſenſe and ſolid thought, the moſt Florid Style is but a childiſh impoſition on the Public. The Public, however, are but too apt to be ſo impoſed on; at leaſt, the mob of readers, who are very ready to be caught, at firſt, with whatever is dazzling and gaudy.

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I CANNOT help thinking, that it reflects more honour on the religious turn, and good diſpoſitions of

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of the preſent age, than on the public taſte, that Mr. Harvey's Meditations have had ſo great a currency. The pious and benevolent heart, which is always diſplayed in them, and the lively fancy, which, on ſome occaſions, appears, juſtly merits applauſe: but the perpetual glitter of expreſſion, the ſwoln imagery, and ſtrained deſcription which abound in them, are ornaments of a falſe kind. I would, therefore, adviſe ſtudents of oratory to imitate Mr. Harvey's piety, rather than his Style; and, in all compoſitions of a ſerious kind, to turn their attention, as Mr. Pope ſays, "from ſounds "to things, from fancy to the heart." Admonitions of this kind I have already had occaſion to give, and may hereafter repeat them; as I conceive nothing more incumbent on me in this courſe of Lectures, than to take every opportunity of cautioning my Readers againſt the affected and frivolous uſe of ornament; and, inſtead of that ſlight and ſuperficial taſte in writing, which I apprehend to be at preſent too faſhionable, to introduce, as far as my endeavours can avail, a taſte for more ſolid thought, and more manly Simplicity in Style.

LECTURE XIX.

GENERAL CHARACTERS OF STYLE—SIMPLE, AFFECTED, VEHEMENT—DIRECTIONS FOR FORMING A PROPER STYLE.

HAVING entered, in the laſt Lecture, on the conſideration of the general Characters of Style, I treated of the Conciſe and Diffuſe, the Nervous and Feeble manner. I conſidered Style alſo, with relation to the different degrees of ornament employed to beautify it; in which view, the manner of different authors riſes according to the following gradation: Dry, Plain, Neat, Elegant, Flowery.

I AM next to treat of Style under another character, one of great importance in writing, and which requires to be accurately examined; that of Simplicity, or a Natural Style, as diſtinguiſhed from Affectation. Simplicity, applied to writing, is a term very frequently uſed; but like other critical terms, often uſed looſely, and without preciſion. This has been owing chiefly to the different meanings given to the word Simplicity, which, there-

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therefore, it will be neceſſary here to diſtinguiſh; and to ſhew in what ſenſe it is a proper attribute of Style. We may remark four different acceptations in which it is taken.

THE firſt is, Simplicity of Compoſition, as oppoſed to too great a variety of parts. Horace's precept refers to this:

Denique ſit quod vis ſimplex duntaxat et unum *.

THIS is the ſimplicity of plan in a tragedy, as diſtinguiſhed from double plots, and crowded incidents; the Simplicity of the Iliad, or Æneid, in oppoſition to the digreſſions of Lucan, and the ſcattered tales of Arioſto; the Simplicity of Grecian architecture, in oppoſition to the irregular variety of the Gothic. In this ſenſe, Simplicity is the ſame with unity.

THE ſecond ſenſe is, Simplicity of Thought, as oppoſed to Refinement. Simple thoughts are what ariſe naturally; what the occaſion or the ſubject ſuggeſt unſought; and what, when once ſuggeſted, are eaſily apprehended by all. Refinement in writing, expreſſes a leſs natural and obvious train of thought, and which it required a peculiar turn of

* "Then learn the wand'ring humour to controul,
"And keep one equal tenor through the whole."
FRANCIS.

genius

genius to purſue; within certain bounds very beautiful; but when carried too far, approaching to intricacy, and hurting us by the appearance of being *recherché*, or far-ſought. Thus, we would naturally ſay, that Mr. Parnel is a poet of far greater Simplicity, in his turn of thought, than Mr. Cowley; Cicero's thoughts on moral ſubjects are natural; Seneca's too refined and laboured. In theſe two ſenſes of Simplicity, when it is oppoſed either to variety of parts, or to refinement of thought, it has no proper relation to Style.

THERE is a third ſenſe of Simplicity, in which it has reſpect to Style; and ſtands oppoſed to too much ornament, or pomp of language; as when we ſay Mr. Locke is a ſimple, Mr. Harvey a florid writer; and it is in this ſenſe, that the "*ſimplex*," the "*tenue*," or "*ſubtile genus dicendi*," is underſtood by Cicero and Quinctilian. The Simple Style, in this ſenſe, coincides with the Plain or the Neat Style, which I before mentioned; and, therefore, requires no farther illuſtration.

BUT there is a fourth ſenſe of Simplicity, alſo reſpecting Style; but not reſpecting the degree of ornament employed, ſo much as the eaſy and natural manner in which our language expreſſes our thoughts. This is quite different from the former ſenſe of the word juſt now mentioned, in which Simplicity was equivalent to Plainneſs: whereas, in this ſenſe, it is compatible with the higheſt ornament.

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nament. Homer, for inſtance, poſſeſſes this Simplicity in the greateſt perfection; and yet no writer has more Ornament and Beauty. This Simplicity, which is what we are now to conſider, ſtands oppoſed, not to Ornament, but to Affectation of Ornament, or appearance of labour about our Style; and it is a diſtinguiſhing excellency in writing.

A WRITER of Simplicity expreſſes himſelf in ſuch a manner, that every one thinks he could have written in the ſame way. Horace deſcribes it,

——ut ſibi quivis
Speret idem, ſudet multum, fruſtraque laboret
Auſus idem *.

There are no marks of art in his expreſſion; it ſeems the very language of nature; you ſee in the Style, not the writer and his labour, but the man in his own natural character. He may be rich in his expreſſion; he may be full of figures, and of fancy; but theſe flow from him without effort; and he appears to write in this manner, not becauſe he has ſtudied it, but becauſe it is the manner of expreſſion moſt natural to him. A certain degree of negligence, alſo, is not inconſiſtent with this character of Style, and even not ungraceful in it; for too

* "From well-known tales ſuch fictions would I raiſe,
"As all might hope to imitate with eaſe;
"Yet, while they ſtrive the ſame ſucceſs to gain,
"Should find their labours and their hopes in vain."
FRANCIS.

minute an attention to words is foreign to it: "Ha- "beat ille," ſays Cicero, (Orat. No. 77.) "molle "quiddam, et quod indice non ingratam negligen- "tiam hominis, de re magis quàm de verbo labo- "rantis *." This is the great advantage of Simplicity of Style, that, like ſimplicity of manners, it ſhows us a man's ſentiments and turn of mind laid open without diſguiſe. More ſtudied and artificial manners of writing, however beautiful, have always this diſadvantage, that they exhibit an author in form, like a man at court, where the ſplendour of dreſs, and the ceremonial of behaviour, conceal thoſe peculiarities which diſtinguiſh one man from another. But reading an author of Simplicity, is like converſing with a perſon of diſtinction at home, and with eaſe, where we find natural manners, and a marked character.

THE higheſt degree of this Simplicity is expreſſed by a French term, to which we have none that fully anſwers in our language, *naïveté*. It is not eaſy to give a preciſe idea of the import of this word. It always expreſſes a diſcovery of character. I believe the beſt account of it is given by a French critic, M. Marmontel, who explains it thus: That ſort of amiable ingenuity, or undiſguiſed openneſs,

* "Let this Style have a certain ſoftneſs and eaſe, which "ſhall characteriſe a negligence, not unpleaſing in an author, "who appears to be more ſolicitous about the thought than the "expreſſion."

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which ſeems to give us ſome degree of ſuperiority over the perſon who ſhows it; a certain infantine Simplicity, which we love in our hearts, but which diſplays ſome features of the character that we think we could have art enough to hide; and which, therefore, always leads us to ſmile at the perſon who diſcovers this character. La Fontaine, in his Fables, is given as the great example of ſuch *naïveté*. This, however, is to be underſtood, as deſcriptive of a particular ſpecies only of Simplicity.

With reſpect to Simplicity, in general, we may remark, that the ancient original writers are always the moſt eminent for it. This happens from a plain reaſon, that they wrote from the dictates of natural genius, and were not formed upon the labours and writings of others, which is always in hazard of producing Affectation. Hence, among the Greek writers, we have more models of a beautiful Simplicity than among the Roman. Homer, Heſiod, Anacreon, Theocritus, Herodotus, and Xenophon, are all diſtinguiſhed for it. Among the Romans alſo, we have ſome writers of this character, particularly Terence, Lucretius, Phædrus, and Julius Cæſar. The following paſſage of Terence's Andria, is a beautiful inſtance of Simplicity of manner in deſcription:

Funus interim
Procedit; ſequimur; ad ſepulchrum venimus;

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In ignem impoſita eſt; fletur. Interea hæc ſoror,
Quam dixi, ad flammam acceſſit imprudentius
Satis cum periculo. Ibi tum exanimatus Pamphilus,
Bene diſſimulatum amorem, & celatum indicat;
Occurrit præceps, mulierem ab igne retrahit,
Mea Glycerium, inquit, quid agis? Cur te is perditum?
Tum illa, ut conſuetum facile amorem cerneres,
Rejecit ſe in eum, flens quam familiariter*.

ACT. I. Sc. 1.

All the words here are remarkably happy and elegant; and convey a moſt lively picture of the ſcene deſcribed: while, at the ſame time, the Style appears wholly artleſs and unlaboured. Let us, next, conſider ſome Engliſh writers who come under this claſs.

SIMPLICITY is the great beauty of Archbiſhop Tillotſon's manner. Tillotſon has long been admired as an eloquent writer, and a model for preach-

* "Meanwhile the funeral proceeds; we follow;
"Come to the ſepulchre: the body's placed
"Upon the pile; lamented; whereupon
"This ſiſter I was ſpeaking of, all wild,
"Ran to the flames with peril of her life.
"There! there! the frighted Pamphilus betrays
"His well-diſſembled and long hidden love;
"Runs up, and takes her round the waiſt, and cries,
"Oh! my Glycerium! what is it you do?
"Why, why endeavour to deſtroy yourſelf?
"Then ſhe, in ſuch a manner, that you thence
"Might eaſily perceive their long, long love,
"Threw herſelf back into his arms, and wept,
"Oh! how familiarly!" COLMAN.

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ing. But his eloquence, if we can call it ſuch, has been often miſunderſtood. For, if we include, in the idea of eloquence, vehemence and ſtrength, pictureſque deſcription, glowing figures, or correct arrangement of ſentences, in all theſe parts of oratory the Archbiſhop is exceedingly deficient. His Style is always pure, indeed, and perſpicuous, but careleſs and remiſs, too often feeble and languid; little beauty in the conſtruction of his ſentences, which are frequently ſuffered to drag unharmoniouſly; ſeldom any attempt towards ſtrength or ſublimity. But, notwithſtanding theſe defects, ſuch a conſtant vein of good ſenſe and piety runs through his works, ſuch an earneſt and ſerious manner, and ſo much uſeful inſtruction conveyed in a Style ſo pure, natural and unaffected, as will juſtly recommend him to high regard, as long as the Engliſh language remains; not, indeed, as a model of the higheſt eloquence, but as a ſimple and amiable writer, whoſe manner is ſtrongly expreſſive of great goodneſs and worth. I obſerved before, that Simplicity of manner may be conſiſtent with ſome degree of negligence in Style; and it is only the beauty of that Simplicity which makes the negligence of ſuch writers ſeem graceful. But, as appears in the Archbiſhop, negligence may ſometimes be carried ſo far as to impair the beauty of Simplicity, and make it border on a flat and languid manner.

Sir William Temple is another remarkable writer in the Style of Simplicity. In point of ornament

nament and correctneſs, he riſes a degree above Tillotſon; though for correctneſs, he is not in the higheſt rank. All is eaſy and flowing in him; he is exceedingly harmonious; ſmoothneſs, and what may be called amænity, are the diſtinguiſhing characters of his manner; relaxing, ſometimes, as ſuch a manner will naturally do, into a prolix and remiſs Style. No writer whatever has ſtamped upon his Style a more lively impreſſion of his own character. In reading his works, we ſeem engaged in converſation with him; we become thoroughly acquainted with him, not merely as an author, but as a man; and contract a friendſhip for him. He may be claſſed as ſtanding in the middle, between a negligent Simplicity, and the higheſt degree of ornament, which this character of Style admits.

Of the latter of theſe, the higheſt, moſt correct, and ornamented degree of the ſimple manner, Mr. Addiſon is, beyond doubt, in the Engliſh language, the moſt perfect example: and, therefore, though not without ſome faults, he is, on the whole, the ſafeſt model for imitation, and the freeſt from conſiderable defects, which the language affords. Perſpicuous and pure he is in the higheſt degree; his preciſion, indeed, not very great; yet nearly as great as the ſubjects which he treats of require: the conſtruction of his ſentences eaſy, agreeable, and commonly very muſical; carrying a character of ſmoothneſs, more than of ſtrength. In Figurative Language, he is rich; particularly in ſimilies

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and metaphors; which are ſo employed as to render his Style ſplendid without being gaudy. There is not the leaſt affectation in his manner; we ſee no marks of labour; nothing forced or conſtrained; but great elegance joined with great eaſe and Simplicity. He is, in particular, diſtinguiſhed by a character of modeſty, and of politeneſs, which appears in all his writings. No author has a more popular and inſinuating manner; and the great regard which he every where ſhows for virtue and religion, recommends him highly. If he fails in any thing, it is in want of ſtrength and preciſion, which renders his manner, though perfectly ſuited to ſuch eſſays as he writes in the Spectator, not altogether a proper model for any of the higher and more elaborate kinds of compoſition. Though the Public have ever done much juſtice to his merit, yet the nature of his merit has not always been ſeen in its true light: for, though his poetry be elegant, he certainly bears a higher rank among the proſe writers, than he is intitled to among the poets; and, in proſe, his humour is of a much higher, and more original ſtrain, than his philoſophy. The character of Sir Roger de Coverly diſcovers more genius than the critique on Milton.

Such authors as thoſe, whoſe characters I have been giving, one is never tired of reading. There is nothing in their manner that ſtrains or fatigues our thoughts: we are pleaſed, without being dazzled by their luſtre. So powerful is the charm of Simplicity

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Simplicity in an author of real genius, that it atones for many defects, and reconciles us to many a careleſs expreſſion. Hence, in all the moſt excellent authors, both in proſe and verſe, the ſimple and natural manner may be always remarked; although other beauties being predominant, this forms not their peculiar and diſtinguiſhing character. Thus Milton is ſimple in the midſt of all his grandeur; and Demoſthenes in the midſt of all his vehemence. To grave and ſolemn writings, Simplicity of manner adds the more venerable air. Accordingly, this has often been remarked as the prevailing character throughout all the ſacred Scriptures; and indeed no other character of Style was ſo much ſuited to the dignity of inſpiration.

Of authors, who, notwithſtanding many excellencies, have rendered their Style much leſs beautiful by want of Simplicity, I cannot give a more remarkable example than Lord Shaftſbury. This is an author on whom I have made obſervations ſeveral times before, and ſhall now take leave of him, with giving his general character under this head. Conſiderable merit, doubtleſs, he has. His works might be read with profit for the moral philoſophy which they contain, had he not filled them with ſo many oblique and invidious inſinuations againſt the Chriſtian Religion, thrown out, too, with ſo much ſpleen and ſatire, as do no honour to his memory, either as an author or a man. His language has many beauties. It is firm, and ſupported in

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an uncommon degree: it is rich and muſical. No Engliſh Author, as I formerly ſhewed, has attended ſo much to the regular conſtruction of his ſentences, both with reſpect to propriety, and with reſpect to cadence. All this gives ſo much elegance and pomp to his language, that there is no wonder it ſhould have been highly admired by ſome. It is greatly hurt, however, by perpetual ſtiffneſs and affectation. This is its capital fault. His Lordſhip can expreſs nothing with Simplicity. He ſeems to have conſidered it as vulgar, and beneath the dignity of a man of quality, to ſpeak like other men. Hence he is ever in buſkins; and dreſſed out with magnificent elegance. In every ſentence we ſee the marks of labour and art; nothing of that eaſe, which expreſſes a ſentiment coming natural and warm from the heart. Of figures and ornament of every kind, he is exceedingly fond; ſometimes happy in them; but his fondneſs for them is too viſible; and, having once laid hold of ſome metaphor or alluſion that pleaſed him, he knows not how to part with it. What is moſt wonderful, he was a profeſſed admirer of Simplicity; is always extolling it in the antients, and cenſuring the moderns for the want of it; though he departs from it himſelf as far as any one modern whatever. Lord Shaftſbury poſſeſſed delicacy and refinement of taſte, to a degree that we may call exceſſive and ſickly; but he had little warmth of paſſion; few ſtrong or vigorous feelings: and the coldneſs of his character led him to that artificial and ſtately

ſtately manner which appears in his writings. He was fonder of nothing than of wit and raillery; but he is far from being happy in it. He attempts it often, but always awkwardly; he is ſtiff even in his pleaſantry; and laughs in form, like an author, and not like a man*.

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From the account which I have given of Lord Shaftſbury's manner, it may eaſily be imagined, that he would miſlead many who blindly admired him. Nothing is more dangerous to the tribe of imitators, than an author, who, with many impoſing beauties, has alſo ſome very conſiderable blemiſhes. This is fully exemplified in Mr. Blackwall of Aberdeen, the author of the Life of Homer, the Letters on Mythology, and the Court of Auguſtus; a writer of conſiderable learning, and of ingenuity alſo; but infected with an extravagant love of an artificial Style, and of that parade of language which diſtinguiſhes the Shaftſburean manner.

Having now ſaid ſo much to recommend Simplicity, or the eaſy and natural manner of writing,

* It may perhaps be not unworthy of being mentioned, that the firſt edition of his Enquiry into Virtue was publiſhed, ſurreptitiouſly I believe, in a ſeparate form, in the year 1699; and is ſometimes to be met with; by comparing which, with the corrected edition of the ſame treatiſe, as it now ſtands among his works, we ſee one of the moſt curious and uſeful examples that I know, of what is called *Limæ labor*; the art of poliſhing language, breaking long ſentences, and working up an imperfect draught into a highly finiſhed performance.

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and having pointed out the defects of an oppoſite manner; in order to prevent miſtakes on this ſubject, it is neceſſary for me to obſerve, that it is very poſſible for an author to write ſimply, and yet not beautifully. One may be free from affectation, and not have merit. The beautiful Simplicity ſuppoſes an author to poſſeſs real genius; to write with ſolidity, purity, and livelineſs of imagination. In this caſe, the ſimplicity or unaffectedneſs of his manner, is the crowning ornament; it heightens every other beauty; it is the dreſs of nature, without which all beauties are imperfect. But if mere unaffectedneſs were ſufficient to conſtitute the beauty of Style, weak, trifling, and dull writers might often lay claim to this beauty. And, accordingly, we frequently meet with pretended critics, who extol the dulleſt writers on account of what they call the "Chaſte Simplicity of their manner;" which, in truth, is no other than the abſence of every ornament, through the mere want of genius and imagination. We muſt diſtinguiſh, therefore, between that Simplicity which accompanies true genius, and which is perfectly compatible with every proper ornament of Style, and that which is no other than a careleſs and ſlovenly manner. Indeed, the diſtinction is eaſily made from the effect produced. The one never fails to intereſt the reader; the other is inſipid and tireſome.

I PROCEED to mention one other manner or character of Style different from any that I have yet ſpoken

ſpoken of; which may be diſtinguiſhed by the name of the Vehement. This always implies ſtrength; and is not, by any means, inconſiſtent with Simplicity: but, in its predominant character, is diſtinguiſhable from either the ſtrong or the ſimple manner. It has a peculiar ardour; it is a glowing Style; the language of a man, whoſe imagination and paſſions are heated, and ſtrongly affected by what he writes; who is therefore negligent of leſſer graces, but pours himſelf forth with the rapidity and fulneſs of a torrent. It belongs to the higher kinds of oratory; and, indeed, is rather expected from a man who is ſpeaking, than from one who is writing in his cloſet. The orations of Demoſthenes furniſh the full and perfect example of this ſpecies of Style.

Among Engliſh writers, the one who has moſt of this character, though mixed, indeed, with ſeveral defects, is Lord Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke was formed by nature to be a factious leader; the demagogue of a popular aſſembly. Accordingly, the Style that runs through all his political writings, is that of one declaiming with heat, rather than writing with deliberation. He abounds in Rhetorical Figures; and pours himſelf forth with great impetuoſity. He is copious to a fault; places the ſame thought before us in many different views; but generally with life and ardour. He is bold, rather than correct; a torrent that flows ſtrong, but often muddy. His ſentences are varied as to length and ſhortneſs; inclining, however, moſt to long periods, ſome-

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times including parentheſes, and frequently crowding and heaping a multitude of things upon one another, as naturally happens in the warmth of ſpeaking. In the choice of his words, there is great felicity and preciſion. In exact conſtruction of ſentences, he is much inferior to Lord Shaftſbury; but greatly ſuperior to him in life and eaſe. Upon the whole, his merit, as a writer, would have been very conſiderable, if his matter had equalled his Style. But whilſt we find many things to commend in the latter, in the former, as I before remarked, we can hardly find any thing to commend. In his reaſonings, for the moſt part, he is flimſy and falſe; in his political writings, factious; in what he calls his philoſophical ones, irreligious and ſophiſtical in the higheſt degree.

I SHALL inſiſt no longer on the different manners of Writers, or the general Characters of Style. Some other, beſides thoſe which I have mentioned, might be pointed out; but I am ſenſible, that it is very difficult to ſeparate ſuch general conſiderations of the Style of authors from their peculiar turn of ſentiment, which it is not my buſineſs at preſent to criticiſe. Conceited writers, for inſtance, diſcover their ſpirit ſo much in their compoſition, that it imprints on their Style a character of pertneſs; though I confeſs it is difficult to ſay whether this can be claſſed among the attributes of Style, or rather is to be aſcribed entirely to the thought. In whatever claſs we rank it, all appearances

ances of it ought to be avoided with care, as a most diſguſting blemiſh in writing. Under the general heads, which I have conſidered, I have taken an opportunity of giving the character of many of the eminent claſſics in the Engliſh language.

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From what I have ſaid on this ſubject, it may be inferred, that to determine among all theſe different manners of writing, what is preciſely the beſt, is neither eaſy nor neceſſary. Style is a field that admits of great latitude. Its qualities in different authors may be very different; and yet in them all beautiful. Room muſt be left here for genius; for that particular determination which every one receives from nature to one manner of expreſſion more than another. Some general qualities, indeed, there are of ſuch importance, as ſhould always, in every kind of compoſition, be kept in view; and ſome defects we ſhould always ſtudy to avoid. An oſtentatious, a feeble, a harſh, or an obſcure Style, for inſtance, are always faults; and Perſpicuity, Strength, Neatneſs, and Simplicity, are beauties to be always aimed at. But as to the mixture of all, or the degree of predominancy of any one of theſe good qualities, for forming our peculiar diſtinguiſhing manner, no preciſe rules can be given; nor will I venture to point out any one model as abſolutely perfect.

It will be more to the purpoſe, that I conclude theſe diſſertations upon Style, with a few directions concern-

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concerning the proper method of attaining a good Style, in general; leaving the particular character of that Style to be either formed by the ſubject on which we write, or prompted by the bent of genius.

THE firſt direction which I give for this purpoſe, is, to ſtudy clear ideas on the ſubject concerning which we are to write or ſpeak. This is a direction which may at firſt appear to have ſmall relation to Style. Its relation to it, however, is extremely cloſe. The foundation of all good Style, is good ſenſe accompanied with a lively imagination. The Style and thoughts of a writer are ſo intimately connected, that, as I have ſeveral times hinted, it is frequently hard to diſtinguiſh them. Wherever the impreſſions of things upon our minds are faint and indiſtinct, or perplexed and confuſed, our Style in treating of ſuch things will infallibly be ſo too. Whereas, what we conceive clearly and feel ſtrongly, we ſhall naturally expreſs with clearneſs and with ſtrength. This, then, we may be aſſured, is a capital rule as to Style, to think cloſely of the ſubject, till we have attained a full and diſtinct view of the matter which we are to clothe in words, till we become warm and intereſted in it; then, and not till then, ſhall we find expreſſion begin to flow. Generally ſpeaking, the beſt and moſt proper expreſſions, are thoſe which a clear view of the ſubject ſuggeſts, without much labour or enquiry after them. This is Quinctilian's obſervation, lib. viii. c. 1. "Ple-
"rumque optima verba rebus cohærent, et cer-
"nuntur ſuo lumine. At nos quærimus illa, tan-
"quam

" quam lateant ſeque ſubducant. Ita nunquam LECT. XIX.
" putamus verba eſſe circa id de quo dicendum eſt;
" ſed ex aliis locis petimus, et inventus vim affe-
" rimus *."

In the ſecond place, in order to form a good Style, the frequent practice of compoſing is indiſpenſably neceſſary. Many rules concerning Style I have delivered; but no rules will anſwer the end without exerciſe and habit. At the ſame time, it is not every ſort of compoſing that will improve Style. This is ſo far from being the caſe, that by frequent, careleſs, and haſty compoſition, we ſhall acquire certainly a very bad Style; we ſhall have more trouble afterwards in unlearning faults, and correcting negligences, than if we had not been accuſtomed to compoſition at all. In the beginning, therefore, we ought to write ſlowly and with much care. Let the facility and ſpeed of writing, be the fruit of longer practice. " Moram et ſolicitudinem," ſays Quinctilian with the greateſt reaſon, l. x. c. 3, " initiis impero. Nam primum hoc
" conſtituendum ac obtinendum eſt, ut quam op-
" time ſcribamus: celeritatem dabit conſuetudo.
" Paulatim res facilius ſe oſtendent, verba reſpon-

* " The moſt proper words for the moſt part adhere to the
" thoughts which are to be expreſſed by them, and may be diſ-
" covered as by their own light. But we hunt after them as if
" they were hidden, and only to be found in a corner. Hence,
" inſtead of conceiving the words to lie near the ſubject, we go
" in queſt of them to ſome other quarter, and endeavour to give
" force to the expreſſions we have found out."

" debunt,

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" debunt, compoſitio proſequetur. Cuncta deni-
" que ut in familiâ bene inſtitutâ in officio erunt.
" Summa hæc eſt rei; cito ſcribendo non fit ut
" bene ſcribatur; bene ſcribendo, fit ut cito *."

We muſt obſerve, however, that there may be an extreme, in too great and anxious a care about words. We muſt not retard the courſe of thought, nor cool the heat of imagination, by pauſing too long on every word we employ. There is, on certain occaſions, a glow of compoſition which ſhould be kept up, if we hope to expreſs ourſelves happily, though at the expence of allowing ſome inadvertencies to paſs. A more ſevere examination of theſe muſt be left to be the work of correction. For, if the practice of compoſition be uſeful, the laborious work of correcting is no leſs ſo; is indeed abſolutely neceſſary to our reaping any benefit from the habit of compoſition. What we have written, ſhould be laid by for ſome little time, till the ardour of compoſition be paſt, till the fondneſs for the expreſſions we have uſed be worn off, and

* " I enjoin that ſuch as are beginning the practice of compo-
" ſition, write ſlowly, and with anxious deliberation. Their
" great object at firſt ſhould be, to write as well as poſſible;
" practice will enable them to write ſpeedily. By degrees mat-
" ter will offer itſelf ſtill more readily; words will be at hand;
" compoſition will flow; every thing, as in the arrangement
" of a well-ordered family, will preſent itſelf in its proper place.
" The ſum of the whole is this, by haſty compoſition, we ſhall
" never acquire the art of compoſing well; by writing well, we
" ſhall come to write ſpeedily."

the

the expreſſions themſelves be forgotten; and then reviewing our work with a cool and critical eye, as if it were the performance of another, we ſhall diſcern many imperfections which at firſt eſcaped us. Then is the ſeaſon for pruning redundancies; for examining the arrangement of ſentences; for attending to the juncture and connecting particles; and bringing Style into a regular, correct, and ſupported form. This "*Limæ Labor*" muſt be ſubmitted to by all who would communicate their thoughts with proper advantage to others; and ſome practice in it will ſoon ſharpen their eye to the moſt neceſſary objects of attention, and render it a much more eaſy and practicable work than might at firſt be imagined. LECT. XIX.

In the third place, with reſpect to the aſſiſtance that is to be gained from the writings of others, it is obvious, that we ought to render ourſelves well acquainted with the Style of the beſt authors. This is requiſite both in order to form a juſt taſte in Style, and to ſupply us with a full ſtock of words on every ſubject. In reading authors with a view to Style, attention ſhould be given to the peculiarities of their different manners; and in this, and former Lectures, I have endeavoured to ſuggeſt ſeveral things that may be uſeful in this view. I know no exerciſe that will be found more uſeful for acquiring a proper Style, than to tranſlate ſome paſſage from an eminent Engliſh author into our own words. What I mean is, to take, for inſtance,

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ſome page of one of Mr. Addiſon's Spectators, and read it carefully over two or three times, till we have got a firm hold of the thoughts contained in it; then to lay aſide the book; to attempt to write out the paſſage from memory, in the beſt way we can; and having done ſo, next to open the book, and compare what we have written, with the Style of the author. Such an exerciſe will, by compariſon, ſhew us where the defects of our Style lie; will lead us to the proper attentions for rectifying them; and among the different ways in which the ſame thought may be expreſſed, will make us perceive that which is the moſt beautiful. But,

In the fourth place, I muſt caution, at the ſame time, againſt a ſervile imitation of any author whatever. This is always dangerous. It hampers genius; it is likely to produce a ſtiff manner; and thoſe who are given to cloſe imitation, generally imitate an author's faults as well as his beauties. No man will ever become a good writer or ſpeaker, who has not ſome degree of confidence to follow his own genius. We ought to beware, in particular, of adopting any author's noted phraſes, or tranſcribing paſſages from him. Such a habit will prove fatal to all genuine compoſition. Infinitely better it is to have ſomething that is our own, though of moderate beauty, than to affect to ſhine in borrowed ornaments, which will, at laſt, betray the utter poverty of our genius. On theſe heads of compoſing, correcting, reading, and imitating, I adviſe

viſe every ſtudent of oratory to conſult what Quinctilian has delivered in the Xth book of his Inſtitutions, where he will find a variety of excellent obſervations and directions, that well deſerve attention.

In the fifth place, it is an obvious, but material rule, with reſpect to Style, that we always ſtudy to adapt it to the ſubject, and alſo to the capacity of our hearers, if we are to ſpeak in public. Nothing merits the name of eloquent or beautiful, which is not ſuited to the occaſion, and to the perſons to whom it is addreſſed. It is to the laſt degree awkward and abſurd, to attempt a poetical florid Style, on occaſions, when it ſhould be our buſineſs only to argue and reaſon; or to ſpeak with elaborate pomp of expreſſion, before perſons who comprehend nothing of it, and who can only ſtare at our unſeaſonable magnificence. Theſe are defects not ſo much in point of Style, as, what is much worſe, in point of common ſenſe. When we begin to write or ſpeak, we ought previouſly to fix in our minds a clear conception of the end to be aimed at; to keep this ſteadily in our view, and to ſuit our Style to it. If we do not ſacrifice to this great object, every ill-timed ornament that may occur to our fancy, we are unpardonable; and though children and fools may admire, men of ſenſe will laugh at us and our Style.

In the laſt place, I cannot conclude the ſubject without this admonition, that, in any caſe, and on

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any occaſion, attention to Style muſt not engroſs us ſo much, as to detract from a higher degree of attention to the thoughts; "Curam verborum," ſays the great Roman Critic, "rerum volo eſſe "ſolicitudinem*." A direction the more neceſſary, as the preſent taſte of the age in writing, ſeems to lean more to Style than to thought. It is much eaſier to dreſs up trivial and common ſentiments with ſome beauty of expreſſion, than to afford a fund of vigorous, ingenious, and uſeful thoughts. The latter requires true genius; the former may be attained by induſtry, with the help of very ſuperficial parts. Hence, we find ſo many writers frivolouſly rich in Style, but wretchedly poor in Sentiment. The public ear is now ſo much accuſtomed to a correct and ornamented Style, that no writer can, with ſafety, neglect the ſtudy of it. But he is a contemptible one, who does not look to ſomething beyond it; who does not lay the chief ſtreſs upon his matter, and employ ſuch ornaments of Style to recommend it, as are manly not foppiſh: "Majore animo," ſays the writer whom I have ſo often quoted, "aggredienda "eſt eloquentia; quæ ſi toto corpore valet, ungues "polire et capillum componere, non exiſtimabit "ad curam ſuam pertinere. Ornatus et virilis et "fortis, et ſanctus ſit; nec effeminatam levitatem,

* "To your expreſſion be attentive; but about your matter be "ſolicitous."

"et

" et fuco ementitum colorem amet; ſanguine et " viribus niteat*."

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* " A higher ſpirit ought to animate thoſe who ſtudy elo-
" quence. They ought to conſult the health and ſoundneſs of the
" whole body, rather than bend their attention to ſuch trifling
" objects as paring the nails and dreſſing the hair. Let orna-
" ment be manly and chaſte, without effeminate gaiety, or ar-
" tificial colouring; let it ſhine with the glow of health and
" ſtrength."

LECTURE XX.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE STYLE OF MR. ADDISON, IN N° 411. OF THE SPECTATOR.

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I HAVE inſiſted fully on the ſubject of Language and Style, both becauſe it is, in itſelf, of great importance, and becauſe it is more capable of being aſcertained by preciſe rule, than ſeveral other parts of compoſition. A critical analyſis of the Style of ſome good author will tend further to illuſtrate the ſubject; as it will ſuggeſt obſervations which I have not had occaſion to make, and will ſhow, in the moſt practical light, the uſe of thoſe which I have made.

MR. ADDISON is the author whom I have choſen for this purpoſe. The Spectator, of which his papers are the chief ornament, is a book which is in the hands of every one, and which cannot be praiſed too highly. The good ſenſe, and good writing, the uſeful morality, and the admirable vein of humour which abound in it, render it one of

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of thoſe ſtandard books which have done the greateſt honour to the Engliſh nation. I have formerly given the general character of Mr. Addiſon's Style and manner, as natural and unaffected, eaſy and polite, and full of thoſe graces which a flowery imagination diffuſes over writing. At the ſame time, though one of the moſt beautiful writers in the Language, he is not the moſt correct; a circumſtance which renders his compoſition the more proper to be the ſubject of our preſent criticiſm. The free and flowing manner of this amiable writer ſometimes led him into inaccuracies, which the more ſtudied circumſpection and care of far inferior writers have taught them to avoid. Remarking his beauties, therefore, which I ſhall have frequent occaſion to do as I proceed, I muſt alſo point out his negligences and defects. Without a free, impartial diſcuſſion of both the faults and beauties which occur in his compoſition, it is evident this piece of criticiſm would be of no ſervice: and, from the freedom which I uſe in criticiſing Mr. Addiſon's Style, none can imagine, that I mean to depreciate his writings, after having repeatedly declared the high opinion which I entertain of them. The beauties of this author are ſo many, and the general character of his Style is ſo elegant and eſtimable, that the minute imperfections I ſhall have occaſion to point out, are but like thoſe ſpots in the ſun, which may be diſcovered by the aſſiſtance of art, but which have no effect in obſcuring its luſtre. It is, indeed, my judgment, that what Quinctilian applies to

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Cicero, " Ille ſe profeciſſe ſciat, cui Cicero valde " placebit," may, with juſtice, be applied to Mr. Addiſon; that to be highly pleaſed with his manner of writing, is the criterion of one's having acquired a good taſte in Engliſh Style. The paper on which we are now to enter, is N° 411. the firſt of his celebrated eſſays on the Pleaſures of the Imagination, in the Sixth Volume of the Spectator. It begins thus:

Our ſight is the moſt perfect, and moſt delightful of all our ſenſes.

This is an excellent introductory ſentence. It is clear, preciſe, and ſimple. The author lays down in a few plain words, the propoſition which he is going to illuſtrate throughout the reſt of the paragraph. In this manner we ſhould always ſet out. A firſt ſentence ſhould ſeldom be a long, and never an intricate one.

He might have ſaid, *Our ſight is the moſt perfect and the moſt delightful.*——But he has judged better, in omitting to repeat the article *the*. For the repetition of it is proper chiefly when we intend to point out the objects of which we ſpeak, as diſtinguiſhed from, or contraſted with, each other; and when we want that the reader's attention ſhould reſt on that diſtinction. For inſtance; had Mr. Addiſon intended to ſay, That our ſight is at once the moſt *delightful*, and the moſt *uſeful*, of all our

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our ſenſes, the article might then have been repeated with propriety, as a clear and ſtrong diſtinction would have been conveyed. But as between *perfect* and *delightful*, there is leſs contraſt, there was no occaſion for ſuch repetition. It would have had no other effect, but to add a word unneceſſarily to the ſentence. He proceeds:

It fills the mind with the largeſt variety of ideas, converſes with its objects at the greateſt diſtance, and continues the longeſt in action, without being tired or ſatiated with its proper enjoyments.

This ſentence deſerves attention, as remarkably harmonious, and well conſtructed. It poſſeſſes, indeed, almoſt all the properties of a perfect ſentence. It is entirely perſpicuous. It is loaded with no ſuperfluous or unneceſſary words. For, *tired or ſatiated*, towards the end of the ſentence, are not uſed for ſynonymous terms. They convey diſtinct ideas, and refer to different members of the period; that this ſenſe *continues the longeſt in action without being tired*, that is, without being fatigued with its action; and alſo, without being *ſatiated with its proper enjoyments*. That quality of a good ſentence which I termed its unity, is here perfectly preſerved. It is *our ſight* of which he ſpeaks. This is the object carried through the ſentence, and preſented to us in every member of it, by thoſe verbs, *fills*, *converſes*, *continues*, to each of which it is clearly the nominative. Thoſe capital

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tal words are diſpoſed of in the moſt proper places; and that uniformity is maintained in the conſtruction of the ſentence, which ſuits the unity of the object.

OBSERVE too, the muſic of the period; conſiſting of three members, each of which, agreeably to a rule I formerly mentioned, grows, and riſes above the other in ſound, till the ſentence is conducted, at laſt, to one of the moſt melodious cloſes which our Language admits; *without being tired or ſatiated with its proper enjoyments. Enjoyments*, is a word of length and dignity, exceedingly proper for a cloſe which is deſigned to be a muſical one. The harmony is the more happy, as this diſpoſition of the members of the period, which ſuits the ſound ſo well, is no leſs juſt and proper with reſpect to the ſenſe. It follows the order of nature. Firſt, we have the variety of objects mentioned, which ſight furniſhes to the mind; next we have the action of ſight on thoſe objects; and laſtly, we have the time and continuance of its action. No order could be more natural or happy.

THIS ſentence has ſtill another beauty. It is figurative, without being too much ſo for the ſubject. A metaphor runs through it. The ſenſe of ſight is, in ſome degree, perſonified. We are told of its *converſing* with its objects; and of its not being *tired* or *ſatiated* with its *enjoyments*; all which expreſ-

expreſſions are plain alluſions to the actions and feelings of men. This is that ſlight ſort of Perſonification, which, without any appearance of boldneſs, and without elevating the fancy much above its ordinary ſtate, renders diſcourſe pictureſque, and leads us to conceive the author's meaning more diſtinctly, by clothing abſtract ideas, in ſome degree, with ſenſible colours. Mr. Addiſon abounds with this beauty of Style beyond moſt authors; and the ſentence which we have been conſidering, is very expreſſive of his manner of writing. There is no blemiſh in it whatever, unleſs that a ſtrict Critic might perhaps object, that the epithet *large*, which he applies to *variety—the largeſt variety of ideas*, is an epithet more commonly applied to extent than to number. It is plain, that he here employed it to avoid the repetition of the word *great*, which occurs immediately afterwards.

The ſenſe of feeling can, indeed, give us a notion of extenſion, ſhape, and all other ideas that enter at the eye, except colours; but, at the ſame time, it is very much ſtraitened and confined in its operations, to the number, bulk, and diſtance of its particular objects.

This ſentence is by no means ſo happy as the former. It is, indeed, neither clear nor elegant. *Extenſion and ſhape*, can, with no propriety, be called *ideas*; they are properties of matter. Neither is it accurate, even according to Mr. Locke's philo-

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philoſophy (with which our Author ſeems here to have puzzled himſelf), to ſpeak of any ſenſe *giving us a notion of ideas*; our ſenſes give us the ideas themſelves. The meaning would have been much more clear, if the Author had expreſſed himſelf thus: "The ſenſe of feeling can, indeed, give us "the idea of extenſion, figure, and all the other "properties of matter which are perceived by the "eye, except colours."

THE latter part of the ſentence is ſtill more embarraſſed. For what meaning can we make of the ſenſe of feeling being *confined, in its operations, to the number, bulk, and diſtance of its particular objects?* Surely, every ſenſe is confined, as much as the ſenſe of feeling, to the number, bulk, and diſtance of its own objects. Sight and feeling are, in this reſpect, perfectly on a level; neither of them can extend beyond its own objects. The turn of expreſſion is ſo inaccurate here, that one would be apt to ſuſpect two words to have been omitted in the printing, which were originally in Mr. Addiſon's manuſcript; becauſe the inſertion of them would render the ſenſe much more intelligible and clear. Theſe two words are, *with regard:—it is very much ſtraitened, and confined, in its operations, with regard to the number, bulk, and diſtance of its particular objects.* The meaning then would be, that feeling is more limited than ſight *in this reſpect*; that it is confined to a narrower circle, to a ſmaller number of objects.

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THE epithet *particular*, applied to *objects*, in the concluſion of the ſentence, is redundant, and conveys no meaning whatever. Mr. Addiſon ſeems to have uſed it in place of *peculiar*, as indeed he does often in other paſſages of his writings. But *particular* and *peculiar*, though they are too often confounded, are words of different import from each other. *Particular* ſtands oppoſed to *general*; *peculiar* ſtands oppoſed to what is poſſeſſed in *common with others*. *Particular* expreſſes what in the logical Style is called *Species*; *peculiar* what is called *differentia*.—*Its peculiar objects* would have ſignified in this place, the objects of the ſenſe of feeling, as diſtinguiſhed from the objects of any other ſenſe; and would have had more meaning than *its particular objects*. Though, in truth, neither the one nor the other epithet was requiſite. It was ſufficient to have ſaid ſimply, *its objects*.

Our ſight ſeems deſigned to ſupply all theſe defects, and may be conſidered as a more delicate and diffuſive kind of touch, that ſpreads itſelf over an infinite multitude of bodies, comprehends the largeſt figures, and brings into our reach ſome of the moſt remote parts of the univerſe.

HERE again the Author's Style returns upon us in all its beauty. This is a ſentence diſtinct, graceful, well arranged, and highly muſical. In the latter part of it, it is conſtructed with three members, which are formed much in the ſame manner

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manner with thoſe of the ſecond ſentence, on which I beſtowed ſo much praiſe. The conſtruction is ſo ſimilar, that if it had followed immediately after it, we ſhould have been ſenſible of a faulty monotony. But the interpoſition of another ſentence between them, prevents this effect.

It is this ſenſe which furniſhes the imagination with its ideas; ſo that by the pleaſures of the Imagination or Fancy (which I ſhall uſe promiſcuouſly), I here mean ſuch as ariſe from viſible objects, either when we have them actually in our view; or when we call up their ideas into our minds by painting, ſtatues, deſcriptions, or any the like occaſion.

In place of, *It is this ſenſe which furniſhes*— the author might have ſaid more ſhortly, *This ſenſe furniſhes*. But the mode of expreſſion which he has uſed, is here more proper. This ſort of full and ample aſſertion, *it is this which*, is fit to be uſed when a propoſition of importance is laid down, to which we ſeek to call the reader's attention. It is like pointing with the hand at the object of which we ſpeak. The parentheſis in the middle of the ſentence, *which I ſhall uſe promiſcuouſly*, is not clear. He ought to have ſaid, *terms which I ſhall uſe promiſcuouſly*; as the verb *uſe* relates not to the pleaſures of the imagination, but to the terms of fancy and imagination, which he was to

to employ as ſynonymous. *Any the like occaſion*— to call a painting or a ſtatue *an occaſion* is not a happy expreſſion, nor is it very proper to ſpeak of *calling up ideas by occaſions*. The common phraſe, *any ſuch means*, would have been more natural. LECT. XX.

We cannot indeed have a ſingle image in the fancy that did not make its firſt entrance through the ſight; but we have the power of retaining, altering, and compounding thoſe images which we have once received, into all the varieties of picture and viſion that are moſt agreeable to the imagination; for, by this faculty, a man in a dungeon is capable of entertaining himſelf with ſcenes and landſcapes more beautiful than any that can be found in the whole compaſs of nature.

It may be of uſe to remark, that in one member of this ſentence there is an inaccuracy in ſyntax. It is very proper to ſay, *altering and compounding thoſe images which we have once received, into all the varieties of picture and viſion.* But we can with no propriety ſay, *retaining them into all the varieties*; and yet, according to the manner in which the words are ranged, this conſtruction is unavoidable. For *retaining*, *altering*, and *compounding*, are participles, each of which equally refers to, and governs the ſubſequent noun, *thoſe images*; and that noun again is neceſſarily connected with the following prepoſition, *into*. This inſtance ſhows the importance of carefully attending to the rules

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of Grammar and Syntax; when ſo pure a writer as Mr. Addiſon could, through inadvertence, be guilty of ſuch an error. The conſtruction might eaſily have been rectified, by disjoining the participle *retaining* from the other two participles in this way: "We have the power of retaining thoſe images "which we have once received; and of altering "and compounding them into all the varieties of "picture and viſion;" or better perhaps thus: "We have the power of retaining, altering, and "compounding thoſe images which we have once "received; and of forming them into all the "varieties of picture and viſion."—The latter part of the ſentence is clear and elegant.

There are few words in the Engliſh Language, which are employed in a more looſe and uncircumſcribed ſenſe than thoſe of the Fancy and the Imagination.

There are few words—which are employed.—It had been better, if our Author here had ſaid more ſimply—*Few words in the Engliſh Language are employed.*—Mr. Addiſon, whoſe Style is of the free and full, rather than the nervous kind, deals, on all occaſions, in this extended ſort of phraſeology. But it is proper only when ſome aſſertion of conſequence is advanced, and which can bear an emphaſis; ſuch as that in the firſt ſentence of the former paragraph. On other occaſions, theſe little words, *it is*, and *there are*, ought to be avoided as

redundant and enfeebling.——*Thoſe of the Fancy and the Imagination.* The article ought to have been omitted here. As he does not mean the powers of *the Fancy and the Imagination,* but the words only, the article certainly had no proper place; neither, indeed, was there any occaſion for other two words, *thoſe of.* Better, if the ſentence had run thus: "Few words in the Engliſh Language "are employed in a more looſe and uncircum-"ſcribed ſenſe, than Fancy and Imagination."

I therefore thought it neceſſary to fix and determine the notion of theſe two words, as I intend to make uſe of them in the thread of my following ſpeculations, that the reader may conceive rightly what is the ſubject which I proceed upon.

THOUGH *fix and determine* may appear ſynonymous words, yet a difference between them may be remarked, and they may be viewed, as applied here, with peculiar delicacy. The Author had juſt ſaid, that the words of which he is ſpeaking were *looſe* and *uncircumſcribed. Fix* relates to the firſt of theſe, *determine* to the laſt. We *fix* what is *looſe*; that is, we confine the word to its proper place, that it may not fluctuate in our imagination, and paſs from one idea to another; and we *determine* what is *uncircumſcribed,* that is, we aſcertain its *termini* or limits, we draw the circle round it, that we may ſee its boundaries. For we cannot conceive the meaning of a word, nor indeed of any

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other thing, clearly, till we ſee its limits, and know how far it extends. Theſe two words, therefore, have grace and beauty as they are here applied; though a writer, more frugal of words than Mr. Addiſon, would have preferred the ſingle word *aſcertain*, which conveys, without any metaphor, the import of them both.

THE *notion of theſe words*, is ſomewhat of a harſh phraſe, at leaſt not ſo commonly uſed, as the *meaning of theſe words.—As I intend to make uſe of them in the thread of my ſpeculations*; this is plainly faulty. A ſort of metaphor is improperly mixed with words in the literal ſenſe. He might very well have ſaid, *as I intend to make uſe of them in my following ſpeculations.*——This was plain language; but if he choſe to borrow an alluſion from *thread*, that alluſion ought to have been ſupported; for there is no conſiſtency in *making uſe of them in the thread of ſpeculations*; and, indeed, in expreſſing any thing ſo ſimple and familiar as this is, plain language is always to be preferred to metaphorical. ——*The ſubject which I proceed upon*, is an ungraceful cloſe of a ſentence; better, *the ſubject upon which I proceed.*

I muſt therefore deſire him to remember, that by the pleaſures of the Imagination, I mean only ſuch pleaſures as ariſe originally from ſight, and that I divide theſe pleaſures into two kinds.

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As the laſt ſentence began with—*I therefore thought it neceſſary to fix*, it is careleſs to begin this ſentence in a manner ſo very ſimilar, *I muſt therefore deſire him to remember*; eſpecially, as the ſmall variation of uſing, *on this account*, or, *for this reaſon*, in place of *therefore*, would have amended the Style.——When he ſays—*I mean only ſuch pleaſures*—it may be remarked, that the adverb *only* is not in its proper place. It is not intended here to qualify the verb *mean*, but *ſuch pleaſures*; and therefore ſhould have been placed in as cloſe connection as poſſible with the word which it limits or qualifies. The Style becomes more clear and neat, when the words are arranged thus: " by the " pleaſures of the Imagination, I mean ſuch plea- " ſures only as ariſe from ſight."

My deſign being, firſt of all, to diſcourſe of thoſe primary pleaſures of the Imagination, which entirely proceed from ſuch objects as are before our eyes; and, in the next place, to ſpeak of thoſe ſecondary pleaſures of the Imagination, which flow from the ideas of viſible objects, when the objects are not actually before the eye, but are called up into our memories, or formed into agreeable viſions of things, that are either abſent or fictitious.

It is a great rule in laying down the diviſion of a ſubject, to ſtudy neatneſs and brevity as much as poſſible. The diviſions are then more diſtinctly apprehended, and more eaſily remembered. This

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ſentence is not perfectly happy in that reſpect. It is ſomewhat clogged by a tedious phraſeology. *My deſign being firſt of all to diſcourſe—in the next place to ſpeak of—ſuch objects as are before our eyes—things that are either abſent or fictitious.* Several words might have been ſpared here; and the Style made more neat and compact.

The pleaſures of the Imagination, taken in their full extent, are not ſo groſs as thoſe of ſenſe, nor ſo refined as thoſe of the underſtanding.

THIS ſentence is diſtinct and elegant.

The laſt are indeed more preferable, becauſe they are founded on ſome new knowledge or improvement in the mind of man: Yet it muſt be confeſſed, that thoſe of the Imagination are as great, and as tranſporting as the other.

IN the beginning of this ſentence, the phraſe, *more preferable*, is ſuch a plain inaccuracy, that one wonders how Mr. Addiſon ſhould have fallen into it; ſeeing *preferable*, of itſelf, expreſſes the comparative degree, and is the ſame with more eligible, or more excellent.

I MUST obſerve farther, that the propoſition contained in the laſt member of this ſentence, is neither clear nor neatly expreſſed—*it muſt be confeſſed, that thoſe of the Imagination are as great, and*

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and as tranſporting as the other.—In the former ſentence, he had compared three things together; the pleaſures of the Imagination, thoſe of Senſe, and thoſe of the Underſtanding. In the beginning of this ſentence, he had called the pleaſures of the Underſtanding *the laſt:* and he ends the ſentence, with obſerving, that thoſe of the Imagination are as great and tranſporting *as the other.* Now, beſides that *the other* makes not a proper contraſt with *the laſt*, he leaves it ambiguous, whether, by *the other*, he meant the pleaſures of the Underſtanding, or the pleaſures of Senſe; for it may refer to either by the conſtruction; though, undoubtedly, he intended that it ſhould refer to the pleaſures of the Underſtanding only. The propoſition, reduced to perſpicuous language, runs thus: "Yet it "muſt be confeſſed, that the pleaſures of the "Imagination, when compared with thoſe of "the Underſtanding, are no leſs great and "tranſporting."

A beautiful proſpect delights the ſoul as much as a demonſtration; and a deſcription in Homer has charmed more readers than a chapter in Ariſtotle.

This is a good illuſtration of what he had been aſſerting, and is expreſſed with that happy and elegant turn, for which our Author is very remarkable.

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Beſides, the pleaſures of the Imagination have this advantage above thoſe of the Underſtanding, that they are more obvious, and more eaſy to be acquired.

THIS is alſo an unexceptionable ſentence.

It is but opening the eye, and the ſcene enters.

THIS ſentence is lively and pictureſque. By the gaiety and briſkneſs which it gives the Style, it ſhows the advantage of intermixing ſuch a ſhort ſentence as this amidſt a run of longer ones, which never fails to have a happy effect. I muſt remark, however, a ſmall inaccuracy. A *ſcene* cannot be ſaid to *enter*; an *actor* enters; but a ſcene *appears*, or *preſents itſelf*.

The colours paint themſelves on the fancy, with very little attention of thought or application of mind in the beholder.

THIS is ſtill beautiful illuſtration; carried on with that agreeable flowerineſs of fancy and Style, which is ſo well ſuited to thoſe pleaſures of the Imagination, of which the Author is treating.

We are ſtruck, we know not how, with the ſymmetry of any thing we ſee, and immediately aſſent to the beauty of an object, without inquiring into the particular cauſes and occaſions of it.

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THERE is a falling off here from the elegance of the former ſentences. We *aſſent* to the truth of a propoſition; but cannot ſo well be ſaid to *aſſent to the beauty of an object*. *Acknowledge* would have expreſſed the ſenſe with more propriety. The cloſe of the ſentence too is heavy and ungraceful—*the particular cauſes and occaſions of it*—both *particular* and *occaſions* are words quite ſuperfluous; and the pronoun *it* is in ſome meaſure ambiguous, whether it refers to *beauty* or to *object*. It would have been ſome amendment to the Style to have run thus: "We immediately acknowledge the "beauty of an object, without inquiring into the "cauſe of that beauty."

A man of a polite imagination is let into a great many pleaſures, that the vulgar are not capable of receiving.

Polite is a term more commonly applied to manners or behaviour, than to the mind or imagination. There is nothing farther to be obſerved on this ſentence, unleſs the uſe of *that* for a relative pronoun, inſtead of *which*; an uſage which is too frequent with Mr. Addiſon. *Which* is a much more definite word than *that*, being never employed in any other way than as a relative; whereas *that* is a word of many ſenſes; ſometimes a demonſtrative pronoun, often a conjunction. In ſome caſes we are indeed obliged to uſe *that* for a relative, in order to avoid the ungraceful repetition of

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which in the ſame ſentence. But when we are laid under no neceſſity of this kind, *which* is always the preferable word, and certainly was ſo in this ſentence—*Pleaſures which the vulgar are not capable of receiving*, is much better than *pleaſures that the vulgar, &c.*

He can converſe with a picture, and find an agreeable companion in a ſtatue. He meets with a ſecret refreſhment in a deſcription; and often feels a greater ſatisfaction in the proſpect of fields and meadows, than another does in the poſſeſſion. It gives him, indeed, a kind of property in every thing he ſees; and makes the moſt rude uncultivated parts of nature adminiſter to his pleaſures: ſo that he looks upon the world, as it were, in another light, and diſcovers in it a multitude of charms that conceal themſelves from the generality of mankind.

All this is very beautiful. The illuſtration is happy; and the Style runs with the greateſt eaſe and harmony. We ſee no labour, no ſtiffneſs, or affectation; but an author writing from the native flow of a gay and pleaſing imagination. This predominant character of Mr. Addiſon's manner, far more than compenſates all thoſe little negligences which we are now remarking. Two of theſe occur in this paragraph. The firſt, in the ſentence which begins with, *It gives him indeed a kind of property*—To this *it*, there is no proper antecedent in the whole paragraph. In order to gather the meaning,

meaning, we muſt look back as far as to the third ſentence before the firſt of the paragraph, which begins with, *A man of a polite imagination.* This phraſe, *polite imagination*, is the only antecedent to which this *it* can refer; and even that is an improper antecedent, as it ſtands in the genitive caſe, as the qualification only of a man.

The other inſtance of negligence, is towards the end of the paragraph—*So that he looks upon the world as it were in another light.*—By *another* light, Mr. Addiſon means, a light different from that in which other men view the world. But though this expreſſion clearly conveyed this meaning to himſelf when writing, it conveys it very indiſtinctly to others; and is an inſtance of that ſort of inaccuracy, into which, in the warmth of compoſition, every writer of a lively imagination is apt to fall; and which can only be remedied by a cool ſubſequent review.—*As it were*—is upon moſt occaſions no more than an ungraceful palliative, and here there was not the leaſt occaſion for it, as he was not about to ſay any thing which required a ſoftening of this kind. To ſay the truth, this laſt ſentence, *ſo that he looks upon the world*, and what follows, had better been wanting altogether. It is no more than an unneceſſary recapitulation of what had gone before; a feeble adjection to the lively picture he had given of the pleaſures of the imagination. The paragraph would have ended with more ſpirit at the words immediately preceding;

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ing; *the uncultivated parts of nature adminiſter to his pleaſures.*

There are, indeed, but very few who know how to be idle and innocent, or have a reliſh of any pleaſures that are not criminal; every diverſion they take, is at the expence of ſome one virtue or another, and their very firſt ſtep out of buſineſs is into vice or folly.

NOTHING can be more elegant, or more finely turned, than this ſentence. It is neat, clear, and muſical. We could hardly alter one word, or diſarrange one member, without ſpoiling it. Few ſentences are to be found more finiſhed, or more happy.

A man ſhould endeavour, therefore, to make the ſphere of his innocent pleaſures as wide as poſſible, that he may retire into them with ſafety, and find in them ſuch a ſatisfaction as a wiſe man would not bluſh to take.

THIS alſo is a good ſentence, and gives occaſion to no material remark.

Of this nature are thoſe of the imagination, which do not require ſuch a bent of thought as is neceſſary to our more ſerious employments, nor, at the ſame time, ſuffer the mind to ſink into that indolence and remiſſneſs, which are apt to accompany our more ſenſual

ſual delights; but, like a gentle exerciſe to the faculties, awaken them from ſloth and idleneſs, without putting them upon any labour or difficulty.

THE beginning of this ſentence is not correct, and affords an inſtance of a period too looſely connected with the preceding one. *Of this nature*, ſays he, *are thoſe of the imagination.* We might aſk of what nature? For it had not been the ſcope of the preceding ſentence to deſcribe the nature of any ſet of pleaſures. He had ſaid, that it was every man's duty to make the ſphere of his innocent pleaſures as wide as poſſible, in order that, within that ſphere, he might find a ſafe retreat, and a laudable ſatisfaction. The tranſition is looſely made, by beginning the next ſentence with ſaying, *Of this nature are thoſe of the imagination.* It had been better, if, keeping in view the governing object of the preceeding ſentence, he had ſaid, "This "advantage we gain," or, "This ſatisfaction we "enjoy, by means of the pleaſures of imagina-"tion." The reſt of the ſentence is abundantly correct.

We might here add, that the pleaſures of the fancy are more conducive to health than thoſe of the underſtanding, which are worked out by dint of thinking, and attended with too violent a labour of the brain.

ON this ſentence nothing occurs deſerving of remark, except that *worked out by dint of thinking*, is

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is a phraſe which borders too much on vulgar and colloquial language, to be proper for being employed in a poliſhed compoſition.

Delightful ſcenes, whether in nature, painting, or poetry, have a kindly influence on the body, as well as the mind, and not only ſerve to clear and brighten the imagination, but are able to diſperſe grief and melancholy, and to ſet the animal ſpirits in pleaſing and agreeable motions. For this reaſon Sir Francis Bacon, in his Eſſay upon Health, has not thought it improper to preſcribe to his reader a poem, or a proſpect, where he particularly diſſuades him from knotty and ſubtile diſquiſitions, and adviſes him to purſue ſtudies that fill the mind with ſplendid and illuſtrious objects, as hiſtories, fables, and contemplations of nature.

In the latter of theſe two ſentences, a member of the period is altogether out of its place; which gives the whole ſentence a harſh and disjointed caſt, and ſerves to illuſtrate the rules I formerly gave concerning arrangement. The wrong-placed member which I point at, is this; *where he particularly diſſuades him from knotty and ſubtile diſquiſitions*; theſe words ſhould, undoubtedly, have been placed not where they ſtand, but thus: *Sir Francis Bacon, in his Eſſay upon Health, where he particularly diſſuades the reader from knotty and ſubtile ſpeculations, has not thought it improper to preſcribe*

to him, &c. This arrangement reduces every thing into proper order.

I have in this Paper, by way of introduction, ſettled the notion of thoſe pleaſures of the imagination, which are the ſubject of my preſent undertaking, and endeavoured, by ſeveral conſiderations, to recommend to my readers the purſuit of thoſe pleaſures; I ſhall, in my next Paper, examine the ſeveral ſources from whence theſe pleaſures are derived.

THESE two concluding ſentences afford examples of the proper collocation of circumſtances in a period. I formerly ſhewed, that it is often a matter of difficulty to diſpoſe of them in ſuch a manner, as that they ſhall not embarraſs the principal ſubject of the ſentence. In the ſentences before us, ſeveral of theſe incidental circumſtances neceſſarily come in—*By way of introduction—by ſeveral conſiderations—in this Paper—in the next Paper.* All which are, with great propriety, managed by our author. It will be found, upon trial, that there were no other parts of the ſentence, in which they could have been placed to equal advantage. Had he ſaid, for inſtance, " I have ſettled the notion " (rather the *meaning*)—of thoſe pleaſures of the " imagination, which are the ſubject of my pre- " ſent undertaking, by way of introduction in this " paper, and endeavoured to recommend the pur- " ſuit

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LECTURE XXI.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE STYLE IN N° 412 OF THE SPECTATOR.

THE obſervations which have occurred in reviewing that Paper of Mr. Addiſon's, which was the ſubject of the laſt Lecture, ſufficiently ſhow, that, in the writings of an author of the moſt happy genius and diſtinguiſhed talents, inaccuracies may ſometimes be found. Though ſuch inaccuracies may be overbalanced by ſo many beauties, as render Style highly pleaſing and agreeable upon the whole, yet it muſt be deſirable to every writer to avoid, as far as he can, inaccuracy of any kind. As the ſubject therefore is of importance, I have thought it might be uſeful to carry on this criticiſm throughout two or three ſubſequent Papers of the Spectator. At the ſame time I muſt intimate, that the Lectures on theſe Papers are ſolely intended for ſuch as are applying themſelves to the ſtudy of Engliſh Style. I pretend not to give inſtruction to thoſe who are already well acquainted with the powers of language. To them my remarks

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marks may prove unedifying; to ſome they may ſeem tedious and minute; but to ſuch as have not yet made all the proficiency which they deſire in elegance of Style, ſtrict attention to the compoſition and ſtructure of ſentences cannot fail to prove of conſiderable benefit: and though my remarks on Mr. Addiſon ſhould, in any inſtance, be thought ill-founded, they will, at leaſt, ſerve the purpoſe of leading them into the train of making proper remarks for themſelves*. I proceed, therefore, to the examination of the ſubſequent Paper, N° 412.

I ſhall firſt conſider thoſe pleaſures of the imagination, which ariſe from the actual view and ſurvey of outward objects: and theſe, I think, all proceed from the ſight of what is great, uncommon, or beautiful.

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* If there be readers who think any farther apology requiſite for my adventuring to criticiſe the ſentences of ſo eminent an anthor as Mr. Addiſon, I muſt take notice, that I was naturally led to it by the circumſtances of that part of the kingdom where theſe Lectures were read; where the ordinary ſpoken language often differs much from what is uſed by good Engliſh authors. Hence it occured to me, as a proper method of correcting any peculiarities of dialect, to direct ſtudents of eloquence, to analize and examine, with particular attention, the ſtructure of Mr. Addiſon's ſentences. Thoſe Papers of the Spectator, which are the ſubject of the following Lectures, were accordingly given out in exerciſe to ſtudents, to be thus examined and analized; and ſeveral of the obſervations which follow, both on the beauties and blemiſhes of this Author, were ſuggeſted by the obſervations given to me in conſequence of the exerciſe preſcribed.

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THIS ſentence gives occaſion for no material remark. It is ſimple and diſtinct. The two words which he here uſes, *view* and *ſurvey*, are not altogether ſynonymous: as the former may be ſuppoſed to import mere inſpection; the latter more deliberate examination. Yet they lie ſo near to one another in meaning, that, in the preſent caſe, any one of them, perhaps, would have been ſufficient. The epithet *actual*, is introduced, in order to mark more ſtrongly the diſtinction between what our author calls the primary pleaſures of imagination, which ariſe from immediate view, and the ſecondary, which ariſe from remembrance or deſcription.

There may, indeed, be ſomething ſo terrible or offenſive, that the horror or loathſomeneſs of an object may overbear the pleaſure which reſults from its novelty, greatneſs, or beauty; but ſtill there will be ſuch a mixture of delight in the very diſguſt it gives us, as any of theſe three qualifications are moſt conſpicuous and prevailing.

THIS ſentence muſt be acknowledged to be an unfortunate one. The ſenſe is obſcure and embarraſſed, and the expreſſion looſe and irregular. The beginning of it is perplexed by the wrong poſition of the words *ſomething* and *object*. The natural arrangement would have been, *There may, indeed, be ſomething in an object ſo terrible or offenſive, that the horror or loathſomeneſs of it may overbear.*—Theſe

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two epithets, *horror* or *loathſomeneſs*, are awkwardly joined together. *Loathſomeneſs* is, indeed, a quality which may be aſcribed to an object; but *horror* is not; it is a feeling excited in the mind. The Language would have been much more correct, had our Author ſaid, *There may, indeed, be ſomething in an object ſo terrible or offenſive, that the horror or diſguſt which it excites may overbear.*—The firſt two epithets, *terrible* or *offenſive*, would then have expreſſed the qualities of an object; the latter, *horror* or *diſguſt*, the correſponding ſentiments which theſe qualities produce in us. *Loathſomeneſs* was the moſt unhappy word he could have choſen: for to be *loathſome*, is to be odious, and ſeems totally to exclude any *mixture of delight*, which he afterwards ſuppoſes may be found in the object.

In the latter part of the ſentence there are ſeveral inaccuracies. When he ſays, *there will be ſuch a mixture of delight in the very diſguſt it gives us, as any of theſe three qualifications are moſt conſpicuous*—the conſtruction is defective, and ſeems hardly grammatical. He meant aſſuredly to ſay, *ſuch a mixture of delight as is proportioned to the degree in which any of theſe three qualifications are moſt conſpicuous.*—We know that there may be a mixture of pleaſant and of diſagreeable feelings excited by the ſame object; yet it appears inaccurate to ſay, that there is any *delight in the very diſguſt.*—The plural verb *are*, is improperly joined to *any of*

of theſe three qualifications; for as *any* is here uſed diſtributively, and means *any one of theſe three qualifications*, the correſponding verb ought to have been ſingular. The order in which the two laſt words are placed, ſhould have been reſerved, and made to ſtand *prevailing and conſpicuous*. They are *conſpicuous* becauſe they prevail.

By greatneſs, I do not only mean the bulk of any ſingle object, but the largeneſs of a whole view, conſidered as one entire piece.

In a former Lecture, when treating of the Structure of Sentences, I quoted this ſentence as an inſtance of the careleſs manner in which adverbs are ſometimes interjected in the midſt of a period. *Only*, as it is here placed, appears to be a limitation of the following verb *mean*. The queſtion might be put, What more does he than only mean? As the author, undoubtedly, intended it to refer to the *bulk of a ſingle object*, it would have been placed, with more propriety, after theſe words: *I do not mean the bulk of any ſingle object only, but the largeneſs of a whole view*.—As the following phraſe, *conſidered as one entire piece*, ſeems to be ſomewhat deficient, both in dignity and propriety, perhaps this adjection might have been altogether omitted, and the ſentence have cloſed with fully as much advantage at the word *view*.

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Such are the proſpects of an open champaign country, a vaſt uncultivated deſert, of huge heaps of mountains, high rocks and precipices, or a wide expanſe of waters, where we are not ſtruck with the novelty or beauty of the ſight, but with that rude kind of magnificence which appears in many of theſe ſtupendous works of nature.

THIS ſentence, in the main, is beautiful. The objects preſented are all of them noble, ſelected with judgment, arranged with propriety, and accompanied with proper epithets. We muſt, however, obſerve, that the ſentence is too looſely, and not very grammatically, connected with the preceding one. He ſays,—*ſuch are the proſpects*;—*ſuch*, ſignifies, of that nature or quality, which neceſſarily preſuppoſes ſome adjective, or word deſcriptive of a quality going before, to which it refers. But, in the foregoing ſentence, there is no ſuch adjective. He had ſpoken of *greatneſs* in the abſtract only; and, therefore, *ſuch* has no diſtinct antecedent to which we can refer it. The ſentence would have been introduced with more grammatical propriety, by ſaying, *To this claſs belong*, or, *under this head are ranged the proſpects*, *&c.* The *of*, which is prefixed to *huge heaps of mountains*, is miſplaced, and has, perhaps, been an error in the printing; as, either all the particulars here enumerated ſhould have had this mark of the genitive, or it ſhould have been prefixed to none but the firſt.—When in the cloſe of the ſentence, the

the Author ſpeaks of that *rude magnificence which appears in many of theſe ſtupendous works of nature*, he had better have omitted the word *many*, which ſeems to except ſome of them. Whereas, in his general propoſition, he undoubtedly meant to include all the ſtupendous works he had enumerated; and there is no queſtion that, in all of them, a rude magnificence appears.

Our imagination loves to be filled with an object, or to graſp at any thing that is too big for its capacity. We are flung into a pleaſing aſtoniſhment at ſuch unbounded views; and feel a delightful ſtillneſs and amazement in the ſoul, at the apprehenſion of them.

The Language here is elegant, and ſeveral of the expreſſions remarkably happy. There is nothing which requires any animadverſion except the cloſe, *at the apprehenſion of them.* Not only is this a languid enfeebling concluſion of a ſentence, otherwiſe beautiful, but *the apprehenſion of views*, is a phraſe deſtitute of all propriety, and, indeed, ſcarcely intelligible. Had this adjection been entirely omitted, and the ſentence been allowed to cloſe with *ſtillneſs and amazement in the ſoul*, it would have been a great improvement. Nothing is frequently more hurtful to the grace or vivacity of a period, than ſuperfluous dragging words at the concluſion.

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The mind of man naturally hates every thing that looks like a reſtraint upon it, and is apt to fancy itſelf under a ſort of confinement, when the ſight is pent up in a narrow compaſs, and ſhortened on every ſide by the neighbourhood of walls or mountains. On the contrary, a ſpacious horizon is an image of liberty, where the eye has room to range abroad, to expatiate at large on the immenſity of its views, and to loſe itſelf amidſt the variety of objects that offer themſelves to its obſervation. Such wide and undetermined proſpects are pleaſing to the fancy, as the ſpeculations of eternity, or infinitude, are to the underſtanding.

Our Author's Style appears here, in all that native beauty which cannot be too much praiſed. The numbers flow ſmoothly, and with a graceful harmony. The words which he has choſen, carry a certain amplitude and fullneſs, well ſuited to the nature of the ſubject; and the members of the periods riſe in a gradation, accommodated to the riſe of the thought. The eye firſt *ranges abroad*; then *expatiates at large on the immenſity of its views*; and, at laſt, *loſes itſelf amidſt the variety of objects that offer themſelves to its obſervation.* The *fancy* is elegantly contraſted with the *underſtanding*, *proſpects* with *ſpeculations*, and *wide and undetermined proſpects* with *ſpeculations of eternity and infinitude.*

But if there be a beauty or uncommonneſs joined with this grandeur, as in a troubled ocean, a heaven adorned

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adorned with ſtars and meteors, or a ſpacious landſcape cut out into rivers, woods, rocks, and meadows, the pleaſure ſtill grows upon us, as it ariſes from more than a ſingle principle.

THE article prefixed to *beauty*, in the beginning of this ſentence, might have been omitted, and the Style have run, perhaps, to more advantage thus: *But if beauty, or uncommonneſs, be joined to this grandeur—A landſcape cut out into rivers, woods,* &c. ſeems unſeaſonably to imply an artificial formation, and would have been better expreſſed by, *diverſified with rivers, woods,* &c.

Every thing that is new or uncommon raiſes a pleaſure in the imagination, becauſe it fills the ſoul with an agreeable ſurprize, gratifies its curioſity, and gives it an idea of which it was not before poſſeſſed. We are, indeed, ſo often converſant with one ſet of objects, and tired out with ſo many repeated ſhows of the ſame things, that whatever is new or uncommon contributes a little to vary human life, and to divert our minds, for a while, with the ſtrangeneſs of its appearance. It ſerves us for a kind of refreſhment, and takes off from that ſatiety we are apt to complain of in our uſual and ordinary entertainments.

THE Style in theſe ſentences flows in an eaſy and agreeable manner. A ſevere critic might point out ſome expreſſions that would bear being retrenched. But this would alter the genius and character of

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Mr. Addiſon's Style. We muſt always remember, that good compoſition admits of being carried on under many different forms. Style muſt not be reduced to one preciſe ſtandard. One writer may be as agreeable, by a pleaſing diffuſeneſs, when the ſubject bears, and his genius prompts it, as another by a conciſe and forcible manner. It is fit, however, to obſerve, that, in the beginning of thoſe ſentences which we have at preſent before us, the phraſe, *raiſes a pleaſure in the imagination*, is unqueſtionably too flat and feeble, and mighty eaſily be amended, by ſaying, *affords pleaſure to the imagination*; and towards the end there are two *of*'s, which grate harſhly on the ear, in that phraſe, *takes off from that ſatiety we are apt to complain of*; where the correction is as eaſily made as in the other caſe, by ſubſtituting *diminiſhes that ſatiety of which we are apt to complain.* Such inſtances ſhow the advantage of frequent reviews of what we have written, in order to give proper correctneſs and poliſh to our Language.

It is this which beſtows charms on a monſter, and makes even the imperfections of nature pleaſe us. It is this that recommends variety, where the mind is every inſtant called off to ſomething new, and the attention not ſuffered to dwell too long, and waſte itſelf, on any particular object. It is this likewiſe, that improves what is great or beautiful, and makes it afford the mind a double entertainment.

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STILL the Style proceeds with perſpicuity, grace, and harmony. The full and ample aſſertion, with which each of theſe ſentences is introduced, frequent, on many occaſions, with our Author, is here proper and ſeaſonable; as it was his intention to magnify, as much as poſſible, the effects of novelty and variety, and to draw our attention to them. His frequent uſe of *that*, inſtead of which, is another peculiarity of his Style; but, on this occaſion in particular, cannot be much commended, as, *it is this which*, ſeems, in every view, to be better than, *it is this that*, three times repeated. I muſt, likewiſe, take notice, that the antecedent to, *it is this*, when critically conſidered, is not altogether proper. It refers, as we diſcover by the ſenſe, to *whatever is new or uncommon*. But, as it is not good language to ſay, *whatever is new beſtows charms on a monſter*, one cannot avoid thinking that our Author had done better to have begun the firſt of theſe three ſentences, with ſaying, *It is novelty which beſtows charms on a monſter, &c.*

Groves, fields, and meadows, are at any ſeaſon of the year pleaſant to look upon, but never ſo much as in the opening of the Spring, when they are all new and freſh, with their firſt gloſs upon them, and not yet too much accuſtomed and familiar to the eye.

IN this expreſſion, *never ſo much as in the opening of the Spring*, there appears to be a ſmall error in grammar; for when the conſtruction is filled up,

it

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it must be read, *never so much pleasant*. Had he, to avoid this, said, *never so much so*, the grammatical error would have been prevented, but the language would have been awkward. Better to have said, *but never so agreeable as in the opening of the Spring*. We readily say, the eye is accustomed to objects, but to say, as our Author has done at the close of the sentence, that objects are *accustomed to the eye*, can scarcely be allowed in a prose composition.

For this reason, there is nothing that more enlivens a prospect than rivers, jetteaus, or falls of water, where the scene is perpetually shifting, and entertaining the sight, every moment, with something that is new. We are quickly tired with looking at hills and valleys, where every thing continues fixed and settled in the same place and posture, but find our thoughts a little agitated and relieved at the sight of such objects as are ever in motion, and sliding away from beneath the eye of the beholder.

The first of these sentences is connected in too loose a manner with that which immediately preceded it. When he says, *For this reason, there is nothing that more enlivens, &c.* we are entitled to look for the *reason* in what he had just before said. But there we find no *reason* for what he is now going to assert, except that groves and meadows are most pleasant in the Spring. We know that he has been speaking of the pleasure produced

by Novelty and Variety, and our minds naturally recur to this, as the reaſon here alluded to; but his language does not properly expreſs it. It is, indeed, one of the defects of this amiable writer, that his ſentences are often too negligently connected with one another. His meaning, upon the whole, we gather with eaſe from the tenour of his diſcourſe. Yet this negligence prevents his ſenſe from ſtriking us with that force and evidence, which a more accurate juncture of parts would have produced. Bating this inaccuracy, theſe two ſentences, eſpecially the latter, are remarkably elegant and beautiful. The cloſe, in particular, is uncommonly fine, and carries as much expreſſive harmony as the language can admit. It ſeems to paint what he is deſcribing, at once to the eye and the ear.—*Such objects as are ever in motion, and ſliding away from beneath the eye of the beholder.*—Indeed, notwithſtanding thoſe ſmall errors, which the ſtrictneſs of critical examination obliges me to point out, it may be ſafely pronounced, that the two paragraphs which we have now conſidered in this paper, the one concerning greatneſs, and the other concerning novelty, are extremely worthy of Mr. Addiſon, and exhibit a Style, which they who can ſucceſsfully imitate, may eſteem themſelves happy.

But there is nothing that makes its way more directly to the ſoul than beauty, which immediately diffuſes a ſecret ſatisfaction and complacency through the imagination, and gives a finiſhing to any thing that

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that is great or uncommon. The very firſt diſcovery of it ſtrikes the mind with an inward joy, and ſpreads a cheerfulneſs and delight through all its faculties.

Some degree of verboſity may be here diſcovered, as phraſes are repeated which ſeem little more than the echo of one another; ſuch as *diffuſing ſatisfaction and complacency through the imagination —ſtriking the mind with inward joy—ſpreading cheerfulneſs and delight through all its faculties.* At the ſame time, I readily admit that this full and flowing Style, even though it carry ſome redundancy, is not unſuitable to the gaiety of the ſubject on which the Author is entering, and is more allowable here, than it would have been on ſome other occaſions.

There is not, perhaps, any real beauty or deformity more in one piece of matter than another; becauſe we might have been ſo made, that whatever now appears loathſome to us, might have ſhewn itſelf agreeable; but we find by experience, that there are ſeveral modifications of matter, which the mind, without any previous conſideration, pronounces at firſt ſight beautiful or deformed.

In this ſentence there is nothing remarkable, in any view, to draw our attention. We may obſerve only, that the word *more*, towards the beginning, is not in its proper place, and that the prepoſition *in* is wanting before *another*. The phraſe ought

to have ſtood thus—*Beauty or deformity in one piece of matter, more than in another.*

Thus we ſee, that every different ſpecies of ſenſible creatures has its different notions of Beauty, and that each of them is moſt affected with the beauties of its own kind. This is nowhere more remarkable than in birds of the ſame ſhape and proportion, when we often ſee the male determined in his courtſhip by the ſingle grain or tincture of a feather, and never diſcovering any charms but in the colour of its ſpecies.

NEITHER is there here any particular elegance or felicity of language.—*Different ſenſe of Beauty* would have been a more proper expreſſion to have been applied to irrational creatures, than as it ſtands, *different notions of Beauty*. In the cloſe of the ſecond ſentence, when the Author ſays, *colour of its ſpecies*, he is guilty of a conſiderable inaccuracy in changing the gender, as he had ſaid in the ſame ſentence that the *male was determined in his courtſhip*.

There is a ſecond kind of Beauty, that we find in the ſeveral products of art and nature, which does not work in the imagination with that warmth and violence, as the beauty that appears in our proper ſpecies, but is apt, however, to raiſe in us a ſecret delight, and a kind of fondneſs for the places or objects in which we diſcover it.

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STILL, I am ſorry to ſay, we find little to praiſe. As in his enunciation of the ſubject, when beginning the former paragraph, he appeared to have been treating of Beauty in general, in diſtinction from greatneſs or novelty; this *ſecond kind of Beauty* of which he here ſpeaks, comes upon us in a ſort of ſurprize, and it is only by degrees we learn, that formerly he had no more in view than the Beauty which the different ſpecies of ſenſible creatures find in one another. This *ſecond kind of Beauty*, he ſays, *we find in the ſeveral products of art and nature.* He undoubtedly means, not in all, but *in ſeveral of the products of art and nature*; and ought ſo to have expreſſed himſelf; and in the place of *products*, to have uſed alſo the more proper word *productions*. When he adds, that this kind of Beauty *does not work in the imagination with that warmth and violence as the beauty that appears in our proper ſpecies*; the language would certainly have been more pure and elegant, if he had ſaid, that it *does not work upon the imagination with ſuch warmth and violence, as the beauty that appears in our own ſpecies.*

This conſiſts either in the gaiety or variety of colours, in the ſymmetry and proportion of parts, in the arrangement and diſpoſition of bodies, or in a juſt mixture and concurrence of all together. Among theſe ſeveral kinds of Beauty, the eye takes moſt delight in colours.

To

To the language here I ſee no objection that can be made.

We no where meet with a more glorious or pleaſing ſhow in nature, than what appears in the heavens at the riſing and ſetting of the ſun, which is wholly made up of thoſe different ſtains of light, that ſhow themſelves in clouds of a different ſituation.

THE chief ground of criticiſm on this ſentence, is the disjointed ſituation of the relative *which*. Grammatically, it refers to *the riſing and ſetting of the ſun*. But the Author meant, that it ſhould refer to *the ſhow* which appears in the heavens at that time. It is too common among Authors, when they are writing without much care, to make ſuch particles as *this*, and *which*, refer not to any particular antecedent word, but to the tenour of ſome phraſe, or perhaps the ſcope of ſome whole ſentence, which has gone before. This practice ſaves them trouble in marſhalling their words, and arranging a period: but though it may leave their meaning intelligible, yet it renders that meaning much leſs perſpicuous, determined, and preciſe, than it might otherwiſe have been. The error I have pointed out, might have been avoided by a ſmall alteration in the conſtruction of the ſentence, after ſome ſuch manner as this: *We no where meet with a more glorious and pleaſing ſhow in nature, than what is formed in the heavens at the riſing and ſetting of the ſun, by the different ſtains of light which*

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which ſhow themſelves in clouds of different ſituations. Our Author writes, *in clouds of a different ſituation*, by which he means, clouds that differ in ſituation from each other. But as this is neither the obvious nor grammatical meaning of his words, it was neceſſary to change the expreſſion, as I have done, into the plural number.

For this reaſon, we find the poets, who are always addreſſing themſelves to the imagination, borrowing more of their epithets from colours than from any other topic.

On this ſentence nothing occurs, except a remark ſimilar to what was made before, of looſe connection with the ſentence which precedes. For, though he begins with ſaying, *For this reaſon*, the foregoing ſentence, which was employed about the *clouds* and *the ſun*, gives no reaſon for the general propoſition he now lays down. The *reaſon* to which he refers, was given two ſentences before, when he obſerved, that the eye takes more delight in colours than in any other beauty; and it was with that ſentence that the preſent one ſhould have ſtood immediately connected.

As the fancy delights in every thing that is great, ſtrange, or beautiful, and is ſtill more pleaſed, the more it finds of theſe perfections in the ſame object, ſo it is capable of receiving a new ſatisfaction by the aſſiſtance of another ſenſe.

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Another ſenſe here, means grammatically, *another ſenſe than fancy*. For there is no other thing in the period to which this expreſſion, *another ſenſe*, can at all be oppoſed. He had not for ſome time made mention of any *ſenſe* whatever. He forgot to add, what was undoubtedly in his thoughts, *another ſenſe than that of ſight*.

Thus any continued ſound, as the muſic of birds, or a fall of water, awakens every moment the mind of the beholder, and makes him more attentive to the ſeveral beauties of the place which lie before him. Thus, if there ariſes a fragrancy of ſmells or perfumes, they heighten the pleaſures of the imagination, and make even the colours and verdure of the landſcape appear more agreeable; for the ideas of both ſenſes recommend each other, and are pleaſanter together, than when they enter the mind ſeparately; as the different colours of a picture, when they are well-diſpoſed, ſet off one another, and receive an additional beauty from the advantage of their ſituation.

WHETHER Mr. Addiſon's theory here be juſt or not, may be queſtioned. A continued ſound, ſuch as that of a fall of water, is ſo far from *awakening, every moment, the mind of the beholder*, that nothing is more likely to lull him aſleep. It may, indeed, pleaſe the imagination, and heighten the beauties of the ſcene; but it produces this effect, by a ſoothing, not by an awakening influence. With regard to the Style, nothing appears exceptionable.

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The flow, both of language and of ideas, is very agreeable. The Author continues, to the end, the ſame pleaſing train of thought, which had run through the reſt of the Paper; and leaves us agreeably employed in comparing together different degrees of Beauty.

LECTURE XXII.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE STYLE IN N° 413 OF THE SPECTATOR.

THOUGH in yeſterday's Paper we conſidered how every thing that is great, new, or beautiful, is apt to affect the imagination with pleaſure, we muſt own, that it is impoſſible for us to aſſign the neceſſary cauſe of this pleaſure, becauſe we know neither the nature of an idea, nor the ſubſtance of a human ſoul, which might help us to diſcover the conformity or diſagreeableneſs of the one to the other; and, therefore, for want of ſuch a light, all that we can do in ſpeculations of this kind, is, to reflect on thoſe operations of the ſoul that are moſt agreeable, and to range, under their proper heads, what is pleaſing or diſpleaſing to the mind, without being able to trace out the ſeveral neceſſary and efficient cauſes from whence the pleaſure or diſpleaſure ariſes.

THIS ſentence, conſidered as an introductory one, muſt be acknowledged to be very faulty. An introductory ſentence ſhould never contain any

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thing that can in any degree fatigue or puzzle the reader. When an Author is entering on a new branch of his ſubject, informing us of what he has done, and what he purpoſes farther to do, we naturally expect that he ſhould expreſs himſelf in the ſimpleſt and moſt perſpicuous manner poſſible. But the ſentence now before us is crowded and indiſtinct; containing three ſeparate propoſitions, which, as I ſhall afterwards ſhow, required ſeparate ſentences to unfold them. Mr. Addiſon's chief excellence, as a writer, lay in deſcribing and painting. There he is great; but in methodiſing and reaſoning, he is not ſo eminent. As, beſides the general fault of prolixity and indiſtinctneſs, this ſentence contains ſeveral inaccuracies, I ſhall be obliged to enter into a minute diſcuſſion of its ſtructure and parts; a diſcuſſion, which to many readers will appear tedious, and which therefore they will naturally paſs over; but which, to thoſe who are ſtudying compoſition, I hope may prove of ſome benefit.

Though in yeſterday's Paper we conſidered—The import of *though* is, *notwithſtanding that*. When it appears in the beginning of a ſentence, its relative generally is *yet:* and it is employed to warn us, after we have been informed of ſome truth, that we are not to infer from it ſome other thing which we might perhaps have expected to follow: as, "Though virtue be the only road to happineſs, "yet it does not permit the unlimited gratifica-

"tion

" tion of our desires." Now it is plain, that there was no such opposition between the subject of yesterday's Paper, and what the Author is now going to say, between his asserting a fact, and his not being able to assign the cause of that fact, as rendered the use of this adversative particle *though*, either necessary or proper in the introduction.—*We considered how every thing that is great, new, or beautiful, is apt to affect the imagination with pleasure*—The adverb *how* signifies, either the means by which, or the manner in which, something is done. But, in truth, neither one nor the other of these had been considered by our Author. He had illustrated the fact alone, that they do affect the imagination with pleasure; and, with respect to the *quomodo*, or the *how*, he is so far from having considered it, that he is just now going to show that it cannot be explained, and that we must rest contented with the knowledge of the fact alone, and of its purpose or final cause.—*We must own, that it is impossible for us to assign the necessary cause* (he means, what is more commonly called the *efficient cause*) *of this pleasure, because we know neither the nature of an idea, nor the substance of a human soul.*—*The substance of a human soul* is certainly a very uncouth expression, and there appears no reason why he should have varied from the word *nature*, which would have been equally applicable to *idea* and to *soul*.

Which might help us, our Author proceeds, *to discover the conformity or disagreeableness of the one*

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to the other.—The *which*, at the beginning of this member of the period, is ſurely ungrammatical, as it is a relative, without any antecedent in all the ſentence. It refers, by the conſtruction, to *the nature of an idea, or the ſubſtance of a human ſoul*; but this is by no means the reference which the Author intended. His meaning is, that *our knowing* the nature of an idea, and the ſubſtance of a human ſoul, might help us to diſcover the conformity or diſagreeableneſs of the one to the other: and therefore the ſyntax abſolutely required the word *knowledge* to have been inſerted as the antecedent to *which*. I have before remarked, and the remark deſerves to be repeated, that nothing is a more certain ſign of careleſs compoſition than to make ſuch relatives as *which*, not refer to any preciſe expreſſion, but carry a looſe and vague relation to the general ſtrain of what had gone before. When our ſentences run into this form, we may be aſſured there is ſomething in the conſtruction of them that requires alteration. The phraſe of diſcovering *the conformity or diſagreeableneſs of the one to the other* is likewiſe exceptionable; for *diſagreeableneſs* neither forms a proper contraſt to the other word, *conformity*, nor expreſſes what the Author meant here (as far as any meaning can be gathered from his words), that is, a certain unſuitableneſs or want of conformity to the nature of the ſoul. To ſay the truth, this member of the ſentence had much better have been omitted altogether. *The conformity or diſagreeableneſs of an idea to the ſubſtance of a human ſoul*, is a phraſe which

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which conveys to the mind no distinct nor intelligible conception whatever. The Author had before given a sufficient reason for his not assigning the efficient cause of those pleasures of the imagination, because we neither know the nature of our own ideas nor of the soul: and this farther discussion about the conformity or disagreeableness of the nature of the one, to the substance of the other, affords no clear or useful illustration.

And therefore, the sentence goes on, *for want of such a light, all that we can do in speculations of this kind, is to reflect on those operations of the soul that are most agreeable, and to range under their proper heads what is pleasing or displeasing to the mind.*——The two expressions in the beginning of this member, *therefore*, and *for want of such a light*, evidently refer to the same thing, and are quite synonymous. One or other of them, therefore, had better have been omitted. Instead of *to range under their proper heads*, the language would have been smoother, if *their* had been left out. *Without being able to trace out the several necessary and efficient causes from whence the pleasure or displeasure arises.* The expression, *from whence*, though seemingly justified by very frequent usage, is taxed by Dr. Johnson as a vicious mode of speech; seeing *whence* alone, has all the power of *from whence*, which therefore appears an unnecessary reduplication. I am inclined to think, that the whole of this last member of the sentence had

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better have been dropped. The period might have closed with full propriety, at the words, *pleasing or displeasing to the mind.* All that follows, suggests no idea that had not been fully conveyed in the preceding part of the sentence. It is a mere expletive adjection which might be omitted, not only without injury to the meaning, but to the great relief of a sentence already labouring under the multitude of words.

HAVING now finished the analysis of this long sentence, I am inclined to be of opinion, that if, on any occasion, we can adventure to alter Mr. Addison's Style, it may be done to advantage here, by breaking down this period in the following manner: "In yesterday's Paper, we have shown "that every thing which is great, new, or beau- "tiful, is apt to affect the imagination with plea- "sure. We must own, that it is impossible for "us to assign the efficient cause of this pleasure, "because we know not the nature either of an "idea, or of the human soul. All that we can do, "therefore, in speculations of this kind, is to re- "flect on the operations of the soul, which are "most agreeable, and to range under proper "heads, what is pleasing or displeasing to the "mind."—We proceed now to the examination of the following sentences.

Final causes lie more bare and open to our observation, as there are often a great variety that belong

belong to the ſame effect; and theſe, though they are not altogether ſo ſatisfactory, are generally more uſeful than the other, as they give us greater occaſion of admiring the goodneſs and wiſdom of the firſt contriver.

THOUGH ſome difference might be traced between the ſenſe of *bare* and *open*, yet as they are here employed, they are ſo nearly ſynonymous, that one of them was ſufficient. It would have been enough to have ſaid, *Final cauſes lie more open to obſervation.*—One can ſcarcely help obſerving here, that the obviouſneſs of final cauſes does not proceed, as Mr. Addiſon ſuppoſes, from a variety of them concurring in the ſame effect, which is often not the caſe; but from our being able to aſcertain more clearly, from our own experience, the congruity of a final cauſe with the circumſtances of our condition; whereas the conſtituent parts of ſubjects, whence efficient cauſes proceed, lie for the moſt part beyond the reach of our faculties. But as this remark reſpects the thought more than the Style, it is ſufficient for us to obſerve, that when he ſays, *a great variety that belong to the ſame effect*, the expreſſion, ſtrictly conſidered, is not altogether proper. The acceſſory is properly ſaid to belong to the principal; not the principal to the acceſſory. Now an effect is conſidered as the acceſſory or conſequence of its cauſe; and therefore, though we might well ſay a variety of effects belong to the ſame cauſe, it ſeems not

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not ſo proper to ſay, that a variety of cauſes belong to the ſame effect.

One of the final cauſes of our delight in any thing that is great may be this: The ſupreme Author of our being has ſo formed the ſoul of man, that nothing but himſelf can be its laſt, adequate, and proper happineſs. Becauſe, therefore, a great part of our happineſs muſt ariſe from the contemplation of his being, that he might give our ſouls a juſt reliſh of ſuch a contemplation, he has made them naturally delight in the apprehenſion of what is great or unlimited.

THE concurrence of two conjunctions, *becauſe, therefore*, forms rather a harſh and unpleaſing beginning of the laſt of theſe ſentences; and, in the cloſe, one would think, that the Author might have deviſed a happier word than *apprehenſion*, to be applied to what is *unlimited*. But that I may not be thought hypercritical, I ſhall make no farther obſervation on theſe ſentences.

Our admiration, which is a very pleaſing motion of the mind, immediately riſes at the conſideration of any object that takes up a good deal of room in the fancy, and, by conſequence, will improve into the higheſt pitch of aſtoniſhment and devotion, when we contemplate his nature, that is neither circumſcribed by

by time nor place, nor to be comprehended by the largeſt capacity of a created being.

HERE, our Author's Style riſes beautifully along with the thought. However inaccurate he may ſometimes be when coolly philoſophiſing, yet, whenever his fancy is awakened by deſcription, or his mind, as here, warmed with ſome glowing ſentiment, he preſently becomes great, and diſcovers, in his language, the hand of a maſter. Every one muſt obſerve, with what felicity this period is conſtructed. The words are long and majeſtic. The members riſe one above another, and conduct the ſentence, at laſt, to that full and harmonious cloſe, which leaves upon the mind ſuch an impreſſion as the Author intended to leave, of ſomething uncommonly great, awful, and magnificent.

He has annexed a ſecret pleaſure to the idea of any thing that is new or uncommon, that he might encourage us in the purſuit of knowledge, and engage us to ſearch into the wonders of creation; for every new idea brings ſuch a pleaſure along with it, as rewards the pains we have taken in its acquiſition, and, conſequently, ſerves as a motive to put us upon freſh diſcoveries.

THE Language, in this ſentence, is clear and preciſe: only, we cannot but obſerve, in this, and the two following ſentences, which are conſtructed

in

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in the ſame manner, a ſtrong proof of Mr. Addiſon's unreaſonable partiality to the particle *that*, in preference to *which—annexed a ſecret pleaſure to the idea of any thing that is new or uncommon, that he might encourage us.*—Here the firſt *that* ſtands for a relative pronoun, and the next *that*, at the diſtance only of four words, is a conjunction. This confuſion of ſounds ſerves to embarraſs Style. Much better, ſure, to have ſaid, *the idea of any thing which is new or uncommon, that he might encourage.* —The expreſſion with which the ſentence concludes—*a motive to put us upon freſh diſcoveries*—is flat, and, in ſome degree, improper. He ſhould have ſaid, *put us upon making freſh diſcoveries*—or rather, *ſerves as a motive inciting us to make freſh diſcoveries.*

He has made every thing that is beautiful in our own ſpecies, pleaſant, that all creatures might be tempted to multiply their kind, and fill the world with inhabitants; for 'tis very remarkable, that wherever nature is croſt in the production of a monſter (the reſult of any unnatural mixture), the breed is incapable of propagating its likeneſs, and of founding a new order of creatures; ſo that unleſs all animals were allured by the beauty of their own ſpecies, generation would be at an end, and the earth unpeopled.

HERE we muſt, however reluctantly, return to the employment of cenſure: for this is among the worſt

worſt ſentences our Author ever wrote; and contains a variety of blemiſhes. Taken as a whole, it is extremely deficient in unity. Inſtead of a complete propoſition, it contains a ſort of chain of reaſoning, the links of which are ſo ill put together, that it is with difficulty we can trace the connection; and, unleſs we take the trouble of peruſing it ſeveral times, it will leave nothing on the mind but an indiſtinct and obſcure impreſſion.

Besides this general fault, reſpecting the meaning, it contains ſome great inaccuracies in Language. Firſt, God's having made every thing which *is beautiful in our ſpecies* (that is, in the human ſpecies) *pleaſant*, is certainly no motive for *all creatures*, for beaſts, and birds, and fiſhes, *to multiply their kind*. What the Author meant to ſay, though he has expreſſed himſelf in ſo erroneous a manner, undoubtedly was, "In all the different "orders of creatures, he has made every thing "which is beautiful in their own ſpecies pleaſant, "that all creatures might be tempted to multiply "their kind." The ſecond member of the ſentence is ſtill worſe. *For, it is very remarkable, that wherever nature is croſt in the production of a monſter*, &c. The reaſon which he here gives, for the preceding aſſertion, intimated by the caſual particle *for*, is far from being obvious. The connection of thought is not readily apparent, and would have required an intermediate ſtep, to render it diſtinct. But, what does he mean, by *nature being*

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being croſt in the production of a monſter? One might underſtand him to mean, "diſappointed in "its intention of producing a monſter;" as when we ſay one is croſt in his purſuits, we mean, that he is diſappointed in accompliſhing the end which he intended. Had he ſaid, *croſt by the production of a monſter*, the ſenſe would have been more intelligible. But the proper rectification of the expreſſion would be to inſert the adverb *as*, before the prepoſition *in*, after this manner—*wherever nature is croſt, as in the production of a monſter*;—the inſertion of this particle *as*, throws ſo much light on the conſtruction of this member of the ſentence, that I am very much inclined to believe it had ſtood thus, originally, in our Author's manuſcript; and that the preſent reading is a typographical error, which having crept into the firſt edition of the Spectator, ran through all the ſubſequent ones.

In the laſt place, he has made every thing that is beautiful, in all other objects, pleaſant, or rather has made ſo many objects appear beautiful, that he might render the whole creation more gay and delightful. He has given, almoſt, every thing about us the power of raiſing an agreeable idea in the imagination; ſo that it is impoſſible for us to behold his works with coldneſs or indifference, and to ſurvey ſo many beauties without a ſecret ſatisfaction and complacency.

THE

THE idea, here, is ſo juſt, and the Language ſo clear, flowing, and agreeable, that to remark any diffuſeneſs which may be attributed to theſe ſentences, would be juſtly eſteemed hypercritical.

Things would make but a poor appearance to the eye, if we ſaw them only in their proper figures and motions: and what reaſon can we aſſign for their exciting in us, many of thoſe ideas which are different from any thing that exiſts in the objects themſelves (for ſuch are light and colours), were it not to add ſupernumerary ornaments to the univerſe, and make it more agreeable to the imagination?

OUR Author is now entering on a theory, which he is about to illuſtrate, if not with much philoſophical accuracy, yet, with great beauty of fancy, and glow of expreſſion. A ſtrong inſtance of his want of accuracy, appears in the manner in which he opens the ſubject. For what meaning is there in things *exciting in us many of thoſe ideas which are different from any thing that exiſts in the objects?* No one, ſure, ever imagined, that our ideas exiſt in the objects. Ideas, it is agreed on all hands, can exiſt no where but in the mind. What Mr. Locke's philoſophy teaches, and what our Author ſhould have ſaid, is, *exciting in us many ideas of qualities which are different from any thing that exiſts in the objects.* The ungraceful parentheſis which follows, *for ſuch are light and colours*, had far better have been avoided, and incorporated

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with the reſt of the ſentence, in this manner:— "exciting in us many ideas of qualities, ſuch as "light and colours, which are different from any "thing that exiſts in the objects."

We are every where entertained with pleaſing ſhows and apparitions. We diſcover imaginary glories in the heavens, and in the earth, and ſee ſome of this viſionary beauty poured out upon the whole creation; but what a rough unſightly ſketch of nature ſhould we be entertained with, did all her colouring diſappear, and the ſeveral diſtinctions of light and ſhade vaniſh? In ſhort, our ſouls are delightfully loſt and bewildered in a pleaſing deluſion; and we walk about like the enchanted hero of a romance, who ſees beautiful caſtles, woods, and meadows; and, at the ſame time, hears the warbling of birds, and the purling of ſtreams; but, upon the finiſhing of ſome ſecret ſpell, the fantaſtic ſcene breaks up, and the diſconſolate knight finds himſelf on a barren heath, or in a ſolitary deſert.

After having been obliged to point out ſeveral inaccuracies, I return with much more pleaſure to the diſplay of beauties, for which we have now full ſcope; for theſe two ſentences are ſuch as do the higheſt honour to Mr. Addiſon's talents as a writer. Warmed with the idea he had laid hold of, his delicate ſenſibility to the beauty of nature, is finely diſplayed in the illuſtration of it. The Style is flowing and full, without being too

diffuſe. It is flowery, but not gaudy; elevated, but not oſtentatious. LECT. XXII.

AMIDST this blaze of beauties, it is neceſſary for us to remark one or two inaccuracies. When it is ſaid, towards the cloſe of the firſt of thoſe ſentences, *what a rough unſightly ſketch of nature ſhould we be entertained with*, the prepoſition *with*, ſhould have been placed at the beginning, rather than at the end of this member; and the word *entertained*, is both improperly applied here, and careleſsly repeated from the former part of the ſentence. It was there employed according to its more common uſe, as relating to agreeable objects. *We are every where entertained with pleaſing ſhows.* Here, it would have been more proper to have changed the phraſe, and ſaid, *with what a rough unſightly ſketch of nature ſhould we be preſented.*—At the cloſe of the ſecond ſentence, where it is ſaid, *the fantaſtic ſcene breaks up*, the expreſſion is lively, but not altogether juſtifiable. An aſſembly *breaks up*; a ſcene *cloſes* or *diſappears*.

EXCEPTING theſe two ſlight inaccuracies, the Style, here, is not only correct, but perfectly elegant. The moſt ſtriking beauty of the paſſage ariſes from the happy ſimile which the Author employs, and the fine illuſtration which it gives to the thought. The *enchanted hero*, the *beautiful caſtles*, the *fantaſtic ſcene*, the *ſecret ſpell*, the *diſconſolate knight*, are terms choſen with the utmoſt

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felicity, and ſtrongly recal all thoſe romantic ideas with which he intended to amuſe our imagination. Few authors are more ſucceſsful in their imagery than Mr. Addiſon; and few paſſages, in his works, or in thoſe of any author, are more beautiful and pictureſque, than that on which we have been commenting.

It is not improbable, that ſomething like this may be the ſtate of the ſoul after its firſt ſeparation, in reſpect of the images it will receive from matter; though, indeed, the ideas of colours are ſo pleaſing and beautiful in the imagination, that it is poſſible the ſoul will not be deprived of them, but, perhaps, find them excited by ſome other occaſional cauſe, as they are, at preſent, by the different impreſſions of the ſubtile matter on the organ of the ſight.

As all human things, after having attained the ſummit, begin to decline, we muſt acknowledge, that, in this ſentence, there is a ſenſible falling off from the beauty of what went before. It is broken and deficient in unity. Its parts are not ſufficiently compacted. It contains, beſides, ſome faulty expreſſions. When it is ſaid, *ſomething like this may be the ſtate of the ſoul*, to the pronoun *this*, there is no determined antecedent; it refers to the general import of the preceding deſcription, which, as I have ſeveral times remarked, always renders Style clumſy and inelegant, if not obſcure—*the ſtate of the ſoul after its firſt ſeparation*, appears to be an

incomplete phraſe, and *firſt*, ſeems an uſeleſs, and even an improper word. More diſtinct if he had ſaid—*ſtate of the ſoul immediately on its ſeparation from the body*. The adverb *perhaps*, is redundant, after having juſt before ſaid, *it is poſſible*.

I have here ſuppoſed that my reader is acquainted with that great modern diſcovery, which is, at preſent, univerſally acknowledged by all the enquirers into natural philoſophy; namely, that light and colours, as apprehended by the imagination, are only ideas in the mind, and not qualities that have any exiſtence in matter. As this is a truth which has been proved inconteſtably by many modern philoſophers, and is, indeed, one of the fineſt ſpeculations in that ſcience, if the Engliſh Reader would ſee the notion explained at large, he may find it in the eighth chapter of the ſecond book of Mr. Locke's Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding.

In theſe two concluding ſentences, the Author, haſtening to finiſh, appears to write rather careleſsly. In the firſt of them, a manifeſt tautology occurs, when he ſpeaks of what is *univerſally acknowledged by all enquirers*. In the ſecond, when he calls *a truth which has been inconteſtably proved*; firſt, a *ſpeculation*, and afterwards, *a notion*, the Language ſurely is not very accurate. When he adds, *one of the fineſt ſpeculations in that ſcience*, it does not, at firſt, appear what ſcience he means. One would imagine, he meant to refer to *modern*

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philoſophers; for *natural philoſophy* (to which, doubtleſs, he refers) ſtands at much too great a diſtance to be the proper or obvious antecedent to the pronoun *that*. The circumſtance towards the cloſe, *if the Engliſh Reader would ſee the notion explained at large, he may find it*, is properly taken notice of by the Author of the Elements of Criticiſm, as wrong arranged, and is rectified thus: *the Engliſh Reader, if he would ſee the notion explained at large, may find it, &c.*

In concluding the Examination of this Paper, we may obſerve, that, though not a very long one, it exhibits a ſtriking view both of the beauties, and the defects, of Mr. Addiſon's Style. It contains ſome of the beſt, and ſome of the worſt ſentences that are to be found in his works. But, upon the whole, it is an agreeable and elegant Eſſay.

LECTURE XXIII.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE STYLE IN N° 414 OF THE SPECTATOR.

IF we conſider the works of Nature and Art, as they are qualified to entertain the imagination, we ſhall find the laſt very defective in compariſon of the former; for, though they may ſometimes appear as beautiful or ſtrange, they can have nothing in them of that vaſtneſs and immenſity which afford ſo great an entertainment to the mind of the beholder.

I HAD occaſion formerly to obſerve, that an introductory ſentence ſhould always be ſhort and ſimple, and contain no more matter than is neceſſary for opening the ſubject. This ſentence leads to a repetition of this obſervation, as it contains both an aſſertion, and the proof of that aſſertion; two things, which, for the moſt part, but eſpecially at firſt ſetting out, are with more advantage kept ſeparate. It would certainly have been better, if this ſentence had contained only the aſſertion, ending with the word *former*; and if a new one

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had then begun, entering on the proofs of Nature's ſuperiority over Art, which is the ſubject continued to the end of the paragraph. The proper diviſion of the period I ſhall point out, after having firſt made a few obſervations which occur on different parts of it.

If we conſider the works.—Perhaps it might have been preferable, if our Author had begun with ſaying, *When we conſider the works.*—Diſcourſe ought always to begin, when it is poſſible, with a clear propoſition. The *if*, which is here employed, converts the ſentence into a ſuppoſition, which is always in ſome degree entangling, and proper to be uſed only when the courſe of reaſoning renders it neceſſary. As this obſervation, however, may, perhaps, be conſidered as over-refined, and as the ſenſe would have remained the ſame in either form of expreſſion, I do not mean to charge our Author with any error on this account. We cannot abſolve him from inaccuracy in what immediately follows—*the works of Nature and Art.* It is the ſcope of the Author, throughout this whole Paper, to compare Nature and Art together, and to oppoſe them in ſeveral views to each other. Certainly, therefore, in the beginning, he ought to have kept them as diſtinct as poſſible, by interpoſing the prepoſition, and ſaying, *The works of Nature and of Art.* As the words ſtand at preſent, they would lead us to think that he is going to treat of theſe works, not as contraſted, but as connected; as united in forming one whole. When I ſpeak of body and

ſoul

ſoul as united in the human nature, I would interpoſe neither article nor prepoſition between them; "man is compounded of ſoul and body." But the caſe is altered, if I mean to diſtinguiſh them from each other; then I repreſent them as ſeparate; and ſay, "I am to treat of the intereſts "of the ſoul, and of the body."

Though they may ſometimes appear as beautiful or ſtrange.—I cannot help conſidering this as a looſe member of the period. It does not clearly appear at firſt what the antecedent is to *they*. In reading onwards, we ſee the works of Art to be meant; but from the ſtructure of the ſentence, *they* might be underſtood to refer to *the former*, as well as to *the laſt*. In what follows, there is a greater ambiguity—*may ſometimes appear as beautiful or ſtrange*. It is very doubtful in what ſenſe we are to underſtand *as*, in this paſſage. For according as it is accented in reading, it may ſignify, that *they appear equally beautiful or ſtrange*, to wit, with the works of Nature; and then it has the force of the Latin *tam:* or it may ſignify no more than that they *appear in the light of beautiful and ſtrange*; and then it has the force of the Latin *tanquam*, without importing any compariſon. An expreſſion ſo ambiguous, is always faulty; and it is doubly ſo here; becauſe, if the Author intended the former ſenſe, and meant (as ſeems moſt probable) to employ *as* for a mark of *compariſon*, it was neceſſary to have mentioned both the compared objects; whereas only one member of the compariſon is here

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mentioned, viz. the works of Art; and if he intended the latter ſenſe, *as* was in that caſe ſuperfluous and encumbering, and he had better have ſaid ſimply, *appear beautiful or ſtrange.*—The epithet *ſtrange*, which Mr. Addiſon applies to the works of Art, cannot be praiſed. *Strange works*, appears not by any means a happy expreſſion to ſignify what he here intends, which is new or uncommon.

THE ſentence concludes with much harmony and dignity—*they can have nothing in them of that vaſtneſs and immenſity which afford ſo great an entertainment to the mind of the beholder.* There is here a fulneſs and grandeur of expreſſion well ſuited to the ſubject; though, perhaps, *entertainment* is not quite the proper word for expreſſing the effect which vaſtneſs and immenſity have upon the mind. Reviewing the obſervations that have been made on this period, it might, I think, with advantage, be reſolved into two ſentences, ſomewhat after this manner: "When we conſider the works of "Nature and of Art, as they are qualified to en- "tertain the imagination, we ſhall find the latter "very defective in compariſon of the former. "The works of Art may ſometimes appear no "leſs beautiful or uncommon than thoſe of Na- "ture; but they can have nothing of that vaſt- "neſs and immenſity which ſo highly tranſport "the mind of the beholder."

The one, proceeds our Author in the next ſentence, *may be as polite and delicate as the other; but*

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but can never ſhow herſelf ſo auguſt and magnificent in the deſign.

THE *one* and the *other*, in the firſt part of this ſentence, muſt unqueſtionably refer to the *works of Nature and of Art*. For of theſe he had been ſpeaking immediately before; and with reference to the plural word, *works*, had employed the plural pronoun *they*. But in the courſe of the ſentence, he drops this conſtruction; and paſſes very incongruouſly to the perſonification of Art—*can never ſhow herſelf*.—To render his Style conſiſtent, *Art*, and not *the works of Art*, ſhould have been made the nominative in this ſentence.—*Art may be as polite and delicate as Nature, but can never ſhew herſelf*.—*Polite* is a term oftener applied to perſons and to manners, than to things; and is employed to ſignify their being highly civilized. Poliſhed, or refined, was the idea which the Author had in view. Though the general turn of this ſentence be elegant, yet in order to render it perfect, I muſt obſerve, that the concluding words, *in the deſign*, ſhould either have been altogether omitted, or ſomething ſhould have been properly oppoſed to them in the preceding member of the period, thus: "Art may, in the execution, be as poliſhed "and delicate as Nature; but, in the deſign, can "never ſhew herſelf ſo auguſt and magnificent."

There is ſomething more bold and maſterly in the rough, careleſs ſtrokes of Nature, than in the nice touches and embelliſhments of Art.

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THIS ſentence is perfectly happy and elegant; and carries, in all the expreſſions, that *curioſa felicitas*, for which Mr. Addiſon is ſo often remarkable. *Bold and maſterly* are words applied with the utmoſt propriety. The *ſtrokes of Nature* are finely oppoſed to the *touches of Art*; and the *rough ſtrokes* to the *nice touches*; the former painting the freedom and eaſe of Nature, and the other, the diminutive exactneſs of Art; while both are introduced before us as different performers, and their reſpective merits in execution very juſtly contraſted with each other.

The beauties of the moſt ſtately garden or palace lie in a narrow compaſs, the imagination immediately runs them over, and requires ſomething elſe to gratify her; but in the wide fields of nature, the ſight wanders up and down without confinement, and is fed with an infinite variety of images, without any certain ſtint or number.

THIS ſentence is not altogether ſo correct and elegant as the former. It carries, however, in the main, the character of our Author's Style; not ſtrictly accurate, but agreeable, eaſy, and unaffected; enlivened too with a ſlight perſonification of the imagination, which gives a gaiety to the period. Perhaps it had been better, if this perſonification of the imagination, with which the ſentence is introduced, had been continued throughout, and not changed unneceſſarily, and even improperly, into

into *ſight*, in the ſecond member, which is contrary both to unity and elegance. It might have ſtood thus—*the imagination immediately runs them over, and requires ſomething elſe to gratify her; but in the wild fields of nature, ſhe wanders up and down without confinement.*—The epithet *ſtately*, which the Author uſes in the beginning of the ſentence, is applicable, with more propriety, to *palaces* than to *gardens*. The cloſe of the ſentence, *without any certain ſtint or number*, may be objected to, as both ſuperfluous and ungraceful. It might perhaps have terminated better in this manner—*ſhe is fed with an infinite variety of images, and wanders up and down without confinement.*

For this reaſon, we always find the Poet in love with a country life, where nature appears in the greateſt perfection, and furniſhes out all thoſe ſcenes that are moſt apt to delight the imagination.

THERE is nothing in this ſentence to attract particular attention. One would think it was rather the *country* than a *country life*, on which the remark here made ſhould reſt. A *country life* may be productive of ſimplicity of manners, and of other virtues; but it is to *the country* itſelf, that the properties here mentioned belong, of diſplaying the beauties of Nature, and furniſhing thoſe ſcenes which delight the imagination.

But though there are ſeveral of theſe wild ſcenes that are more delightful than any artificial ſhows, yet we

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we find the works of Nature ſtill more pleaſant, the more they reſemble thoſe of Art; for in this caſe, our pleaſure riſes from a double principle; from the agreeableneſs of the objects to the eye, and from their ſimilitude to other objects: we are pleaſed, as well with comparing their beauties, as with ſurveying them, and can repreſent them to our minds either as copies or as originals. Hence it is, that we take delight in a proſpect which is well laid out, and diverſified with fields and meadows, woods and rivers; in thoſe accidental landſcapes of trees, clouds, and cities, that are ſometimes found in the veins of marble, in the curious fretwork of rocks and grottos; and, in a word, in any thing that hath ſuch a degree of variety and regularity as may ſeem the effect of deſign in what we call the works of chance.

THE Style, in the two ſentences which compoſe this paragraph, is ſmooth and perſpicuous. It lies open, in ſome places, to criticiſm; but leſt the reader ſhould be tired of what he may conſider as petty remarks, I ſhall paſs over any which theſe ſentences ſuggeſt; the rather too, as the idea which they preſent to us, of Nature's reſembling Art, of Art's being conſidered as an original, and Nature as a copy, ſeems not very diſtinct nor well brought out, nor indeed very material to our Author's purpoſe.

If the products of Nature riſe in value, according as they more or leſs reſemble thoſe of Art, we may be ſure that artificial works receive a greater advantage from the reſemblance of ſuch as are natural; becauſe

becauſe here the ſimilitude is not only pleaſant, but the pattern more perfect.

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It is neceſſary to our preſent deſign, to point out two conſiderable inaccuracies which occur in this ſentence. *If the products* (he had better have ſaid the *productions*) *of Nature riſe in value, according as they more or leſs reſemble thoſe of Art.*—Does he mean, that theſe productions *riſe in value*, both according as they *more reſemble*, and as they *leſs reſemble*, thoſe of Art? His meaning, undoubtedly, is, that they riſe in value only, according as they *more reſemble them:* and therefore, either theſe words, *or leſs*, muſt be ſtruck out, or the ſentence muſt run thus—*productions of Nature riſe or ſink in value, according as they more or leſs reſemble.*—The preſent conſtruction of the ſentence has plainly been owing to haſty and careleſs writing.

The other inaccuracy is toward the end of the ſentence, and ſerves to illuſtrate a rule which I formerly gave concerning the poſition of adverbs. The Author ſays,—*becauſe here, the ſimilitude is not only pleaſant, but the pattern more perfect.* Here, by the poſition of the adverb *only*, we are led to imagine that he is going to give ſome other property of the ſimilitude, that it is *not only pleaſant*, as he ſays, but more than pleaſant; it is uſeful, or, on ſome account or other, valuable. Whereas, he is going to oppoſe another thing to the *ſimilitude* itſelf, and not to this property of its being

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being *pleaſant*; and therefore, the right collocation, beyond doubt, was, *becauſe here, not only the ſimilitude is pleaſant, but the pattern more perfect*; the contraſt lying, not between *pleaſant* and *more perfect*, but between *ſimilitude* and *pattern*.—Much of the clearneſs and neatneſs of Style depends on ſuch attentions as theſe.

The prettieſt landſcape I ever ſaw, was one drawn on the walls of a dark room, which ſtood oppoſite, on one ſide, to a navigable river, and, on the other, to a park. The experiment is very common in optics.

In the deſcription of the landſcape which follows, Mr. Addiſon is abundantly happy; but in this introduction to it, he is obſcure and indiſtinct. One who had not ſeen the experiment of the Camera Obſcura, could comprehend nothing of what he meant. And even, after we underſtand what he points at, we are at ſome loſs, whether to underſtand his deſcription as of one continued landſcape, or of two different ones, produced by the projection of two Camera Obſcuras on oppoſite walls. The ſcene which I am inclined to think Mr. Addiſon here refers to, is Greenwich Park, with the proſpects of the Thames, as ſeen by a Camera Obſcura, which is placed in a ſmall room in the upper ſtory of the Obſervatory; where I remember to have ſeen, many years ago, the whole ſcene here deſcribed, correſponding ſo much to Mr. Addiſon's account of it in this paſſage, that, at the time, it recalled

called it to my memory. As the Obſervatory ſtands in the middle of the Park, it overlooks, from one ſide, both the River and the Park; and the objects afterwards mentioned, the ſhips, the trees, and the deer, are preſented in one view, without needing any aſſiſtance from oppoſite walls. Put into plainer language, the ſentence might run thus: "The "prettieſt landſcape I ever ſaw, was one formed "by a Camera Obſcura, a common optical inſtru-"ment, on the wall of a dark room, which over-"looked a navigable river and a park."

Here you might diſcover the waves and fluctuations of the water in ſtrong and proper colours, with the picture of a ſhip entering at one end, and ſailing by degrees though the whole piece. On another, there appeared the green ſhadows of trees, waving to and fro with the wind, and herds of deer among them in miniature, leaping about upon the wall.

Bating one or two ſmall inaccuracies, this is beautiful and lively painting. The principal inaccuracy lies in the connection of the two ſentences, *Here*, and *On another*. I ſuppoſe the Author meant, on *one ſide*, and *on another ſide*. As it ſtands, *another* is ungrammatical, having nothing to which it refers. But the fluctuations of the water, the ſhip entering and ſailing on by degrees, the trees waving in the wind, and the herds of deer among them leaping about, is all very elegant,

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gant, and gives a beautiful conception of the ſcene meant to be deſcribed.

I muſt confeſs the novelty of ſuch a ſight, may be one occaſion of its pleaſantneſs to the imagination; but certainly the chief reaſon is its near reſemblance to Nature; as it does not only, like other pictures, give the colour and figure, but the motions of the things it repreſents.

In this ſentence there is nothing remarkable, either to be praiſed or blamed. In the concluſion, inſtead of *the things it repreſents*, the regularity of correct Style requires *the things which it repreſents*. In the beginning, as *one occaſion* and the *chief reaſon* are oppoſed to one another, I ſhould think it better to have repeated the ſame word—*one reaſon of its pleaſantneſs to the imagination; but certainly the chief reaſon is*, &c.

We have before obſerved, that there is generally, in Nature, ſomething more grand and auguſt than what we meet with in the curioſities of Art. When, therefore, we ſee this imitated in any meaſure, it gives us a nobler and more exalted kind of pleaſure, than what we receive from the nicer and more accurate productions of Art.

It would have been better to have avoided terminating theſe two ſentences in a manner ſo

similar to each other; *curiosities of Art—productions of Art.*

On this account, our English gardens are not so entertaining to the fancy as those in France and Italy, where we see a large extent of ground covered with an agreeable mixture of garden and forest, which represent every where an artificial rudeness, much more charming than that neatness and elegance which we meet with in those of our own country.

THE expression—*represent every where an artificial rudeness*, is so inaccurate, that I am inclined to think, what stood in Mr. Addison's manuscript must have been—*present every where.*—For the mixture of garden and forest does not *represent*, but actually *exhibits* or *presents*, artificial rudeness. That mixture *represents* indeed *natural rudeness*, that is, is designed to imitate it; but it in reality *is*, and *presents*, *artificial rudeness*.

It might indeed be of ill consequence to the public, as well as unprofitable to private persons, to alienate so much ground from pasturage and the plough, in many parts of a country that is so well peopled and cultivated to a far greater advantage. But why may not a whole estate be thrown into a kind of garden by frequent plantations, that may turn as much to the profit as the pleasure of the owner? A marsh overgrown with willows, or a mountain shaded with

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oaks, are not only more beautiful, but more beneficial, than when they lie bare and unadorned. Fields of corn make a pleaſant proſpect; and if the walks were a little taken care of that lie between them, and the natural embroidery of the meadows were helped and improved by ſome ſmall additions of art, and the ſeveral rows of hedges were ſet off by trees and flowers that the ſoil was capable of receiving, a man might make a pretty landſcape of his own poſſeſſions.

THE ideas here are juſt, and the Style is eaſy and perſpicuous, though in ſome places bordering on the careleſs. In that paſſage, for inſtance, *if the walks were a little taken care of that lie between them*—one member is clearly out of its place, and the turn of the phraſe, *a little taken care of*, is vulgar and colloquial. Much better, if it had run thus—*if a little care were beſtowed on the walks that lie between them.*

Writers who have given us an account of China, tell us, the inhabitants of that country laugh at the plantations of our Europeans, which are laid out by the rule and the line; becauſe, they ſay, any one may place trees in equal rows and uniform figures. They chuſe rather to ſhew a genius in works of this nature, and therefore always conceal the art by which they direct themſelves. They have a word, it ſeems, in their Language, by which they expreſs the particular beauty of a plantation, that thus ſtrikes

the imagination at firſt ſight, without diſcovering what it is that has ſo agreeable an effect.

THESE ſentences furniſh occaſion for no remark, except that in the laſt of them, *particular* is improperly uſed inſtead of *peculiar—the peculiar beauty of a plantation that thus ſtrikes the imagination*, was the phraſe to have conveyed the idea which the Author meant; namely, the beauty which diſtinguiſhes it from plantations of another kind.

Our Britiſh gardeners, on the contrary, inſtead of humouring nature, love to deviate from it as much as poſſible. Our trees riſe in cones, globes, and pyramids. We ſee the marks of the ſciſſars on every plant and buſh.

THESE ſentences are lively and elegant. They make an agreeable diverſity from the ſtrain of thoſe which went before; and are marked with the hand of Mr. Addiſon. I have to remark only, that, in the phraſe, *inſtead of humouring nature, love to deviate from it—humouring* and *deviating*, are terms not properly oppoſed to each other; a ſort of perſonification of Nature is begun in the firſt of them, which is not ſupported in the ſecond.—To *humouring*, was to have been oppoſed, *thwarting*—or if *deviating* was kept, *following* or *going along with nature*, was to have been uſed.

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I do not know whether I am ſingular in my opinion, but, for my own part, I would rather look upon a tree, in all its luxuriancy and diffuſion of boughs and branches, than when it is thus cut and trimmed into a mathematical figure; and cannot but fancy that an orchard, in flower, looks infinitely more delightful, than all the little labyrinths of the moſt finiſhed parterre.

THIS ſentence is extremely harmonious, and every way beautiful. It carries all the characteriſtics of our Author's natural, graceful, and flowing Language.—A tree, in *all its luxuriancy and diffuſion of boughs and branches*, is a remarkably happy expreſſion. The Author ſeems to become luxuriant in deſcribing an object which is ſo, and thereby renders the ſound a perfect echo to the ſenſe.

But as our great modellers of gardens have their magazines of plants to diſpoſe of, it is very natural in them, to tear up all the beautiful plantations of fruit trees, and contrive a plan that may moſt turn to their profit, in taking off their evergreens, and the like moveable plants, with which their ſhops are plentifully ſtocked.

AN Author ſhould always ſtudy to conclude, when it is in his power, with grace and dignity. It is ſomewhat unfortunate, that this Paper did not end, as it might very well have done, with the former beautiful period. The impreſſion left on the

the mind by the beauties of nature with which he had been entertaining us, would then have been more agreeable. But in this ſentence there is a great falling off; and we return with pain from thoſe pleaſing objects, to the inſignificant contents of a nurſery-man's ſhop.

LECTURE XXIV.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE STYLE IN A PASSAGE OF DEAN SWIFT's WRITINGS.

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MY deſign, in the four preceding Lectures, was not merely to appretiate the merit of Mr. Addiſon's Style, by pointing out the faults and the beauties that are mingled in the writings of that great Author. They were not compoſed with any view to gain the reputation of a critic; but intended for the aſſiſtance of ſuch as are deſirous of ſtudying the moſt proper and elegant conſtruction of ſentences in the Engliſh language. To ſuch, it is hoped, they may be of advantage; as the proper application of rules reſpecting Style, will always be beſt learned by means of the illuſtration which examples afford. I conceived that examples, taken from the writings of an Author ſo juſtly eſteemed, would, on that account, not only be more attended to, but would alſo produce this good effect, of familiariſing thoſe who ſtudy compoſition with the Style of a writer, from whom they may, upon the whole, derive great benefit. With the ſame view, I ſhall,

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in this Lecture, give one critical exerciſe more of the ſame kind, upon the Style of an Author of a different character, Dean Swift; repeating the intimation I gave formerly, that ſuch as ſtand in need of no aſſiſtance of this kind, and who, therefore, will naturally conſider ſuch minute diſcuſſions concerning the propriety of words, and ſtructure of ſentences, as beneath their attention, had beſt paſs over what will ſeem to them a tedious part of the work.

I FORMERLY gave the general character of Dean Swift's Style. He is eſteemed one of our moſt correct writers. His Style is of the plain and ſimple kind; free from all affectation, and all ſuperfluity; perſpicuous, manly, and pure. Theſe are its advantages. But we are not to look for much ornament and grace in it*. On the contrary, Dean Swift ſeems to have ſlighted and deſpiſed the ornaments of Language, rather than to have ſtudied them. His arrangement is often looſe

* I am glad to find, that, in my judgment concerning this Author's compoſition, I have coincided with the opinion of a very able critic: "This eaſy and ſafe conveyance of meaning, "it was Swift's deſire to attain, and for having attained, he cer- "tainly deſerves praiſe, though, perhaps, not the higheſt praiſe. "For purpoſes merely didactic, when ſomething is to be told "that was not known before, it is in the higheſt degree proper: "but againſt that inattention by which known truths are ſuffered "to be neglected it makes no proviſion; it inſtructs, but does "not perſuade." Johnſon's Lives of the Poets; in Swift.

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and negligent. In elegant, muſical, and figurative Language, he is much inferior to Mr. Addiſon. His manner of writing carries in it the character of one who reſts altogether upon his ſenſe, and aims at no more than giving his meaning in a clear and conciſe manner.

THAT part of his writings, which I ſhall now examine, is the beginning of his Treatiſe, entitled, "A propoſal for correcting, improving, and aſ- "certaining the Engliſh Tongue," in a Letter addreſſed to the Earl of Oxford, then Lord High Treaſurer. I was led, by the nature of this ſubject, to chooſe this treatiſe: but, in juſtice to the Dean, I muſt obſerve that, after having examined it, I do not eſteem it one of his moſt correct productions; but am apt to think it has been more haſtily compoſed than ſome other of them. It bears the title and form of a Letter: but it is, however, in truth, a Treatiſe deſigned for the Public: and, therefore, in examining it, we cannot proceed upon the indulgence due to an epiſtolary correſpondence. When a man addreſſes himſelf to a Friend only, it is ſufficient if he makes himſelf fully underſtood by him; but when an Author writes for the Public, whether he employ the form of an Epiſtle or not, we are always entitled to expect, that he ſhall expreſs himſelf with accuracy and care. Our Author begins thus:

What I had the honour of mentioning to your Lordſhip, ſometime ago, in converſation, was not a new

new thought, juſt then ſtarted by accident or occaſion, but the reſult of long reflection; and I have been confirmed in my ſentiments by the opinion of ſome very judicious perſons with whom I conſulted.

THE diſpoſition of circumſtances in a ſentence, ſuch as ſerve to limit or to qualify ſome aſſertion, or to denote time and place, I formerly ſhowed to be a matter of nicety; and I obſerved, that it ought to be always held a rule, not to crowd ſuch circumſtances together, but rather to intermix them with more capital words, in ſuch different parts of the ſentence, as can admit them naturally. Here are two circumſtances of this kind placed together, which had better have been ſeparated. *Sometime ago, in converſation*—better thus:—*When I had the honour, ſometime ago, of mentioning to your Lordſhip, in converſation—was not a new thought*, proceeds our Author, *ſtarted by accident or occaſion:* the different meaning of theſe two words may not, at firſt, occur. They have, however, a diſtinct meaning, and are properly uſed: for it is one very laudable property of our Author's Style, that it is ſeldom incumbered with ſuperfluous, ſynonymus words. *Started by accident*, is, fortuitouſly, or at random: ſtarted *by occaſion*, is, by ſome incident, which at that time gave birth to it. His meaning is, that it was not a new thought which either caſually ſprung up in his mind, or was ſuggeſted to him, for the firſt time, by the train of the diſcourſe: but,

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They all agreed, that nothing would be of greater uſe towards the improvement of knowledge and politeneſs, than ſome effectual method, for correcting, enlarging, and aſcertaining our Language; and they think it a work very poſſible to be compaſſed under the protection of a prince, the countenance and encouragement of a miniſtry, and the care of proper perſons choſen for ſuch an undertaking.

THIS is an excellent ſentence; clear, and elegant. The words are all ſimple, well choſen, and expreſſive; and arranged in the moſt proper order. It is a harmonious period too, which is a beauty not frequent in our Author. The laſt part of it conſiſts of three members, which gradually riſe and ſwell one above another, without any affected or unſuitable pomp;—*under the protection of a prince, the countenance and encouragement of a miniſtry, and the care of proper perſons choſen for ſuch an undertaking.* We may remark, in the beginning of the ſentence, the proper uſe of the prepoſition *towards*—*greater uſe towards the improvement of knowledge and politeneſs*—importing the pointing or tendency of any thing to a certain end; which could not have been ſo well expreſſed by the prepoſition *for*, commonly employed in place of *towards*, by Authors who are leſs attentive, than Dean Swift was, to the force of words.

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One fault might, perhaps, be found, both with this and the former ſentence, conſidered as introductory ones. We expect, that an introduction is to unfold, clearly and directly, the ſubject that is to be treated of. In the firſt ſentence, our Author had told us, of a thought he mentioned to his Lordſhip, in converſation, which had been the reſult of long reflection, and concerning which he had conſulted judicious perſons. But what that thought was, we are never told directly. We gather it indeed from the ſecond ſentence, wherein he informs us, in what theſe judicious perſons agreed; namely, that ſome method for improving the Language was both uſeful and practicable. But this indirect method of opening the ſubject, would have been very faulty in a regular treatiſe; though the eaſe of the epiſtolary form, which our Author here aſſumes in addreſſing his patron, may excuſe it in the preſent caſe.

I was glad to find your Lordſhip's anſwer in ſo different a ſtyle from what hath commonly been made uſe of, on the like occaſions, for ſome years paſt; "*That* "*all ſuch thoughts muſt be deferred to a time of* "*peace*;" *a topic which ſome have carried ſo far, that they would not have us, by any means, think of preſerving our civil and religious conſtitution, becauſe we are engaged in a war abroad.*

This ſentence alſo is clear and elegant; only there is one inaccuracy when he ſpeaks of his Lordſhip's

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ſhip's *anſwer* being in ſo different a ſtyle from what had formerly been uſed. His anſwer to what? or to whom? For from any thing going before, it does not appear that any application or addreſs had been made to his Lordſhip by thoſe perſons, whoſe opinion was mentioned in the preceding ſentence; and to whom the anſwer, here ſpoken of, naturally refers. There is a little indiſtinctneſs, as I before obſerved, in our Author's manner of introducing his ſubject here.—We may obſerve too, that the phraſe—*glad to find your anſwer in ſo different a ſtyle*—though abundantly ſuited to the language of converſation, or of a familiar letter, yet, in regular compoſition, requires an additional word—*glad to find your anſwer run in ſo different a ſtyle.*

It will be among the diſtinguiſhing marks of your miniſtry, my Lord, that you have a genius above all ſuch regards, and that no reaſonable propoſal, for the honour, the advantage, or ornament of your country, however foreign to your immediate office, was ever neglected by you.

THE phraſe—*a genius above all ſuch regards*, both ſeems ſomewhat harſh, and does not clearly expreſs what the Author means, namely, the *confined views* of thoſe who neglected every thing that belonged to the arts of peace in the time of war.—Except this expreſſion, there is nothing that can be ſubject to the leaſt reprehenſion in this ſentence, nor in all that follows, to the end of the paragraph.

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I confeſs the merit of this candor and condeſcenſion is very much leſſened, becauſe your Lordſhip hardly leaves us room to offer our good wiſhes; removing all our difficulties, and ſupplying our wants, faſter than the moſt viſionary projector can adjuſt his ſchemes. And therefore, my Lord, the deſign of this paper is not ſo much to offer you ways and means, as to complain of a grievance, the redreſſing of which is to be your own work, as much as that of paying the nation's debts, or opening a trade into the South Sea; and though not of ſuch immediate benefit as either of theſe, or any other of your glorious actions, yet, perhaps, in future ages not leſs to your honour.

THE compliments which the Dean here pays to his patron, are very high and ſtrained; and ſhow, that, with all his ſurlineſs, he was as capable, on ſome occaſions, of making his court to a great man by flattery, as other writers. However, with reſpect to the Style, which is the ſole object of our preſent conſideration, every thing here, as far as appears to me, is faultleſs. In theſe ſentences, and, indeed, throughout this paragraph, in general, which we have now ended, our Author's Style appears to great advantage. We ſee that eaſe and ſimplicity, that correctneſs and diſtinctneſs, which particularly characteriſe it. It is very remarkable, how few Latiniſed words Dean Swift employs. No writer, in our Language, is ſo purely Engliſh as he is, or borrows ſo little aſſiſtance from words of foreign derivation. From none can we take a better model

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of the choice and proper ſignificancy of words. It is remarkable, in the ſentences we have now before us, how plain all the expreſſions are, and yet, at the ſame time, how ſignificant; and in the midſt of that high ſtrain of compliment into which he riſes, how little there is of pomp, or glare of expreſſion. How very few writers can preſerve this manly temperance of Style; or would think a compliment of this nature ſupported with ſufficient dignity, unleſs they had embelliſhed it with ſome of thoſe high-ſounding words, whoſe chief effect is no other than to give their Language a ſtiff and forced appearance?

My Lord, I do here, in the name of all the learned and polite perſons of the nation, complain to your Lordſhip, as Firſt Miniſter, that our Language is extremely imperfect; that its daily improvements are by no means in proportion to its daily corruptions; that the pretenders to poliſh and refine it, have chiefly multiplied abuſes and abſurdities; and that, in many inſtances, it offends againſt every part of grammar.

The turn of this ſentence is extremely elegant. He had ſpoken before of a grievance for which he ſought redreſs, and he carries on the alluſion, by entering, here, directly on his ſubject, in the Style of a public repreſentation preſented to the Miniſter of State. One imperfection, however, there is in this ſentence, which, luckily for our purpoſe, ſerves to illuſtrate a rule before given, concerning the poſition

ſition of adverbs, ſo as to avoid ambiguity. It is in the middle of the ſentence;—*that the pretenders to poliſh and refine it, have chiefly multiplied abuſes and abſurdities.*—Now concerning the import of this adverb, *chiefly*, I aſk, whether it ſignifies that theſe pretenders to poliſh the Language, have been the *chief perſons* who have multiplied its abuſes, in diſtinction *from others*; or, that the *chief thing* which theſe pretenders have done, is to multiply the abuſes of our Language, in oppoſition to their *doing any thing to refine it?* Theſe two meanings are really different; and yet by the poſition which the word *chiefly* has in the ſentence, we are left at a loſs in which to underſtand it. The conſtruction would lead us rather to the latter ſenſe; that the chief thing which theſe pretenders have done, is to multiply the abuſes of our Language. But it is more than probable, that the former ſenſe was what the Dean intended, as it carries more of his uſual ſatirical edge; "that the pretended refiners of our "Language were, in fact, its chief corrupters;" on which ſuppoſition, his words ought to have run thus: *that the pretenders to poliſh and refine it, have been the chief perſons to multiply its abuſes and abſurdities*; which would have rendered the ſenſe perfectly clear.

Perhaps, too, there might be ground for obſerving farther upon this ſentence, that as Language is the object with which it ſets out; *that our Language is extremely imperfect*; and as there follows an

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an enumeration concerning Language, in three particulars, it had been better if Language had been kept the ruling word, or the nominative to every verb without changing the conſtruction; by making *pretenders* the ruling word, as is done in the ſecond member of the enumeration, and then, in the third, returning again to the former word, *Language—That the pretenders to poliſh—and that, in many inſtances, it offends*—I am perſuaded, that the ſtructure of the ſentence would have been more neat and happy, and its unity more complete, if the members of it had been arranged thus: "That "our Language is extremely imperfect; that its "daily improvements are by no means in propor- "tion to its daily corruptions; that, in many in- "ſtances, it offends againſt every part of gram- "mar; and that the pretenders to poliſh and re- "fine it, have been the chief perſons to multiply "its abuſes and abſurdities."—This degree of attention ſeemed proper to be beſtowed on ſuch a ſentence as this, in order to ſhow how it might have been conducted after the moſt perfect manner. Our Author, after having ſaid,

Leſt your Lordſhip ſhould think my cenſure too ſevere, I ſhall take leave to be more particular; proceeds in the following paragraph:

I believe your Lordſhip will agree with me, in the reaſon why our Language is leſs refined than thoſe of Italy, Spain, or France.

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I AM ſorry to ſay, that now we ſhall have leſs to commend in our Author. For the whole of this paragraph, on which we are entering, is, in truth, perplexed and inaccurate. Even, in this ſhort ſentence, we may diſcern an inaccuracy—*why our Language is leſs refined than thoſe of Italy, Spain, or France*; putting the pronoun *thoſe* in the plural, when the antecedent ſubſtantive to which it refers is in the ſingular, *our Language*. Inſtances of this kind may ſometimes be found in Engliſh authors; but they ſound harſh to the ear, and are certainly contrary to the purity of grammar. By a very little attention, this inaccuracy might have been remedied, and the ſentence have been made to run much better in this way; "why our Language is "leſs refined than the Italian, Spaniſh, or French."

It is plain, that the Latin Tongue, in its purity, was never in this iſland; towards the conqueſt of which, few or no attempts were made till the time of Claudius; neither was that Language ever ſo vulgar in Britain, as it is known to have been in Gaul and Spain.

To ſay, that *the Latin Tongue, in its purity, was never in this iſland*, is very careleſs Style; it ought to have been, *was never ſpoken in this iſland*. In the progreſs of the ſentence, he means to give a reaſon why the Latin was never ſpoken in its purity amongſt us, becauſe our iſland was not conquered by the Romans till after the purity of their

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Tongue began to decline. But this reaſon ought to have been brought out more clearly. This might eaſily have been done, and the relation of the ſeveral parts of the ſentence to each other much better pointed out by means of a ſmall variation; thus: "It is plain, that the Latin Tongue, in its "purity, was never ſpoken in this iſland, as few or "no attempts towards the conqueſt of it were made "till the time of Claudius." He adds, *Neither was that Language ever ſo vulgar in Britain.*—*Vulgar* was one of the worſt words he could have choſen for expreſſing what he means here; namely, that the Latin Tongue was at no time ſo *general*, or ſo much in *common uſe*, in Britain, as it is known to have been in Gaul and Spain.—*Vulgar*, when applied to Language, commonly ſignifies impure, or debaſed Language, ſuch as is ſpoken by the low people, which is quite oppoſite to the Author's ſenſe here; for, inſtead of meaning to ſay, that the Latin ſpoken in Britain was not ſo debaſed, as what was ſpoken in Gaul and Spain; he means juſt the contrary, and had been telling us, that we never were acquainted with the Latin at all, till its purity began to be corrupted.

Further, we find that the Roman legions here were at length all recalled to help their country againſt the Goths, and other barbarous invaders.

THE chief ſcope of this ſentence is, to give a reaſon why the Latin Tongue did not ſtrike any deep

deep root in this iſland, on account of the ſhort continuance of the Romans in it. He goes on: LECT. XXIV.

Meantime the Britons, left to ſhift for themſelves, and daily haraſſed by cruel inroads from the Picts, were forced to call in the Saxons for their defence; who, conſequently, reduced the greateſt part of the iſland to their own power, drove the Britons into the moſt remote and mountainous parts, and the reſt of the country, in cuſtoms, religion, and language, became wholly Saxon.

This is a very exceptionable ſentence. Firſt, the phraſe, *left to ſhift for themſelves*, is rather a low phraſe, and too much in the familiar Style to be proper in a grave treatiſe. Next, as the ſentence advances—*forced to call in the Saxons for their defence, who, conſequently, reduced the greateſt part of the iſland to their own power.*—What is the meaning of *conſequently* here? If it means "afterwards," or "in progreſs of time," this, certainly, is not a ſenſe in which *conſequently* is often taken; and therefore the expreſſion is chargeable with obſcurity. The adverb, *conſequently*, in its moſt common acceptation, denotes one thing following from another, as an effect from a cauſe. If he uſes it in this ſenſe, and means that the Britons being ſubdued by the Saxons, was a neceſſary conſequence of their having called in theſe Saxons to their aſſiſtance, this conſequence is drawn too abruptly, and needed more explanation. For though it has often

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happened, that nations have been ſubdued by their own auxiliaries, yet this is not a conſequence of ſuch a nature that it can be aſſumed, as it ſeems here to be done, for a firſt and ſelf-evident principle.—But further, what ſhall we ſay to this phraſe, *reduced the greateſt part of the iſland to their own power?* we ſay, *reduce to rule*, *reduce to practice*—we can ſay, that *one nation reduces another to ſubjection.*—But when *dominion* or *power* is uſed, we always, as far as I know, ſay, *reduce under their power*. *Reduce to their power*, is ſo harſh and uncommon an expreſſion, that, though Dean Swift's authority in language be very great, yet, in the uſe of this phraſe, I am of opinion that it would not be ſafe to follow his example.

Besides theſe particular inaccuracies, this ſentence is chargeable with want of unity in the compoſition of the whole. The perſons and the ſcene are too often changed upon us—Firſt, the Britons are mentioned, who are haraſſed by inroads from the Picts; next, the Saxons appear, who ſubdue the greateſt part of the iſland, and drive the Britons into the mountains; and, laſtly, the reſt of the country is introduced, and a deſcription given of the change made upon it. All this forms a group of various objects, preſented in ſuch quick ſucceſſion, that the mind finds it difficult to comprehend them under one view. Accordingly it is quoted in the *Elements of Criticiſm*, as an inſtance of a ſentence rendered faulty by the breach of unity.

This

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This I take to be the reaſon why there are more Latin words remaining in the Britiſh than the old Saxon; which, excepting ſome few variations in the orthography, is the ſame in moſt original words with our preſent Engliſh, as well as with the German and other northern dialects.

THIS ſentence is faulty, ſomewhat in the ſame manner with the laſt. It is looſe in the connection of its parts; and, beſides this, it is alſo too looſely connected with the preceding ſentence. What he had there ſaid, concerning the Saxons expelling the Britons, and changing the cuſtoms, the religion, and the language of the country, is a clear and good reaſon for our preſent language being Saxon rather than Britiſh. This is the inference which we would naturally expect him to draw from the premiſes juſt before laid down: But when he tells us, that *this is the reaſon why there are more Latin words remaining in the Britiſh tongue than in the old Saxon*, we are preſently at a ſtand. No reaſon for this inference appears. If it can be gathered at all from the foregoing deduction, it is gathered only imperfectly. For as he had told us that the Britons had *ſome* connection with the Romans, he ſhould have alſo told us, in order to make out his inference, that the Saxons never had *any*. The truth is, the whole of this paragraph, concerning the influence of the Latin tongue upon ours, is careleſs, perplexed, and obſcure. His argument required to have been more fully unfolded, in order to make it be diſtinctly apprehended, and to give it its due force.

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In the next paragraph, he proceeds to diſcourſe concerning the influence of the French tongue upon our language. The Style becomes more clear, though not remarkable for great beauty or elegance.

Edward the Confeſſor having lived long in France, appears to be the firſt who introduced any mixture of the French tongue with the Saxon; the court affecting what the Prince was fond of, and others taking it up for a faſhion, as it is now with us. William the Conqueror proceeded much further, bringing over with him vaſt numbers of that nation, ſcattering them in every monaſtery, giving them great quantities of land, directing all pleadings to be in that language, and endeavouring to make it univerſal in the kingdom.

On theſe two ſentences, I have nothing of moment to obſerve. The ſenſe is brought out clearly, and in ſimple, unaffected language.

This, at leaſt, is the opinion generally received; but your Lordſhip hath fully convinced me, that the French tongue made yet a greater progreſs here under Harry the Second, who had large territories on that continent both from his father and his wife; made frequent journeys and expeditions thither; and was always attended with a number of his countrymen, retainers at court.

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In the beginning of this ſentence, our Author ſtates an oppoſition between an opinion generally received, and that of his Lordſhip; and in compliment to his patron, he tells us, that his Lordſhip had convinced him of ſomewhat that differed from the general opinion. Thus one muſt naturally underſtand his words: *This, at leaſt, is the opinion generally received; but your Lordſhip hath fully convinced me*—Now here there muſt be an inaccuracy of expreſſion. For, on examining what went before, there appears no ſort of oppoſition betwixt the generally received opinion, and that of the Author's patron. The general opinion was, that William the Conqueror had proceeded much farther than Edward the Confeſſor, in propagating the French language, and had endeavoured to make it univerſal. Lord Oxford's opinion was, that the French tongue had gone on to make a yet greater progreſs under Harry the Second, than it had done under his predeceſſor William: which two opinions are as entirely conſiſtent with each other, as any can be; and therefore the oppoſition here affected to be ſtated between them, by the adverſative particle *but*, was improper and groundleſs.

For ſome centuries after, there was a conſtant intercourſe between France and England by the dominions we poſſeſſed there, and the conqueſts we made; ſo that our language, between two and three hundred years ago, ſeems to have had a greater mixture with French than at preſent; many words having been afterwards rejected, and ſome ſince the days of

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Spenſer; although we have ſtill retained not a few, which have been long antiquated in France.

THIS is a ſentence too long and intricate, and liable to the ſame objection that was made to a former one, of the want of unity. It conſiſts of four members, each divided from the ſubſequent by a ſemicolon. In going along, we naturally expect the ſentence is to end at the ſecond of theſe, or, at fartheſt, at the third; when, to our ſurpriſe, a new member of the period makes its appearance, and fatigues our attention in joining all the parts together. Such a ſtructure of a ſentence is always the mark of careleſs writing. In the firſt member of the ſentence, *a conſtant intercourſe between France and England, by the dominions we poſſeſſed there, and the conqueſts we made*, the conſtruction is not ſufficiently filled up. In place of *intercourſe by the dominions we poſſeſſed*, it ſhould have been—*by reaſon of the dominions we poſſeſſed*—or—*occaſioned by the dominions we poſſeſſed*—and in place of—*the dominions we poſſeſſed there, and the conqueſts we made*, the regular Style is—*the dominions which we poſſeſſed there, and the conqueſts which we made*. The relative pronoun *which* is indeed in phraſes of this kind ſometimes omitted: But, when it is omitted, the Style becomes elliptic; and though in converſation, or in the very light and eaſy kinds of writing, ſuch elliptic Style may not be improper, yet in grave and regular writing, it is better to fill up the conſtruction, and inſert the relative pronoun.—After having ſaid—*I could produce*

produce ſeveral inſtances of both kinds, if it were of any uſe or entertainment—our Author begins the next paragraph thus:

To examine into the ſeveral circumſtances by which the language of a country may be altered, would force me to enter into a wide field.

THERE is nothing remarkable in this ſentence, unleſs that here occurs the firſt inſtance of a metaphor ſince the beginning of this treatiſe; *entering into a wide field*, being put for beginning an extenſive ſubject. Few writers deal leſs in figurative language than Swift. I before obſerved, that he appears to deſpiſe ornaments of this kind; and though this renders his Style ſomewhat dry on ſerious ſubjects, yet his plainneſs and ſimplicity, I muſt not forbear to remind my readers, is far preferable to an oſtentatious and affected parade of ornament.

I ſhall only obſerve, that the Latin, the French, and the Engliſh, ſeem to have undergone the ſame fortune. The firſt, from the days of Romulus to thoſe of Julius Cæſar, ſuffered perpetual changes; and by what we meet in thoſe Authors who occaſionally ſpeak on that ſubject, as well as from certain fragments of old laws, it is manifeſt, that the Latin, three hundred years before Tully, was as unintelligible in his time, as the French and Engliſh of the ſame period are now; and theſe two have changed as much

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much ſince William the Conqueror (which is but little leſs than ſeven hundred years), as the Latin appears to have done in the like term.

THE Dean plainly appears to be writing negligently here. This ſentence is one of that involved and intricate kind, of which ſome inſtances have occured before; but none worſe than this. It requires a very diſtinct head to comprehend the whole meaning of the period at firſt reading. In one part of it we find extreme careleſſneſs of expreſſion. He ſays, *it is manifeſt that the Latin, three hundred years before Tully, was as unintelligible in his time, as the Engliſh and French of the ſame period are now.* By the Engliſh and French *of the ſame period*, muſt naturally be underſtood, *the Engliſh and French that were ſpoken three hundred years before Tully.* This is the only grammatical meaning his words will bear; and yet aſſuredly what he means, and what it would have been eaſy for him to have expreſſed with more preciſion, is, *the Engliſh and French that were ſpoken three hundred years ago*; or at a period equally diſtant from our age, as the old Latin, which he had mentioned, was from the age of Tully. But when an Author writes haſtily, and does not review with proper care what he has written, many ſuch inaccuracies will be apt to creep into his Style.

Whether our Language or the French will decline as faſt as the Roman did, is a queſtion that would perhaps

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perhaps admit more debate than it is worth. There were many reaſons for the corruptions of the laſt; as the change of their government to a tyranny, which ruined the ſtudy of eloquence, there being no further uſe or encouragement for popular orators; their giving not only the freedom of the city, but capacity for employments, to ſeveral towns in Gaul, Spain, and Germany, and other diſtant parts, as far as Aſia, which brought a great number of foreign pretenders to Rome; the ſlaviſh diſpoſition of the Senate and people, by which the wit and eloquence of the age were wholly turned into panegyric, the moſt barren of all ſubjects; the great corruption of manners, and introduction of foreign luxury, with foreign terms to expreſs it, with ſeveral others that might be aſſigned; not to mention the invaſion from the Goths and Vandals, which are too obvious to inſiſt on.

In the enumeration here made of the cauſes contributing towards the corruption of the Roman Language, there are many inaccuracies—*The change of their government to a tyranny*—of whoſe government? He had indeed been ſpeaking of the Roman language, and therefore we gueſs at his meaning; but the Style is ungrammatical; for he had not mentioned the Romans themſelves; and therefore, when he ſays *their government*, there is no antecedent in the ſentence to which the pronoun, *their*, can refer with any propriety.—*Giving the capacity for employments to ſeveral towns in Gaul*, is a queſtionable expreſſion. For though towns are ſometimes

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times put for the people who inhabit them, yet to give a town *the capacity for employments*, ſounds harſh and uncouth.—*The wit and eloquence of the age wholly turned into panegyric*, is a phraſe which does not well expreſs the meaning. Neither wit nor eloquence can be turned into panegyric; but they may be turned *towards panegyric*, or, *employed in panegyric*, which was the ſenſe the Author had in view.

THE concluſion of the enumeration is viſibly incorrect—*The great corruption of manners, and introduction of foreign luxury, with foreign terms to expreſs it, with ſeveral others that might be aſſigned* —He means, *with ſeveral other reaſons*. The word, *reaſons*, had indeed been mentioned before; but as it ſtands at the diſtance of thirteen lines backward, the repetition of it here became indiſpenſable, in order to avoid ambiguity. *Not to mention*, he adds, *the invaſions from the Goths and Vandals, which are too obvious to inſiſt on*. One would imagine him to mean, that the invaſions from the Goths and Vandals, are *hiſtorical facts* too well known and obvious to be inſiſted on. But he means quite a different thing, though he has not taken the proper method of expreſſing it, through his haſte, probably, to finiſh the paragraph; namely, that theſe invaſions from the Goths and Vandals *were cauſes of the corruption of the Roman Language too obvious to be inſiſted on*.

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I SHALL not purſue this criticiſm any farther. I have been obliged to point out many inaccuracies in the paſſage which we have conſidered. But, in order that my obſervations may not be conſtrued as meant to depreciate the Style or the Writings of Dean Swift below their juſt value, there are two remarks, which I judge it neceſſary to make before concluding this Lecture. One is, that it were unfair to eſtimate an Author's Style on the whole, by ſome paſſage in his writings, which chances to be compoſed in a careleſs manner. This is the caſe with reſpect to this treatiſe, which has much the appearance of a haſty production; though, as I before obſerved, it was by no means on that account that I pitched upon it for the ſubject of this exerciſe. But after having examined it, I am ſenſible that, in many other of his writings, the Dean is more accurate.

MY other obſervation, which is equally applicable to Dean Swift and Mr. Addiſon, is, that there may be writers much freer from ſuch inaccuracies, as I have had occaſion to point out in theſe two, whoſe Style, however, upon the whole, may not have half their merit. Refinement in Language has, of late years, begun to be much attended to. In ſeveral modern productions of very ſmall value, I ſhould find it difficult to point out many errors in Language. The words might, probably, be all proper words, correctly and clearly arranged, and the turn of the ſentence ſonorous and

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and muſical; whilſt yet the Style, upon the whole, might deſerve no praiſe. The fault often lies in what may be called the general caſt or complexion of the Style; which a perſon of a good taſte diſcerns to be vicious; to be feeble, for inſtance, and diffuſe; flimſy or affected; petulant or oſtentatious; though the faults cannot be ſo eaſily pointed out and particulariſed, as when they lie in ſome erroneous, or negligent conſtruction of a ſentence. Whereas, ſuch writers as Addiſon and Swift carry always thoſe general characters of good Style, which, in the midſt of their occaſional negligences, every perſon of good taſte muſt diſcern and approve. We ſee their faults overbalanced by higher beauties. We ſee a writer of ſenſe and reflection expreſſing his ſentiments without affectation, attentive to thoughts as well as to words; and, in the main current of his Language, elegant and beautiful; and, therefore, the only proper uſe to be made of the blemiſhes which occur in the writings of ſuch Authors, is to point out to thoſe who apply themſelves to the ſtudy of compoſition, ſome of the rules which they ought to obſerve for avoiding ſuch errors; and to render them ſenſible of the neceſſity of ſtrict attention to Language and to Style. Let them imitate the eaſe and ſimplicity of thoſe great Authors; let them ſtudy to be always natural, and, as far as they can, always correct in their expreſſions; let them endeavour to be, at ſometimes, lively and ſtriking; but carefully avoid being at any time oſtentatious and affected.

LECTURE XXV.

ELOQUENCE, OR PUBLIC SPEAKING.—HISTORY OF ELOQUENCE.—GRECIAN ELOQUENCE.—DEMOSTHENES.

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HAVING finiſhed that part of the Courſe which relates to Language and Style, we are now to aſcend a ſtep higher, and to examine the ſubjects upon which Style is employed. I begin with what is properly called Eloquence, or Public Speaking. In treating of this, I am to conſider the different kinds and ſubjects of Public Speaking; the manner ſuited to each; the proper diſtribution and management of all the parts of a diſcourſe; and the proper pronunciation or delivery of it. But before I enter on any of theſe heads, it may be proper to take a view of the nature of Eloquence in general, and of the ſtate in which it has ſubſiſted in different ages and countries. This will lead into ſome detail; but I hope an uſeful one; as in every art it is of great conſequence to have a juſt idea of the perfection of that art, of the end at which it aims, and of the progreſs which it has made among mankind.

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OF Eloquence, in particular, it is the more neceſſary to aſcertain the proper notion, becauſe there is not any thing concerning which falſe notions have been more prevalent. Hence, it has been ſo often, and is ſtill at this day, in diſrepute with many. When you ſpeak to a plain man of Eloquence, or in praiſe of it, he is apt to hear you with very little attention. He conceives Eloquence to ſignify a certain trick of Speech; the art of varniſhing weak arguments plauſibly; or of ſpeaking ſo as to pleaſe and tickle the ear. "Give me "good ſenſe," ſays he, "and keep your Eloquence "for boys." He is in the right, if Eloquence were what he conceives it to be. It would be then a very contemptible art indeed, below the ſtudy of any wiſe or good man. But nothing can be more remote from truth. To be truly eloquent, is to ſpeak to the purpoſe. For the beſt definition which, I think, can be given of Eloquence, is the Art of Speaking in ſuch a manner as to attain the end for which we ſpeak. Whenever a man ſpeaks or writes, he is ſuppoſed, as a rational being, to have ſome end in view; either to inform, or to amuſe, or to perſuade, or, in ſome way or other, to act upon his fellow-creatures. He who ſpeaks, or writes, in ſuch a manner as to adapt all his words moſt effectually to that end, is the moſt eloquent man. Whatever then the ſubject be, there is room for Eloquence; in hiſtory, or even in philoſophy, as well as in orations. The definition which I have given of Eloquence, comprehends all the dif-

ferent kinds of it; whether calculated to inſtruct, to perſuade, or to pleaſe. But, as the moſt important ſubject of diſcourſe is Action, or Conduct, the power of Eloquence chiefly appears when it is employed to influence Conduct, and perſuade to Action. As it is principally with reference to this end, that it becomes the object of Art, Eloquence may, under this view of it, be defined, The Art of Perſuaſion.

THIS being once eſtabliſhed, certain conſequences immediately follow, which point out the fundamental maxims of the Art. It follows clearly, that, in order to perſuade, the moſt eſſential requiſites are, ſolid argument, clear method, a character of probity appearing in the Speaker, joined with ſuch graces of ſtyle and utterance, as ſhall draw our attention to what he ſays. Good ſenſe is the foundation of all. No man can be truly eloquent without it; for fools can perſuade none but fools. In order to perſuade a man of ſenſe, you muſt firſt convince him; which is only to be done, by ſatisfying his underſtanding of the reaſonableneſs of what you propoſe to him.

THIS leads me to obſerve, that convincing and perſuading, though they are ſometimes confounded, import, notwithſtanding, different things, which it is neceſſary for us, at preſent, to diſtinguiſh from each other. Conviction affects the underſtanding only; perſuaſion, the will and the practice. It is

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the buſineſs of the philoſopher to convince me of truth; it is the buſineſs of the orator to perſuade me to act agreeably to it, by engaging my affections on its ſide. Conviction, and perſuaſion, do not always go together. They *ought*, indeed, to go together; and *would* do ſo, if our inclination regularly followed the dictates of our underſtanding. But as our nature is conſtituted, I may be convinced, that virtue, juſtice, or public ſpirit, are laudable, while, at the ſame time, I am not perſuaded to act according to them. The inclination may revolt, though the underſtanding be ſatisfied; the paſſions may prevail againſt the judgment. Conviction is, however, always one avenue to the inclination, or heart; and it is that which an Orator muſt firſt bend his ſtrength to gain: for no perſuaſion is likely to be ſtable, which is not founded on conviction. But, in order to perſuade, the Orator muſt go farther than merely producing conviction; he muſt conſider man as a creature moved by many different ſprings, and muſt act upon them all. He muſt addreſs himſelf to the paſſions; he muſt paint to the fancy, and touch the heart; and, hence, beſides ſolid argument, and clear method, all the conciliating and intereſting arts, both of Compoſition and Pronunciation, enter into the idea of Eloquence.

An objection may, perhaps, hence be formed againſt Eloquence; as an Art which may be employed for perſuading to ill, as well as to good. There is no doubt

doubt that it may; and ſo reaſoning may alſo be, and too often is employed, for leading men into error. But who would think of forming an argument from this againſt the cultivation of our reaſoning powers? Reaſon, Eloquence, and every Art which ever has been ſtudied among mankind, may be abuſed, and may prove dangerous in the hands of bad men; but it were perfectly childiſh to contend, that, upon this account, they ought to be aboliſhed. Give truth and virtue the ſame arms which you give vice and falſehood, and the former are likely to prevail. Eloquence is no invention of the ſchools. Nature teaches every man to be eloquent, when he is much in earneſt. Place him in ſome critical ſituation; let him have ſome great intereſt at ſtake, and you will ſee him lay hold of the moſt effectual means of perſuaſion. The Art of Oratory propoſes nothing more than to follow out that track which Nature has firſt pointed out. And the more exactly that this track is purſued, the more that Eloquence is properly ſtudied, the more ſhall we be guarded againſt the abuſe which bad men make of it, and enabled the better to diſtinguiſh between true Eloquence and the tricks of Sophiſtry.

We may diſtinguiſh three kinds, or degrees, of Eloquence. The firſt, and loweſt, is that which aims only at pleaſing the hearers. Such, generally, is the Eloquence of panegyrics, inaugural orations, addreſſes to great men, and other harangues of this

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ſort. This ornamental ſort of Compoſition is not altogether to be rejected. It may innocently amuſe and entertain the mind; and it may be mixed, at the ſame time, with very uſeful ſentiments. But it muſt be confeſſed, that where the Speaker has no farther aim than merely to ſhine and to pleaſe, there is great danger of Art being ſtrained into oſtentation, and of the Compoſition becoming tireſome and languid.

A SECOND and a higher degree of Eloquence is when the Speaker aims not merely to pleaſe, but alſo to inform, to inſtruct, to convince: when his Art is exerted in removing prejudices againſt himſelf and his cauſe, in chuſing the moſt proper arguments, ſtating them with the greateſt force, arranging them in the beſt order, expreſſing and delivering them with propriety and beauty; and thereby diſpoſing us to paſs that judgment, or embrace that ſide of the cauſe, to which he ſeeks to bring us. Within this compaſs, chiefly, is employed the Eloquence of the bar.

BUT there is a third, and ſtill higher degree of Eloquence, wherein a greater power is exerted over the human mind; by which we are not only convinced, but are intereſted, agitated, and carried along with the Speaker; our paſſions are made to riſe together with his; we enter into all his emotions; we love, we deteſt, we reſent, according as he inſpires us; and are prompted to reſolve,

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reſolve, or to act, with vigour and warmth. Debate, in popular aſſemblies, opens the moſt illuſtrious field to this ſpecies of Eloquence; and the pulpit, alſo, admits it.

I AM here to obſerve, and the obſervation is of conſequence, that the high Eloquence which I have laſt mentioned, is always the offspring of paſſion. By paſſion, I mean that ſtate of the mind in which it is agitated, and fired, by ſome object it has in view. A man may convince, and even perſuade others to act, by mere reaſon and argument. But that degree of Eloquence which gains the admiration of mankind, and properly denominates one an Orator, is never found without warmth, or paſſion. Paſſion, when in ſuch a degree as to rouſe and kindle the mind, without throwing it out of the poſſeſſion of itſelf, is univerſally found to exalt all the human powers. It renders the mind infinitely more enlightened, more penetrating, more vigorous and maſterly, than it is in its calm moments. A man, actuated by a ſtrong paſſion, becomes much greater than he is at other times. He is conſcious of more ſtrength and force; he utters greater ſentiments, conceives higher deſigns, and executes them with a boldneſs and a felicity, of which, on other occaſions, he could not think himſelf capable. But chiefly, with reſpect to perſuaſion, is the power of paſſion felt. Almoſt every man, in paſſion, is eloquent. Then, he is at no loſs for words and arguments. He tranſmits to others, by a ſort of

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contagious ſympathy, the warm ſentiments which he feels: his looks and geſtures are all perſuaſive; and Nature here ſhows herſelf infinitely more powerful than Art. This is the foundation of that juſt and noted rule: "Si vis me flere, dolendum eſt "primum ipſi tibi."

THIS principle being once admitted, that all high Eloquence flows from paſſion, ſeveral conſequences follow, which deſerve to be attended to; and the mention of which will ſerve to confirm the principle itſelf. For hence, the univerſally acknowledged effect of enthuſiaſm, or warmth of any kind, in Public Speakers, for affecting their audience. Hence all laboured declamation, and affected ornaments of Style, which ſhew the mind to be cool and unmoved, are ſo inconſiſtent with perſuaſive Eloquence. Hence all ſtudied prettineſſes, in geſture or pronunciation, detract ſo greatly from the weight of a Speaker. Hence a diſcourſe that is read, moves us leſs than one that is ſpoken, as having leſs the appearance of coming warm from the heart. Hence, to call a man cold, is the ſame thing as to ſay, that he is not eloquent. Hence a ſceptical man, who is always in ſuſpence, and feels nothing ſtrongly; or a cunning mercenary man, who is ſuſpected rather to aſſume the appearance of paſſion than to feel it; have ſo little power over men in Public Speaking. Hence, in fine, the neceſſity of being, and being believed to be, diſintereſted, and in earneſt, in order to perſuade.

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THESE are ſome of the capital ideas which have occurred to me, concerning Eloquence in general; and with which I have thought proper to begin, as the foundation of much of what I am afterwards to ſuggeſt. From what I have already ſaid, it is evident that Eloquence is a high talent, and of great importance in ſociety; and that it requires both natural genius, and much improvement from Art. Viewed as the Art of Perſuaſion, it requires, in its loweſt ſtate, ſoundneſs of underſtanding, and conſiderable acquaintance with human nature; and, in its higher degrees, it requires, moreover, ſtrong ſenſibility of mind, a warm and lively imagination, joined with correctneſs of judgment, and an extenſive command of the power of Language; to which muſt alſo be added, the graces of Pronunciation and Delivery.—Let us next proceed to conſider in what ſtate Eloquence has ſubſiſted in different ages and nations.

IT is an obſervation made by ſeveral writers, that Eloquence is to be looked for only in free ſtates. Longinus, in particular, at the end of his treatiſe on the ſublime, when aſſigning the reaſon why ſo little ſublimity of genius appeared in the age wherein he lived, illuſtrates this obſervation with a great deal of beauty. Liberty, he remarks, is the nurſe of true genius; it animates the ſpirit, and invigorates the hopes of men; excites honourable emulation, and a deſire of excelling in every Art. All other qualifications, he ſays, you may find among

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thoſe who are deprived of liberty; but never did a ſlave become an orator; he can only be a pompous flatterer. Now, though this reaſoning be, in the main, true; it muſt, however, be underſtood with ſome limitations. For, under arbitrary governments, if they be of the civilized kind, and give encouragement to the arts, ornamented Eloquence may flouriſh remarkably. Witneſs France at this day, where, ever ſince the reign of Louis XIV. more of what may juſtly be called Eloquence, within a certain ſphere, is to be found, than, perhaps, in any other nation in Europe; though freedom be enjoyed by ſome nations in a much greater degree. The French ſermons, and orations pronounced on public occaſions, are not only polite and elegant harangues, but ſeveral of them are uncommonly ſpirited, are animated with bold figures, and riſe to a degree of the Sublime. Their Eloquence, however, in general, muſt be confeſſed to be of the flowery, rather than the vigorous kind; calculated more to pleaſe and ſoothe, than to convince and perſuade. High, manly, and forcible Eloquence is, indeed, to be looked for only, or chiefly, in the regions of freedom. Under arbitrary governments, beſides the general turn of ſoftneſs and effeminacy which ſuch governments may be juſtly ſuppoſed to give to the ſpirit of a nation, the art of ſpeaking cannot be ſuch an inſtrument of ambition, buſineſs, and power, as it is in democratical ſtates. It is confined within a narrower range; it can be employed only

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only in the pulpit, or at the bar; but is excluded from thoſe great ſcenes of public buſineſs, where the ſpirits of men have the freeſt exertion; where important affairs are tranſacted, and perſuaſion, of courſe, is more ſeriouſly ſtudied. Wherever man can acquire moſt power over man by means of reaſon and diſcourſe, which certainly is under a free ſtate of government, there we may naturally expect that true Eloquence will be beſt underſtood, and carried to the greateſt height.

HENCE, in tracing the riſe of oratory, we need not attempt to go far back into the early ages of the world, or ſearch for it among the monuments of Eaſtern or Egyptian antiquity. In thoſe ages, there was, indeed, an Eloquence of a certain kind; but it approached nearer to Poetry, than to what we properly call Oratory. There is reaſon to believe, as I formerly ſhowed, that the Language of the firſt ages was paſſionate and metaphorical; owing partly to the ſcanty ſtock of words, of which Speech then conſiſted; and partly to the tincture which Language naturally takes from the ſavage and uncultivated ſtate of men, agitated by unreſtrained paſſions, and ſtruck by events, which to them are ſtrange and ſurpriſing. In this ſtate, rapture and enthuſiaſm, the parents of Poetry, had an ample field. But while the intercourſe of men was as yet unfrequent, and force and ſtrength were the chief means employed in deciding controverſies, the arts of Oratory and Perſuaſion, of Reaſoning

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ſoning and Debate, could be but little known. The firſt empires that aroſe, the Aſſyrian and Egyptian, were of the deſpotic kind. The whole power was in the hands of one, or at moſt of a few. The multitude were accuſtomed to a blind reverence; they were led, not perſuaded; and none of thoſe refinements of ſociety, which make public ſpeaking an object of importance, were as yet introduced.

It is not till the riſe of the Grecian Republics, that we find any remarkable appearances of Eloquence as the art of perſuaſion; and theſe gave it ſuch a field as it never had before, and, perhaps, has never had again ſince that time. And, therefore, as the Grecian Eloquence has ever been the object of admiration to thoſe who have ſtudied the powers of Speech, it is neceſſary, that we fix our attention, for a little, on this period.

Greece was divided into a multitude of petty ſtates. Theſe were governed, at firſt, by kings who were call Tyrants; on whoſe expulſion from all theſe ſtates, there ſprung up a great number of democratical governments, founded nearly on the ſame plan, animated by the ſame high ſpirit of freedom, mutually jealous, and rivals of one another. We may compute the flouriſhing period of thoſe Grecian ſtates, to have laſted from the battle of Marathon, till the time of Alexander the Great, who ſubdued the liberties of Greece; a period

period which comprehends about 150 years, and within which are to be found moſt of their celebrated poets and philoſophers, but chiefly their Orators; for though poetry and philoſophy were not extinct among them after that period, yet Eloquence hardly made any figure.

Of theſe Grecian Republics, the moſt noted, by far, for Eloquence, and, indeed, for arts of every kind, was that of Athens. The Athenians were an ingenious, quick, ſprightly people; practiſed in buſineſs, and ſharpened by frequent and ſudden revolutions, which happened in their government. The genius of their government was altogether democratical; their legiſlature conſiſted of the whole body of the people. They had, indeed, a Senate of five hundred; but in the general convention of the citizens, was placed the laſt reſort; and affairs were conducted there, entirely, by reaſoning, ſpeaking, and a ſkilful application to the paſſions and intereſts of a popular aſſembly. There, laws were made, peace and war decreed, and thence the magiſtrates were choſen. For the higheſt honours of the ſtate were alike open to all; nor was the meaneſt tradeſman excluded from a ſeat in their ſupreme courts. In ſuch a ſtate, Eloquence, it is obvious, would be much ſtudied, as the ſureſt means of riſing to influence and power; and what ſort of Eloquence? Not that which was brilliant merely, and ſhowy, but that which was found, upon trial, to be moſt effectual for convincing,

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vincing, intereſting, and perſuading the hearers. For there, public ſpeaking was not a mere competition for empty applauſe, but a ſerious contention for that public leading, which was the great object both of the men of ambition, and the men of virtue.

In ſo enlightened and acute a nation, where the higheſt attention was paid to every thing elegant in the arts, we may naturally expect to find the public taſte refined and judicious. Accordingly, it was improved to ſuch a degree, that the Attic taſte and Attic manner have paſſed into a proverb. It is true, that ambitious demagogues, and corrupt orators, did ſometimes dazzle and miſlead the people, by a ſhowy but falſe Eloquence; for the Athenians, with all their acuteneſs, were factious and giddy, and great admirers of every novelty. But when ſome important intereſt drew their attention, when any great danger rouſed them, and put their judgment to a ſerious trial, they commonly diſtinguiſhed, very juſtly, between genuine and ſpurious Eloquence: and hence Demoſthenes triumphed over all his opponents; becauſe he ſpoke always to the purpoſe, affected no inſignificant parade of words, uſed weighty arguments, and ſhowed them clearly where their intereſt lay. In critical conjunctures of the ſtate, when the public was alarmed with ſome preſſing danger, when the people were aſſembled, and proclamation was made by the crier, for any one to riſe and deliver his

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opinion upon the preſent ſituation of affairs, empty declamation and ſophiſtical reaſoning would not only have been hiſſed, but reſented and puniſhed by an aſſembly ſo intelligent and accuſtomed to buſineſs. Their greateſt orators trembled on ſuch occaſions, when they roſe to addreſs the people, as they knew they were to be held anſwerable for the iſſue of the counſel which they gave. The moſt liberal endowments of the greateſt princes never could found ſuch a ſchool for true oratory, as was formed by the nature of the Athenian Republic. Eloquence there ſprung, native and vigorous, from amidſt the contentions of faction and freedom, of public buſineſs and of active life; and not from that retirement and ſpeculation, which we are apt ſometimes to fancy more favourable to Eloquence than they are found to be.

Pysistratus, who was cotemporary with Solon, and ſubverted his plan of government, is mentioned by Plutarch, as the firſt who diſtinguiſhed himſelf among the Athenians by application to the Arts of Speech. His ability in theſe arts, he employed for raiſing himſelf to the ſovereign power; which, however, when he had attained it, he exerciſed with moderation. Of the Orators who flouriſhed between his time and the Peloponneſian war, no particular mention is made in hiſtory. Pericles, who died about the beginning of that war, was properly the firſt who carried Eloquence to a great height; to ſuch a height, indeed, that it does not appear

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appear he was ever afterwards ſurpaſſed. He was more than an Orator; he was alſo a Stateſman and a General; expert in buſineſs, and of conſummate addreſs. For forty years, he governed Athens with abſolute ſway; and hiſtorians aſcribe his influence, not more to his political talents than to his Eloquence, which was of that forcible and vehement kind, that bore every thing before it, and triumphed over the paſſions and affections of the people. Hence he had the ſurname of Olympias given him: and it was ſaid, that, like Jupiter, he thundered when he ſpoke. Though his ambition be liable to cenſure, yet he was diſtinguiſhed for ſeveral virtues; and it was the confidence which the people repoſed in his integrity, that gave ſuch a powerful effect to his Eloquence. He appears to have been generous, magnanimous, and public-ſpirited: he raiſed no fortune to himſelf; he expended indeed great ſums of the public money, but chiefly on public works, and at his death is ſaid to have valued himſelf principally on having never obliged any citizen to wear mourning on his account, during his long adminiſtration. It is a remarkable particular recorded of Pericles by Suidas, that he was the firſt Athenian who compoſed, and put into writing, a diſcourſe deſigned for the public.

Posterior to Pericles, in the courſe of the Peloponneſian war, aroſe Cleon, Alcibiades, Critias, and Theramenes, eminent citizens of Athens, who were all diſtinguiſhed for their Eloquence. They

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were not Orators by profeſſion; they were not formed by ſchools, but by a much more powerful education, that of buſineſs and debate; where man ſharpened man, and civil affairs carried on by public ſpeaking, brought every power of the mind into action. The manner or ſtyle of Oratory which then prevailed, we learn from the Orations in the Hiſtory of Thucydides, who alſo flouriſhed in the ſame age. It was manly, vehement, and conciſe, even to ſome degree of obſcurity. "Grandes erant verbis," ſays Cicero, "crebi ſententiis, compreſſione rerum breves, et, ob eam "ipſam cauſam, interdum ſubobſcuri *." A manner very different from what in modern times we would conceive to be the Style of popular Oratory; and which tends to give a high idea of the acuteneſs of thoſe audiences to which they ſpoke.

The power of Eloquence having, after the days of Pericles, become an object of greater conſequence than ever, this gave birth to a ſet of men till then unknown, called Rhetoricians, and ſometimes Sophiſts, who aroſe in multitudes during the Peloponneſian war; ſuch as Protagoras, Prodicas, Thraſymus, and one who was more eminent than all the reſt, Gorgias of Leontium. Theſe Sophiſts joined to their art of rhetoric a ſubtile logic, and

* "They were magnificent in their expreſſions; they "abounded in thought; they compreſſed their matter into few "words, and, by their brevity, were ſometimes obſcure."

were

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were generally a ſort of metaphyſical Sceptics. Gorgias, however, was a profeſſed maſter of Eloquence only. His reputation was prodigious. He was highly venerated in Leontium of Sicily, his native city; and money was coined with his name upon it. In the latter part of his life, he eſtabliſhed himſelf at Athens, and lived till he had attained the age of 105 years. Hermogenes (de Ideis, l. ii. cap. 9.) has preſerved a fragment of his, from which we ſee his ſtyle and manner. It is extremely quaint and artificial; full of antitheſis and pointed expreſſion; and ſhows how far the Grecian ſubtilty had already carried the ſtudy of language. Theſe Rhetoricians did not content themſelves with delivering general inſtructions concerning Eloquence to their pupils, and endeavouring to form their taſte; but they profeſſed the art of giving them receipts for making all ſorts of Orations; and of teaching them how to ſpeak for, and againſt, every cauſe whatever. Upon this plan, they were the firſt who treated of common places, and the artificial invention of arguments and topics for every ſubject. In the hands of ſuch men, we may eaſily believe that Oratory would degenerate from the maſculine ſtrain it had hitherto held, and become a trifling and ſophiſtical art; and we may juſtly deem them the firſt corrupters of true Eloquence. To them, the great Socrates oppoſed himſelf. By a profound, but ſimple reaſoning peculiar to himſelf, he exploded their ſophiſtry; and endeavoured to recal men's attention from

from that abuſe of reaſoning and diſcourſe which began to be in vogue, to natural language, and ſound and uſeful thought. LECT. XXV.

In the ſame age, though ſomewhat later than the philoſopher above mentioned, flouriſhed Iſocrates, whoſe writings are ſtill extant. He was a profeſſed Rhetorician, and by teaching Eloquence, he acquired both a great fortune, and higher fame than any of his rivals in that profeſſion. No contemptible Orator he was. His orations are full of morality and good ſentiments; they are flowing and ſmooth; but too deſtitute of vigour. He never engaged in public affairs, nor pleaded cauſes; and accordingly his orations are calculated only for the ſhade: "Pompæ," Cicero allows, "magis "quam pugnæ aptior; ad voluptatem aurium ac- "commodatus potius quam ad judiciorum certa- "men*." The Style of Gorgias of Leontium was formed into ſhort ſentences, compoſed generally of two members balanced againſt each other. The Style of Iſocrates, on the contrary, is ſwelling and full; and he is ſaid to be the firſt who introduced the method of compoſing in regular periods, which had a ſtudied muſic and harmonious cadence; a manner which he has carried to a vicious exceſs. What ſhall we think of an orator, who employed ten years in compoſing one diſcourſe, ſtill extant,

* "More fitted for ſhow than for debate; better calculated "for the amuſement of an audience, than for judicial conteſts."

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entitled the Panegyric? How much frivolous care muſt have been beſtowed on all the minute elegance of words and ſentences? Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus has given us upon the orations of Iſocrates, as alſo upon thoſe of ſome other Greek orators, a full and regular treatiſe, which is, in my opinion, one of the moſt judicious pieces of antient criticiſm extant, and very worthy of being conſulted. He commends the ſplendor of Iſocrates's Style, and the morality of his ſentiments; but ſeverely cenſures his affectation, and the uniform regular cadence of all his ſentences. He holds him to be a florid declaimer; not a natural perſuaſive ſpeaker. Cicero, in his critical works, though he admits his failings, yet diſcovers a propenſity to be very favourable to that "plena ac numeroſa oratio," that ſwelling and muſical ſtyle which Iſocrates introduced; and with the love of which, Cicero himſelf was, perhaps, ſomewhat infected. In one of his Treatiſes (Orat. ad M. Brut.) he informs us, that his friend Brutus and he differed in this particular, and that Brutus found fault with his partiality to Iſocrates. The manner of Iſocrates generally catches young people, when they begin to attend to compoſition; and it is very natural that it ſhould do ſo. It gives them an idea of that regularity, cadence, and magnificence of ſtyle, which fills the ear: but when they come to write or ſpeak for the world, they will find this oſtentatious manner unfit, either for carrying on buſineſs, or commanding attention. It is ſaid, that the high reputation

tation of Isocrates prompted Aristotle, who was nearly his contemporary, or lived but a little after him, to write his Institutions of Rhetoric; which are indeed formed upon a plan of Eloquence very different from that of Isocrates and the Rhetoricians of that time. He seems to have had it in view to direct the attention of orators much more towards convincing and affecting their hearers, than towards the musical cadence of periods.

Isæus and Lysias, some of whose orations are preserved, belong also to this period. Lysias was somewhat earlier than Isocrates, and is the model of that manner which the Antients call the "Tenuis "vel Subtilis." He has none of Isocrates's pomp. He is every where pure and attic in the highest degree; simple and unaffected; but wants force, and is sometimes frigid in his compositions*.

Isæus

* In the judicious comparison, which Dionysius of Halicarnassus makes of the merits of Lysias and Isocrates, he ascribes to Lysias, as the distinguishing character of his manner, a certain grace or elegance arising from simplicity; "φέρει γὰρ ἡ "Λυσιου λέξις ἐχειν το Χαριεν· ἡ δ' Ισοκρατους, βουλεται." "The style "of Lysias has gracefulness for its nature; that of Isocrates "seeks to have it." In the art of narration, as distinct, probable, and persuasive, he holds Lysias to be superior to all Orators: at the same time, he admits that his composition is more adapted to private litigation than to great subjects. He convinces, but he does not elevate nor animate. The magnificence and splendor of Isocrates is more suited to great occasions. He is more agreeable than Lysias; and, in dignity of

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Iſæus is chiefly remarkable for being the maſter of the great Demoſthenes, in whom, it muſt be acknowledged, Eloquence ſhone forth with higher ſplendor, than perhaps in any that ever bore the

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ſentiment, far excels him. With regard to the affectation which is viſible in Iſocrates's manner, he concludes what he ſays of it with the following excellent obſervations, which ſhould never be forgotten by any who aſpire to be true Orators: "Τῆς μεντοι ἀγωγῆς των περιοδων το κυκλικι, και των σχηματισμων της λεξεως το μειρακιωδες, ουκ εδοκιμαζον· θελκυει γαρ ἡ διανοια πολλακις τω ρυθμω της λεξεως, και τυ κομψυ λειπεται τα ἀληθινον. κρατιστον τ' επιτηδευμα εν διαλεκτω πολιτικη, και ἐγωγε, το ὁμοιοτατον τω κατα φυσιν. βελεται δε ἡ φυσις τοις νοημασιν επεσθαι την λεξιν, ὐ τη λεξει τα νοηματα· συμβελω δε δη περι πολεμυ και ειρηνης λεγοντι και ιδιωτη τον περι ψυχης τρεχοντι κινδυνον εν δικαιαις, τα κομψα, και θεατρικα, και μειρακιωδη ταυτι ὐκ οιδα ἡτινα δυναιτ' αν παρασχειν ωφελειαν· μαλλον δ' οιδα ὁτι και βλαβης ἀν ἀντια γενοιτο. χαριεντισμος γαρ πᾶς εν σπυδη, και καλως γινομενος, ἀωρον πραγμα και πολεμωτα τον ἐλεω." Judic. de Iſocrate, p. 558. "His ſtudied circumflexion of periods, "and juvenile affectation of the flowers of ſpeech, I do not "approve. The thought is frequently made ſubſervient to the "muſic of the ſentence; and elegance is preferred to reaſon. "Whereas, in every diſcourſe, where buſineſs and affairs are "concerned, nature ought to be followed: and nature certainly "dictates that the expreſſion ſhould be an object ſubordinate to "the ſenſe, not the ſenſe to the expreſſion. When one riſes "to give public counſel concerning war and peace, or takes the "charge of a private man, who is ſtanding at the bar to be "tried for his life, thoſe ſtudied decorations, thoſe theatrical "graces and juvenile flowers, are out of place. Inſtead of "being of ſervice, they are detrimental to the cauſe we eſpouſe. "When the conteſt is of a ſerious kind, ornaments, which at "another time would have beauty, then loſe their effect, and "prove hoſtile to the affections which we wiſh to raiſe in our "hearers."

name

name of an orator, and whoſe manner and character, therefore, muſt deſerve our particular attention.

I SHALL not ſpend any time upon the circumſtances of Demoſthenes's life; they are well known. The ſtrong ambition which he diſcovered to excel in the art of ſpeaking; the unſucceſsfulneſs of his firſt attempts; his unwearied perſeverance in ſurmounting all the diſadvantages that aroſe from his perſon and addreſs; his ſhutting himſelf up in a cave, that he might ſtudy with leſs diſtraction; his declaiming by the ſea-ſhore, that he might accuſtom himſelf to the noiſe of a tumultuous aſſembly, and with pebbles in his mouth, that he might correct a defect in his ſpeech; his practiſing at home with a naked ſword hanging over his ſhoulder, that he might check an ungraceful motion, to which he was ſubject; all thoſe circumſtances which, we learn from Plutarch, are very encouraging to ſuch as ſtudy Eloquence, as they ſhew how far art and application may avail, for acquiring an excellence which nature ſeemed unwilling to grant us.

DESPISING the affected and florid manner which the Rhetoricians of that age followed, Demoſthenes returned to the forcible and manly Eloquence of Pericles; and ſtrength and vehemence form the principal characteriſtics of his Style. Never had orator a finer field than Demoſthenes in his Olyn-

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thiacs and Philippics, which are his capital Orations; and, no doubt, to the nobleneſs of the ſubject, and to that integrity and public ſpirit which eminently breathe in them, they are indebted for much of their merit. The ſubject, is to rouſe the indignation of his countrymen againſt Philip of Macedon, the public enemy of the liberties of Greece; and to guard them againſt the inſidious meaſures, by which that crafty prince endeavoured to lay them aſleep to danger. In the proſecution of this end, we ſee him taking every proper method to animate a people, renowned for juſtice, humanity, and valour, but in many inſtances become corrupt and degenerate. He boldly taxes them with their venality, their indolence, and indifference to the public cauſe; while, at the ſame time, with all the art of an Orator, he recalls the glory of their anceſtors to their thoughts, ſhows them that they are ſtill a flouriſhing and a powerful people, the natural protectors of the liberty of Greece, and who wanted only the inclination to exert themſelves, in order to make Philip tremble. With his cotemporary orators, who were in Philip's intereſt, and who perſuaded the people to peace, he keeps no meaſures, but plainly reproaches them as the betrayers of their country. He not only prompts to vigorous conduct, but he lays down the plan of that conduct; he enters into particulars; and points out, with great exactneſs, the meaſures of execution. This is the ſtrain of theſe orations. They are ſtrongly animated; and full of the

the impetuoſity and fire of public ſpirit. They proceed in a continued train of inductions, conſequences, and demonſtrations, founded on ſound reaſon. The figures which he uſes, are never ſought after; but always riſe from the ſubject. He employs them ſparingly indeed; for ſplendor and ornament are not the diſtinctions of this Orator's compoſition. It is an energy of thought peculiar to himſelf, which forms his character, and ſets him above all others. He appears to attend much more to things than to words. We forget the orator, and think of the buſineſs. He warms the mind, and impels to action. He has no parade and oſtentation; no methods of inſinuation; no laboured introductions; but is like a man full of his ſubject, who, after preparing his audience by a ſentence or two for hearing plain truths, enters directly on buſineſs.

DEMOSTHENES appears to great advantage, when contraſted with Æſchines in the celebrated Oration "pro Corona." Æſchines was his rival in buſineſs, and perſonal enemy; and one of the moſt diſtinguiſhed Orators of that age. But when we read the two orations, Æſchines is feeble in compariſon of Demoſthenes, and makes much leſs impreſſion on the mind. His reaſonings concerning the law that was in queſtion, are indeed very ſubtile; but his invective againſt Demoſthenes is general, and ill ſupported. Whereas Demoſthenes is a torrent, that nothing can reſiſt. He bears

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down his antagoniſt with violence; he draws his character in the ſtrongeſt colours; and the particular merit of that Oration is, that all the deſcriptions in it are highly picturesque. There runs through it a ſtrain of magnanimity and high honour: the Orator ſpeaks with that ſtrength and conſcious dignity which great actions and public ſpirit alone inſpire. Both Orators uſe great liberties with one another; and, in general, that unreſtrained licence which antient manners permitted, and which was carried by public ſpeakers even to the length of abuſive names and downright ſcurrility, as appears both here and in Cicero's Philippics, hurts and offends a modern ear. What thoſe antient Orators gained by ſuch a manner in point of freedom and boldneſs is more than compenſated by want of dignity; which ſeems to give an advantage, in this reſpect, to the greater decency of modern ſpeaking.

The Style of Demoſthenes is ſtrong and conciſe, though ſometimes, it muſt not be diſſembled, harſh and abrupt. His words are very expreſſive; his arrangement is firm and manly; and, though far from being unmuſical, yet it ſeems difficult to find in him that ſtudied, but concealed number and rhythmus, which ſome of the antient critics are fond of attributing to him. Negligent of theſe leſſer graces, one would rather conceive him to have aimed at that Sublime which lies in ſentiment. His action and pronunciation are recorded to have been

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been uncommonly vehement and ardent; which, from the manner of his compoſition, we are naturally led to believe. The character which one forms of him, from reading his works, is of the auſtere, rather than the gentle kind. He is, on every occaſion, grave, ſerious, paſſionate; takes every thing on a high tone; never lets himſelf down, nor attempts any thing like pleaſantry. If any fault can be found with his admirable Eloquence, it is, that he ſometimes borders on the hard and dry. He may be thought to want ſmoothneſs and grace; which Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus attributes to his imitating too cloſely the manner of Thucydides, who was his great model for Style, and whoſe hiſtory he is ſaid to have written eight times over with his own hand. But theſe defects are far more than compenſated, by that admirable and maſterly force of maſculine Eloquence, which, as it overpowered all who heard it, cannot, at this day, be read without emotion.

After the days of Demoſthenes, Greece loſt her liberty, Eloquence of courſe languiſhed, and relapſed again into the feeble manner introduced by the Rhetoricians and Sophiſts. Demetrius Phalerius, who lived in the next age to Demoſthenes, attained indeed ſome character, but he is repreſented to us as a flowery, rather than a perſuaſive ſpeaker, who aimed at grace rather than ſubſtance.

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ſubſtance. "Delectabat Athenienſes," ſays Cicero, "magis quam inflammabat." "He amuſed the "Athenians, rather than warmed them." And after his time, we hear of no more Grecian Orators of any note.

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HISTORY OF ELOQUENCE CONTINUED.—ROMAN ELOQUENCE.—CICERO.—MODERN ELOQUENCE.

HAVING treated of the rise of Eloquence, and of its state among the Greeks, we now proceed to consider its progress among the Romans, where we shall find one model, at least, of Eloquence, in its most splendid and illustrious form. The Romans were long a martial nation, altogether rude, and unskilled in arts of any kind. Arts were of late introduction among them; they were not known till after the conquest of Greece; and the Romans always acknowledged the Grecians as their masters in every part of learning.

> Grecia capta ferum victorem cepit, & artes
> Intulit agresti Latio*.—— HOR. Epist. ad Aug.

* When conquer'd Greece brought in her captive arts,
She triumph'd o'er her savage conquerors hearts;
Taught our rough verse its numbers to refine,
And our rude Style with elegance to shine. FRANCIS.

As

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As the Romans derived their Eloquence, Poetry, and Learning, from the Greeks, ſo they muſt be confeſſed to be far inferior to them in genius for all theſe accompliſhments. They were a more grave and magnificent, but a leſs acute and ſprightly people. They had neither the vivacity nor the ſenſibility of the Greeks; their paſſions were not ſo eaſily moved, nor their conceptions ſo lively; in compariſon of them, they were a phlegmatic nation. Their language reſembled their character; it was regular, firm, and ſtately; but wanted that ſimple and expreſſive naïveté, and, in particular, that flexibility to ſuit every different mode and ſpecies of compoſition, for which the Greek tongue is diſtinguiſhed above that of every other country.

> Graiis ingenium, Graiis dedit ore rotundo
> Muſa loqui* —— ARS POET.

And hence, when we compare together the various rival productions of Greece and Rome, we ſhall always find this diſtinction obtain, that in the Greek productions there is more native genius; in the Roman, more regularity and art. What the Greeks invented, the Romans poliſhed; the one was the original, rough ſometimes, and incorrect; the other, a finiſhed copy.

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* To her lov'd Greeks the Muſe indulgent gave,
To her lov'd Greeks with greatneſs to conceive;
And in ſublimer tone their language raiſe:
Her Greeks were only covetous of praiſe. FRANCIS.

As the Roman government, during the republic, was of the popular kind, there is no doubt but that, in the hands of the leading men, public ſpeaking became early an engine of government, and was employed for gaining diſtinction and power. But in the rude unpoliſhed times of the State, their ſpeaking was hardly of that ſort that could be called Eloquence. Though Cicero, in his Treatiſe "de Claris Oratoribus," endeavours to give ſome reputation to the elder Cato, and thoſe who were his cotemporaries, yet he acknowledges it to have been "Aſperum et horridum genus dicendi," a rude and harſh ſtrain of ſpeech. It was not till a ſhort time preceding Cicero's age, that the Roman Orators roſe into any note. Craſſus and Antonius, two of the Speakers in the dialogue de Oratore, appear to have been the moſt eminent, whoſe different manners Cicero deſcribes with great beauty in that dialogue, and in his other rhetorical works. But as none of their productions are extant, nor any of Hortenſius's, who was Cicero's cotemporary and rival at the bar, it is needleſs to tranſcribe from Cicero's writings the account which he gives of thoſe great men, and of the character of their Eloquence*.

* Such as are deſirous of particular information on this head, had better have recourſe to the original, by reading Cicero's three books De Oratore, and his other two treatiſes, entitled, the one, Brutus, Sive de Claris Oratoribus; the other Orator, ad M. Brutum; which, on ſeveral accounts, well deſerve peruſal.

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THE object in this period moſt worthy to draw our attention, is Cicero himſelf; whoſe name alone ſuggeſts every thing that is ſplendid in Oratory. With the hiſtory of his life, and with his character as a man and a politician, we have not at preſent any direct concern. We conſider him only as an eloquent Speaker; and, in this view, it is our buſineſs to remark both his virtues, and his defects, if he has any. His virtues are, beyond controverſy, eminently great. In all his Orations there is high art. He begins, generally, with a regular exordium; and with much preparation and inſinuation prepoſſeſſes the hearers, and ſtudies to gain their affections. His method is clear, and his arguments are arranged with great propriety. His method is indeed more clear than that of Demoſthenes; and this is one advantage which he has over him. We find every thing in its proper place; he never attempts to move, till he has endeavoured to convince; and in moving, eſpecially the ſofter paſſions, he is very ſucceſsful. No man knew the power and force of words better than Cicero. He rolls them along with the greateſt beauty and pomp; and, in the ſtructure of his ſentences, is curious and exact to the higheſt degree. He is always full and flowing, never abrupt. He is a great amplifier of every ſubject; magnificent, and in his ſentiments highly moral. His manner is on the whole diffuſe, yet it is often happily varied, and ſuited to the ſubject. In his four orations, for inſtance, againſt Catiline, the tone and ſtyle of each of

of them, particularly the firſt and laſt, is very different, and accommodated with a great deal of judgment to the occaſion, and the ſituation in which they were ſpoken. When a great public object rouſed his mind, and demanded indignation and force, he departs conſiderably from that looſe and declamatory manner to which he leans at other times, and becomes exceedingly cogent and vehement. This is the caſe in his Orations againſt Anthony, and in thoſe two againſt Verres and Catiline.

Together with thoſe high qualities which Cicero poſſeſſes, he is not exempt from certain defects, of which it is neceſſary to take notice. For the Ciceronian Eloquence is a pattern ſo dazzling by its beauties, that, if not examined with accuracy and judgment, it is apt to betray the unwary into a faulty imitation; and I am of opinion, that it has ſometimes produced this effect. In moſt of his Orations, eſpecially thoſe compoſed in the earlier part of his life, there is too much art; even carried the length of oſtentation. There is too viſible a parade of Eloquence. He ſeems often to aim at obtaining admiration, rather than at operating conviction, by what he ſays. Hence, on ſome occaſions, he is ſhowy rather than ſolid; and diffuſe where he ought to have been preſſing. His ſentences are, at all times, round and ſonorous; they cannot be accuſed of monotony, for they poſſeſs variety of cadence; but from too great a ſtudy of

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of magnificence, he is ſometimes deficient in ſtrength. On all occaſions, where there is the leaſt room for it, he is full of himſelf. His great actions, and the real ſervices which he had performed to his country, apologize for this in part; antient manners, too, impoſed fewer reſtraints from the ſide of decorum; but, even after theſe allowances made, Cicero's oſtentation of himſelf cannot be wholly palliated; and his Orations, indeed all his works, leave on our minds the impreſſion of a good man, but withal, of a vain man.

THE defects which we have now taken notice of in Cicero's Eloquence were not unobſerved by his own cotemporaries. This we learn from Quinctilian, and from the author of the dialogue "de "Cauſis Corruptæ Eloquentiæ." Brutus, we are informed, called him, "fractum et elumbem," broken and enervated. "Suorum temporum ho"mines," ſays Quinctilian, "inceſſere audebant "eum ut tumidiorem & Aſianum, et redundantem, "et in repetitionibus nimium, et in ſalibus ali"quando frigidum, & in compoſitione fractum et "exſultantum, & penè viro molliorem*." Theſe cenſures were undoubtedly carried too far; and favour of malignity and perſonal enmity. They ſaw

* "His cotemporaries ventured to reproach him as ſwelling, "redundant, and Aſiatic; too frequent in repetitions; in his "attempts towards wit ſometimes cold; and, in the ſtrain of his "compoſition, feeble, deſultory, and more effeminate than be"came a man."

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his defects, but they aggravated them; and the source of these aggravations can be traced to the difference which prevailed in Rome, in Cicero's days, between two great parties, with respect to Eloquence; the "Attici," and the "Asiani." The former, who called themselves the Attics, were the patrons of what they conceived to be the chaste, simple, and natural Style of Eloquence; from which they accused Cicero as having departed, and as leaning to the florid Asiatic manner. In several of his rhetorical works, particularly in his "Orator ad Brutum," Cicero, in his turn, endeavours to expose this sect, as substituting a frigid and jejune manner, in place of the true Attic Eloquence; and contends that his own composition was formed upon the real Attic Style. In the 10th Chapter of the last book of Quinctilian's Institutions, a full account is given of the disputes between these two parties, and of the Rhodian or middle manner between the Attics and the Asiatics. Quinctilian himself declares on Cicero's side; and whether it be called Attic or Asiatic, prefers the full, the copious, and the amplifying Style. He concludes with this very just observation: "Plures sunt eloquentiæ facies; sed stultissi-"mum est quærere, ad quam recturus se sit orator; "cum omnis species, quæ modo recta est, habeat "usum.—Utetur enim, ut res exiget, omnibus; "nec pro causâ modo, sed pro partibus causæ *."

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On

* "Eloquence admits of many different forms; and no-"thing can be more foolish than to enquire, by which of them

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On the ſubject of comparing Cicero and Demoſthenes, much has been ſaid by critical writers. The different manners of theſe two Princes of Eloquence, and the diſtinguiſhing characters of each, are ſo ſtrongly marked in their writings, that the compariſon is, in many reſpects, obvious and eaſy. The character of Demoſthenes is vigour and auſterity; that of Cicero is gentleneſs and inſinuation. In the one, you find more manlineſs; in the other, more ornament. The one is more harſh, but more ſpirited and cogent; the other, more agreeable, but withal, looſer and weaker.

To account for this difference, without any prejudice to Cicero, it has been ſaid, that we muſt look to the nature of their different auditories; that the refined Athenians followed with eaſe the conciſe and convincing Eloquence of Demoſthenes; but that a manner more popular, more flowery, and declamatory, was requiſite in ſpeaking to the Romans, a people leſs acute, and leſs acquainted with the arts of ſpeech. But this is not ſatisfactory. For we muſt obſerve, that the Greek Orator ſpoke much oftener before a mixed multitude, than the Roman. Almoſt all the public buſineſs of Athens was tranſacted in popular Aſſemblies. The com-

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" an Orator is to regulate his Compoſition; ſince every form " which is in itſelf juſt, has its own place and uſe. The Orator, " according as circumſtances require, will employ them all; " ſuiting them not only to the cauſe or ſubject of which he " treats, but to the different parts of that ſubject."

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mon people were his hearers, and his judges. Whereas Cicero generally addreſſed himſelf to the "Patres Conſcripti," or in criminal trials to the Prætor, and the Select Judges; and it cannot be imagined, that the perſons of higheſt rank and beſt education in Rome, required a more diffuſe manner of pleading than the common citizens of Athens, in order to make them underſtand the cauſe, or reliſh the Speaker. Perhaps we ſhall come nearer the truth, by obſerving, that to unite all the qualities, without the leaſt exception, that form a perfect Orator, and to excel equally in each of thoſe qualities, is not to be expected from the limited powers of human genius. The higheſt degree of ſtrength is, I ſuſpect, never found united with the higheſt degree of ſmoothneſs and ornament; equal attentions to both are incompatible; and the genius that carries ornament to its utmoſt length, is not of ſuch a kind as can excel as much in vigour. For there plainly lies the characteriſtical difference between theſe two celebrated Orators.

It is a diſadvantage to Demoſthenes, that, beſides his conciſeneſs, which ſometimes produces obſcurity, the language in which he writes is leſs familiar to moſt of us than the Latin, and that we are leſs acquainted with the Greek antiquities than we are with the Roman. We read Cicero with more eaſe, and of courſe with more pleaſure. Independent of this circum-

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ſtance too, he is no doubt, in himſelf, a more agreeable writer than the other. But notwithſtanding this advantage, I am of opinion, that were the ſtate in danger, or ſome great national intereſt at ſtake, which drew the ſerious attention of the public, an Oration in the ſpirit and ſtrain of Demoſthenes would have more weight, and produce greater effects than one in the Ciceronian manner. Were Demoſthenes's Philippics ſpoken in a Britiſh Aſſembly, in a ſimilar conjuncture of affairs, they would convince and perſuade at this day. The rapid Style, the vehement reaſoning, the diſdain, anger, boldneſs, freedom, which perpetually animate them, would render their ſucceſs infallible over any modern aſſembly. I queſtion whether the ſame can be ſaid of Cicero's Orations; whoſe Eloquence, however beautiful, and however well ſuited to the Roman taſte, yet borders oftener on declamation, and is more remote from the manner in which we now expect to hear real buſineſs and cauſes of importance treated *.

In comparing Demoſthenes and Cicero, moſt of the French Critics are diſpoſed to give the preference to the latter. P. Rapin the Jeſuit, in the Parallels which he has drawn between ſome of the

* In this judgment, I concur with Mr. David Hume, in his Eſſay upon Eloquence. He gives it as his opinion, that, of all human productions, the Orations of Demoſthenes preſent to us the models which approach the neareſt to perfection.

moſt

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moſt eminent Greek and Roman writers, uniformly decides in favour of the Roman. For the preference which he gives to Cicero, he aſſigns, and lays ſtreſs on one reaſon of a pretty extraordinary nature; viz. that Demoſthenes could not poſſibly have ſo complete an inſight as Cicero into the manners and paſſions of men; Why? Becauſe he had not the advantage of peruſing Ariſtotle's Treatiſe of Rhetoric, wherein, ſays our Critic, he has fully laid open that myſtery: and, to ſupport this weighty argument, he enters into a controverſy with A. Gellius, in order to prove that Ariſtotle's Rhetoric was not publiſhed till after Demoſthenes had ſpoken, at leaſt, his moſt conſiderable orations. Nothing can be more childiſh. Such Orators as Cicero and Demoſthenes derived their knowledge of the human paſſions, and their power of moving them, from higher ſources than any Treatiſe of Rhetoric. One French Critic has indeed departed from the common track; and, after beſtowing on Cicero thoſe juſt praiſes to which the conſent of ſo many ages ſhews him to be entitled, concludes, however, with giving the palm to Demoſthenes. This is Fenelon, the famous Archbiſhop of Cambray, and Author of Telemachus; himſelf ſurely no enemy to all the graces and flowers of compoſition. It is in his Reflections on Rhetoric and Poetry, that he gives this judgment; a ſmall tract, commonly publiſhed along with his Dialogues

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on Eloquence*. Theſe dialogues and reflections are particularly worthy of peruſal, as containing, I think, the juſteſt ideas on the ſubject, that are to be met with in any modern critical writer.

The reign of Eloquence, among the Romans, was very ſhort. After the age of Cicero, it languiſhed, or rather expired; and we have no reaſon to wonder at this being the caſe. For not only was liberty entirely extinguiſhed, but arbitrary

* As his expreſſions are remarkably happy and beautiful, the paſſage here referred to deſerves to be inſerted.—" Je ne " crains pas dire, que Demoſthene me paroit ſupérieur à Cicé- " ron. Je proteſte que perſonne n'admire plus Cicéron que je " fais. Il embellit tout ce qu'il touche. Il fait honneur à la pa- " role. Il fait des mots ce qu'un autre n'en ſauroit faire. Il " a je ne ſai combien de ſortes d'eſprits. Il eſt même court, & " vehement, toutes les fois qu'il veut l'eſtre; contre Catiline, " contre Verres, contre Antoine. Mais on remarque quelque " parure dans ſon diſcours. L'art y eſt merveilleux; mais on " l'entrevoit. L'orateur en penſant au ſalut de la république, " ne s'oublie pas, et ne ſe laiſſe pas oublier. Demoſthene pa- " roit ſortir de ſoi, et ne voir que la patrie. Il ne cherche point " le beau; il le fait, ſans y penſer. Il eſt au-deſſus de l'admi- " ration. Il ſe ſert de la parole, comme un homme modeſte de " ſon habit, pour ſe couvrir. Il tonne; il foudroye. C'eſt un " torrent qui entraine tout. On ne peut le critiquer, parcequ'on " eſt ſaiſi. On penſe aux choſes qu'il dit, & non à ſes paroles. " On le perd de vue. On n'eſt occupé que de Philippe qui en- " havit tout. Je ſuis charmé de ces deux orateurs: mais " j'avoue que je ſuis moins touché de l'art infini, & de la mag- " nifique eloquence de Cicéron, que de la rapide ſimplicité de " Demoſthene."

power

power felt in its heavieſt and moſt oppreſſive weight: Providence having, in its wrath, delivered over the Roman Empire to a ſucceſſion of ſome of the moſt execrable tyrants that ever diſgraced and ſcourged the human race. Under their government, it was naturally to be expected that taſte would be corrupted, and genius diſcouraged. Some of the ornamental arts, leſs intimately connected with liberty, continued, for a while, to prevail; but for that maſculine Eloquence, which had exerciſed itſelf in the ſenate, and in the public affairs, there was no longer any place. The change which was produced on Eloquence, by the nature of the government, and the ſtate of the public manners, is beautifully deſcribed in the Dialogue de Cauſis corruptæ Eloquentiæ, which is attributed, by ſome, to Tacitus, by others, to Quinctilian. Luxury, effeminacy, and flattery overwhelmed all. The Forum, where ſo many great affairs had been tranſacted, was now become a deſart. Private cauſes were ſtill pleaded; but the Public was no longer intereſted; nor any general attention drawn to what paſſed there: " Unus inter hæc, et alter, dicenti, aſſiſtit; et res " velut in ſolitudine agitur. Oratori autem cla- " more plauſuque opus eſt, et velut quodam the- " atro, qualia quotidie antiquis oratoribus con- " tingebant; cum tot ac tam nobiles forum co- " arctarent; cum clientelæ, & tribus, & muni- " cipiorum legationes, periclitantibus aſſiſterent;

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" cum in pleriſque judiciis crederet populus Ro-
" manus ſua intereſſe quid judicaretur *."

In the ſchools of the declaimers, the corruption of Eloquence was completed. Imaginary and fantaſtic ſubjects, ſuch as had no reference to real life, or buſineſs, were made the themes of declamation; and all manner of falſe and affected ornaments were brought into vogue: " Pace veſ-
" tra liceat dixiſſe," ſays Petronius Arbiter, to the declaimers of his time, " primi omnem eloquen-
" tiam perdidiſtis. Levibus enim ac inanibus
" ſonis ludibria quædam excitando, effeciſtis ut
" corpus orationis enervaretur atque caderet. Et
" ideo ego exiſtimo adoleſcentulos in ſcholis ſtul-
" tiſſimos fieri, quia nihil ex iis, quæ in uſu habe-
" mus, aut audiunt, aut vident; ſed piratas cum
" catenis in littore ſtantes; et tyrannos edicta
" ſcribentes quibus imperent filiis ut patrum ſu-
" orum capita præcidant; ſed reſponſa, in peſti-
" lentia data, ut virgines tres aut plures immo-

* " The Courts of Judicature are, at preſent, ſo unfrequented,
" that the Orator ſeems to ſtand alone, and talk to bare walls.
" But Eloquence rejoices in the burſts of loud applauſe, and ex-
" ults in a full audience; ſuch as uſed to preſs round the ancient
" Orators, when the Forum ſtood crowded with nobles; when a
" numerous retinue of clients, when foreign ambaſſadors, when
" tribes, and whole cities aſſiſted at the debate; and when, in
" many trials, the Roman people underſtood themſelves to be
" concerned in the event."

" lentur;

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" lentur; ſed mellitos verborum globulos, & om-
" nia quaſi papavere, & ſeſamo ſparſa. Qui in-
" ter hæc nutriuntur, non magis ſapere poſſunt,
" quam bene olere qui in culina habitant *." In the hands of the Greek rhetoricians, the manly and ſenſible Eloquence of their firſt noted ſpeakers, degenerated, as I formerly ſhowed, into ſubtility and ſophiſtry; in the hands of the Roman declaimers, it paſſed into the quaint and affected; into point and antitheſis. This corrupt manner begins to appear in the writings of Seneca; and ſhows itſelf, alſo, in the famous panegyric of Pliny the Younger on Trajan, which may be conſidered as the laſt effort of Roman oratory. Though the author was a man of genius, yet it is deficient in nature and eaſe. We ſee, throughout the whole,

* " With your permiſſion, I muſt be allowed to ſay, that you
" have been the firſt deſtroyers of all true Eloquence. For by
" thoſe mock ſubjects, on which you employ your empty and
" unmeaning compoſitions, you have enervated and overthrown
" all that is manly and ſubſtantial in Oratory. I cannot but
" conclude that the youth whom you educate, muſt be totally
" perverted in your ſchools, by hearing and ſeeing nothing
" which has any affinity to real life, or human affairs; but ſto-
" ries of pirates ſtanding on the ſhore, provided with chains for
" loading their captives, and of tyrants iſſuing their edicts,
" by which children are commanded to cut off the heads of
" their parents; but reſponſes given by oracles in the time of
" peſtilence, that ſeveral virgins muſt be ſacrificed; but glitter-
" ing ornaments of phraſe, and a ſtyle highly ſpiced, if we may
" ſay ſo, with affected conceits. They who are educated in the
" midſt of ſuch ſtudies, can no more acquire a good taſte, than
" they can ſmell ſweet who dwell perpetually in a kitchen."

a per-

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a perpetual attempt to depart from the ordinary way of thinking, and to support a forced elevation.

In the decline of the Roman Empire, the introduction of Christianity gave rise to a new species of Eloquence, in the apologies, sermons, and pastoral writings of the Fathers of the Church. Among the Latin Fathers, Lactantius and Minutius Felix are the most remarkable for purity of Style; and, in a later age, the famous St. Augustine possesses a considerable share of sprightliness and strength. But none of the Fathers afford any just models of Eloquence. Their Language, as soon as we descend to the third or fourth century, becomes harsh; and they are, in general, infected with the taste of that age, a love of swoln and strained thoughts, and of the play of words. Among the Greek Fathers, the most distinguished, by far, for his oratorial merit, is St. Chrysostome. His Language is pure; his Style highly figured. He is copious, smooth, and sometimes pathetic. But he retains, at the same time, much of that character which has been always attributed to the Asiatic Eloquence, diffuse and redundant to a great degree, and often overwrought and tumid. He may be read, however, with advantage, for the Eloquence of the pulpit, as being freer from false ornaments than the Latin Fathers.

As there is nothing more that occurs to me, deserving particular attention in the middle age, I pass

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paſs now to the ſtate of Eloquence in modern times. Here it muſt be confeſſed, that in no European nation, Public Speaking has been conſidered as ſo great an object, or been cultivated with ſo much care, as in Greece or Rome. Its reputation has never been ſo high; its effects have never been ſo conſiderable: nor has that high and ſublime kind of it, which prevailed in thoſe antient ſtates, been ſo much as aimed at: notwithſtanding, too, that a new profeſſion has been eſtabliſhed, which gives peculiar advantages to Oratory, and affords it the nobleſt field; I mean that of the Church. The genius of the world ſeems, in this reſpect, to have undergone ſome alteration. The two countries where we might expect to find moſt of the ſpirit of Eloquence, are France and Great Britain: France, on account of the diſtinguiſhed turn of the nation towards all the liberal arts, and of the encouragement, which, for this century paſt, theſe arts have received from the Public; Great Britain, on account both of the public capacity and genius, and of the free government which it enjoys. Yet, ſo it is, that, in neither of thoſe countries, has the talent of Public Speaking riſen near to the degree of its antient ſplendor. While in other productions of genius, both in proſe and in poetry, they have contended for the prize with Greece and Rome; nay, in ſome compoſitions, may be thought to have ſurpaſſed them: the names of Demoſthenes and Cicero ſtand, at this day, unrivalled in fame; and it would be held preſumptuous and abſurd, to

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pretend to place any modern whatever in the ſame, or even in a nearly equal rank.

It ſeems particularly ſurpriſing, that Great Britain ſhould not have made a more conſpicuous figure in Eloquence than it has hitherto attained; when we conſider the enlightened, and, at the ſame time, the free and bold genius of the country, which ſeems not a little to favour Oratory; and when we conſider that, of all the polite nations, it alone poſſeſſes a popular government, or admits into the legiſlature ſuch numerous aſſemblies as can be ſuppoſed to lie under the dominion of Eloquence*. Notwithſtanding this advantage, it muſt be confeſſed, that, in moſt parts of Eloquence, we are undoubtedly inferior, not only to the Greeks and Romans, by many degrees, but alſo in ſome reſpects to the French. We have Philoſophers, eminent and conſpicuous, perhaps, beyond any nation, in every branch of ſcience. We have both taſte and erudition, in a high degree. We have Hiſtorians, we have Poets of the greateſt name; but of Orators, or Public Speakers, how little have

* Mr. Hume, in his Eſſay on Eloquence, makes this obſervation, and illuſtrates it with his uſual elegance. He, indeed, ſuppoſes, that no ſatisfactory reaſons can be given to account for the inferiority of modern to antient Eloquence. In this, I differ from him, and ſhall endeavour, before the concluſion of this Lecture, to point out ſome cauſes, to which, I think, it may, in a great meaſure, be aſcribed, in the three great ſcenes of Public Speaking.

we to boaſt? And where are the monuments of their genius to be found? In every period we have had ſome who made a figure, by managing the debates in Parliament; but that figure was commonly owing to their wiſdom, or their experience in buſineſs, more than to their talents for Oratory; and unleſs, in ſome few inſtances, wherein the power of Oratory has appeared, indeed, with much luſtre, the art of Parliamentary Speaking rather obtained to ſeveral a temporary applauſe, than conferred upon any a laſting renown. At the bar, though, queſtionleſs, we have many able pleaders, yet few or none of their pleadings have been thought worthy to be tranſmitted to poſterity; or have commanded attention, any longer than the cauſe which was the ſubject of them intereſted the Public; while, in France, the pleadings of Patru, in the former age, and thoſe of Cochin and D'Agueſſeau, in later times, are read with pleaſure, and are often quoted as examples of Eloquence by the French critics. In the ſame manner, in the pulpit, the Britiſh divines have diſtinguiſhed themſelves by the moſt accurate and rational compoſitions which, perhaps, any nation can boaſt of. Many printed ſermons we have, full of good ſenſe, and of ſound divinity and morality; but the Eloquence to be found in them, the power of perſuaſion, of intereſting and engaging the heart, which is, or ought to be, the great object of the pulpit, is far from bearing a ſuitable proportion to the excellence of the matter. There are few arts, in my opinion, farther from perfection,

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perfection, than that of preaching is among us; the reaſons of which, I ſhall afterwards have occaſion to diſcuſs; in proof of the fact, it is ſufficient to obſerve, that an Engliſh ſermon, inſtead of being a perſuaſive animated Oration, ſeldom riſes beyond the ſtrain of correct and dry reaſoning. Whereas, in the ſermons of Boſſuet, Maſſillon, Bourdaloue, and Flechier, among the French, we ſee a much higher ſpecies of Eloquence aimed at, and in a great meaſure attained, than the Britiſh preachers have in view.

In general, the characteriſtical difference between the ſtate of Eloquence in France and in Great Britain is, that the French have adopted higher ideas both of pleaſing and perſuading by means of Oratory, though ſometimes, in the execution they fail. In Great Britain, we have taken up Eloquence on a lower key; but in our execution, as was naturally to be expected, have been more correct. In France, the ſtyle of their Orators is ornamented with bolder figures; and their diſcourſe carried on with more amplification, more warmth and elevation. The compoſition is often very beautiful; but ſometimes, alſo, too diffuſe, and deficient in that ſtrength and cogency which renders Eloquence powerful: a defect owing, perhaps, in part, to the genius of the people, which leads them to attend fully as much to ornament as to ſubſtance; and, in part, to the nature of their government, which, by excluding Public Speaking from having much influence

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influence on the conduct of public affairs, deprives Eloquence of its best opportunity for acquiring nerves and strength. Hence the pulpit is the principal field which is left for their Eloquence. The members, too, of the French Academy, give harangues at their admission, in which genius often appears; but labouring under the misfortune of having no subject to discourse upon, they run commonly into flattery and panegyric, the most barren and insipid of all topics.

I OBSERVED before, that the Greeks and Romans aspired to a more sublime species of Eloquence, than is aimed at by the Moderns. Theirs was of the vehement and passionate kind, by which they endeavoured to inflame the minds of their hearers, and hurry their imagination away: and, suitable to this vehemence of thought, was their vehemence of gesture and action; the "supplosio "pedis*," the "percussio frontis & femoris*," were, as we learn from Cicero's writings, usual gestures among them at the bar; though now they would be reckoned extravagant any where, except upon the stage. Modern Eloquence is much more cool and temperate; and in Great Britain especially, has confined itself almost wholly to the argumentative and rational. It is much of that species which the antient critics called the "Tenuis" or "Sub-"tilis;" which aims at convincing and instruct-

* Vide De Clar. Orator.

ing,

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ing, rather than affecting the paſſions, and aſſumes a tone not much higher than common argument and diſcourſe.

SEVERAL reaſons may be given, why Modern Eloquence has been ſo limited and humble in its efforts. In the firſt place, I am of opinion, that this change muſt, in part, be aſcribed to that correct turn of thinking, which has been ſo much ſtudied in modern times. It can hardly be doubted, that, in many efforts of mere genius, the ancient Greeks and Romans excelled us; but, on the other hand, that, in accuracy and cloſeneſs of reaſoning on many ſubjects, we have ſome advantage over them, ought, I think, to be admitted alſo. In proportion as the world has advanced, philoſophy has made greater progreſs. A certain ſtrictneſs of good ſenſe has, in this iſland particularly, been cultivated, and introduced into every ſubject. Hence we are more on our guard againſt the flowers of Elocution; we are on the watch; we are jealous of being deceived by Oratory. Our Public Speakers are obliged to be more reſerved than the Antients, in their attempts to elevate the imagination, and warm the paſſions; and, by the influence of prevailing taſte, their own genius is ſobered and chaſtened, perhaps, in too great a degree. It is likely too, I confeſs, that what we fondly aſcribe to our correctneſs and good ſenſe, is owing, in a great meaſure, to our phlegm and natural coldneſs. For the vivacity and ſenſibility

of the Greeks and Romans, more eſpecially of the former, ſeem to have been much greater than ours, and to have given them a higher reliſh of all the beauties of Oratory. LECT. XXVI.

Besides theſe national conſiderations, we muſt, in the next place, attend to peculiar circumſtances in the three great ſcenes of Public Speaking, which have proved diſadvantageous to the growth of Eloquence among us. Though the Parliament of Great Britain be the nobleſt field which Europe, at this day, affords to a Public Speaker, yet Eloquence has never been ſo powerful an inſtrument there, as it was in the popular aſſemblies of Greece and Rome. Under ſome former reigns, the high hand of arbitrary power bore a violent ſway; and in latter times, miniſterial influence has generally prevailed. The power of Speaking, though always conſiderable, yet has been often found too feeble to counterbalance either of theſe; and, of courſe, has not been ſtudied with ſo much zeal and fervour, as where its effect on buſineſs was irreſiſtible and certain.

At the Bar, our diſadvantage, in compariſon of the Antients, is great. Among them, the judges were generally numerous; the laws were few and ſimple; the deciſion of cauſes was left, in a great meaſure, to equity and the ſenſe of mankind. Here was an ample field for what they termed Judicial Eloquence. But among the Moderns, the caſe is

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quite altered. The ſyſtem of law is become much more complicated. The knowledge of it is thereby rendered ſo laborious an attainment, as to be the chief object of a lawyer's education, and, in a manner, the ſtudy of his life. The Art of Speaking is but a ſecondary accompliſhment, to which he can afford to devote much leſs of his time and labour. The bounds of Eloquence, beſides, are now much circumſcribed at the Bar; and, except in a few caſes, reduced to arguing from ſtrict law, ſtatute, or precedent; by which means knowledge, much more than Oratory, is become the principal requiſite.

With regard to the Pulpit, it has certainly been a great diſadvantage, that the practice of reading Sermons, inſtead of repeating them from memory, has prevailed in England. This may, indeed, have introduced accuracy; but it has done great prejudice to Eloquence; for a Diſcourſe read, is far inferior to an Oration ſpoken. It leads to a different ſort of compoſition, as well as of delivery; and can never have an equal effect upon any audience. Another circumſtance, too, has been unfortunate. The ſectaries and fanatics, before the Reſtoration, adopted a warm, zealous, and popular manner of preaching; and thoſe who adhered to them in after-times, continued to diſtinguiſh themſelves by ſomewhat of the ſame manner. The odium of theſe ſects drove the eſtabliſhed church from that warmth which they were judged to have

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carried too far, into the oppoſite extreme of a ſtudied coolneſs, and compoſure of manner. Hence, from the art of perſuaſion, which preaching ought always to be, it has paſſed in England, into mere reaſoning and inſtruction; which not only has brought down the Eloquence of the Pulpit to a lower tone than it might juſtly aſſume; but has produced this farther effect, that, by accuſtoming the Public ear to ſuch cool and diſpaſſionate Diſcourſes, it has tended to faſhion other kinds of Public Speaking upon the ſame model.

THUS I have given ſome view of the ſtate of Eloquence in modern times, and endeavoured to account for it. It has, as we have ſeen, fallen below that ſplendor which it maintained in antient ages; and from being ſublime and vehement, has come down to be temperate and cool. Yet ſtill, in that region which it occupies, it admits great ſcope; and, to the defect of zeal and application, more than to the want of capacity and genius, we may aſcribe its not having hitherto attained higher diſtinction. It is a field where there is much honour yet to be reaped. It is an inſtrument which may be employed for purpoſes of the higheſt importance. The antient models may ſtill, with much advantage, be ſet before us for imitation; though in that imitation, we muſt, doubtleſs, have ſome regard to what modern taſte and modern manners will bear; of which I ſhall afterwards have occaſion to ſay more.

LECTURE XXVII.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF PUBLIC SPEAKING—ELOQUENCE OF POPULAR ASSEMBLIES—EXTRACTS FROM DEMOSTHENES.

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AFTER the preliminary views which have been given of the nature of Eloquence in general, and of the ſtate in which it has ſubſiſted in different ages and countries, I am now to enter on the conſideration of the different kinds of Public Speaking, the diſtinguiſhing characters of each, and the rules which relate to them. The antients divided all Orations into three kinds: the Demonſtrative, the Deliberative, and the Judicial. The ſcope of the Demonſtrative was to praiſe or to blame; that of the Deliberative, to adviſe or to diſſuade; that of the Judicial, to accuſe or to defend. The chief ſubjects of Demonſtrative Eloquence, were Panegyrics, Invectives, Gratulatory and Funeral Orations. The Deliberative was employed in matters of public concern, agitated in the Senate, or before the Aſſemblies of the People. The Judicial is the ſame with the Eloquence of the Bar, employed in addreſſing

addreſſing Judges, who have power to abſolve or to condemn. This diviſion runs through all the antient Treatiſes on Rhetoric; and is followed by the moderns who copy them. It is a diviſion not inartificial; and comprehends moſt, or all of the matters which can be the ſubject of Public Diſcourſe. It will, however, ſuit our purpoſe better, and be found, I imagine, more uſeful, to follow that diviſion, which the train of Modern Speaking naturally points out to us, taken from the three great ſcenes of Eloquence, Popular Aſſemblies, the Bar, and the Pulpit; each of which has a diſtinct character, that particularly ſuits it. This diviſion coincides in part with the antient one. The Eloquence of the Bar is preciſely the ſame with what the Antients called the Judicial. The Eloquence of Popular Aſſemblies, though moſtly of what they term the Deliberative Species, yet admits alſo of the Demonſtrative. The Eloquence of the Pulpit is altogether of a diſtinct nature, and cannot be properly reduced under any of the heads of the antient Rhetoricians.

To all the three, Pulpit, Bar, and Popular Aſſemblies, belong, in common, the rules, concerning the conduct of a diſcourſe in all its parts. Of theſe rules I purpoſe afterwards to treat at large. But before proceeding to them, I intend to ſhow, firſt, what is peculiar to each of theſe three kinds of Oratory, in their ſpirit, character, or manner. For every ſpecies of Public Speaking has a manner

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or character peculiarly ſuited to it; of which it is highly material to have a juſt idea, in order to direct the application of general rules. The Eloquence of a Lawyer is fundamentally different from that of a Divine, or a Speaker in Parliament: and to have a preciſe and proper idea of the diſtinguiſhing character which any kind of Public Speaking requires, is the foundation of what is called a juſt taſte in that kind of Speaking.

Laying aſide any queſtion concerning the preeminence in point of rank, which is due to any one of the three kinds before mentioned, I ſhall begin with that which tends to throw moſt light upon the reſt, viz. the Eloquence of Popular Aſſemblies. The moſt auguſt Theatre for this kind of Eloquence, to be found in any nation of Europe, is, beyond doubt, the Parliament of Great Britain. In meetings too, of leſs dignity, it may diſplay itſelf. Wherever there is a popular court, or wherever any number of men are aſſembled for debate or conſultation, there, in different forms, this ſpecies of Eloquence may take place.

Its object is, or ought always to be, Perſuaſion. There muſt be ſome end propoſed; ſome point, moſt commonly of public utility or good, in favour of which we ſeek to determine the hearers. Now, in all attempts to perſuade men, we muſt proceed upon this principle, that it is neceſſary to convince their underſtanding. Nothing can be more erroneous,

neous, than to imagine, that, becauſe Speeches to Popular Aſſemblies admit more of a declamatory Style than ſome other diſcourſes, they therefore ſtand leſs in need of being ſupported by ſound reaſoning. When modelled upon this falſe idea, they may have the ſhow, but never can produce the effect, of real Eloquence. Even the ſhow of Eloquence which they make, will pleaſe only the trifling and ſuperficial. For, with all tolerable judges, indeed almoſt with all men, mere declamation ſoon becomes inſipid. Of whatever rank the hearers be, a Speaker is never to preſume, that by a frothy and oſtentatious harangue, without ſolid ſenſe and argument, he can either make impreſſion on them, or acquire fame to himſelf. It is, at leaſt, a dangerous experiment; for, where ſuch an artifice ſucceeds once, it will fail ten times. Even the common people are better judges of argument and good ſenſe, than we ſometimes think them; and upon any queſtion of buſineſs, a plain man, who ſpeaks to the point without art, will generally prevail over the moſt artful Speaker who deals in flowers and ornament, rather than in reaſoning. Much more, when Public Speakers addreſs themſelves to any Aſſembly where there are perſons of education and improved underſtanding, they ought to be careful not to trifle with their hearers.

Let it be ever kept in view, that the foundation of all that can be called Eloquence, is good ſenſe, and ſolid thought. As popular as the Orations of

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Demoſthenes were, ſpoken to all the citizens of Athens, every one who looks into them, muſt ſee how fraught they are with argument; and how important it appeared to him, to convince the underſtanding, in order to perſuade, or to work on the principles of action. Hence their influence in his own time; hence their fame at this day. Such a pattern as this, Public Speakers ought to ſet before them for imitation, rather than follow the track of thoſe looſe and frothy Declaimers, who have brought diſcredit on Eloquence. Let it be their firſt ſtudy, in addreſſing any Popular Aſſembly, to be previouſly maſters of the buſineſs on which they are to ſpeak; to be well provided with matter and argument, and to reſt upon theſe the chief ſtreſs. This will always give to their diſcourſe an air of manlineſs and ſtrength, which is a powerful inſtrument of perſuaſion. Ornament, if they have genius for it, will follow of courſe; at any rate it demands only their ſecondary ſtudy: "Cura ſit verborum; ſoli-"citudo rerum:"—"To your expreſſion be atten-"tive, but about your matter be ſolicitous," is an advice of Quinctilian, which cannot be too often recollected by all who ſtudy Oratory.

In the next place, in order to be perſuaſive Speakers in a Popular Aſſembly, it is, in my opinion, a capital rule, that we be ourſelves perſuaded of whatever we recommend to others. Never, when it can be avoided, ought we to eſpouſe any ſide of the argument, but what we believe to be the true and

and the right one. Seldom or never will a man be eloquent, but when he is in earneſt, and uttering his own ſentiments. They are only the "veræ "voces ab imo pectore," the unaſſumed language of the heart or head, that carry the force of conviction. In a former Lecture, when entering on this ſubject, I obſerved, that all high Eloquence muſt be the offspring of paſſion, or warm emotion. It is this which makes every man perſuaſive; and gives a force to his genius, which it poſſeſſes at no other time. Under what diſadvantage then is he placed, who, not feeling what he utters, muſt counterfeit a warmth to which he is a ſtranger?

I know, that young people, on purpoſe to train themſelves to the Art of Speaking, imagine it uſeful to adopt that ſide of the queſtion under debate, which, to themſelves, appears the weakeſt, and to try what figure they can make upon it. But, I am afraid, this is not the moſt improving education for Public Speaking; and that it tends to form them to a habit of flimſy and trivial diſcourſe. Such a liberty they ſhould, at no time, allow themſelves, unleſs in meetings where no real buſineſs is carried on, but where declamation and improvement of Speech is the ſole aim. Not even in ſuch meetings, would I recommend it as the moſt uſeful exerciſe. They will improve themſelves to more advantage, and acquit themſelves with more honour, by chuſing always that ſide of the debate to which, in their own judgment, they are moſt inclined, and

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ſupporting it by what ſeems to themſelves moſt ſolid and perſuaſive. They will acquire the habit of reaſoning cloſely, and expreſſing themſelves with warmth and force, much more when they are adhering to their own ſentiments, than when they are ſpeaking in contradiction to them. In aſſemblies where any real buſineſs is carried on, whether that buſineſs be of much importance or not, it is always of dangerous conſequence for young practitioners to make trial of this ſort of play of Speech. It may fix an imputation on their characters before they are aware; and what they intended merely as amuſement, may be turned to the diſcredit, either of their principles or their underſtanding.

Debate, in Popular Courts, ſeldom allows the Speaker that full and accurate preparation beforehand, which the Pulpit always, and the Bar ſometimes, admits. The arguments muſt be ſuited to the courſe which the Debate takes; and as no man can exactly foreſee this, one who truſts to a ſet Speech, compoſed in his cloſet, will, on many occaſions, be thrown out of the ground which he had taken. He will find it pre-occupied by others, or his reaſonings ſuperſeded by ſome new turn of the buſineſs; and, if he ventures to uſe his prepared Speech, it will be frequently at the hazard of making an awkward figure. There is a general prejudice with us, and not wholly an unjuſt one, againſt ſet Speeches in Public Meetings. The only occaſion, when they have any propriety, is,

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at the opening of a Debate, when the Speaker has it in his power to chuſe his field. But as the Debate advances, and parties warm, diſcourſes of this kind become more unſuitable. They want the native air; the appearance of being ſuggeſted by the buſineſs that is going on; ſtudy and oſtentation are apt to be viſible; and, of courſe, though applauded as elegant, they are ſeldom ſo perſuaſive as more free and unconſtrained diſcourſes.

This, however, does not by any means conclude againſt premeditation of what we are to ſay; the neglect of which, and the truſting wholly to extemporaneous efforts, will unavoidably produce the habit of ſpeaking in a looſe and undigeſted manner. But the premeditation which is of moſt advantage, in the caſe which we now conſider, is of the ſubject or argument in general, rather than of nice compoſition in any particular branch of it. With regard to the matter, we cannot be too accurate in our preparation, ſo as to be fully maſters of the buſineſs under conſideration; but, with regard to words and expreſſion, it is very poſſible ſo far to overdo, as to render our Speech ſtiff and preciſe. Indeed, till once perſons acquire that firmneſs, that preſence of mind, and command of expreſſion, in a Public Meeting, which nothing but habit and practice can beſtow, it may be proper for a young Speaker to commit to memory the whole of what he is to ſay. But, after ſome performances of this kind have given him boldneſs, he

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he will find it the better method not to confine himſelf ſo ſtrictly; but only to write, beforehand, ſome ſentences with which he intends to ſet out, in order to put himſelf fairly in the train; and, for the reſt, to ſet down ſhort notes of the topics, or principal thoughts upon which he is to inſiſt, in their order, leaving the words to be ſuggeſted by the warmth of diſcourſe. Such ſhort notes of the ſubſtance of the diſcourſe will be found of conſiderable ſervice to thoſe eſpecially who are beginning to ſpeak in public. They will accuſtom them to ſome degree of accuracy, which, if they ſpeak frequently, they are in danger too ſoon of loſing. They will even accuſtom them to think more cloſely on the ſubject in queſtion; and will aſſiſt them greatly in arranging their thoughts with method and order.

THIS leads me next to obſerve, that in all kinds of Public Speaking, nothing is of greater conſequence than a proper and clear method. I mean not that formal method of laying down heads and ſubdiviſions, which is commonly practiſed in the Pulpit; and which, in Popular Aſſemblies, unleſs the Speaker be a man of great authority and character, and the ſubject of great importance, and the preparation too very accurate, is rather in hazard of diſguſting the hearers: ſuch an introduction is preſenting always the melancholy proſpect of a long diſcourſe. But though the method be not laid down in form, no diſcourſe of any length ſhould be without method;

method; that is, every thing ſhould be found in its proper place. Every one who ſpeaks, will find it of the greateſt advantage to himſelf to have previouſly arranged his thoughts, and claſſed under proper heads, in his own mind, what he is to deliver. This will aſſiſt his memory, and carry him through his diſcourſe, without that confuſion to which one is every moment ſubject, who has fixed no diſtinct plan of what he is to ſay. And with reſpect to the hearers, order in diſcourſe is abſolutely neceſſary for making any proper impreſſion. It adds both force and light to what is ſaid. It makes them accompany the Speaker eaſily and readily, as he goes along; and makes them feel the full effect of every argument which he employs. Few things, therefore, deſerve more to be attended to than diſtinct arrangement: for Eloquence, however great, can never produce entire conviction without it. Of the rules of method, and the proper diſtribution of the ſeveral parts of a diſcourſe, I am hereafter to treat.

Let us now conſider the Style and Expreſſion ſuited to the Eloquence of Popular Aſſemblies. Beyond doubt, theſe give ſcope for the moſt animated manner of Public Speaking. The very aſpect of a large Aſſembly, engaged in ſome debate of moment, and attentive to the diſcourſe of one man, is ſufficient to inſpire that man with ſuch elevation and warmth, as both gives riſe to ſtrong impreſſions, and gives them propriety. Paſſion eaſily

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eaſily riſes in a great Aſſembly, where the movements are communicated by mutual ſympathy between the Orator and the Audience. Thoſe bold figures, of which I treated formerly as the native language of paſſion, have then their proper place. That ardour of Speech, that vehemence and glow of Sentiment, which ariſe from a mind animated and inſpired by ſome great and public object, form the peculiar characteriſtics of Popular Eloquence, in its higheſt degree of perfection.

The liberty, however, which we are now giving of the ſtrong and paſſionate manner to this kind of Oratory, muſt be always underſtood with certain limitations and reſtraints, which it will be neceſſary to point out diſtinctly, in order to guard againſt dangerous miſtakes on this ſubject.

As firſt, The warmth which we expreſs muſt be ſuited to the occaſion and the ſubject: for nothing can be more prepoſterous, than an attempt to introduce great vehemence into a ſubject, which is either of ſlight importance, or which, by its nature, requires to be treated of calmly. A temperate tone of Speech, is that for which there is moſt frequent occaſion; and he who is, on every ſubject, paſſionate and vehement, will be conſidered as a bluſterer, and meet with little regard.

In the ſecond place, we muſt take care never to counterfeit warmth without feeling it. This always betrays

betrays perſons into an unnatural manner, which expoſes them to ridicule. For, as I have often ſuggeſted, to ſupport the appearance without the real feeling of paſſion, is one of the moſt difficult things in nature. The diſguiſe can almoſt never be ſo perfect, as not to be diſcovered. The heart can only anſwer to the heart. The great rule here, as indeed in every other caſe, is, to follow nature: never to attempt a ſtrain of Eloquence which is not ſeconded by our own genius. One may be a Speaker, both of much reputation and much influence, in the calm argumentative manner. To attain the pathetic, and the ſublime of Oratory, requires thoſe ſtrong ſenſibilities of mind, and that high power of expreſſion, which are given to few.

In the third place, even when the ſubject juſtifies the vehement manner, and when genius prompts it; when warmth is felt, not counterfeited; we muſt, ſtill, ſet a guard on ourſelves, not to allow impetuoſity to tranſport us too far. Without emotion in the ſpeaker, Eloquence, as was before obſerved, will never produce its higheſt effects; but at the ſame time, if the Speaker loſe command of himſelf, he will ſoon loſe command of his audience too. He muſt never kindle too ſoon: he muſt begin with moderation; and ſtudy to carry his hearers along with him, as he warms in the progreſs of his diſcourſe. For, if he runs before in the courſe of paſſion, and leaves them behind; if they are not tuned, if we may ſpeak ſo, in uniſon

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to him, the diſcord will preſently be felt, and be very grating. Let a Speaker have ever ſo good reaſon to be animated and fired by his ſubject, it is always expected of him, that the awe and regard due to his Audience ſhould lay a decent reſtraint upon his warmth, and prevent it from carrying him beyond certain bounds. If, when moſt heated by the ſubject, he can be ſo far maſter of himſelf as to preſerve cloſe attention to argument, and even to ſome degree of correct expreſſion, this ſelf-command, this exertion of reaſon, in the midſt of paſſion, has a wonderful effect both to pleaſe, and to perſuade. It is indeed the maſter-piece, the higheſt attainment of Eloquence; uniting the ſtrength of reaſon, with the vehemence of paſſion; affording all the advantages of paſſion for the purpoſe of perſuaſion, without the confuſion and diſorder which are apt to accompany it.

In the fourth place, In the higheſt and moſt animated ſtrain of Popular Speaking, we muſt always preſerve regard to what the public ear will bear. This direction I give, in order to guard againſt an injudicious imitation of antient Orators, who, both in their pronunciation and geſture, and in their figures of expreſſion, uſed a bolder manner than what the greater coolneſs of modern taſte will readily ſuffer. This may perhaps, as I formerly obſerved, be a diſadvantage to Modern Eloquence. It is no reaſon why we ſhould be too ſevere in checking the impulſe of genius, and continue always creeping on

on the ground; but it is a reaſon, however, why we ſhould avoid carrying the tone of declamation to a height that would now be reckoned extravagant. Demoſthenes, to juſtify the unſucceſsful action of Cheronæa, calls up the manes of thoſe heroes who fell in the battle of Marathon and Platæa, and ſwears by them, that their fellow-citizens had done well, in their endeavours to ſupport the ſame cauſe. Cicero, in his Oration for Milo, implores and obteſts the Alban hills and groves, and makes a long addreſs to them: and both paſſages, in theſe Orators, have a fine effect *. But how few modern Orators could venture on ſuch apoſtrophes? and what a power of genius would it require to give ſuch figures now their proper grace, or make them produce a due effect upon the hearers?

* The paſſage in Cicero is very beautiful, and adorned with the higheſt colouring of his Eloquence. "Non eſt humano "conſilio, ne mediocri quidem, Judices, deorum immortalium "cura, res illa perfecta. Religiones, mehercule, ipſæ aræque "cum illam belluam cadere viderunt, commoviſſe ſe videntur, "et jus in illo ſuum retinuiſſe. Vos enim jam Albani tumuli, "atque luci, vos inquam imploro atque obteſtor, voſque Al- "banorum obrutæ aræ, ſacrorum populi Romani ſociæ et "equales, quas ille præceps amentiâ, cæſis proſtratiſque, ſanc- "tiſſimis lucis, ſubſtructionum inſanis molibus oppreſſerat; "veſtræ tum aræ, veſtræ religiones viguerunt, veſtra vis valuit, "quam ille omni ſcelere polluerat. Tuque ex tuo edito monte La- "tiali, ſancte Jupiter, cujus ille lacus, nemora, fineſque, ſæpe omni "nefario ſtrupro, ſcelere maculârat, aliquando ad eum puni- "endum, oculos aperuiſti; vobis illæ, vobis veſtro in conſpectu, "feræ, ſed juſtæ tamen, & debitæ pœnæ ſolutæ ſunt."

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In the fifth and laſt place, In all kinds of Public Speaking, but eſpecially in popular Aſſemblies, it is a capital rule to attend to all the decorums of time, place, and character. No warmth of Eloquence can atone for the neglect of theſe. That vehemence, which is becoming in a perſon of character and authority, may be unſuitable to the modeſty expected from a young Speaker. That ſportive and witty manner which may ſuit one ſubject and one aſſembly, is altogether out of place in a grave cauſe, and a ſolemn meeting. "Caput "artis eſt," ſays Quinctilian, "decere. The firſt "principle of art, is, to obſerve decorum." No one ſhould ever riſe to ſpeak in public, without forming to himſelf a juſt and ſtrict idea of what ſuits his own age and character; what ſuits the ſubject, the hearers, the place, the occaſion; and adjuſting the whole train and manner of his ſpeaking on this idea. All the Antients inſiſt much on this. Conſult the firſt chapter of the eleventh book of Quinctilian, which is employed wholly on this point, and is full of good ſenſe. Cicero's admonitions in his Orator ad Brutum, I ſhall give in his own words, which ſhould never be forgotten by any who ſpeak in public. "Eſt Eloquentiæ, ſicut re-"liquarum rerum, fundamentum, ſapientia; ut "enim in vita, ſic in oratione nihil eſt difficilius "quam quod deceat videre; hujus ignoratione fæ-"piſſimè peccatur; non enim omnis fortuna, non "omnis auctoritas, non omnis ætas, nec vero locus, "aut tempus, aut auditor omnis, eodem aut verbo-

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" rum genere tractandus eſt, aut ſententiarum. " Semperque in omni parte orationis, ut vitæ, " quid deceat conſiderandum; quod et in re de " qua agitur poſitum eſt, et in perſonis et eorum " qui dicunt, et eorum qui audiunt*."—So much for the conſiderations that require to be attended to, with reſpect to the vehemence and warmth which is allowed in Popular Eloquence.

The current of Style ſhould in general be full, free, and natural. Quaint and artificial expreſſions are out of place here; and always derogate from perſuaſion. It is a ſtrong and manly Style which ſhould chiefly be ſtudied; and metaphorical Language, when properly introduced, produces often a happy effect. When the metaphors are warm, glowing, and deſcriptive, ſome inaccuracy in them will be overlooked, which, in a written compoſition, would be remarked and cenſured. Amidſt the torrent of declamation, the ſtrength of the

* " Good ſenſe is the foundation of Eloquence, as it is of all " other things that are valuable. It happens in Oratory exactly " at it does in life, that frequently nothing is more difficult " than to diſcern what is proper and becoming. In conſe- " quence of miſtaking this, the groſſeſt faults are often com- " mitted. For to the different degrees of rank, fortune, and " age among men, to all the varieties of time, place, and au- " ditory, the ſame Style of Language, and the ſame ſtrain of " thought, cannot agree. In every part of a diſcourſe, juſt " as in every part of life, we muſt attend to what is ſuitable " and decent; whether that be determined by the nature of the " ſubject of which we treat, or by the characters of thoſe who " ſpeak, or of thoſe who hear."

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figure makes impreſſion; the inaccuracy of it eſcapes.

With regard to the degree of conciſeneſs or diffuſeneſs, ſuited to popular Eloquence, it is not eaſy to fix any exact bounds. I know that it is common to recomend a diffuſe manner as the moſt proper. I am inclined, however, to think, that there is danger of erring in this reſpect; and that by indulging too much in the diffuſe Style, Public Speakers often loſe more in point of ſtrength, than they gain by the fulneſs of their illuſtration. There is no doubt, that in ſpeaking to a multitude, we muſt not ſpeak in ſentences and apophthegms; care muſt be taken to explain and to inculcate; but this care may be, and frequently is, carried too far. We ought always to remember, that how much ſoever we may be pleaſed with hearing ourſelves ſpeak, every audience is very ready to be tired; and the moment they begin to be tired, all our Eloquence goes for nothing. A looſe and verboſe manner never fails to create diſguſt; and, on moſt occaſions, we had better run the riſque of ſaying too little, than too much. Better place our thought in one ſtrong point of view, and reſt it there, than by turning it into every light, and pouring forth a profuſion of words upon it, exhauſt the attention of our hearers, and leave them flat and languid.

Of Pronunciation and Delivery, I am hereafter to treat apart. At preſent it is ſufficient to obſerve, that

that in ſpeaking to mixt Aſſemblies, the beſt manner of delivery is the firm and the determined. An arrogant and overbearing manner is indeed always diſagreeable; and the leaſt appearance of it ought to be ſhunned: but there is a certain deciſive tone, which may be aſſumed even by a modeſt man, who is thoroughly perſuaded of the ſentiments he utters; and which is beſt calculated for making a general impreſſion. A feeble and heſitating manner beſpeaks always ſome diſtruſt of a man's own opinion; which is, by no means, a favourable circumſtance for his inducing others to embrace it.

These are the chief thoughts which have occurred to me from reflection and obſervation, concerning the peculiar diſtinguiſhing characters of the Eloquence proper for Popular Aſſemblies. The ſum of what has been ſaid, is this: The end of Popular Speaking is perſuaſion; and this muſt be founded on conviction. Argument and reaſoning muſt be the baſis, if we would be Speakers of buſineſs, and not mere declaimers. We ſhould be engaged in earneſt on the ſide which we eſpouſe; and utter, as much as poſſible, our own, and not counterfeited Sentiments. The premeditation ſhould be of things, rather than of words. Clear order and method ſhould be ſtudied: the manner and expreſſion warm and animated; though ſtill, in the midſt of that vehemence, which may at times be ſuitable, carried on under the proper reſtraints which regard to the audience, and to the

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decorum of character, ought to lay on every Public Speaker: the Style free and eaſy; ſtrong and deſcriptive, rather than diffuſe; and the delivery determined and firm. To conclude this head, let every Orator remember, that the impreſſion made by fine and artful ſpeaking is momentary; that made by argument and good ſenſe, is ſolid and laſting.

I SHALL now, that I may afford an exemplification of that ſpecies of Oratory of which I have been treating, inſert ſome extracts from Demoſthenes. Even under the great diſadvantage of an Engliſh tranſlation, they will exhibit a ſmall ſpecimen of that vigorous and ſpirited Eloquence which I have ſo often praiſed. I ſhall take my extracts moſtly from the Philippics and Olynthiacs, which were entirely popular Orations ſpoken to the general convention of the citizens of Athens: and, as the ſubject of both the Philippics, and the Olynthiacs, is the ſame, I ſhall not confine myſelf to one Oration, but ſhall join together paſſages taken from two or three of them; ſuch as may ſhow his general ſtrain of ſpeaking, on ſome of the chief branches of the ſubject. The ſubject in general is, to rouſe the Athenians to guard againſt Philip of Macedon, whoſe growing power and crafty policy had by that time endangered, and ſoon after overwhelmed the liberties of Greece. The Athenians began to be alarmed; but their deliberations were ſlow, and their meaſures feeble; ſeveral of their favourite

favourite Orators having been gained by Philip's bribes to favour his cauſe. In this critical conjuncture of affairs Demoſthenes aroſe. In the following manner he begins his firſt Philippic; which, like the exordiums of all his Orations, is ſimple and artleſs*.

" HAD we been convened, Athenians! on ſome " new ſubject of debate, I had waited till moſt of " your uſual counſellors had declared their opi- " nions. If I had approved of what was propoſed " by them, I ſhould have continued ſilent; if " not, I ſhould then have attempted to ſpeak my " ſentiments. But ſince thoſe very points on " which theſe Speakers have oftentimes been " heard already, are at this time to be conſidered; " though I have ariſen firſt, I preſume I may ex- " pect your pardon; for if they on former occa- " ſions had adviſed the proper meaſures, you " would not have found it needful to conſult at " preſent.

" FIRST then, Athenians! however wretched " the ſituation of our affairs at preſent ſeems, " it muſt not by any means be thought deſperate. " What I am now going to advance may poſſibly " appear a paradox; yet it is a certain truth, that " our paſt misfortunes afford a circumſtance moſt

* In the following extracts, Leland's tranſlation is moſtly followed.

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" favourable to our future hopes*. And what is " that? even that our preſent difficulties are owing " entirely to our total indolence, and utter diſre- " gard of our own intereſt. For were we thus " ſituated, in ſpite of every effort which our duty " demanded, then indeed we might regard our " fortunes as abſolutely deſperate. But now, " Philip hath only conquered your ſupine- " neſs and inactivity; the ſtate he hath not con- " quered. You cannot be ſaid to be defeated; " your force hath never been exerted.

" If there is a man in this aſſembly who thinks " that we muſt find a formidable enemy in " Philip, while he views on one hand the nume- " rous armies which ſurround him, and on the " other, the weakneſs of our ſtate, deſpoiled of ſo " much of its dominions, I cannot deny that he " thinks juſtly. Yet let him reflect on this; there " was a time, Athenians! when we poſſeſſed " Pydna, Potidœa, and Melthone, and all that " country round: when many of the ſtates, now " ſubjected to him, were free and independent, " and more inclined to our alliance than to his. " If Philip, at that time weak in himſelf, and " without allies, had deſponded of ſucceſs againſt " you, he would never have engaged in thoſe en- " terpriſes which are now crowned with ſucceſs, nor

* This thought is only hinted at in the firſt Philippic, but brought out more fully in the third; as the ſame thoughts, occaſioned by ſimilar ſituations of affairs, ſometimes occur in the different orations on this ſubject.

" could

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" could have raiſed himſelf to that pitch of gran-
" deur at which you now behold him. But he
" knew well that the ſtrongeſt places are only
" prizes laid between the combatants, and ready
" for the conqueror. He knew that the domi-
" nions of the abſent devolve naturally to thoſe
" who are in the field; the poſſeſſions of the
" ſupine, to the active and intrepid. Animated
" by theſe ſentiments he overturns whole nations.
" He either rules univerſally as a conqueror, or
" governs as a protector. For mankind naturally
" ſeek confederacy with ſuch, as they ſee reſolved
" and preparing not to be wanting to themſelves.

" If you, my countrymen! will now at length
" be perſuaded to entertain the like ſentiments; if
" each of you will be diſpoſed to approve himſelf
" an uſeful citizen, to the utmoſt that his ſtation
" and abilities enable him; if the rich will be
" ready to contribute, and the young to take the
" field; in one word, if you will be yourſelves,
" and baniſh theſe vain hopes which every ſingle
" perſon entertains, that the active part of public
" buſineſs may lie upon others, and he remain at
" his eaſe; you may then, by the aſſiſtance of the
" Gods, recal thoſe opportunities which your ſu-
" pineneſs hath neglected, regain your dominions,
" and chaſtiſe the inſolence of this man.

" But when, O my countrymen! will you
" begin to exert your vigour? Do you wait till
" rouſed by ſome dire event? till forced by ſome
" neceſſity? What then are we to think of our
" preſent condition? To free men, the diſgrace
" attending

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" attending on miſconduct is, in my opinion, " the moſt urgent neceſſity. Or ſay, is it your " ſole ambition to wander through the public " places, each inquiring of the other, " What " new advices?" Can any thing be more new, " than that a man of Macedon ſhould conquer the " Athenians, and give law to Greece? " Is " Philip dead?" " No—but he is ſick." Pray, " what is it to you whether Philip is ſick or not? " Suppoſing he ſhould die, you would raiſe up " another Philip, if you continue thus regardleſs " of your intereſt.

" MANY, I know, delight more in nothing " than in circulating all the rumours they hear as " articles of intelligence. Some cry, Philip hath " joined with the Lacedæmonians, and they are " concerting the deſtruction of Thebes. Others " aſſure us, he hath ſent an embaſſy to the king of " Perſia; others, that he is fortifying places in " Illyria. Thus we all go about framing our ſe- " veral tales. I do believe indeed, Athenians! that " he is intoxicated with his greatneſs, and does " entertain his imagination with many ſuch vi- " ſionary projects, as he ſees no power riſing to " oppoſe him. But I cannot be perſuaded that " he hath ſo taken his meaſures that the weakeſt " amongſt us (for the weakeſt they are who ſpread " ſuch rumours) know what he is next to do. Let " us diſregard theſe tales. Let us only be per- " ſuaded of this, that he is our enemy; that we " have long been ſubject to his inſolence; that " whatever we expected to have been done for us

" by

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" by others, hath turned againſt us; that all the re-
" ſource left, is in ourſelves; and that if we are
" not inclined to carry our arms abroad, we ſhould
" be forced to engage him at home. Let us be
" perſuaded of theſe things, and then we ſhall come
" to a proper determination, and be no longer
" guided by rumours. We need not be ſolicitous
" to know what particular events are to happen.
" We may be well aſſured that nothing good can
" happen, unleſs we give due attention to our own
" affairs, and act as becomes Athenians.

" WERE it a point generally acknowledged *,
" that Philip is now at actual war with the ſtate,
" the only thing under deliberation would then be,
" how to oppoſe him with moſt ſafety. But ſince
" there are perſons ſo ſtrangely infatuated, that al-
" though he has already poſſeſſed himſelf of a con-
" ſiderable part of our dominions; although he is
" ſtill extending his conqueſts; although all Greece
" has ſuffered by his injuſtice; yet they can hear
" it repeated in this Aſſembly, that it is ſome of
" us who ſeek to embroil the ſtate in war: this
" ſuggeſtion muſt firſt be guarded againſt. I rea-
" dily admit, that were it in our power to deter-
" mine whether we ſhould be at peace or war,
" peace, if it depended on our option, is moſt de-
" ſirable to be embraced. But if the other party
" hath drawn the ſword, and gathered his armies
" round him; if he amuſes us with the name of

* Phil. iii.

" peace,

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" peace, while, in fact, he is proceeding to the " greateſt hoſtilities; what is left for us but to op- " poſe him? If any man takes that for a peace, " which is only a preparation for his leading his " forces directly upon us, after his other conqueſts, " I hold that man's mind to be diſordered. At " leaſt, it is only our conduct towards Philip, not " Philip's conduct towards us, that is to be " termed a peace; and this is the peace for which " Philip's treaſures are expended, for which his " gold is ſo liberally ſcattered among our venal " orators, that he may be at liberty to carry on " the war againſt you, while you make no war on " him.

" Heavens! is there any man of a right mind " who would judge of peace or war by words, and " not by actions? Is there any man ſo weak as to " imagine that it is for the ſake of thoſe paltry vil- " lages of Thrace, Drongylus, and Cabyle, and " Maſtira, that Philip is now braving the utmoſt " dangers, and enduring the ſeverity of toils and " ſeaſons; and that he has no deſigns upon the " arſenals, and the navies, and the ſilver mines " of Athens? or that he will take up his winter " quarters among the cells and dungeons of " Thrace, and leave you to enjoy all your revenues " in peace? But you wait, perhaps, till he declare " war againſt you.—He will never do ſo—no, " though he were at your gates. He will ſtill be " aſſuring you that he is not at war. Such were " his profeſſions to the people of Oreum, when his " forces

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" forces were in the heart of their country; ſuch
" his profeſſions to thoſe of Pheræ, until the
" moment he attacked their walls: and thus he
" amuſed the Olynthians till he came within a few
" miles of them, and then he ſent them a meſſage,
" that either they muſt quit their city, or he his
" kingdom. He would indeed be the abſurdeſt of
" mankind, if, while you ſuffer his outrages to paſs
" unnoticed, and are wholly engaged in accuſing and
" proſecuting one another, he ſhould, by declaring
" war, put an end to your private conteſts, warn you
" to direct all your zeal againſt him, and deprive
" his penſioners of their moſt ſpecious pretence
" for ſuſpending your reſolutions, that of his not
" being at war with the ſtate. I, for my part,
" hold and declare, that by his attack of the Me-
" garæans, by his attempts upon the liberty of
" Eubœa, by his late incurſions into Thrace, by
" his practices in Peloponneſus, Philip has vio-
" lated the treaty; he is in a ſtate of hoſtility with
" you; unleſs you ſhall affirm, that he who pre-
" pares to beſiege a city, is ſtill at peace, until the
" walls be actually inveſted. The man whoſe
" deſigns, whoſe whole conduct tends to reduce
" me to ſubjection, that man is at war with me,
" though not a blow hath yet been given, nor a
" ſword drawn.

" All Greece, all the barbarian world, is too
" narrow for this man's ambition. And, though
" we Greeks ſee and hear all this, we ſend no em-
" baſſies to each other; we expreſs no reſentment;

" but

LECT. XII. " but into ſuch wretchedneſs are we ſunk, that " even to this day, we neglect what our intereſt " and duty demand. Without engaging in aſſo- " ciations, or forming confederacies, we look with " unconcern upon Philip's growing power; each " fondly imagining, that the time in which an- " other is deſtroyed, is ſo much time gained to " him; although no man can be ignorant, that, " like the regular periodic return of a fever, he is " coming upon thoſe who think themſelves the " moſt remote from danger.—And what is the " cauſe of our preſent paſſive diſpoſition? For ſome " cauſe ſure there muſt be, why the Greeks, who " have been ſo zealous heretofore in defence of li- " berty, are now ſo prone to ſlavery. The cauſe, " Athenians! is, that a principle, which was for- " merly fixed in the minds of all, now exiſts no " more; a principle which conquered the opulence " of Perſia; maintained the freedom of Greece, " and triumphed over the powers of ſea and land. " That principle was, an unanimous abhorrence " of all thoſe who accepted bribes from princes, " that were enemies to the liberties of Greece. To " be convicted of bribery, was then a crime alto- " gether unpardonable. Neither Orators, nor Ge- " nerals, would then ſell for gold the favourable " conjunctures which fortune put into their hands. " No gold could impair our firm concord at home, " our hatred and diffidence of tyrants and barba- " rians. But now all things are expoſed to ſale, " as in a public market. Corruption has intro-

" duced

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" duced ſuch manners, as have proved the bane " and deſtruction of our country. Is a man " known to have received foreign money? Peo- " ple envy him. Does he own it? They laugh. " Is he convicted in form? They forgive him: " ſo univerſally has this contagion diffuſed itſelf " among us.

" If there be any who, though not carried away " by bribes, yet are ſtruck with terror, as if Philip " was ſomething more than human, they may ſee " upon a little conſideration, that he hath ex- " hauſted all thoſe artifices to which he owes his " preſent elevation; and that his affairs are now " ready to decline. For I myſelf, Athenians! " ſhould think Philip really to be dreaded, if I " ſaw him raiſed by honourable means.—When " forces join in harmony and affection, and one " common intereſt unites confederating powers, " then they ſhare the toils with alacrity, and en- " dure diſtreſſes with perſeverance. But when " extravagant ambition and lawleſs power, as in " the caſe of Philip, have aggrandized a ſingle " perſon, the firſt pretence, the ſlighteſt accident, " overthrows him, and daſhes his greatneſs to the " ground. For, it is not poſſible, Athenians! " it is not poſſible, to found a laſting power upon " injuſtice, perjury, and treachery. Theſe may " perhaps ſucceed for once, and borrow for a " while, from hope, a gay and flouriſhing ap- " pearance. But time betrays their weakneſs, " and they fall of themſelves to ruin. For, as

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" in ſtructures of every kind, the lower parts " ſhould have the firmeſt ſtability, ſo the grounds " and principles of great enterpriſes ſhould be " juſtice and truth. But this ſolid foundation is " wanting to all the enterpriſes of Philip.

" HENCE, among his confederates, there are " many who hate, who diſtruſt, who envy him. " If you will exert yourſelves, as your honour and " your intereſt require, you will not only diſcover " the weakneſs and inſincerity of his confederates, " but the ruinous condition alſo of his own king- " dom. For you are not to imagine, that the in- " clinations of his ſubjects are the ſame with thoſe " of their prince. He thirſts for glory; but they " have no part in this ambition. Haraſſed by " thoſe various excurſions he is ever making, they " groan under perpetual calamity; torn from their " buſineſs and their families; and beholding com- " merce excluded from their coaſts. All thoſe " glaring exploits, which have given him his " apparent greatneſs, have waſted his natural " ſtrength, his own kingdom, and rendered it " much weaker than it originally was. Beſides, " his profligacy and baſeneſs, and thoſe troops of " buffoons, and diſſolute perſons, whom he careſſes " and keeps conſtantly about him, are, to men of " juſt diſcernment, great indications of the weak- " neſs of his mind. At preſent, his ſucceſſes caſt " a ſhade over theſe things; but let his arms meet " with the leaſt diſgrace, his feebleneſs will ap- " pear, and his character be expoſed. For, as

" in our bodies, while a man is in apparent health, " the effect of ſome inward debility, which has " been growing upon him, may, for a time, be " concealed; but, as ſoon as it comes the length " of diſeaſe, all his ſecret infirmities ſhow " themſelves, in whatever part of his frame " the diſorder is lodged: ſo, in ſtates and " monarchies, while they carry on a war abroad, " many defects eſcape the general eye; but, " as ſoon as war reaches their own territory, " their infirmities come forth to general obſerva- " tion.

" FORTUNE has great influence in all human " affairs; but I, for my part, ſhould prefer the " fortune of Athens, with the leaſt degree of vi- " gour in aſſerting your cauſe, to this man's for- " tune. For we have many better reaſons to de- " pend upon the favour of Heaven than this man. " But, indeed, he who will not exert his own " ſtrength, hath no title to depend either on his " friends, or on the Gods. Is it at all ſurpriſing " that he, who is himſelf ever amidſt the labours " and dangers of the field; who is every where; " whom no opportunity eſcapes; to whom no ſea- " ſon is unfavourable; ſhould be ſuperior to you, " who are wholly engaged in contriving delays, " and framing decrees, and enquiring after news? " The contrary would be much more ſurpriſing, " if we, who have never hitherto acted as became " a ſtate engaged in war, ſhould conquer one who " acts, in every inſtance, with indefatigable vigi-

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" lance. It is this, Athenians! it is this which " gives him all his advantage againſt you. Philip, " conſtantly ſurrounded by his troops, and per- " petually engaged in projecting his deſigns, can, " in a moment, ſtrike the blow where he pleaſes. " But we, when any accident alarms us, firſt ap- " point our Trierarchs; then we allow them to " exchange by ſubſtitution: then the ſupplies are " conſidered; next, we reſolve to man our fleet " with ſtrangers and foreigners; then find it ne- " ceſſary to ſupply their place ourſelves. In the " midſt of theſe delays, what we are failing to de- " fend, the enemy is already maſter of; for the " time of action is ſpent by us in preparing; " and the iſſues of war will not wait for our ſlow " and irreſolute meaſures.

" CONSIDER then your preſent ſituation, and " make ſuch proviſion as the urgent danger re- " quires. Talk not of your ten thouſands, or " your twenty thouſand foreigners; of thoſe ar- " mies which appear ſo magnificent on paper " only; great and terrible in your decrees, in " execution weak and contemptible. But let your " army be made up chiefly of the native forces of " the ſtate; let it be an Athenian ſtrength to " which you are to truſt; and whomſoever you " appoint as general, let them be entirely un- " der his guidance and authority. For ever " ſince our armies have been formed of fo- " reigners alone, their victories have been gain- " ed over our allies and confederates only, while

" our enemies have riſen to an extravagance of " power." LECT. XXVII.

THE Orator goes on to point out the number of forces which ſhould be raiſed; the places of their deſtination; the ſeaſon of the year in which they ſhould ſet out; and then propoſes in form his motion, as we would call it, or his decree, for the neceſſary ſupply of money, and for aſcertaining the funds from which it ſhould be raiſed. Having finiſhed all that relates to the buſineſs under deliberation, he concludes theſe Orations on public affairs, commonly with no longer peroration than the following, which terminates the Firſt Philippic: " I, for my part, have never, upon any " occaſion, choſen to court your favour, by ſpeak- " ing any thing but what I was convinced would " ſerve you. And, on this occaſion, you have " heard my ſentiments freely declared, without " art, and without reſerve. I ſhould have been " pleaſed, indeed, that, as it is for your advantage, " to have your true intereſt laid before you, ſo I " might have been aſſured, that he who layeth it " before you would ſhare the advantage. But, " uncertain as I know the conſequence to be with " reſpect to myſelf, I yet determined to ſpeak, be- " cauſe I was convinced, that theſe meaſures, if " purſued, muſt prove beneficial to the Public. " And, of all thoſe opinions which ſhall be offered " to your acceptance, may the Gods determine

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" that to be chofen which will beſt advance the " general welfare!"

THESE Extracts may ſerve to give ſome imperfect idea of the manner of Demoſthenes. For a juſter and more complete one, recourſe muſt be had to the excellent original.

LECTURE XXVIII.

ELOQUENCE OF THE BAR—ANALYSIS OF CICERO's ORATION FOR CLUENTIUS.

I TREATED, in the laſt Lecture, of what is peculiar to the Eloquence of Popular Aſſemblies. Much of what was ſaid on that head is applicable to the Eloquence of the Bar, the next great ſcene of Public Speaking to which I now proceed, and my obſervations upon which will therefore be the ſhorter. All, however, that was ſaid in the former Lecture muſt not be applied to it; and it is of importance, that I begin with ſhowing where the diſtinction lies.

IN the firſt place, the ends of Speaking at the Bar, and in Popular Aſſemblies, are commonly different. In Popular Aſſemblies, the great object is perſuaſion; the Orator aims at determining the hearers to ſome choice or conduct, as good, fit, or uſeful. For accompliſhing this end, it is incumbent on him to apply himſelf to all the principles of action in our nature; to the paſſions and

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to the heart, as well as to the underſtanding. But, at the Bar, conviction is the great object. There, it is not the Speaker's buſineſs to perſuade the Judges to what is good or uſeful, but to ſhow them what is juſt and true; and, of courſe, it is chiefly, or ſolely, to the underſtanding that his eloquence is addreſſed. This is a characteriſtical difference which ought ever to be kept in view.

In the next place, Speakers at the Bar addreſs themſelves to one, or to a few Judges, and theſe, too, perſons generally of age, gravity, and authority of character. There, they have not thoſe advantages which a mixed and numerous Aſſembly affords for employing all the arts of Speech, even ſuppoſing their ſubject to admit them. Paſſion does not riſe ſo eaſily; the Speaker is heard more coolly; he is watched over more ſeverely; and would expoſe himſelf to ridicule, by attempting that high vehement tone, which is only proper in ſpeaking to a multitude.

In the laſt place, the nature and management of the ſubjects which belong to the Bar, require a very different ſpecies of Oratory from that of Popular Aſſemblies. In the latter, the Speaker has a much wider range. He is ſeldom confined to any preciſe rule; he can fetch his topics from a great variety of quarters; and employ every illuſtration which his fancy or imagination ſuggeſts. But, at the Bar, the field of ſpeaking is limited to preciſe

preciſe law and ſtatute. Imagination is not allowed to take its ſcope. The Advocate has always lying before him the line, the ſquare, and the compaſs. Theſe, it is his principal buſineſs to be continually applying to the ſubjects under debate.

For theſe reaſons, it is clear, that the Eloquence of the Bar is of a much more limited, more ſober and chaſtened kind, than that of Popular Aſſemblies; and, for ſimilar reaſons, we muſt beware of conſidering even the judicial Orations of Cicero or Demoſthenes, as exact models of the manner of Speaking which is adapted to the preſent ſtate of the Bar. It is neceſſary to warn young Lawyers of this: becauſe, though theſe were pleadings ſpoken in civil or criminal cauſes, yet, in fact, the nature of the Bar anciently, both in Greece and Rome, allowed a much nearer approach to Popular Eloquence, than what it now does. This was owing chiefly to two cauſes.

First, Becauſe in the ancient Judicial Orations ſtrict law was much leſs an object of attention than it is become among us. In the days of Demoſthenes and Cicero, the municipal ſtatutes were few, ſimple, and general; and the deciſion of cauſes was truſted, in a great meaſure, to the equity and common ſenſe of the Judges. Eloquence, much more than Juriſprudence, was the ſtudy of thoſe who were to plead cauſes. Cicero

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ſomewhere ſays, that three months ſtudy was ſufficient to make any man a complete Civilian; nay, it was thought that one might be a good pleader at the Bar, who had never ſtudied law at all. For there were among the Romans a ſet of men called *Pragmatici*, whoſe office it was to give the Orator all the law knowledge which the cauſe he was to plead required, and which he put into that popular form, and dreſſed up with thoſe colours of Eloquence, that were beſt fitted for influencing the Judges before whom he ſpoke.

We may obſerve next, that the Civil and Criminal Judges, both in Greece and Rome, were commonly much more numerous than they are with us, and formed a ſort of Popular Aſſembly. The renowned tribunal of the Areopagus at Athens conſiſted of fifty Judges at the leaſt *. Some make it to conſiſt of a great many more. When Socrates was condemned, by what court it is uncertain, we are informed that no fewer than 280 voted againſt him. In Rome, the Prætor, who was the proper Judge both in civil and criminal cauſes, named for every cauſe of moment, the *Judices Selecti*, as they were called, who were always numerous, and had the office and power of both Judge and Jury. In the famous cauſe of Milo, Cicero ſpoke to fifty-one *Judices Selecti*,

* Vide Potter, Antiq. vol. I. p. 102.

and

and ſo had the advantage of addreſſing his whole pleading not to one or a few learned Judges of the point of law, as is the caſe with us, but to an Aſſembly of Roman Citizens. Hence all thoſe arts of Popular Eloquence, which we find the Roman Orator ſo frequently employing, and probably with much ſucceſs. Hence tears and commiſeration are ſo often made uſe of as the inſtruments of gaining a cauſe. Hence certain practices which would be reckoned theatrical among us, were common at the Roman Bar; ſuch as introducing not only the accuſed perſon dreſſed in deep mourning, but preſenting to the Judges his family, and his young children, endeavouring to move them by their cries and tears.

For theſe reaſons, on account of the wide difference between the ancient and modern ſtate of the Bar, to which we may add alſo the difference in the turn of antient and modern Eloquence, which I formerly took notice of, too ſtrict an imitation of Cicero's manner of pleading would now be extremely injudicious. To great advantage he may ſtill be ſtudied by every Speaker at the Bar. In the Addreſs with which he opens his ſubject, and the inſinuation he employs for gaining the favour of the Judges; in the diſtinct arrangement of his facts; in the gracefulneſs of his narration; in the conduct and expoſition of his arguments, he may and he ought to be imitated. A higher pattern cannot be ſet before us; but

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but one who ſhould imitate him alſo in his exaggeration and amplifications, in his diffuſe and pompous declamation, and in his attempts to raiſe paſſion, would now make himſelf almoſt as ridiculous at the Bar, as if he ſhould appear there in the *Toga* of a Roman Lawyer.

BEFORE I deſcend to more particular directions concerning the Eloquence of the Bar, I muſt be allowed to take notice, that the foundation of a Lawyer's reputation and ſucceſs muſt always be laid in a profound knowledge of his own profeſſion. Nothing is of ſuch conſequence to him, or deſerves more his deep and ſerious ſtudy. For whatever his abilities as a Speaker may be, if his knowledge of the law be reckoned ſuperficial, few will chuſe to commit their cauſe to him. Beſides previous ſtudy, and a proper ſtock of knowledge attained, another thing highly material to the ſucceſs of every Pleader, is a diligent and painful attention to every cauſe with which he is entruſted, ſo as to be thoroughly maſter of all the facts and circumſtances relating to it. On this the antient Rhetoricians inſiſt with great earneſtneſs, and juſtly repreſent it as a neceſſary baſis to all the Eloquence that can be exerted in pleading. Cicero tells us (under the character of Antonius, in the ſecond book De Oratore), that he always converſed at full length with every client who came to conſult him; that he took care there ſhould be no witneſs to their converſation, in order

order that his client might explain himſelf more freely; that he was wont to ſtart every objection, and to plead the cauſe of the adverſe party with him, that he might come at the whole truth, and be fully prepared on every point of the buſineſs; and that, after the client had retired, he uſed to balance all the facts with himſelf, under three different characters, his own, that of the Judge, and that of the Advocate on the oppoſite ſide. He cenſures very ſeverely thoſe of the profeſſion who declined taking ſo much trouble; taxing them not only with ſhameful negligence, but with diſhoneſty and breach of truſt*. To the ſame purpoſe Quinctilian, in the eighth chapter of his laſt book, delivers a great many excellent rules concerning all the methods which a Lawyer ſhould employ for attaining the moſt thorough knowledge of the cauſe he is to plead; again and again recommending patience and attention in converſation with clients, and obſerving very ſenſibly, "Non tam obeſt audire ſupervacua, quam igno-

* "Equidem ſoleo dare operam, ut de ſua quiſque re me ipſe "doceat; et nequis alius adſit, quo liberius loquatur; et agere "adverſarii cauſam, ut ille agat ſuam; et quicquid de ſua re "cogitaret, in medium proferat. Itaque cùm ille deceſſit, "tres perſonas unus ſuſtineo, ſummâ animi equitate; meam, "adverſarii, judicis.—Nonnulli dum operam ſuam multam ex- "iſtimari volunt, ut toto foro volitare, et a cauſa ad cauſam "ire videantur, cauſas dicunt incognitas. In quo eſt illa qui- "dem magna offenſio, vel negligentiæ ſuſceptis rebus, vel per- "fidiæ receptis; ſed etiam illa, major opinione, quod nemo "poteſt de ea re quam non novit, non turpiſſimè dicere."

"rare

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" rare neceſſaria. Frequenter enim et vulnus, " et remedium, in iis Orator inveniet quæ liti- " gatori in neutram partem, habere momentum " videbantur*."

Supposing an Advocate to be thus prepared, with all the knowledge which the ſtudy of the law in general, and of that cauſe which he is to plead in particular, can furniſh him, I muſt next obſerve, that Eloquence in pleading is of the higheſt moment for giving ſupport to a cauſe. It were altogether wrong to infer, that becauſe the ancient popular and vehement manner is now in a great meaſure ſuperſeded, there is, therefore, no room for Eloquence at the Bar, and that the ſtudy of it is become ſuperfluous. Though the manner of ſpeaking be changed, yet ſtill there is a right and proper manner, which deſerves to be ſtudied as much as ever. Perhaps there is no ſcene of public ſpeaking where Eloquence is more neceſſary. For, on other occaſions, the ſubject on which men ſpeak in public, is frequently ſufficient, by itſelf, to intereſt the hearers. But the dryneſs and ſubtilty of the ſubjects generally agitated at the Bar, require more than any other, a certain kind of Elo-

* " To liſten to ſomething that is ſuperfluous can do no hurt; " whereas to be ignorant of ſomething that is material, may be " highly prejudicial. The Advocate will frequently diſcover " the weak ſide of a cauſe, and learn, at the ſame time, what " is the proper defence, from circumſtances which, to the party " himſelf, appeared to be of little or no moment."

quence

quence in order to command attention; in order to give proper weight to the arguments that are employed, and to prevent any thing which the Pleader advances from paſſing unregarded. The effect of good ſpeaking is always very great. There is as much difference in the impreſſion made upon the hearers, by a cold, dry, and confuſed Speaker, and that made by one who pleads the ſame cauſe with elegance, order, and ſtrength, as there is between our conception of an object, when it is preſented to us in a dim light, and when we behold it in a full and clear one.

It is no ſmall encouragement to Eloquence at the Bar, that of all the liberal profeſſions, none gives fairer play to genius and abilities than that of the Advocate. He is leſs expoſed than ſome others, to ſuffer by the arts of rivalry, by popular prejudices, or ſecret intrigues. He is ſure of coming forward according to his merit: for he ſtands forth every day to view; he enters the liſt boldly with his competitors; every appearance which he makes is an appeal to the Public, whoſe deciſion ſeldom fails of being juſt, becauſe it is impartial. Intereſt and friends may ſet forward a young Pleader with peculiar advantages beyond others, at the beginning; but they can do no more than open the field to him. A reputation reſting on theſe aſſiſtances will ſoon fall. Spectators remark, Judges decide, Parties watch; and to him will the multitude of Clients never fail to reſort, who gives the moſt

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moſt approved ſpecimens of his knowledge, eloquence, and induſtry.

It muſt be laid down for a firſt principle, that the Eloquence ſuited to the Bar, whether in ſpeaking or in writing law papers, is of the calm and temperate kind, and connected with cloſe reaſoning. Sometimes a little play may be allowed to the Imagination, in order to enliven a dry ſubject, and give relief to the fatigue of attention: but this liberty muſt be taken with a ſparing hand. For a Florid Style, and a ſparkling manner, never fail to make the Speaker be heard with a jealous ear by the Judge. They detract from his weight, and always produce a ſuſpicion of his failing in ſoundneſs of ſtrength of argument. It is purity and neatneſs of expreſſion which is chiefly to be ſtudied; a Style perſpicuous and proper, which ſhall not be needleſsly overcharged with the pedantry of law terms, and where, at the ſame time, no affectation ſhall appear of avoiding theſe, when they are ſuitable and neceſſary.

Verbosity is a common fault, of which the gentlemen of this profeſſion are accuſed; and into which the habit of ſpeaking and writing ſo haſtily, and with ſo little preparation, as they are often obliged to do, almoſt unavoidably betrays them. It cannot, therefore, be too much recommended to thoſe who are beginning to practiſe at the Bar, that they ſhould early ſtudy to guard againſt this, while

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as yet they have full leiſure for preparation. Let them form themſelves, eſpecially in the papers which they write, to the habit of a ſtrong and a correct Style; which expreſſes the ſame thing much better in a few words, than is done by the accumulation of intricate and endleſs periods. If this habit be once acquired, it will become natural to them afterwards, when the multiplicity of buſineſs ſhall force them to compoſe in a more precipitant manner. Whereas, if the practice of a looſe and negligent Style has been ſuffered to become familiar, it will not be in their power, even upon occaſions when they wiſh to make an unuſual effort, to expreſs themſelves with energy and grace.

Distinctness is a capital property in ſpeaking at the Bar. This ſhould be ſhown chiefly in two things: firſt, in ſtating the queſtion; in ſhowing clearly what is the point in debate; what we admit; what we deny; and where the line of diviſion begins between us, and the adverſe party. Next, it ſhould be ſhown in the order and arrangement of all the parts of the pleading. In every ſort of Oration, a clear method is of the utmoſt conſequence; but in thoſe embroiled and difficult caſes which belong to the Bar, it is almoſt all in all. Too much pains, therefore, cannot be taken in previouſly ſtudying the plan and method. If there be indiſtinctneſs and diſorder there, we can have no ſucceſs in convincing; we leave the whole cauſe in darkneſs.

With

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With reſpect to the conduct of Narration and Argumentation, I ſhall hereafter make ſeveral remarks, when I come to treat of the component parts of a regular Oration. I ſhall at preſent only obſerve, that the Narration of facts at the Bar, ſhould always be as conciſe as the nature of them will admit. Facts are always of the greateſt conſequence to be remembered during the courſe of the pleading; but, if the Pleader be tedious in his manner of relating them, and needleſsly circumſtantial, he lays too great a load upon the memory. Whereas, by cutting off all ſuperfluous circumſtances in his recital, he adds ſtrength to the material facts: he both gives a clearer view of what he relates, and makes the impreſſion of it more laſting. In Argumentation, again, I would incline to give ſcope to a more diffuſe manner at the Bar, than on ſome other occaſions. For, in Popular Aſſemblies, where the ſubject of debate is often a plain queſtion, Arguments, taken from known topics, gain ſtrength by their conciſeneſs. But the obſcurity of law points frequently requires the Arguments to be ſpread out, and placed in different lights, in order to be fully apprehended.

When the Pleader comes to refute the Arguments employed by his adverſary, he ſhould be on his guard not to do them injuſtice, by diſguiſing, or placing them in a falſe light. The deceit is ſoon diſcovered: it will not fail of being expoſed; and tends to impreſs the Judge and the Hearers with

with diſtruſt of the Speaker, as one who either wants diſcernment to perceive, or wants fairneſs to admit, the ſtrength of the reaſoning on the other ſide. Whereas, when they ſee that he ſtates, with accuracy and candour, the Arguments which have been uſed againſt him, before he proceeds to combat them, a ſtrong prejudice is created in his favour. They are naturally led to think, that he has a clear and full conception of all that can be ſaid on both ſides of the argument; that he has entire confidence in the goodneſs of his own cauſe; and does not attempt to ſupport it by any artifice or concealment. The judge is thereby inclined to receive, much more readily, the impreſſions which are given him by a Speaker, who appears both ſo fair and ſo penetrating. There is no part of the diſcourſe, in which the Orator has greater opportunity of ſhowing a maſterly addreſs, than when he ſets himſelf to repreſent the reaſonings of his antagoniſts, in order to refute them.

Wit may ſometimes be of ſervice at the Bar, eſpecially in a lively reply, by which we may throw ridicule on ſomething that has been ſaid on the other ſide. But, though the reputation of wit be dazzling to a young Pleader, I would never adviſe him to reſt his ſtrength upon this talent. It is not his buſineſs to make an Audience laugh, but to convince the Judge; and ſeldom or never did any one riſe to eminence in his profeſſion, by being a witty Lawyer.

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A PROPER degree of warmth in pleading a cauſe is always of uſe. Though, in ſpeaking to a multitude, greater vehemence be natural; yet, in addreſſing ourſelves even to a ſingle man, the warmth which ariſes from ſerioufneſs and earneſtneſs, is one of the moſt powerful means of perſuading him. An advocate perſonates his client; he has taken upon him the whole charge of his intereſts; he ſtands in his place. It is improper, therefore, and has a bad effect upon the cauſe, if he appears indifferent and unmoved; and few clients will be fond of truſting their intereſts in the hands of a cold Speaker.

AT the ſame time, he muſt beware of proſtituting his earneſtneſs and ſenſibility ſo much as to enter with equal warmth into every cauſe that is committed to him, whether it can be ſuppoſed really to excite his zeal or not. There is a dignity of character, which it is of the utmoſt importance for every one in this profeſſion to ſupport. For it muſt never be forgotten, that there is no inſtrument of perſuaſion more powerful, than an opinion of probity and honour in the perſon who undertakes to perſuade*. It is ſcarcely poſſible for any hearer to ſeparate altogether the impreſſion made by the character of him that ſpeaks, from the things

* "Plurimum ad omnia momenti eſt in hoc poſitum, ſi vir "bonus creditur. Sic enim contingit, ut non ſtudium advocati, "videatur afferre, ſed pene teſtis fidem."

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that

that he ſays. However ſecretly and imperceptibly, it will be always lending its weight to one ſide or other; either detracting from, or adding to, the authority and influence of his Speech. This opinion of honour and probity muſt therefore be carefully preſerved both by ſome degree of delicacy in the choice of cauſes, and by the manner of conducting them. And though, perhaps, the nature of the profeſſion may render it extremely difficult to carry this delicacy its utmoſt length, yet there are attentions to this point, which, as every good man for virtue's ſake, ſo every prudent man for reputation's ſake, will find to be neceſſary. He will always decline embarking in cauſes that are odious and manifeſtly unjuſt; and, when he ſupports a doubtful cauſe, he will lay the chief ſtreſs upon ſuch arguments as appear to his own judgment the moſt tenable; reſerving his zeal and his indignation for caſes where injuſtice and iniquity are flagrant. But of the perſonal qualities and virtues requiſite in Public Speakers, I ſhall afterwards have occaſion to diſcourſe.

These are the chief directions which have occurred to me concerning the peculiar ſtrain of Speaking at the Bar. In order to illuſtrate the ſubject farther, I ſhall give a ſhort Analyſis of one of Cicero's Pleadings, or judicial Orations. I have choſen that, *pro Cluentio*. The celebrated one, *pro Milone*, is more laboured and ſhowy; but it is too declamatory. That, *pro Cluentio*, comes nearer the ſtrain of a modern Pleading; and though

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it has the disadvantage of being very long, and complicated too in the subject, yet it is one of the most chaste, correct, and forcible of all Cicero's judicial Orations, and well deserves attention for its conduct.

Avitus Cluentius, a Roman Knight of splendid family and fortunes, had accused his Stepfather Oppianicus of an attempt to poison him. He prevailed in the prosecution; Oppianicus was condemned and banished. But as rumours arose of the Judges having been corrupted by money in this cause, these gave occasion to much popular clamour, and had thrown a heavy odium on Cluentius. Eight years afterwards Oppianicus died. An accusation was brought against Cluentius of having poisoned him, together with a charge also of having bribed the Judges in the former trial to condemn. In this action Cicero defends him. The accusers were Sassia, the mother of Cluentius, and widow of Oppianicus, and young Oppianicus, the son. Q. Naso, the Prætor, was Judge, together with a considerable number of *Judices Selecti*.

The introduction of the Oration is simple and proper, taken from no common-place topic, but from the nature of the cause. It begins with taking notice, that the whole Oration of the accuser was divided into two parts*. These two parts were,

* "Animadverte, Judices, omnem accusatoris orationem in "duas divisam esse partes; quarum altera mihi niti et magno- "pere

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were, the charge of having poiſoned Oppianicus; on which the accuſer, conſcious of having no proof, did not lay the ſtreſs of his cauſe; but reſted it chiefly on the other charge of formerly corrupting the Judges, which was capital in certain caſes by the Roman law. Cicero purpoſes to follow him in this method, and to apply himſelf chiefly to the vindication of his client from the latter charge. He makes ſeveral proper obſervations on the danger of Judges ſuffering themſelves to be ſwayed by a popular cry, which often is raiſed by faction, and directed againſt the innocent. He acknowledges, that Cluentius had ſuffered much and long by reproach, on account of what had paſſed at the former trial; but begs only a patient and attentive hearing, and aſſures the Judges, that he will ſtate every thing relating to that matter ſo fairly and ſo clearly, as ſhall give them entire ſatisfaction. A great appearance of candour reigns throughout this introduction.

THE crimes with which Cluentius was charged, were heinous. A mother accuſing her ſon, and accuſing him of ſuch actions, as having firſt bribed

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" pere confidere videbatur, invidiâ jam inveterata judicii Juniani,
" altera tantummodo conſuetudinis cauſâ, timidè et diffidenter
" attingere rationem veneficii criminum; quâ de re lege eſt
" hæc queſtio conſtituta. Itaque mihi certum eſt hanc eandem
" diſtributionem invidiæ et criminum ſic in defenſione ſervare,
" ut omnes intelligant, nihil me nec ſubterfugere voluiſſe re-
" ticendo, nec obſcurare dicendo."

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Judges to condemn her husband, and having afterwards poisoned him, were circumstances that naturally raised strong prejudices against Cicero's client. The first step, therefore, necessary for the Orator, was to remove these prejudices; by shewing what sort of persons Cluentius's mother, and her husband Oppianicus, were; and thereby turning the edge of public indignation against them. The nature of the cause rendered this plan altogether proper, and in similar situations it is fit to be imitated. He executes his plan with much eloquence and force; and in doing it lays open such a scene of infamy and complicated guilt, as gives a shocking picture of the manners of that age; and such as would seem incredible, did not Cicero refer to the proof that was taken in the former trial, of the facts which he alleges.

Sassia, the mother, appears to have been altogether of an abandoned character. Soon after the death of her first husband, the father of Cluentius, she fell in love with Aurius Melinus, a young man of illustrious birth and great fortune, who was married to her own daughter. She prevailed with him to divorce her daughter, and then she married him herself*. This Melinus being afterwards, by

* "Lectum illum genialem quem biennio ante filiæ suæ nubenti "stravérat, in eâdem domo sibi ornari et sterni, expulsâ atque "exturbatâ filia, jubet. Nubit genero socrus, nullis auspicibus "funestis

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by the means of Oppianicus, involved in Sylla's proſcription, and put to death; and Saſſia being left, for the ſecond time, a widow, and in a very opulent ſituation, Oppianicus himſelf made his addreſſes to her. She, not ſtartled at the impudence of the propoſal, nor at the thoughts of marrying one, whoſe hands had been imbrued in her former huſband's blood, objected only, as Cicero ſays, to Oppianicus having two ſons by his preſent wife. Oppianicus removed the objection, by having his ſons privately diſpatched; and then, divorcing his wife, the infamous match was concluded between him and Saſſia. Theſe flagrant deeds are painted, as we may well believe, with the higheſt colours of Cicero's Eloquence, which here has a very proper field. Cluentius, as a man of honour, could no longer live on any tolerable terms with a woman, a mother only in the name, who had loaded herſelf and all her family with ſo much diſhonour; and hence, the feud which had ever ſince ſubſiſted between them, and had in-

" funeſtis omnibus omnium. O mulieris ſcelus incredibile, " & præter hanc unam, in omni vita inauditum! O audaciam " ſingularem! non timuiſſe, ſi minus vim Deorum, hominumque " famam, at illam ipſam noctem, faceſque illas nuptiales? non " limen cubiculi? non cubile filiæ? non parietes denique ipſos " ſuperiorum teſtes nuptiarum? perfregit ac poſtravit omnia " cupiditate & furore; vicit pudorem libido; timorem audacia; " rationem amentia."—The warmth of Cicero's Eloquence, which this paſſage beautifully exemplifies, is here fully juſtified by the ſubject.

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volved her unfortunate ſon in ſo much trouble and perſecution. As for Oppianicus, Cicero gives a ſhort hiſtory of his life, and a full detail of his crimes; and by what he relates, Oppianicus appears to have been a man daring, fierce, and cruel, inſatiable in avarice and ambition; trained and hardened in all the crimes which thoſe turbulent times of Marius and Sylla's proſcriptions produced: "Such a man," ſays our Orator, "as, in place of "being ſurpriſed that he was condemned, you "ought rather to wonder that he had eſcaped ſo "long."

And now, having prepared the way by all this narration, which is clear and elegant, he enters on the hiſtory of that famous trial in which his client was charged with corrupting the Judges. Both Cluentius and Oppianicus were of the city of Larinum. In a public conteſt about the rights of the freemen of that city, they had taken oppoſite ſides, which embittered the miſunderſtanding already ſubſiſting between them. Saſſia, now the wife of Oppianicus, puſhed him on to the deſtruction of her ſon, whom ſhe had long hated, as one who was conſcious of her crimes; and as Cluentius was known to have made no will, they expected, upon his death, to ſucceed to his fortune. The plan was formed, therefore, to diſpatch him by poiſon; which, conſidering their former conduct, is no incredible part of the ſtory. Cluentius was at that time indiſpoſed: the ſervant of his phyſician was to

be bribed to give him poiſon, and one Fabricius, an intimate friend of Oppianicus, was employed in the negociation. The ſervant having made the diſcovery, Cluentius firſt proſecuted Scamander, a freedman of Fabricius, in whoſe cuſtody the poiſon was found; and afterwards Fabricius, for this attempt upon his life. He prevailed in both actions: and both theſe perſons were condemned by the voices, almoſt unanimous, of the Judges.

Of both theſe *Prejudicia*, as our Author calls them, or previous trial, he gives a very particular account; and reſts upon them a great part of his argument, as, in neither of them, there was the leaſt charge or ſuſpicion of any attempt to corrupt the Judges. But in both theſe trials, Oppianicus was pointed at plainly; in both, Scamander and Fabricius were proſecuted as only the inſtruments and miniſters of his cruel deſigns. As a natural conſequence, therefore, Cluentius immediately afterwards raiſed a third proſecution againſt Oppianicus himſelf, the contriver and author of the whole. It was in this proſecution, that money was ſaid to have been given to the Judges; all Rome was filled with the report of it, and the alarm loudly raiſed, that no man's life or liberty was ſafe, if ſuch dangerous practices were not checked. By the following arguments, Cicero defends his client againſt this heavy charge of the *Crimen corrupti Judicii.*

He reaſons firſt, that there was not the leaſt reaſon to ſuſpect it; ſeeing the condemnation of Oppianicus

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Oppianicus was a direct and neceſſary conſequence of the judgments given againſt Scamander and Fabricius, in the two former trials; trials, that were fair and uncorrupted, to the ſatisfaction of the whole world. Yet by theſe, the road was laid clearly open to the detection of Oppianicus's guilt. His inſtruments and miniſters being once condemned, and by the very ſame Judges too, nothing could be more abſurd than to raiſe a cry about an innocent perſon being circumvented by bribery, when it was evident, on the contrary, that a guilty perſon was now brought into judgment, under ſuch circumſtances, that unleſs the Judges were altogether inconſiſtent with themſelves, it was impoſſible for him to be acquitted.

He reaſons next, that, if in this trial there were any corruption of the Judges by money, it was infinitely more probable, that corruption ſhould have proceeded from Oppianicus than from Cluentius. For ſetting aſide the difference of character between the two men, the one fair, the other flagitious; what motive had Cluentius to try ſo odious and dangerous an experiment, as that of bribing Judges? Was it not much more likely that he ſhould have had recourſe to this laſt remedy, who ſaw and knew himſelf and his cauſe to be in the utmoſt danger; than the other, who had a cauſe clear in itſelf, and of the iſſue of which, in conſequence of the two previous ſentences given by the ſame Judges, he had full reaſon to be confi-

dent? Was it not much more likely that he ſhould bribe, who had every thing to fear; whoſe life and liberty, and fortune were at ſtake; than he who had already prevailed in a material part of his charge, and who had no further intereſt in the iſſue of the proſecution, than as juſtice was concerned?

In the third place, he aſſerts it as a certain fact, that Oppianicus did attempt to bribe the Judges; that the corruption in this trial, ſo much complained of, was employed, not by Cluentius, but againſt him. He calls on Titus Attius, the Orator on the oppoſite ſide; he challenges him to deny, if he can, or if he dare, that Stalenus, one of the thirty-two *Judices Selecti*, did receive money from Oppianicus; he names the ſum that was given; he names the perſons that were preſent, when, after the trial was over, Stalenus was obliged to refund the bribe. This is a ſtrong fact, and would ſeem quite deciſive. But, unluckily, a very croſs circumſtance occurs here For this very Stalenus gave his voice to condemn Oppianicus. For this ſtrange incident, Cicero accounts in the following manner: Stalenus, ſays he, known to be a worthleſs man, and accuſtomed before to the like practices, entered into a treaty with Oppianicus to bring him off, and demanded for that purpoſe a certain ſum, which he undertook to diſtribute among a competent number of the other Judges. When he was once in poſſeſſion of the money; when he found a greater treaſure, than ever he had been maſter

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maſter of, depoſited in his empty and wretched habitation, he became very unwilling to part with any of it to his colleagues; and bethought himſelf of ſome means by which he could contrive to keep it all to himſelf. The ſcheme which he deviſed for this purpoſe, was, to promote the condemnation, inſtead of the acquittal of Oppianicus; as, from a condemned perſon, he did not apprehend much danger of being called to account, or being obliged to make reſtitution. Inſtead, therefore, of endeavouring to gain any of his colleagues, he irritated ſuch as he had influence with againſt Oppianicus, by firſt promiſing them money in his name, and afterwards telling them, that Oppianicus had cheated him*. When ſentence was to be pronounced, he had taken meaſures for being abſent himſelf; but being brought by Oppianicus's Lawyers from another court, and obliged to give his voice, he found it neceſſary to lead the way, in condemning the

* "Cum eſſet agens, ſumptuoſus, audax, callidus, perfi-
" dioſus, & cum domi ſuæ, miſerrimis in locis, et inaniſſimis,
" tantum nummorum poſitum viderit, ad omnem malitiam &
" fraudem verſare mentem ſuam cœpit. Demne Judicibus?
" mihi igitur, ipſi præter periculum et infamiam quid quæretur?
" Siquis eum forte caſus ex periculo eripuerit, nonne reddendum
" eſt? præcipitantem igitur impellamus, inquit, et perditum
" proſternamus. Capit hoc conſilium et pecuniam quibuſdam
" judicibus leviſſimis polliceatur, deinde eam poſtea ſupprimat;
" ut quoniam graves homines ſuâ ſponte ſeverè judicaturos
" putabat, hos qui leviores erant, deſtitutione inatos Oppianico
" redderet."

man

man whoſe money he had taken, without fulfilling the bargain which he had made with him. LECT. XXVIII.

By theſe plauſible facts and reaſonings, the character of Cluentius ſeems in a great meaſure cleared; and, what Cicero chiefly intended, the odium thrown upon the adverſe party. But a difficult part of the Orator's buſineſs ſtill remained. There were ſeveral ſubſequent deciſions of the Prætor, the Cenſors, and the Senate, againſt the Judges in this cauſe; which all proceeded, or ſeemed to proceed, upon this ground of bribery and corruption: for it is plain the ſuſpicion prevailed, that if Oppianicus had given money to Stalenus, Cluentius had outbribed him. To all theſe deciſions, however, Cicero replies with much diſtinctneſs and ſubtilty of argument; though it might be tedious to follow him through all his reaſonings on theſe heads. He ſhows, that the facts were, at that time, very indiſtinctly known; that the deciſions appealed to were haſtily given; that not one of them concluded directly againſt his Client; and that, ſuch as they were, they were entirely brought about by the inflammatory and factious harangues of Quinctius, the Tribune of the People, who had been the Agent and Advocate of Oppianicus; and who, enraged at the defeat he had ſuſtained, had employed all his tribunitial influence to raiſe a ſtorm againſt the Judges who condemned his Client.

At

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At length, Cicero comes to reaſon concerning the point of law. The *Crimen Corrupti Judicii*, or the bribing of Judges, was capital. In the famous *Lex Cornelia de Sicariis*, was contained this clauſe (which we find ſtill extant, Pandect. lib. xlviii. Tit. 10. § 1.), "Qui judicem corruperit, vel "corrumpendum curaverit, hâc lege teneatur." This clauſe, however, we learn from Cicero, was reſtricted to Magiſtrates and Senators; and as Cluentius was only of the Equeſtrian Order, he was not, even ſuppoſing him guilty, within the law. Of this Cicero avails himſelf doubly; and as he ſhows here the moſt maſterly addreſs, I ſhall give a ſummary of his pleading on this part of the cauſe; "You," ſays he to the Advocate for the proſecutor, "you, T. Attius, I know, had every where "given it out, that I was to defend my Client, "not from facts, not upon the footing of inno- "cence, but by taking advantage merely of the "law in his behalf. Have I done ſo? I appeal "to yourſelf. Have I ſought to cover him be- "hind a legal defence only? On the contrary, "have I not pleaded his cauſe as if he had been a "Senator, liable, by the Cornelian Law, to be "capitally convicted; and ſhown that neither "proof nor probable preſumption lies againſt his "innocence? In doing ſo, I muſt acquaint you, "that I have complied with the deſire of Cluentius "himſelf. For when he firſt conſulted me in this "cauſe, and when I informed him that it was "clear no action could be brought againſt him "from

" from the Cornelian Law, he inſtantly beſought LECT. XXVIII.
" and obteſted me, that I would not reſt his de-
" fence upon that ground; ſaying, with tears in
" his eyes, That his reputation was as dear to him
" as his life; and that what we ſought as an inno-
" cent man, was not only to be abſolved from any
" penalty, but to be acquitted in the opinion of all
" his fellow-citizens.

" HITHERTO, then, I have pleaded this cauſe
" upon his plan. But my Client muſt forgive me,
" if now I ſhould plead it upon my own. For I
" ſhould be wanting to myſelf, and to that regard
" which my character and ſtation require me to
" bear to the laws of the State, if I ſhould allow
" any perſon to be judged of by a law which does
" not bind him. You, Attius, indeed, have told
" us, that it was a ſcandal and reproach, that a
" Roman Knight ſhould be exempted from thoſe
" penalties to which a Senator, for corrupting
" Judges, is liable. But I muſt tell you, that it
" would be a much greater reproach, in a State
" that is regulated by law, to depart from the law.
" What ſafety have any of us in our perſons, what
" ſecurity for our rights, if the law ſhall be ſet
" aſide? By what title do you, Q. Naſo, ſit in
" that chair, and preſide in this judgment? By
" what right, T. Attius, do you accuſe, or do I
" defend? Whence all the ſolemnity and pomp
" of Judges, and Clerks, and Officers, of which
" this houſe is full? Does not all proceed from
" the

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" the law, which regulates the whole departments " of the State; which, as a common bond, holds " its members together; and like the ſoul within " the body, actuates and directs all the public " functions*? On what ground, then, dare you " ſpeak lightly of the law, or move that, in a cri- " minal trial, Judges ſhould advance one ſtep be- " yond what it permits them to go? The wiſdom " of our anceſtors has found, that, as Senators " and Magiſtrates enjoy higher dignities, and " greater advantages than other members of the " State, the law ſhould alſo, with regard to them, " be more ſtrict, and the purity and uncorrupted- " neſs of their morals be guarded by more ſevere " ſanctions. But if it be your pleaſure that this " inſtitution ſhould be altered, if you wiſh to have " the Cornelian Law, concerning bribery, ex- " tended to all ranks, then let us join, not in vio-

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* " Ait Attius, indignum eſſe facinus, ſi ſenator judicio " quemquam circumvenerit, eum legibus teneri; ſi Eques Ro- " manus hoc idem fecerit, eum non teneri. Ut tibi concedam " hoc indignum eſſe, tu mihi concedas neceſſe eſt multo eſſe in- " dignius, in eâ civitate quæ legibus contineatur, diſcedi a legi- " bus. Hoc nam vinculum eſt hujus dignitatis qua fruimur in " republicâ. Hoc fundamentum libertatis; hic fons equitatis; " mens et animus, et conſilium, et ſententia civitatis poſita eſt " in legibus. Ut corpora noſtra ſine mente, ſic civitas ſine " lege, ſuis partibus, ut nervis ac ſanguine & membris, uti non " poteſt. Legum miniſtri, magiſtratus; legum interpretes, " judices; legum denique idcirco omnes ſimus ſervi, ut liber " eſſe poſſimus. Quid eſt, Q. Naſo, cur tu in hoc loco ſedeas? " &c."

" lating

" lating the law, but in propoſing to have this al-
" teration made by a new law. My Client, Cluen-
" tius, will be the foremoſt in this meaſure, who
" now, while the old law ſubſiſts, rejected its de-
" fence, and required his cauſe to be pleaded, as
" if he had been bound by it. But, though he
" would not avail himſelf of the law, you are
" bound in juſtice not to ſtretch it beyond its
" proper limits."

Such is the reaſoning of Cicero on this head; eloquent, ſurely, and ſtrong. As his manner is diffuſe, I have greatly abridged it from the original, but have endeavoured to retain its force.

In the latter part of the Oration, Cicero treats of the other accuſation that was brought againſt Cluentius, of having poiſoned Oppianicus. On this, it appears, his accuſers themſelves laid ſmall ſtreſs; having placed their chief hope in overwhelming Cluentius with the odium of bribery in the former trial; and, therefore, on this part of the cauſe, Cicero does not dwell long. He ſhows the improbability of the whole tale which they related concerning this pretended poiſoning, and makes it appear to be altogether deſtitute of any ſhadow of proof.

Nothing, therefore, remains but the Peroration, or Concluſion of the whole. In this, as indeed throughout the whole of this Oration, Cicero is

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uncommonly chaſte, and, in the midſt of much warmth and earneſtneſs, keeps clear of turgid declamation. The Peroration turns on two points; the indignation which the character and conduct of Saſſia ought to excite, and the compaſſion due to a ſon, perſecuted through his whole life by ſuch a mother. He recapitulates the crimes of Saſſia; her lewdneſs, her violation of every decorum, her inceſtuous marriages, her violence and cruelty. He places, in the moſt odious light, the eagerneſs and fury which ſhe had ſhown in the ſuit ſhe was carrying on againſt her ſon; deſcribes her journey from Larinum to Rome, with a train of attendants, and a great ſtore of money, that ſhe might employ every method for circumventing and oppreſſing him in this trial; while, in the whole courſe of her journey, ſhe was ſo deteſted, as to make a ſolitude wherever ſhe lodged; ſhe was ſhunned and avoided by all; her company, and her very looks, were reckoned contagious; the houſe was deemed polluted, which was entered into by ſo abandoned a woman *. To this he oppoſes the character of Cluentius,

* " Cùm appropinquare hujus judicium ei nuntiatum eſt, " confeſtim hic advolavit; ne aut accuſatoribus diligentia, aut " pecunia teſtibus deeſſit; aut ne forte mater hoc ſibi optatiſſi- " mum ſpectaculum hujus ſordium atque luctus, et tanti ſqualoris " amitteret. Jam vero quod iter Romam hujus mulieris fuiſſe " exiſtimatis? Quod ego propter vicinitatem Aquinatium et " Venafranorum ex multis comperi: quos concurſus in his op- " pidis? Quantos et virorum et mulierum gemitus eſſe factos? " Mulierem

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Cluentius, fair, unſpotted, and reſpectable. He produces the teſtimonies of the magiſtrates of Larinum in his favour, given in the moſt ample and honourable manner by a public decree, and ſupported by a great concourſe of the moſt noted inhabitants, who were now preſent, to ſecond every thing that Cicero could ſay in favour of Cluentius.

"WHEREFORE, Judges," he concludes, "if "you abominate crimes, ſtop the triumph of this "impious woman, prevent this moſt unnatural "mother from rejoicing in her ſon's blood. If "you love virtue and worth, relieve this unfor- "tunate man, who, for ſo many years, has been "expoſed to moſt unjuſt reproach through the "calumnies raiſed againſt him by Saſſia, Oppiani- "cus, and all their adherents. Better far had it "been for him to have ended his days at once by "the poiſon which Oppianicus had prepared for "him, than to have eſcaped thoſe ſnares, if he "muſt ſtill be oppreſſed by an odium which I have "ſhown to be ſo unjuſt. But in you he truſts, in

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" Mulierem quandam Larino, atque illam uſque a mari ſupero " Romam proficiſci cum magno comitatu et pecunia, quo faci- " lius circumvenire judicio capitis, atque opprimere filium poſſit. " Nemo erat illorum, pœne dicam, quin expiandum illum lo- " cum eſſe arbitraretur quacunque illa inter feciſſet; nemo, " quin terram ipſam violari, quæ mater eſt omnium, veſtigiis " conſceleratæ matris putaret. Itaque nullo in oppido con- " ſiſtendi ei poteſtas fuit: nemo ex tot hoſpitibus inventus eſt " qui non contagionem aſpectûs fugeret."

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" your clemency, and your equity, that now, on a " full and fair hearing of his cauſe, you will reſtore " him to his honour; you will reſtore him to his " friends and fellow-citizens, of whoſe zeal and " high eſtimation of him you have ſeen ſuch " ſtrong proofs; and will ſhow, by your deciſion, " that though faction and calumny may reign for a " while in popular meetings and harangues, in " trial and judgment regard is paid to the truth " only."

I HAVE given only a ſkeleton of this Oration of Cicero. What I have principally aimed at, was to ſhow his diſpoſition and method; his arrangement of facts, and the conduct and force of ſome of his main arguments. But, in order to have a full view of the ſubject, and of the art with which the Orator manages it, recourſe muſt be had to the original. Few of Cicero's Orations contain a greater variety of facts and argumentations, which renders it difficult to analyſe it fully. But for this reaſon I choſe it, as an excellent example of managing at the Bar a complex and intricate cauſe, with order, elegance, and force.

LECTURE XXIX.

ELOQUENCE OF THE PULPIT.

BEFORE treating of the ſtructure and component parts of a regular Oration, I purpoſed making ſome obſervations on the peculiar ſtrain, the diſtinguiſhing characters, of each of the three great kinds of Public Speaking. I have already treated of the Eloquence of Popular Aſſemblies and of the Eloquence of the Bar. The ſubject which remains for this Lecture is, the ſtrain and ſpirit of that Eloquence which is ſuited to the Pulpit.

LET us begin with conſidering the advantages and diſadvantages, which belong to this field of Public Speaking. The Pulpit has plainly ſeveral advantages peculiar to itſelf. The dignity and importance of its ſubjects muſt be acknowledged ſuperior to any other. They are ſuch as ought to intereſt every one, and can be brought home to every man's heart; and ſuch as admit, at the ſame time, both the higheſt embelliſhment in deſcribing, and the greateſt vehemence and warmth in enforc-

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ing them. The Preacher has alſo great advantages in treating his ſubjects. He ſpeaks not to one or a few Judges, but to a large Aſſembly. He is ſecure from all interruption. He is obliged to no replies, or extemporaneous efforts. He chuſes his the meat leiſure; and comes to the public with all the aſſiſtance which the moſt accurate premeditation can give him.

But, together with theſe advantages, there are alſo peculiar difficulties that attend the Eloquence of the Pulpit. The Preacher, it is true, has no trouble in contending with an adverſary; but then, Debate and Contention enliven genius, and procure attention. The Pulpit Orator is, perhaps, in too quiet poſſeſſion of his field. His ſubjects of diſcourſe are, in themſelves, noble and important; but they are ſubjects trite and familiar. They have for ages employed ſo many ſpeakers, and ſo many pens; the public ear is ſo much accuſtomed to them, that it requires more than an ordinary power of genius to fix attention. Nothing within the reach of art is more difficult, than to beſtow, on what is common, the grace of novelty. No ſort of compoſition whatever is ſuch a trial of ſkill, as where the merit of it lies wholly in the execution; not in giving any information that is new, not in convincing men of what they did not believe; but in dreſſing truths which they knew, and of which they were before convinced, in ſuch colours as may moſt forcibly affect their imagination and heart.

heart*. It is to be conſidered too, that the ſubject of the Preacher generally confines him to abſtract qualities, to virtues and vices; whereas, that of other popular Speakers leads them to treat of perſons; which is a ſubject that commonly intereſts the hearers more, and takes faſter hold of the imagination. The Preacher's buſineſs is ſolely to make you deteſt the crime. The Pleader's, to make you deteſt the criminal. He deſcribes a living perſon; and with more facility rouſes your in-

* What I have ſaid on this ſubject, coincides very much with the obſervations made by the famous M. Bruyere, in his *Mœurs de Siecle*, when he is comparing the Eloquence of the Pulpit to that of the Bar. "L'Eloquence de la chaire, en ce "qui y entre d'humain, & du talent de l'orateur, eſt cachée, "connue de peu de perſonnes, & d'une difficile execution. Il "faut marcher pas des chemins battus, dire ce qui a été dit, "& ce qui l'on prevoit que vous allez dire: les matières ſont "grandes, mait uſées & triviales; les principes ſurs, mais dont "les auditeurs penetrent les concluſions d'une ſeule vûe: il y "entre des ſujets qui ſont ſublimes, mais qui peut traiter le ſub-"lime?—Le Prédicateur n'eſt point ſoutenu comme l'avocat par "des faits toujours nouveaux, par de differens evénémens, par "des avantures inouies; il ne s'exerce point ſur les queſtions "douteuſes; il ne fait point valoir les violentes conjectures, & "les preſomptions; toutes choſes, neanmoins, qui élevent le "génie, lui donnent de la force, & de l'étendue, & qui con-"traignent bien moins l'éloquence, qu'elles ne le fixent, & le "dirigent. Il doit, au contraire, tirer ſon diſcours d'une ſource "commune, & au tout le monde puiſe; & s'il s'écarte de ces "lieux communs, il n'eſt plus populaire; il eſt abſtrait ou dé-"clamateur."—The inference which he draws from theſe reflections is very juſt—"Il eſt plus aiſé de prêcher que de "plaider; mais plus difficile de bien prêcher que de bien "plaider." Les Characteres, ou Mœurs de ce Siecle, p. 601.

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dignation. From these causes, it comes to pass, that though we have a great number of moderately good Preachers, we have, however, so few that are singularly eminent. We are still far from perfection in the Art of Preaching; and perhaps there are few things in which it is more difficult to excel*. The object, however, is noble, and worthy, upon many accounts, of being pursued with zeal.

It may perhaps occur to some, that Preaching is no proper subject of the Art of Eloquence. This, it may be said, belongs only to human studies and inventions: but the truths of religion, with the greater simplicity, and the less mixture of art they are set forth, are likely to prove the more

* What I say here, and in other passages, of our being far from perfection in the Art of Preaching, and of there being few who are singularly eminent in it, is to be always understood as referring to an ideal view of the perfection of this art, which none, perhaps, since the days of the Apostles, ever did, or ever will, reach. But in that degree of the Eloquence of the Pulpit, which promotes, in a considerable measure, the great end of edification, and gives a just title to high reputation and esteem, there are many who hold a very honourable rank. I agree entirely in opinion with a candid Judge (Dr. Campbell on Rhetoric, B. i. ch. 10), who observes, that considering how rare the talent of Eloquence is among men, and considering all the disadvantages under which Preachers labour, particularly from the frequency of this exercise, joined with the other duties of their office, to which fixed Pastors are obliged, there is more reason to wonder that we hear so many instructive, and even eloquent Sermons, than that we hear so few.

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ſucceſsful. This objection would have weight, if Eloquence were, as the perſons who make ſuch an objection commonly take it to be, an oſtentatious and deceitful art, the ſtudy of words and of plauſibility only, calculated to pleaſe, and to tickle the ear. But againſt this idea of Eloquence I have all along guarded. True Eloquence is the art of placing truth in the moſt advantageous light for conviction and perſuaſion. This is what every good man who preaches the Goſpel not only may, but ought to have at heart. It is moſt intimately connected with the ſucceſs of his miniſtry; and were it needful, as aſſuredly it is not, to reaſon any further on this head, we might refer to the Diſcourſes of the Prophets and Apoſtles, as models of the moſt ſublime and perſuaſive Eloquence, adapted both to the imagination and the paſſions of men.

An eſſential requiſite in order to preach well, is to have a juſt, and, at the ſame time, a fixed and habitual view of the end of Preaching. For in no art can any man execute well, who has not a juſt idea of the end and object of that art. The end of all Preaching is, to perſuade men to become good. Every Sermon, therefore, ſhould be a perſuaſive Oration. Not but that the Preacher is to inſtruct and to teach, to reaſon and argue. All perſuaſion, as I ſhowed formerly, is to be founded on conviction. The underſtanding muſt always be applied to in the firſt place, in order to make a laſting impreſ-

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ſion on the heart; and he who would work on men's paſſions, or influence their practice, without firſt giving them juſt principles, and enlightening their minds, is no better than a mere declaimer. He may raiſe tranſient emotions, or kindle a paſſing ardour; but can produce no ſolid or laſting effect. At the ſame time, it muſt be remembered, that all the Preacher's inſtructions are to be of the practical kind; and that perſuaſion muſt ever be his ultimate object. It is not to diſcuſs ſome abſtruſe point, that he aſcends the Pulpit. It is not to illuſtrate ſome metaphyſical truth, or to inform men of ſomething which they never heard before; but it is to make them better men; it is to give them, at once, clear views, and perſuaſive impreſſions of religious truth. The Eloquence of the Pulpit, then, muſt be Popular Eloquence. One of the firſt qualities of preaching is to be popular; not in the ſenſe of accommodation to the humours and prejudices of the people (which tends only to make a Preacher contemptible), but, in the true ſenſe of the word, calculated to make impreſſion on the people; to ſtrike and to ſeize their hearts. I ſcruple not therefore to aſſert, that the abſtract and philoſophical manner of preaching, however it may have ſometimes been admired, is formed upon a very faulty idea, and deviates widely from the juſt plan of Pulpit Eloquence. Rational, indeed, a Preacher ought always to be; he muſt give his audience clear ideas on every ſubject, and entertain them with ſenſe, not with ſound; but to

be an accurate Reaſoner will be ſmall praiſe, if he be not a perſuaſive Speaker alſo. LECT. XXIX.

Now, if this be the proper idea of a Sermon, a perſuaſive Oration, one very material conſequence follows, that the Preacher himſelf, in order to be ſucceſsful, muſt be a good man. In a preceding Lecture, I endeavoured to ſhow, that on no ſubject can any man be truly eloquent, who does not utter the "veræ voces ab imo pectore," who does not ſpeak the language of his own conviction, and his own feelings. If this holds, as, in my opinion, it does in other kinds of Public Speaking, it certainly holds in the higheſt degree in Preaching. There, it is of the utmoſt conſequence that the Speaker firmly believe both the truth and the importance of thoſe principles which he inculcates on others; and, not only that he believe them ſpeculatively, but have a lively and ſerious feeling of them. This will always give an earneſtneſs and ſtrength, a fervour of piety to his exhortations, ſuperior in its effects to all the arts of ſtudied Eloquence; and, without it, the aſſiſtance of art will ſeldom be able to conceal the mere declaimer. A ſpirit of true piety would prove the moſt effectual guard againſt thoſe errors which Preachers are apt to commit. It would make their diſcourſes ſolid, cogent, and uſeful; it would prevent thoſe frivolous and oſtentatious harangues, which have no other aim than merely to make a parade of Speech, or amuſe an audience; and perhaps the difficulty of attaining that

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that pitch of habitual piety and goodneſs, which the perfection of Pulpit Eloquence would require, and of uniting it with that thorough knowledge of the world, and thoſe other talents which are requiſite for excelling in the Pulpit, is one of the great cauſes why ſo few arrive at very high eminence in this ſphere.

THE chief characteriſtics of the Eloquence ſuited to the Pulpit, as diſtinguiſhed from the other kinds of Public Speaking, appear to me to be theſe two, Gravity and Warmth. The ſerious nature of the ſubjects belonging to the Pulpit, requires Gravity; their importance to mankind, requires Warmth. It is far from being either eaſy or common to unite theſe characters of Eloquence. The Grave, when it is predominant, is apt to run into a dull uniform ſolemnity. The Warm, when it wants gravity, borders on the theatrical and light. The union of the two muſt be ſtudied by all Preachers as of the utmoſt conſequence, both in the compoſition of their diſcourſes, and in their manner of delivery. Gravity and Warmth united, form that character of preaching which the French call *Onction*; the affecting, penetrating, intereſting manner, flowing from a ſtrong ſenſibility of heart in the Preacher to the importance of thoſe truths which he delivers, and an earneſt deſire that they may make full impreſſion on the hearts of his Hearers.

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NEXT to a juſt idea of the nature and object of Pulpit Eloquence, the point of greateſt importance to a Preacher, is a proper choice of the ſubjects on which he preaches. To give rules for the choice of ſubjects for Sermons, belongs to the theological more than to the rhetorical chair; only in general, they ſhould be ſuch as appear to the Preacher to be the moſt uſeful, and the beſt accommodated to the circumſtances of his Audience. No man can be called eloquent, who ſpeaks to an Aſſembly on ſubjects, or in a ſtrain, which none or few of them comprehend. The unmeaning applauſe which the ignorant give to what is above their capacity, common ſenſe, and common probity, muſt teach every man to deſpiſe. Uſefulneſs and true Eloquence always go together; and no man can long be reputed a good Preacher who is not acknowledged to be an uſeful one.

THE rules which relate to the conduct of the different parts of a Sermon, the Introduction, Diviſion, argumentative and pathetic parts, I reſerve till I come to treat of the conduct of a Diſcourſe in general; but ſome rules and obſervations, which reſpect a Sermon as a particular ſpecies of compoſition, I ſhall now give, and I hope they may be of ſome uſe.

THE firſt which I ſhall mention is, to attend to the Unity of a Sermon. Unity indeed is of great conſequence in every compoſition; but in other

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other Diſcourſes, where the choice and direction of the ſubject are not left to the Speaker, it may be leſs in his power to preſerve it. In a Sermon, it muſt be always the Preacher's own fault if he tranſgreſs it. What I mean by Unity is, that there ſhould be ſome one main point to which the whole ſtrain of the Sermon ſhould refer. It muſt not be a bundle of different ſubjects ſtrung together, but one object muſt predominate throughout. This rule is founded on what we all experience, that the mind can fully attend only to one capital object at a time. By dividing, you always weaken the impreſſion. Now this Unity, without which no Sermon can either have much beauty, or much force, does not require that there ſhould be no diviſions or ſeparate heads in the Diſcourſe, or that one ſingle thought only ſhould be, again and again, turned up to the hearers in different lights. It is not to be underſtood in ſo narrow a ſenſe: it admits of ſome variety; it admits of underparts and appendages, provided always that ſo much Union and Connection be preſerved, as to make the whole concur in ſome one impreſſion upon the mind. I may employ, for inſtance, ſeveral different arguments to enforce the love of God; I may alſo inquire, perhaps, into the cauſes of the decay of this virtue; ſtill one great object is preſented to the mind; but if, becauſe my text ſays, "He that loveth God, muſt love his brother "alſo," I ſhould, therefore, mingle in one Diſcourſe arguments for the love of God and for the love

love of our neighbour, I ſhould offend unpardonably againſt Unity, and leave a very looſe and confuſed impreſſion on the Hearers minds.

In the ſecond place, Sermons are always the more ſtriking, and commonly the more uſeful, the more preciſe and particular the ſubject of them is. This follows, in a great meaſure, from what I was juſt now illuſtrating. Though a general ſubject is capable of being conducted with a conſiderable degree of Unity, yet that Unity can never be ſo complete as in a particular one. The impreſſion made muſt always be more undeterminate; and the inſtruction conveyed, will, commonly too, be leſs direct and convincing. General ſubjects, indeed ſuch as the excellency or the pleaſures of religion, are often choſen by young Preachers, as the moſt ſhowy, and the eaſieſt to be handled; and doubtleſs, general views of religion are not to be neglected, as on ſeveral occaſions they have great propriety. But theſe are not the ſubjects moſt favourable for producing the high effects of preaching. They fall in almoſt unavoidably with the beaten track of common-place thought. Attention is much more commanded by ſeizing ſome particular view of a great ſubject, ſome ſingle intereſting topic, and directing to that point the whole force of Argument and Eloquence. To recommend ſome one grace or virtue, or to inveigh againſt a particular vice, furniſhes a ſubject not deficient in unity or preciſion; but if we confine

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fine ourſelves to that virtue or vice as aſſuming a particular aſpect, and conſider it as it appears in certain characters, or affects certain ſituations in life, the ſubject becomes ſtill more intereſting. The execution is, I admit, more difficult, but the merit and the effect are higher.

In the third place, never ſtudy to ſay all that can be ſaid upon a ſubject; no error is greater than this. Select the moſt uſeful, the moſt ſtriking and perſuaſive topics which the text ſuggeſts, and reſt the Diſcourſe upon theſe. If the doctrines which Miniſters of the Goſpel preach were altogether new to their hearers, it might be requiſite for them to be exceedingly full on every particular, leſt there ſhould be any hazard of their not affording complete information. But it is much leſs for the ſake of information than of perſuaſion, that Diſcourſes are delivered from the Pulpit: and nothing is more oppoſite to perſuaſion, than an unneceſſary and tedious fulneſs. There are always ſome things which the Preacher may ſuppoſe to be known, and ſome things which he may only ſlightly touch. If he ſeek to omit nothing which his ſubject ſuggeſts, it will unavoidably happen that he will encumber it, and weaken its force.

In ſtudying a Sermon, he ought to place himſelf in the ſituation of a ſerious Hearer. Let him ſuppoſe the ſubject addreſſed to himſelf: let him conſider what views of it would ſtrike him moſt; what

what arguments would be moſt likely to perſuade him; what parts of it would dwell moſt upon his mind. Let theſe be employed as his principal materials; and in theſe it is moſt likely his genius will exert itſelf with the greateſt vigour. The ſpinning and wire-drawing mode, which is not uncommon among Preachers, enervates the nobleſt truths. It may indeed be a conſequence of obſerving the rule which I am now giving, that fewer Sermons will be preached upon one text than is ſometimes done; but this will, in my opinion, be attended with no diſadvantage. I know no benefit that ariſes from introducing a whole ſyſtem of religious truth under every text. The ſimpleſt and moſt natural method by far, is to chuſe that view of a ſubject to which the text principally leads, and to dwell no longer on the text, than is ſufficient for diſcuſſing the ſubject in that view, which can commonly be done with ſufficient profoundneſs and diſtinctneſs, in one or a few Diſcourſes: for it is a very falſe notion to imagine, that they always preach the moſt profoundly, or go the deepeſt into a ſubject, who dwell on it the longeſt. On the contrary, that tedious circuit, which ſome are ready to take in all their illuſtrations, is very frequently owing, either to their want of diſcernment for perceiving what is moſt important in the ſubject; or to their want of ability for placing it in the moſt proper point of view.

In the fourth place, ſtudy above all things to render your inſtructions intereſting to the Hearers.

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This is the great trial and mark of true genius for the Eloquence of the Pulpit: for nothing is ſo fatal to ſucceſs in preaching, as a dry manner. A dry Sermon can never be a good one. In order to preach in an intereſting manner, much will depend upon the delivery of a Diſcourſe; for the manner in which a man ſpeaks, is of the utmoſt conſequence for affecting his Audience; but much will alſo depend on the compoſition of the Diſcourſe. Correct language, and elegant deſcription, are but the ſecondary inſtruments of preaching in an intereſting manner. The great ſecret lies, in bringing home all that is ſpoken to the hearts of the Hearers, ſo as to make every man think that the Preacher is addreſſing him in particular. For this end, let him avoid all intricate reaſonings; avoid expreſſing himſelf in general ſpeculative propoſitions, or laying down practical truths in an abſtract metaphyſical manner. As much as poſſible, the Diſcourſe ought to be carried on in the ſtrain of direct addreſs to the Audience; not in the ſtrain of one writing an eſſay, but of one ſpeaking to a multitude, and ſtudying to mix what is called Application, or what has an immediate reference to practice, with the doctrinal and didactic parts of the Sermon.

It will be of much advantage to keep always in view the different ages, characters, and conditions of men, and to accommodate directions and exhortations to theſe different claſſes of Hearers. Whenever you bring forth what a man feels to touch

touch his own character, or to ſuit his own circumſtances, you are ſure of intereſting him. No ſtudy is more neceſſary for this purpoſe, than the ſtudy of human life, and the human heart. To be able to unfold the heart, and to diſcover a man to himſelf, in a light in which he never ſaw his own character before, produces a wonderful effect. As long as the Preacher hovers in a cloud of general obſervations, and deſcends not to trace the particular lines and features of manners, the Audience are apt to think themſelves unconcerned in the deſcription. It is the ſtriking accuracy of moral characters that gives the chief power and effect to a Preacher's Diſcourſe. Hence, examples founded on hiſtorical facts, and drawn from real life, of which kind the Scriptures afford many, always, when they are well choſen, command high attention. No favourable opportunity of introducing theſe ſhould be omitted. They correct, in ſome degree, that diſadvantage to which I before obſerved preaching is ſubject, of being confined to treat of qualities in the abſtract, not of perſons, and place the weight and reality of religious truths in the moſt convincing light. Perhaps the moſt beautiful, and among the moſt uſeful Sermons of any, though, indeed, the moſt difficult in compoſition, are ſuch as are wholly characteriſtical, or founded on the illuſtration of ſome peculiar character, or remarkable piece of hiſtory, in the ſacred writings; by purſuing which one can trace, and lay open, ſome of the moſt ſecret windings of man's heart. Other topics of preaching

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have been much beaten; but this is a field, which, wide in itſelf, has hitherto been little explored by the compoſers of Sermons, and poſſeſſes all the advantages of being curious, new, and highly uſeful. Biſhop Butler's Sermon on the *character of Balaam*, will give an idea of that ſort of preaching which I have in my eye.

In the fifth and laſt place, Let me add a caution againſt taking the model of preaching from particular faſhions that chance to have the vogue. Theſe are torrents that ſwell to-day, and will have ſpent themſelves by to-morrow. Sometimes it is the taſte of poetical preaching, ſometimes of philoſophical, that has the faſhion on its ſide; at one time it muſt be all pathetic, at another time all argumentative, according as ſome celebrated Preacher has ſet the example. Each of theſe modes, in the extreme, is very faulty; and he who conforms himſelf to any of them, will both cramp genius, and corrupt it. It is the univerſal taſte of mankind, which is ſubject to no ſuch changing modes, that alone is entitled to poſſeſs any authority; and this will never give its ſanction to any ſtrain of preaching, but what is founded on human nature connected with uſefulneſs, adapted to the proper idea of a Sermon, as a ſerious perſuaſive Oration, delivered to a multitude, in order to make them better men. Let a Preacher form himſelf upon this ſtandard, and keep it cloſe in his eye, and he will be in a much ſurer road to reputation, and ſucceſs at laſt, than by a ſervile compliance with

any popular taſte, or tranſient humour of his Hearers. Truth and good ſenſe are firm, and will eſtabliſh themſelves; mode and humour are feeble and fluctuating. Let him never follow, implicitly, any one example; or become a ſervile imitator of any Preacher, however much admired. From various examples, he may pick up much for his improvement; ſome he may prefer to the reſt; but the ſervility of imitation extinguiſhes all genius, or rather is a proof of the entire want of genius. LECT. XXIX.

With reſpect to Style, that which the Pulpit requires, muſt certainly, in the firſt place, be very perſpicuous. As diſcourſes ſpoken there, are calculated for the inſtruction of all ſorts of hearers, plainneſs and ſimplicity ſhould reign in them. All unuſual, ſwoln, or high-ſounding words, ſhould be avoided; eſpecially all words that are merely poetical, or merely philoſophical. Young Preachers are apt to be caught with the glare of theſe; and in young Compoſers the error may be excuſable; but they may be aſſured that it is an error, and proceeds from their not having yet acquired a correct Taſte. Dignity of expreſſion, indeed, the Pulpit requires in a high degree; nothing that is mean or groveling, no low or vulgar phraſes, ought on any account to be admitted. But this dignity is perfectly conſiſtent with ſimplicity. The words employed may be all plain words, eaſily underſtood, and in common uſe; and yet the Style may be abundantly dignified, and, at the ſame

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time, very lively and animated. For a lively and animated Style is extremely ſuited to the Pulpit. The earneſtneſs which a Preacher ought to feel, and the grandeur and importance of his ſubjects, juſtify and often require warm and glowing expreſſions. He not only may employ metaphors and compariſons, but, on proper occaſions, may apoſtrophiſe the ſaint or the ſinner; may perſonify inanimate objects, break out into bold exclamations, and, in general, has the command of the moſt paſſionate figures of Speech. But on this ſubject, of the proper uſe and management of figures, I have inſiſted ſo fully in former Lectures, that I have no occaſion now to give particular directions; unleſs it be only to recal to mind that moſt capital rule, never to employ ſtrong figures, or a pathetic Style, except in caſes where the ſubject leads to them, and where the Speaker is impelled to the uſe of them by native unaffected warmth.

The language of Sacred Scripture, properly employed, is a great ornament to Sermons. It may be employed, either in the way of quotation, or alluſion. Direct quotations, brought from Scripture, in order to ſupport what the Preacher inculcates, both give authority to his doctrine, and render his diſcourſe more ſolemn and venerable. Alluſions to remarkable paſſages, or expreſſions of Scripture, when introduced with propriety, have generally a pleaſing effect. They afford the Preacher a fund of metaphorical expreſſion which no

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no other compoſition enjoys, and by means of which he can vary and enliven his Style. But he muſt take care that all ſuch alluſions be natural and eaſy; for if they ſeem forced, they approach to the nature of conceits*.

In a Sermon, no points or conceits ſhould appear, no affected ſmartneſs and quaintneſs of expreſſion. Theſe derogate much from the dignity of the Pulpit; and give to a Preacher the air of foppiſhneſs, which he ought, above all things, to ſhun.

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* Biſhop Sherlock, when ſhewing, that the views of reaſon have been enlarged, and the principles of natural religion illuſtrated, by the diſcoveries of Chriſtianity, attacks unbelievers for the abuſe they make of theſe advantages, in the following manner. "What a return do we make for thoſe bleſſings we "have received? How diſreſpectfully do we treat the Goſpel "of Chriſt, to which we owe that clear light both of reaſon "and nature which we now enjoy, when we endeavour to ſet "up reaſon and nature in oppoſition to it? Ought the *withered* "*hand*, which Chriſt has reſtored and made whole, to be lifted "up againſt him?" Vol. i. Diſc. i. This alluſion to a noted miracle of our Lord's, appears to me happy and elegant. Dr. Seed is remarkably fond of alluſions to Scripture Style; but he ſometimes employs ſuch as are too fanciful and ſtrained. As when he ſays (Serm. iv.) "No one great virtue will come "ſingle; the virtues *that be her fellows will bear her company* "*with joy and gladneſs:*" alluding to a paſſage in the XLVth Pſalm, which relates to the virgins, the companions of the king's daughter. And (Serm. xiii.) having ſaid, that the univerſities have juſtly been called the eyes of the nation, he adds, "and "*if the eyes* of the nation *be evil, the whole body eſe muſt be full* "*of darkneſs.*"

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It is rather a ſtrong expreſſive Style, than a ſparkling one, that is to be ſtudied. But we muſt beware of imagining that we render Style ſtrong or expreſſive, by a conſtant and multiplied uſe of epithets. This is a great error. Epithets have often great beauty and force. But if we introduce them into every Sentence, and ſtring many of them together to one object, in place of ſtrengthening, we clog and enfeeble Style; in place of illuſtrating the image, we render it confuſed and indiſtinct. He that tells me "of this periſhing, "mutable, and tranſitory world;" by all theſe three epithets, does not give me ſo ſtrong an idea of what he would convey, as if he had uſed one of them with propriety. I conclude this head with an advice, never to have what may be called a favourite expreſſion; for it ſhews affectation, and becomes diſguſting. Let not any expreſſion, which is remarkable for its luſtre or beauty, occur twice in the ſame Diſcourſe. The repetition of it betrays a fondneſs to ſhine, and, at the ſame time, carries the appearance of a barren invention.

As to the queſtion, whether it be moſt proper to write Sermons fully, and commit them accurately to memory, or to ſtudy only the matter and thoughts, and truſt the expreſſion, in part at leaſt, to the delivery? I am of opinion, that no univerſal rule can here be given. The choice of either of theſe methods muſt be left to Preachers, according to their different genius. The expreſſions which come

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come warm and glowing from the mind, during the fervour of pronunciation, will often have a ſuperior grace and energy, to thoſe which are ſtudied in the retirement of the cloſet. But then, this fluency and power of expreſſion cannot, at all times, be depended upon, even by thoſe of the readieſt genius; and by many can at no time be commanded, when overawed by the preſence of an Audience. It is proper therefore to begin, at leaſt, the practice of preaching, with writing as accurately as poſſible. This is abſolutely neceſſary in the beginning, in order to acquire the power and habit of correct ſpeaking, nay, alſo of correct thinking, upon religious ſubjects. I am inclined to go further, and to ſay, that it is proper not only to begin thus, but alſo to continue, as long as the habits of induſtry laſt, in the practice both of writing and committing to memory. Relaxation in this particular is ſo common, and ſo ready to grow upon moſt Speakers in the Pulpit, that there is little occaſion for giving any cautions againſt the extreme of overdoing in accuracy.

Of pronunciation or delivery, I am hereafter to treat apart. All that I ſhall now ſay upon this head is, that the practice of reading Sermons, is one of the greateſt obſtacles to the Eloquence of the Pulpit in Great Britain, where alone this practice prevails. No diſcourſe, which is deſigned to be perſuaſive, can have the ſame force when read, as when ſpoken. The common people all feel this,

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this, and their prejudice againſt this practice is not without foundation in nature. What is gained hereby in point of correctneſs, is not equal, I apprehend, to what is loſt in point of perſuaſion and force. They, whoſe memories are not able to retain the whole of a diſcourſe, might aid themſelves conſiderably by ſhort notes lying before them, which would allow them to preſerve, in a great meaſure, the freedom and eaſe of one who ſpeaks.

The French and Engliſh writers of Sermons proceed upon very different ideas of the Eloquence of the Pulpit; and ſeem indeed to have ſplit it betwixt them. A French Sermon is, for moſt part, a warm animated exhortation; an Engliſh one, is a piece of cool inſtructive reaſoning. The French Preachers addreſs themſelves chiefly to the imagination and the paſſions; the Engliſh, almoſt ſolely to the underſtanding. It is the union of theſe two kinds of compoſition, of the French earneſtneſs and warmth, with the Engliſh accuracy and reaſon, that would form, according to my idea, the model of a perfect Sermon. A French Sermon would ſound in our ears as a florid, and, often, as an enthuſiaſtic, harangue. The cenſure which, in fact, the French critics paſs on the Engliſh Preachers is, that they are Philoſophers and Logicians, but not Orators *. The defects of moſt of the French

* " Les Sermons ſont ſuivant notre methode, de vrais diſ-
" cours oratoires; & non pas, comme chez les Anglois, des
" diſcuſſions

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French Sermons are theſe: from a mode that pervails among them of taking their texts from the leſſon of the day, the connexion of the text with the ſubject is often unnatural and forced*; their applications of Scripture are fanciful rather than inſtructive; their method is ſtiff and cramped, by their practice of dividing their ſubject always either into three, or two, main points; and their compoſition is in general too diffuſe, and conſiſts rather of a very few thoughts ſpread out, and highly wrought up, than of a rich variety of ſentiments. Admitting, however, all theſe defects, it cannot be denied, that their Sermons are formed upon the idea of a perſuaſive popular Oration; and therefore I am of opinion, they may be read with benefit.

Among the French Proteſtant divines, Saurin is the moſt diſtinguiſhed: He is copious, eloquent, and devout, though too oſtentatious in his manner. Among the Roman Catholics, the two moſt emi-

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" diſcuſſions metaphyſiques plus convenables à une Academie,
" qu'aux Aſſemblies populaires qui ſe forment dans nos temples,
" et qu'il s'agit d'inſtruire des devoirs du Chrêtianiſme, d'en-
" courager, de conſoler, d'edifier."

Rhetorique Françoiſe, par M. Crevier, tom. I. p. 134.

* One of Maſſillon's beſt Sermons, that on the coldneſs and languor with which Chriſtians perform the duties of religion, is preached from Luke, iv. 18. *And he aroſe out of the Synagogue, and entered into Simon's houſe; and Simon's wife's mother was taken ill with a great fever.*

nent

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nent are, Bourdaloue and Maſſillon. It is a ſubject of diſpute among the French Critics, to which of theſe the preference is due, and each of them has his partiſans. To Bourdaloue, they attribute more ſolidity and cloſe reaſoning; to Maſſillon, a more pleaſing and engaging manner. Bourdaloue is indeed a great reaſoner, and inculcates his doctrines with much zeal, piety, and earneſtneſs; but his Style is verboſe, he is diſagreeably full of quotations from the Fathers, and he wants imagination. Maſſillon has more grace, more ſentiment, and, in my opinion, every way more genius. He diſcovers much knowledge both of the world and of the human heart; he is pathetic and perſuaſive; and, upon the whole, is perhaps the moſt eloquent writer of Sermons which modern times have produced*.

During

* In order to give an idea of that kind of Eloquence which is employed by the French Preachers, I ſhall inſert a paſſage from Maſſillon, which, in the Encyclopedie (Article, Eloquence), is extolled by Voltaire, who was the Author of that Article, as the chef d'œuvre, equal to any thing of which either antient or modern times can boaſt. The ſubject of the Sermon is, the ſmall number of thoſe who ſhall be ſaved. The ſtrain of the whole Diſcourſe is extremely ſerious and animated; but when the Orator came to the paſſage which follows, Voltaire informs us, that the whole Aſſembly were moved; that by a ſort of involuntary motion, they ſtarted up from their ſeats, and that ſuch murmurs of ſurpriſe and acclamations aroſe as diſconcerted the Speaker, though they increaſed the effect of his Diſcourſe.

"Je

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During the period that preceded the reſtoration of King Charles II. the Sermons of the Engliſh

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" Je m'arrête à vous, mes frères, qui êtes ici aſſemblés. Je " ne parle plus du reſte des hommes; je vous regarde comme ſi " vous étiez ſeuls ſur la terre: voici la penſée qui m'occupe & " qui m'épouvante. Je ſuppoſe que c'eſt ici votre derniere " heure, et la fin de l'univers; que les cieux vont s'ouvrir ſur " vos têtes, Jeſus Chriſt paroitre dans ſa gloire au milieu de ce " temple, et que vous n'y êtes aſſemblies que pour l'attendre, " comme des criminels tremblans, à qui l'on va prononcer, ou " un ſentence de grace, ou un arrêt du mort eternelle. Car " vous avez beau vous flater; vous mouriez tels que vous " êtes aujourd'hui. Tous ces déſirs de changement que vous " amuſent, vous amuſeront juſqu'au lit de la mort; c'eſt l'ex- " périence de tous les ſiècles. Tout ce que vous trouverez " alors en vous de nouveau, ſera peut être un compte plus grand " que celui que vous auriez aujourd'hui à rendre; et ſur ce que " vous ſeriez, ſi l'on venoit vous juger dans ce moment, vous " pouvez preſque decider ce que vous arrivera au ſortir de la " vie.

" Or, je vous le demande, et je vous le demande frappé de " terreur, ne ſeparant pas en ce point mon ſort du votre, et me " mettant dans la même diſpoſition, où je ſouhait que vous " entriez; je vous demande, donc, ſi Jeſus Chriſt paroiſſoit " dans ce temple, au milieu de cette Aſſemblée, la plus auguſte " de l'univers, pour nous juger, pour faire le terrible diſcerne- " ment des boues et des brebis, croyez vous que le plus grand " nombre de tout ce que nous ſommes ici, fut placé à la droite? " Croyez vous que les choſes du moins fuſſent egales? croyez " vous qu'il s'y trouvât ſeulement dix juſtes, que le Seigneur " ne peut trouver autrefois en cinq villes toutes entières? Je " vous le demande; vous l'ignorez, et je l'ignore moi-meme. " Vous ſeul, O mon Dieu! connoiſſez que vous appartiennent.— " Mes frères, notre parte eſt preſque aſſurée, et nous n'y pen- " ſons pas. Quand même dans cette terrible ſéparation qui ſe

" ſera

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Engliſh divines abounded with ſcholaſtic caſuiſtical theology. They were full of minute diviſions and ſubdiviſions, and ſcraps of learning in the didactic part; but to theſe were joined very warm pathetic

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" fera un jour, il ne devroit y avoir qu'un ſeul pêcheur de cet " Aſſemblée du côté des réprouvés, et qu'une voix du ciel " viendroit nous en aſſurer dans ce Temple, ſans le deſigner; qui " de nous ne craindroit d'être de malheureux? qui de nous ne " retomberoit d'abord, ſur ſa conſcience, pour examiner ſi ſes " crimes n'ont pas méritez ce châtiment? qui de nous, ſaſie de " frayeur, ne demanderoit pas à Jeſus Chriſt comme autrefois " les Apôtres; Seigneur, ne ſeroit-ce pas moi? Sommes nous " ſages, mes chers Auditeurs? peut-être que parmi tous ceux " qui m'entendent, il ne ſe trouvera pas dix juſtes; peut-être " s'en trouvera-t-il encore moins. Que ſai-je, O mon Dieu! " je n'ôſe regarder d'un œil fixe les abiſmes de vos jugemens, " et de votre juſtice; peut-être ne s'en trouvera-t-il qu'un ſeul; " et ce danger ne vous touche point, mon cher Auditeur? et " vous croyez être ce ſeul heureux dans la grand nombre qui " perira? vous qui avez moins ſujet de le croire que tout " autre; vous ſur qui ſeul la ſentence de mort devroit tomber. " Grand Dieu! qui l'on connoit peu dans la monde les terreurs " de votre loi, &c."——After this awakening and alarming exhortation, the Orator comes with propriety to this practical improvement: " Mais que conclure des ces grands verités? " qu'il faut deſeſperer de ſon ſalut? a Dieu ne plaiſe; il n'y a " que l'impie, qui pour ſe calmer ſur ſes deſordres, tache ici de " conclure en ſecret que tous les hommes periront comme lui; " ce ne doit pas être là le fruits de ce diſcours. Mais de vous " detromper de cette erreur ſi univerſelle, qu'on peut faire ce " que tous les autres ſont; et que l'uſage eſt une voie ſure; mais " de vous convaincre que pour ſe ſauver, il faut de diſtinguer " des autres; être ſingulier, vivre à part au milieu du monde, " et ne pas reſembler à la foule."

Sermons de MASSILLON, Vol. IV.

addreſſes to the conſciences of the Hearers, in the applicatory part of the Sermon. Upon the Reſtoration, preaching aſſumed a more correct and poliſhed form. It became diſencumbered from the pedantry and ſcholaſtic diviſions of the ſectaries; but it threw out alſo their warm and pathetic addreſſes, and eſtabliſhed itſelf wholly upon the model of cool reaſoning, and rational inſtruction. As the Diſſenters from the Church continued to preſerve ſomewhat of the old ſtrain of preaching, this led the eſtabliſhed Clergy to depart the farther from it. Whatever was earneſt and paſſionate, either in the compoſition or delivery of Sermons, was reckoned enthuſiaſtic and fanatical; and hence that argumentative manner, bordering on the dry and unperſuaſive, which is too generally the character of Engliſh Sermons. Nothing can be more correct upon that model than many of them are; but the model itſelf on which they are formed, is a confined and imperfect one. Dr. Clark, for inſtance, every where abounds in good ſenſe, and the moſt clear and accurate reaſoning; his applications of Scripture are pertinent; his Style is always perſpicuous, and often elegant; he inſtructs and he convinces; in what then is he deficient? In nothing, except in the power of intereſting and ſeizing the heart. He ſhows you what you ought to do; but he excites not the deſire of doing it; he treats man as if he were a being of pure intellect, without imagination or paſſions. Archbiſhop Tillotſon's manner is more free and warm, and he approaches

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approaches nearer than moſt of the Engliſh divines to the character of Popular Speaking. Hence he is, to this day, one of the beſt models we have for preaching. We muſt not indeed conſider him in the light of a perfect Orator: his compoſition is too looſe and remiſs; his ſtyle too feeble, and frequently too flat, to deſerve that high character; but there is in ſome of his Sermons ſo much warmth and earneſtneſs, and through them all there runs ſo much eaſe and perſpicuity, ſuch a vein of good ſenſe and ſincere piety, as juſtly entitle him to be held as eminent a Preacher as England has produced.

In Dr. Barrow, one admires more the prodigious fecundity of his invention, and the uncommon ſtrength and force of his conceptions, than the felicity of his execution, or his talent in compoſition. We ſee a genius far ſurpaſſing the common, peculiar indeed almoſt to himſelf; but that genius often ſhooting wild and unchaſtiſed by any diſcipline or ſtudy of Eloquence.

I cannot attempt to give particular characters of that great number of Writers of Sermons which this and the former age have produced, among whom we meet with a variety of the moſt reſpectable names. We find in their compoſition much that deſerves praiſe; a great diſplay of abilities of different kinds, much good ſenſe and piety, ſtrong reaſoning, ſound divinity, and uſeful inſtruction; though,

though, in general, the degree of Eloquence bears not, perhaps, equal proportion to the goodneſs of the matter. Biſhop Atterbury deſerves to be particularly mentioned as a model of correct and beautiful Style, beſides having the merit of a warmer and more eloquent ſtrain of writing, in ſome of his Sermons, than is commonly met with. Had Biſhop Butler, in place of abſtract philoſophical eſſays, given us more Sermons in the ſtrain of thoſe two excellent ones which he has compoſed upon Self-deceit, and upon the Character of Balaam, we ſhould then have pointed him out as diſtinguiſhed for that ſpecies of characteriſtical Sermons which I before recommended.

THOUGH the writings of the Engliſh divines are very proper to be read by ſuch as are deſigned for the Church, I muſt caution them againſt making too much uſe of them, or tranſcribing large paſſages of them into the Sermons they compoſe. Such as once indulge themſelves in this practice, will never have any fund of their own. Infinitely better it is, to venture into the public with thoughts and expreſſions which have occurred to themſelves, though of inferior beauty, than to disfigure their compoſitions, by borrowed and ill-ſorted ornaments, which, to a judicious eye, will be always in hazard of diſcovering their own poverty. When a Preacher ſits down to write on any ſubject, never let him begin with ſeeking to conſult all who have written on the ſame text or ſubject. This, if he con-

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ſult many, will throw perplexity and confuſion into his ideas; and, if he conſults only one, will often warp him inſenſibly into his method, whether it be right or not. But let him begin with pondering the ſubject in his own thoughts; let him endeavour to fetch materials from within; to collect and arrange his ideas; and form ſome ſort of a plan to himſelf; which it is always proper to put down in writing. Then, and not till then, he may inquire how others have treated the ſame ſubject. By this means, the method, and the leading thoughts in the Sermon, are likely to be his own. Theſe thoughts he may improve by comparing them with the track of ſentiments which others have purſued; ſome of their ſenſe he may, without blame, incorporate into his compoſition; retaining always his own words and ſtyle. This is fair aſſiſtance: all beyond is plagiariſm.

On the whole, never let the capital principle, with which we ſet out at firſt, be forgotten, to keep cloſe in view, the great end for which a Preacher mounts the Pulpit; even to infuſe good diſpoſitions into his hearers, to perſuade them to ſerve God, and to become better men. Let this always dwell on his mind when he is compoſing, and it will diffuſe through his compoſitions that ſpirit which will render them at once eſteemed and uſeful. The moſt uſeful Preacher is always the beſt, and will not fail of being eſteemed ſo. Embelliſh truth only, with a view to gain it the more full and free admiſſion

admiſſion into your hearer's minds; and your ornaments will, in that caſe, be ſimple, maſculine, natural. The beſt applauſe, by far, which a Preacher can receive, ariſes from the ſerious and deep impreſſions which his diſcourſe leaves on thoſe who hear it. The fineſt encomium, perhaps, ever beſtowed on a Preacher, was given by Louis XIV. to the eloquent Biſhop of Clermont, Father Maſſillon, whom I before mentioned with ſo much praiſe. After hearing him preach at Verſailles, he ſaid to him, "Father, I have heard many great "Orators in this Chapel; I have been highly "pleaſed with them; but for you, whenever I hear "you, I go away diſpleaſed with myſelf; for I ſee "more of my own character."

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LECTURE XXX.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF A SERMON OF BISHOP ATTERBURY's.

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THE laſt Lecture was employed in obſervations on the peculiar and diſtinguiſhing Characters of the Eloquence proper for the Pulpit. But as rules and directions, when delivered in the abſtract, are never ſo uſeful as when they are illuſtrated by particular inſtances, it may, perhaps, be of ſome benefit to thoſe who are deſigned for the Church, that I ſhould analyſe an Engliſh Sermon, and conſider the matter of it, together with the manner. For this purpoſe I have choſen Biſhop Atterbury as my example, who is deſervedly accounted one of our moſt eloquent writers of Sermons, and whom I mentioned as ſuch in the laſt Lecture. At the ſame time, he is more diſtinguiſhed for elegance and purity of expreſſion, than for profoundneſs of thought. His Style, though ſometimes careleſs, is, upon the whole, neat and chaſte; and more beautiful than that of moſt writers of Sermons. In his ſentiments he is not only rational, but pious and

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and devotional, which is a great excellency. The Sermon which I have ſingled out, is, that upon Praiſe and Thankſgiving, the firſt Sermon of the firſt Volume, which is reckoned one of his beſt. In examining it, it is neceſſary that I ſhould uſe full liberty, and, together with the beauties, point out any defects that occur to me in the matter, as well as in the Style.

PSALM l. 14. *Offer unto God Thankſgiving.*

" AMONG the many excellencies of this pious " collection of hymns, for which ſo particular a " value hath been ſet upon it by the Church of " God in all ages, this is not the leaſt, that the " true price of duties is there juſtly ſtated: men " are called off from reſting in the outward ſhew " of religion, in ceremonies and ritual obſervances; " and taught, rather to practiſe (that which was " ſhadowed out by theſe rites, and to which they " are deſigned to lead) ſound inward piety and " virtue.

" THE ſeveral compoſers of theſe Hymns were " *Prophets*; perſons, whoſe buſineſs it was not " only to foretel events for the benefit of the " Church in ſucceeding times, but to correct and " reform alſo what was amiſs among that race of " men with whom they lived and converſed; to " preſerve a fooliſh people from idolatry, and falſe " worſhip; to reſcue the law from corrupt gloſſes, " and ſuperſtitious abuſes; and to put men in

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" mind of (what they are ſo willing to forget) that
" eternal and invariable rule, which was before theſe
" *poſitive* duties, would continue after them, and was
" to be obſerved even then, in preference to them.

" THE diſcharge, I ſay, of this part of the pro-
" phetic office taking up ſo much room in the
" book of *Pſalms*; this hath been one reaſon,
" among many others, why they have always been
" ſo highly eſteemed; becauſe we are from hence
" furniſhed with a proper reply to an argument
" commonly made uſe of by unbelievers, who
" look upon all revealed religions as pious frauds
" and impoſtures, on the account of the prejudices
" they have entertained in relation to that of the
" *Jews*; the whole of which they firſt ſuppoſe to
" lie in external performances, and then eaſily per-
" ſuade themſelves, that God could never be the
" Author of ſuch a mere piece of pageantry and
" empty formality; nor delight in a worſhip which
" conſiſted purely in a number of odd unaccount-
" able ceremonies. Which objection of theirs,
" we ſhould not be able thoroughly to anſwer, un-
" leſs we could prove (chiefly out of the *Pſalms*,
" and other parts of the prophetic writings) that
" the Jewiſh religion was ſomewhat more than
" bare outſide and ſhew; and that inward purity,
" and the devotion of the heart, was a duty then,
" as well as now."

THIS appears to me an excellent Introduction. The thought on which it reſts is ſolid and judici-

ous; that in the book of Pſalms, the attention of men is called to the moral and ſpiritual part of religion; and the Jewiſh diſpenſation thereby vindicated from the ſuſpicion of requiring nothing more from its votaries, than the obſervance of the external rites and ceremonies of the law. Such views of religion are proper to be often diſplayed; and deſerve to be inſiſted on, by all who wiſh to render preaching conducive to the great purpoſe of promoting righteouſneſs and virtue. The Style, as far as we have gone, is not only free from faults, but elegant and happy.

It is a great beauty in an Introduction, when it can be made to turn on ſome thought, fully brought out and illuſtrated; eſpecially, if that thought has a cloſe connection with the following diſcourſe, and, at the ſame time, does not anticipate any thing that is afterwards to be introduced in a more proper place. This Introduction of Atterbury's has all theſe advantages. The encomium which he makes on the ſtrain of David's Pſalms, is not ſuch as might as well have been prefixed to any other diſcourſe, the text of which was taken from any of the Pſalms. Had this been the caſe, the Introduction would have loſt much of its beauty. We ſhall ſee from what follows how naturally the introductory thought connects with his text, and how happily it uſhers it in.

"One great inſtance of this proof, we have in "the words now before us; which are taken from

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" a Pſalm of *Aſaph*, written on purpoſe to ſet out
" the weakneſs and worthleſſneſs of external per-
" formances, when compared with more ſubſtantial
" and vital duties. To enforce which doctrine,
" God himſelf is brought in as delivering it. *Hear,*
" *O my people, and I will ſpeak; O Iſrael, and I*
" *will teſtify againſt thee: I am God, even thy God.*
" The Preface is very ſolemn, and therefore what
" it uſhers in, we may be ſure is of no common
" importance; *I will not reprove thee for thy ſa-*
" *crifices or thy burnt-offerings, to have been con-*
" *tinually before me.* That is, I will not ſo re-
" prove thee for any failures in thy ſacrifices and
" burnt-offerings, as if theſe were the only, or the
" chief things I required of thee. *I will take no*
" *bullock out of thy houſe, nor he-goat out of thy*
" *folds*; I preſcribed not ſacrifices to thee for my
" own ſake, becauſe I needed them; *For every*
" *beaſt of the foreſt is mine, and the cattle on a*
" *thouſand hills.* Mine they are, and were, before
" I commanded thee to offer them to me; ſo that,
" as it follows, *If I were hungry, yet would I not*
" *tell thee*; *for the world is mine, and the fullneſs*
" *thereof.* But can ye be ſo groſs and ſenſeleſs,
" as to think me liable to hunger and thirſt? as to
" imagine that wants of that kind can touch me?
" *Will I eat the fleſh of bulls, or drink the blood of*
" *goats?*—Thus doth he expoſtulate ſeverely with
" them, after the moſt graceful manner of the
" Eaſtern Poetry. The iſſue of which is a plain
" and full reſolution of the caſe, in thoſe few
" words of the text—*Offer unto God thankſgiving.*

" Would

" Would you do your homage the moſt agreeable
" way? would you render the moſt acceptable of
" ſervices? *Offer unto God thankſgiving.*"

It is often a difficult matter to illuſtrate gracefully the text of a Sermon from the context, and to point out the connection between them. This is a part of the diſcourſe which is apt to become dry and tedious, eſpecially when purſued into a minute commentary. And therefore, except as far as ſuch illuſtration from the context is neceſſary for explaining the meaning, or in caſes where it ſerves to give dignity and force to the text, I would adviſe that it be always treated with brevity. Sometimes it may even be wholly omitted, and the text aſſumed merely as an independent propoſition, if the connection with the context be obſcure, and would require a laborious explanation. In the preſent caſe, the illuſtration from the context is ſingularly happy. The paſſage of the Pſalm on which it is founded is noble and ſpirited, and connected in ſuch a manner with the text, as to introduce it with a very ſtriking emphaſis. On the language I have little to obſerve, except that the phraſe, *one great inſtance of this proof*, is a clumſy expreſſion. It was ſufficient to have ſaid, *one great proof*, or *one great inſtance of this*. In the ſame ſentence, when he ſpeaks of *ſetting out the weakneſs and worthleſſneſs of external performances*, we may obſerve, that the word *worthleſſneſs*, as it is now commonly uſed, ſignifies more than the deficiency of

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of worth, which is all that the Author means. It generally imports, a conſiderable degree of badneſs or blame. It would be more proper, therefore, to ſay, the *imperfection*, or the *inſignificancy*, of external performances.

" THE uſe I intend to make of theſe words, is, " from hence to raiſe ſome thoughts about that " very excellent and important duty of Praiſe and " Thankſgiving, a ſubject not unfit to be diſ- " courſed of at this time; whether we conſider, " either the more than ordinary coldneſs that ap- " pears of late in men's tempers towards the practice " of this (or any other) part of a warm and af- " fecting devotion; the great occaſion of ſetting " aſide this particular day in the calendar, ſome " years ago; or the new inſtances of mercy and " goodneſs, which God hath lately been pleaſed " to beſtow upon us; anſwering at laſt the many " *prayers* and *faſtings*, by which we have beſought " him ſo long for the eſtabliſhment of their Ma- " jeſties Throne, and for the ſucceſs of their arms; " and giving us in his good time, an opportunity " of appearing before him in the more delightful " part of our duty, *with the voice of joy and praiſe*, " *with a multitude that keep holidays*."

IN this paragraph there is nothing remarkable; no particular beauty or neatneſs of expreſſion; and the Sentence which it forms is long and tireſome. —*To raiſe ſome thoughts about that very excellent*, &c.

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&c. is rather looſe and awkward;—better—*to recommend that very excellent*, &c.; and when he mentions *ſetting aſide* a particular day in the calendar, one would imagine, that *ſetting apart* would have been more proper, as to *ſet aſide*, ſeems rather to ſuggeſt a different idea.

" *Offer unto God thankſgiving.*—Which that we " may do, let us enquire firſt, how we are to *un-* " *derſtand* this command of offering Praiſe and " Thankſgiving unto God; and then how *reaſon-* " *able* it is that we ſhould comply with it."

THIS is the general diviſion of the diſcourſe. An excellent one it is, and correſponds to many ſubjects of this kind, where particular duties are to be treated of; firſt to explain, and then to recommend or enforce them. A diviſion ſhould always be ſimple and natural; and much depends on the proper view which it gives of the ſubject.

" OUR enquiry into what is meant here, will " be very ſhort; for who is there, that underſtands " any thing of religion, but knows, that the offer- " ing praiſe and thanks to God, implies, our having " a lively and devout ſenſe of his excellencies, and " of his benefits; our recollecting them with " humility and thankfulneſs of heart; and our ex- " preſſing theſe inward affections by ſuitable out- " ward ſigns, by reverent and lowly poſtures of " body, by ſongs and hymns, and ſpiritual ejacu- " lations;

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" lations; either publicly or privately; either in " the cuſtomary and daily ſervice of the Church, " or in its more ſolemn aſſemblies, convened " upon extraordinary occaſions? This is the ac- " count which every Chriſtian eaſily gives himſelf " of it; and which, therefore, it would be need- " leſs to enlarge upon. I ſhall only take notice " upon this head, that Praiſe and Thankſgiving " do, in ſtrictneſs of ſpeech, ſignify things ſome- " what different. Our *praiſe* properly terminates " in God, on account of his natural excellencies " and perfections; and is that act of devotion, by " which we confeſs and admire his ſeveral attri- " butes: but *thankſgiving* is a narrower duty, and " imports only a grateful ſenſe and acknowledg- " ment of paſt mercies. We praiſe God for all " his glorious acts of every kind, that regard either " us or other men; for his very *vengeance*, and " thoſe *judgments* which he ſometimes ſends *abroad* " *in the earth*; but we thank him, properly " ſpeaking, for the inſtances of his *goodneſs* alone; " and for ſuch only of theſe, as we ourſelves are " ſomeway concerned in. This, I ſay, is what " the two words ſtrictly imply; but ſince the lan- " guage of Scripture is generally leſs exact, and " uſeth either of them often to expreſs the other " by, I ſhall not think myſelf obliged, in what fol- " lows, thus nicely always to diſtinguiſh them."

THERE was room for inſiſting more fully on the nature of the duty than the Author has done under this

this head; in particular, this was the place for correcting the miſtake, to which men are always prone, of making Thankſgiving to conſiſt merely in outward expreſſions; and for ſhowing them, that the eſſence of the duty lies in the inward feelings of the heart. In general, it is of much uſe to give full and diſtinct explications of religious duties. But, as our Author intended only one diſcourſe on the ſubject, he could not enlarge with equal fullneſs on every part of it; and he has choſen to dwell on that part on which indeed it is moſt neceſſary to enlarge, the motives enforcing the duty. For, as it is an eaſier matter to know, than to practiſe duty, the perſuaſive part of the diſcourſe is that to which the Speaker ſhould always bend his chief ſtrength. The account given in this head, of the nature of Praiſe and Thankſgiving, though ſhort, is yet comprehenſive and diſtinct, and the language is ſmooth and elegant.

" Now the great *reaſonableneſs* of this duty of " Praiſe or Thankſgiving, and our ſeveral *obli-* " *gations* to it, will appear, if we either conſider " it *abſolutely* in itſelf, as the debt of our natures; " or *compare* it with other duties, and ſhew the " rank it bears among them; or ſet out, in the " laſt place, ſome of its peculiar properties and " *advantages*, with regard to the devout performer " of it."

The Author here enters upon the main part of his ſubject, the reaſonableneſs of the duty, and mentions

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mentions three arguments for proving it. Theſe are well ſtated, and are in themſelves proper and weighty conſiderations. How far he has handled each of them to advantage, will appear as we proceed. I cannot, however, but think that he has omitted one very material part of the argument, which was to have ſhewn the obligations we are under to this duty, from the various ſubjects of Thankſgiving afforded us by the divine goodneſs. This would have led him to review the chief benefits of Creation, Providence, and Redemption: and certainly, they are theſe which lay the foundation of the whole argument for Thankſgiving. The heart muſt firſt be affected with a ſuitable ſenſe of the divine benefits, before one can be excited to praiſe God. If you would perſuade me to be thankful to a benefactor, you muſt not employ ſuch conſiderations merely as thoſe upon which the author here reſts, taken from gratitude's being the law of my nature, or bearing a high rank among moral duties, or being attended with peculiar advantages. Theſe are conſiderations but of a ſecondary nature. You muſt begin with ſetting before me all that my friend has done for me, if you mean to touch my heart, and to call forth the emotions of gratitude. The caſe is perfectly ſimilar, when we are exhorted to give thanks to God; and, therefore, in giving a full view of the ſubject, the bleſſings conferred on us by divine goodneſs ſhould have been taken into the argument.

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It may be ſaid, however, in apology for our Author, that this would have led him into too wide a field for one diſcourſe, and into a field alſo, which is difficult, becauſe ſo beaten, the enumeration of the divine benefits. He, therefore, ſeems to take it for granted, that we have upon our minds a juſt ſenſe of theſe benefits. He aſſumes them as known and acknowledged; and ſetting aſide what may be called the pathetic part of the ſubject, or what was calculated to warm the heart, he goes on to the reaſoning part. In this management, I cannot altogether blame him. I do not by any means ſay, that it is neceſſary in every Diſcourſe to take in all that belongs to the doctrine of which we treat. Many a Diſcourſe is ſpoiled, by attempting to render it too copious and comprehenſive. The Preacher may, without reprehenſion, take up any part of a great ſubject to which his genius at the time leads him, and make that his theme. But when he omits any thing which may be thought eſſential, he ought to give notice, that this is a part, which for the time he lays aſide. Something of this ſort would perhaps have been proper here. Our Author might have begun by ſaying, that the reaſonableneſs of this duty muſt appear to every thinking being, who reflects upon the infinite obligations which are laid upon us, by creating, preſerving, and redeeming love; and, after taking notice that the field which theſe open, was too wide for him to enter upon at that time, have proceeded to his other heads. Let us now conſider theſe ſeparately.

"The

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" THE duty of Praiſe and Thankſgiving, con-
" ſidered *abſolutely* in itſelf, is, I ſay, the debt and
" law of our nature. We had ſuch faculties be-
" ſtowed on us by our Creator, as made us ca-
" pable of ſatisfying this debt, and obeying this
" law; and they never, therefore, work more na-
" turally and freely, than when they are thus em-
" ployed.

" 'TIS one of the earlieſt inſtructions given us
" by philoſophy, and which has ever ſince been
" approved and inculcated by the wiſeſt men of
" all ages, that the original deſign of making man
" was, that he might praiſe and honour him who
" made him. When God had finiſhed this good-
" ly frame of things we call *the world*, and put
" together the ſeveral parts of it, according to
" his infinite wiſdom, in exact number, weight,
" and meaſure, there was ſtill wanting a creature,
" in theſe lower regions, that could apprehend
" the beauty, order, and exquiſite contrivance of
" it; that from contemplating the gift, might be
" able to raiſe itſelf to the great Giver, and do
" honour to all his attributes. Every thing
" indeed that God made, did, in ſome ſenſe,
" glorify its Author, inaſmuch as it carried
" upon it the plain mark and impreſs of the
" Deity, and was an effect worthy of that firſt
" cauſe from whence it flowed; and thus might
" the *Heavens* be ſaid, at the firſt moment in
" which they ſtood forth, *to declare his glory,*
" *and the firmament to ſhow his handy work:* But

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" this was an imperfect and defective glory; the " ſign was of no ſignification here below, whilſt " there was no one here as yet to take notice of " it. Man, therefore, was formed to ſupply this " want, endowed with powers fit to find out, and " to acknowledge theſe unlimited perfections; " and then put into this Temple of God, this " lower world, as the Prieſt of Nature, to offer " up the incenſe of Thanks and Praiſe for the " mute and inſenſible part of the Creation.

" This, I ſay, hath been the opinion all along " of the moſt thoughtful men down from the " moſt antient times: and though it be not de- " monſtrative, yet it is what we cannot but judge " highly reaſonable, if we do but allow, that man " was made for ſome end or other; and that he " is capable of perceiving that end. For, then, " let us ſearch and enquire never ſo much, we " ſhall find no other account of him that we can " reſt upon ſo well. If we ſay, that he was made " purely for the good pleaſure of God; this is, " in effect, to ſay, that he was made for no deter- " minate end; or for none, at leaſt, that we can " diſcern. If we ſay, that he was deſigned as an " inſtance of the wiſdom, and power, and good- " neſs of God; this, indeed, may be the reaſon of " his *being* in general; for 'tis the common reaſon " of the being of every thing beſides. But it " gives no account, why he was made *ſuch* a thing " as he is, a reflecting, thoughtful, inquiſitive be- " ing. The particular reaſon of this ſeems moſt

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" aptly to be drawn from the praiſe and honour " that was (not only to redound to God from " him, but) to be given to God by him."

THE thought which runs through all this paſſage, of man's being the Prieſt of Nature, and of his exiſtence being calculated chiefly for this end, that he might offer up the praiſes of the mute part of the creation, is an ingenious thought, and well illuſtrated. It was a favourite idea among ſome of the antient philoſophers; and it is not the worſe on that account, as it thereby appears to have been a natural ſentiment of the human mind. In compoſing a Sermon, however, it might have been better to have introduced it as a ſort of collateral argument, or an incidental illuſtration, than to have diſplayed it with ſo much pomp, and to have placed it in the front of the arguments for this duty. It does not ſeem to me, when placed in this ſtation, to bear all the ſtreſs which the Author lays upon it. When the divine goodneſs brought man into exiſtence, we cannot well conceive that its chief purpoſe was, to form a being who might ſing praiſes to his Maker. Prompted by infinite benevolence, the Supreme Creator formed the human race, that they might riſe to happineſs, and to the enjoyment of himſelf, through a courſe of virtue, or proper action. The ſentiment on which our Author dwells, however beautiful, appears too looſe and rhetorical, to be a principal head of diſcourſe.

" THIS

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" THIS duty, therefore, is the debt and law of " our nature. And it will more distinctly appear " to be such, if we consider the two ruling faculties of our mind, the *Understanding* and the *Will* " apart, in both which it is deeply founded: in " the Understanding, as in the principle of Reason, which owns and acknowledges it; in the " Will, as in the fountain of gratitude and return, " which prompts, and even constrains us to pay " it.

" *Reason* was given us as a rule and measure, " by the help of which we were to proportion our " esteem of every thing, according to the degrees " of perfection and goodness which we found " therein. It cannot, therefore, if it doth its office at all, but apprehend God as the best and " most perfect being; it must needs see, and own, " and admire his infinite perfections. And this " is what is strictly meant by *praise*; which, therefore, is expressed in Scripture, by *confessing* to " *God* and *acknowledging* him; by *ascribing* to " him what is his due; and as far as this sense of " the words reaches, 'tis impossible to *think* of " God without praising him: for it depends not " on the understanding, how it shall apprehend " things, any more than it doth on the eye, how " visible objects shall appear to it.

" THE duty takes the further and surer hold of " us, by the means of the will, and that strong " bent towards gratitude, which the Author of " our Nature hath implanted in it. There is " not a more active principle than this in the

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" mind of man; and ſurely that which deſerves
" its utmoſt force, and ſhould ſet all its ſprings a-
" work, is God; the great and univerſal Benefac-
" tor, from whom alone we received whatever we
" either have, or are, and to whom we can poſſibly
" repay nothing but our Praiſes, or (to ſpeak more
" properly on this head, and according to the
" ſtrict import of the word) our Thankſgiving.
" *Who hath firſt given to God* (ſaith the great
" Apoſtle, in his uſual figure) *and it ſhall be re-*
" *compenſed unto him again?* A gift, it ſeems,
" always requires a recompence: nay, *but of him,*
" *and through him, and to him, are all things: of*
" *him,* as the Author; *through him,* as the Pre-
" ſerver and Governor; *to him,* as the end and
" perfection of all things: *to whom therefore* (as
" it follows), be glory for ever, Amen!"

I CANNOT much approve of the light in which our Author places his argument in theſe paragraphs. There is ſomething too metaphyſical and refined, in his deducing, in this manner, the obligation to thankſgiving, from the two faculties of the mind, Underſtanding and Will. Though what he ſays be in itſelf juſt, yet the argument is not ſufficiently plain and ſtriking. Arguments in Sermons, eſpecially on ſubjects that ſo naturally and eaſily ſuggeſt them, ſhould be palpable and popular; ſhould not be brought from topics that appear far ſought, but ſhould directly addreſs the heart and feelings. The Preacher ought never to depart too far from the common ways of thinking,

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ing, and expreſſing himſelf. I am inclined to think, that this whole head might have been improved, if the Author had taken up more obvious ground; had ſtated Gratitude as one of the moſt natural principles in the human heart; had illuſtrated this, by ſhewing how odious the oppoſite diſpoſition is, and with what general conſent men, in all ages, have agreed in hating and condemning the ungrateful; and then applying theſe reaſonings to the preſent caſe, had placed, in a ſtrong view, that entire corruption of moral ſentiment which it diſcovers, to be deſtitute of thankful emotions towards the Supreme Benefactor of Mankind. As the moſt natural method of giving vent to grateful ſentiments is, by external expreſſions of thankſgiving, he might then have anſwered the objection that is apt to occur, of the expreſſion of our praiſe being inſignificant to the Almighty. But, by ſeeking to be too refined in his argument, he has omitted ſome of the moſt ſtriking and obvious conſiderations, and which, properly diſplayed, would have afforded as great a field for Eloquence, as the topics which he has choſen. He goes on:

" GRATITUDE conſiſts in an equal return of be-
" nefits, if we are able; of thanks, if we are not:
" which thanks, therefore, muſt riſe always in
" proportion as the favours received are great, and
" the receiver incapable of making any other ſort
" of requital. Now, ſince no man hath bene-

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" fited God at any time, and yet every man, in " each moment of his life, is continually benefited " by him, what ſtrong obligations muſt we needs " be under to thank him? 'Tis true, our thanks " are really as inſignificant to him, as any other " kind of return would be; in themſelves, indeed, " they are worthleſs; but his goodneſs hath put a " value upon them: he hath declared, he will " accept them in lieu of the vaſt debt we owe; " and after that, which is fitteſt for us, to diſpute " how they came to be taken as an *equivalent*, or " to pay them?

" It is, therefore, the voice of nature (as far " as gratitude itſelf is ſo), that the good things " we receive from above ſhould be ſent back again " thither in thanks and praiſes; *as the rivers run* " *into the ſea, to the place* (the ocean of benefi- " cence) *from whence the rivers come, thither* " ſhould *they return again.*"

In theſe paragraphs, he has, indeed, touched ſome of the conſiderations which I mentioned. But he has only touched them; whereas, with advantage, they might have formed the main body of his argument.

" We have conſidered the duty *abſolutely*; we " are now to *compare* it with others, and to ſee " what rank it bears among them. And here " we ſhall find, that, among all the acts of religion " immediately addreſſed to God, this is much the " nobleſt

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" nobleſt and moſt excellent; as it muſt needs be,
" if what hath been laid down be allowed, that
" the end of man's creation was to praiſe and glo-
" rify God. For that cannot but be the moſt
" noble and excellent act of any being, which beſt
" anſwers the end and deſign of it. Other parts
" of devotion, ſuch as *confeſſion* and *prayer*, ſeem
" not originally to have been deſigned for man,
" nor man for them. They imply *guilt* and *want*,
" with which the *ſtate of innocence* was not ac-
" quainted. Had man continued in that eſtate,
" his worſhip (like the devotions of angels) had
" been paid to Heaven in pure acts of thankſ-
" giving; and nothing had been left for him to
" do, beyond the enjoying the good things of life,
" as nature directed, and praiſing the God of na-
" ture who beſtowed them. But being fallen
" from innocence and abundance; having con-
" tracted guilt, and forfeited his right to all ſorts
" of mercies; prayer and confeſſion became ne-
" ceſſary, for a time, to retrieve the loſs, and to re-
" ſtore him to that ſtate wherein he ſhould be able
" to live without them. Theſe are fitted, there-
" fore, for a lower diſpenſation; before which, in
" paradiſe, there was nothing but praiſe, and after
" which, there ſhall be nothing but that in hea-
" ven. Our perfect ſtate did at firſt, and will at
" laſt, conſiſt in the performance of this duty;
" and herein, therefore, lies the excellence, and
" the honour of our nature.

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" 'Tis the ſame way of reaſoning, by which the " Apoſtle hath given the preference to charity, " beyond faith, and hope, and every ſpiritual gift. " *Charity never faileth*, ſaith he; meaning, that it " is not a virtue uſeful only in this life; but will " accompany us alſo into the next: *but whether* " *there be propheſies, they ſhall fail*; *whether there* " *be tongues, they ſhall ceaſe*; *whether there be* " *knowledge, it ſhall vaniſh away*. Theſe are " gifts of a temporary advantage, and ſhall all " periſh in the uſing. *For we know in part, and* " *we propheſy in part*; our preſent ſtate is imper- " fect, and, therefore, what belongs to that, and " only that, muſt be imperfect too. *But when* " *that which is perfect is come, then that which is* " *in part ſhall be done away*. The argument of " St. Paul, we ſee, which ſets charity above the " reſt of Chriſtian graces, will give praiſe alſo the " pre-eminence over all the parts of the Chriſtian " worſhip; and we may conclude our reaſoning, " therefore, as he doth his: *And now abideth con-* " *feſſion, prayer, and praiſe, theſe three; but the* " *greateſt of theſe is praiſe.*"

The Author, here, enters on the ſecond part of his argument, the high rank which thankſgiving holds, when compared with other duties of religion. This he handles with much eloquence and beauty. His idea, that this was the original worſhip of man before his fall rendered other duties requiſite, and ſhall continue to be his worſhip in Heaven, when the

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the duties which are occaſioned by a conſcioufneſs of guilt ſhall have no place, is ſolid and juſt; his illuſtration of it is very happy; and the ſtyle extremely flowing and ſweet. Seldom do we meet with any piece of compoſition in Sermons, that has more merit than this head.

" It is ſo, certainly, on other accounts, as well " as this; particularly, as it is the moſt *diſin-* " *tereſted* branch of our religious ſervice; ſuch as " hath the moſt of God, and the leaſt of ourſelves " in it, of any we pay; and therefore approaches " the neareſt of any to a pure, and free, and " perfect act of homage. For though a good " action doth not grow immediately worthleſs by " being done with the proſpect of advantage, as " ſome have ſtrangely imagined; yet it will be " allowed, I ſuppoſe, that its being done, without " the mixture of that end, or with as little of it as " poſſible, recommends it ſo much the more, and " raiſes the price of it. *Doth* Job *fear God for* " *nought?* was an objection of Satan; which im- " plied, that thoſe duties were moſt valuable, where " our own intereſt was leaſt aimed at: and God " ſeems, by the commiſſion he then gave Satan, " to try experiments upon *Job*, thus far to have " allowed his plea. Now, our requeſts for future, " and even our acknowledgments of paſt mercies, " center purely in ourſelves; our own intereſt is " the direct aim of them. But praiſe is a gene- " rous and unmercenary principle, which pro- " poſes

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" poſes no other end to itſelf, but to do, as is fit " for a creature endowed with ſuch faculties to do, " towards the moſt perfect and beneficent of " beings; and to pay the willing tribute of honour " there, where the voice of Reaſon directs us to " pay it. God hath, indeed, annexed a bleſſing " to the duty; and when we know this, we cannot " chuſe, while we are performing the duty, but " have ſome regard to the bleſſing which belongs " to it. However, that is not the direct aim of " our devotions, nor was it the firſt motive that " ſtirred us up to them. Had it been ſo, we " ſhould naturally have betaken ourſelves to " Prayer, and breathed out our deſires in that " form wherein they are moſt properly conveyed.

" In ſhort, Praiſe is our moſt excellent work, " a work common to the church triumphant and " militant, and which lifts us up into communion " and fellowſhip with Angels. The matter about " which it is converſant, is always the perfection " of God's nature; and the act itſelf, is the per- " fection of ours."

Our Author's ſecond illuſtration, is taken from praiſe being the moſt diſintereſted act of homage. This he explains juſtly and elegantly; though, perhaps, the conſideration is rather too thin and refined for enforcing religious duties: as creatures, ſuch as we, in approaching to the divine preſence, can never be ſuppoſed to lay aſide all conſideration of our own wants and neceſſities; and certainly are not

not required (as the Author admits) to diveſt ourſelves of ſuch regards. The concluding Sentence of this head is elegant and happily expreſſed. LECT. XXX.

" I COME now, in the laſt place, to ſet out ſome " of its peculiar *properties and advantages*, which " recommend it to the devout performer. And,

" 1. IT is the moſt *pleaſing* part of our devo- " tions: it proceeds always from a lively cheerful " temper of mind, and it cheriſhes and improves " what it proceeds from. *For it is good to ſing* " *praiſes unto our God* (ſays one whoſe experience, " in this caſe, we may rely upon), *for it is plea-* " *ſant, and praiſe is comely.* Petition and Con- " feſſion are the language of the indigent and the " guilty, the breathings of a ſad and contrite " ſpirit: *Is any afflicted? let him pray*; but, *Is any* " *merry? let him ſing pſalms.* The moſt uſual and " natural way of men's expreſſing the mirth of " their hearts is in a ſong, and ſongs are the very " language of praiſe; to the expreſſing of which " they are in a peculiar manner appropriated, and " are ſcarce of any other uſe in Religion. Indeed, " the whole compoſition of this duty is ſuch, as " throughout ſpeaks eaſe and delight to the mind. " It proceeds from *Love* and from *Thankfulneſs*; " from *Love*, the fountain of pleaſure, the paſſion " which gives every thing we do, or enjoy, its " reliſh and agreeableneſs. From *Thankfulneſs*, " which involves in it the memory of paſt benefits, " the actual preſence of them to the mind, and the

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" repeated enjoyment of them. And as is its " principle, ſuch is its end alſo: for it procureth " quiet and eaſe to the mind, by doing ſomewhat " towards ſatisfying that debt which it labours " under; by delivering it of thoſe thoughts of " praiſe and gratitude, thoſe exultations it is ſo " full of; and which would grow uneaſy and trou- " bleſome to it if they were kept in. If the " thankful *refrained, it would be pain and grief* to " them; but then, then *is their ſoul ſatisfied as* " *with marrow and fatneſs, when their mouth* " *praiſeth God with joyful lips.*"

In beginning this head of diſcourſe, the expreſſion which the Author uſes, to *ſet out ſome of its peculiar properties and advantages*, would now be reckoned not ſo proper an expreſſion, as *to point out*, or *to ſhow*. The firſt ſubdiviſion concerning praiſe being the moſt pleaſant part of devotion, is very juſt and well expreſſed, as far as it goes; but ſeems to me rather defective. Much more might have been ſaid, upon the pleaſure that accompanies ſuch exalted acts of devotion. It was a cold thought, to dwell upon its diſburdening the mind of a debt. The Author ſhould have inſiſted more upon the influence of Praiſe and Thankſgiving, in warming, gladdening, ſoothing the mind; lifting it above the world, to dwell among divine and eternal objects. He ſhould have deſcribed the peace and joy which then expand the heart; the relief which this exerciſe procures from the cares and agitations

of

of life; the encouraging views of Providence to which it leads our attention; and the truſt which it promotes in the divine mercy for the future, by the commemoration of benefits paſt. In ſhort, this was the place for his pouring out a greater flow of devotional ſentiments than what we here find.

" 2. It is another diſtinguiſhing property of " divine praiſe, that it enlargeth the powers and " capacities of our ſouls, turning them from low " and little things, upon their greateſt and nobleſt " object, the divine nature, and employing them in " the diſcovery and admiration of thoſe ſeveral " perfections that adorn it. We ſee what differ- " ence there is between man and man, ſuch as " there is hardly greater between man and beaſt; " and this proceeds chiefly from the different " ſphere of thought which they act in, and the " different objects they converſe with. The mind " is eſſentially the ſame in the peaſant and the " prince; the force of it naturally equal, in the " untaught man, and the philopher; only the one " of theſe is buſied in mean affairs, and within " narrower bounds; the other exerciſes himſelf in " things of weight and moment; and this it is, " that puts the wide diſtance between them. No- " ble objects are to the mind, what the ſunbeams " are to a bud or flower; they open and unfold, " as it were, the leaves of it; put it upon exerting " and ſpreading itſelf every way; and call forth " all thoſe powers that lie hid and locked up in it.

" The

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" bring this advantage along with it, that it ſets
" our faculties upon their full ſtretch, and im-
" proves them to all the degrees of perfection of
" which they are capable."

THIS head is juſt, well expreſſed, and to cenſure it might appear hypercritical. Some of the expreſſions, however, one would think, might be amended. The ſimile, for inſtance, about the effects of the ſun-beams upon the bud or flower, is pretty, but not correctly expreſſed. *They open and unfold, as it were, the leaves of it.* If this is to be literally applied to the flower, the phraſe, *as it were*, is needleſs; if it is to be metaphorically underſtood (which appears to be the caſe), the *leaves of the mind*, is harſh language; beſides that, *put it upon exerting itſelf*, is rather a low expreſſion. Nothing is more nice, than to manage properly ſuch ſimilies and alluſions, ſo as to preſerve them perfectly correct, and at the ſame time to render the image lively: it might perhaps be amended in ſome ſuch way as this: " As the ſun-beams open
" the bud, and unfold the leaves of a flower,
" noble objects have a like effect upon the mind:
" they expand and ſpread it, and call forth thoſe
" powers that before lay hid and locked up in the
" ſoul."

" 3. IT farther promotes in us an exquiſite
" ſenſe of God's honour, and an high indignation
" of

" of mind at every thing that openly profanes it. LECT. XXX.
" For what we value and delight in, we cannot
" with patience hear ſlighted or abuſed. Our own
" praiſes, which we are conſtantly putting up,
" will be a *ſpur* to us toward procuring and pro-
" moting the divine glory in every other inſtance;
" and will make us ſet our faces againſt all open and
" avowed impieties; which, methinks, ſhould be
" conſidered a little by ſuch as would be thought
" not to be wanting in this duty, and yet are often
" ſilent under the fouleſt diſhonours done to Reli-
" gion, and its great Author: for tamely to hear
" God's name and worſhip vilified by others, is
" no very good argument that we have been uſed
" to honour and reverence him, in good earneſt,
" ourſelves."

THE thought here is well founded, though it is careleſly and looſely brought out. The Sentence, *our own praiſes which we are conſtantly putting up, will be a ſpur to us toward procuring and promoting the divine glory in every other inſtance*, is both negligent in language, and ambiguous in meaning; for *our own praiſes*, properly ſignifies the praiſes of ourſelves. Much better if he had ſaid, " Thoſe
" devout praiſes which we conſtantly offer up to
" the Almighty, will naturally prompt us to pro-
" mote the divine glory in every other inſtance."

" 4. IT will, beyond all this, work in us a deep
" humility and conſciouſneſs of our own imper-
" fections.

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" fections. Upon a frequent attention to God " and his attributes, we ſhall eaſily diſcover our own " weakneſs and emptineſs; our ſwelling thoughts " of ourſelves will abate, and we ſhall ſee and feel " that we are *altogether lighter to be laid in the* " *balance than vanity*; and this is a leſſon which, " to the greateſt part of mankind, is, I think, " very well worth learning. We are naturally " preſumptuous and vain; full of ourſelves, and " regardleſs of every thing beſides, eſpecially when " ſome little outward privileges diſtinguiſh us from " the reſt of mankind; then, 'tis odds, but we " look into ourſelves with great degrees of com- " placency, *and are wiſer* (and better every way) " *in our own conceit, than ſeven men that can* " *render a reaſon.* Now nothing will contribute " ſo much to the cure of this vanity, as a due " attention to God's excellencies and perfections. " By comparing theſe with thoſe which we imagine " belong to us, we ſhall learn, *not to think more* " *highly of ourſelves than we ought to think of our-* " *ſelves*, but *to think ſoberly*; we ſhall find more " ſatisfaction in looking upwards, and humbling " ourſelves before our common Creator, than in " caſting our eyes downward with ſcorn upon our " fellow-creatures, and ſetting at nought any part " of the work of his hands. The vaſt diſtance " we are at from real and infinite Worth, will " aſtoniſh us ſo much, that we ſhall not be tempted " to value ourſelves upon theſe leſſer degrees of " pre-eminence, which cuſtom or opinion, or ſome

" little

" little accidental advantages, have given us over " other men." LECT. XXX.

THOUGH the thought here alſo be juſt, yet a like deficiency in elegance and beauty appears. The phraſe, *'tis odds but we look into ourſelves, with great degrees of complacency*, is much too low and colloquial for a Sermon—he might have ſaid, *we are likely*, or *we are prone* to look into ourſelves.—*Comparing theſe with thoſe which we imagine belong to us*, is alſo very careleſs Style.—*By comparing theſe with the virtues and abilities which we aſcribe to ourſelves, we ſhall learn*—would have been purer and more correct.

" 5. I SHALL mention but one uſe of it more, " and 'tis this; that a conſcientious praiſe of God " will keep us back from all falſe and mean praiſe, " all fulſome and ſervile flatteries ſuch as are in " uſe among men. Praiſing, as 'tis commonly " managed, is nothing elſe but a trial of ſkill " upon a man, how many good things we can " poſſibly ſay of him. All the treaſures of Ora- " tory are ranſacked, and all the fine things that " ever were ſaid, are heaped together for his " ſake; and no matter whether it belongs to " him or not; ſo there be but enough on't. " Which is one deplorable inſtance, among a " thouſand, of the baſeneſs of human nature, of " its ſmall regard to truth and juſtice; to right " or wrong; to what is, or is not to be praiſed.

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" But he who hath a deep ſenſe of the excellencies " of God upon his heart, will make a God of no- " thing beſides. He will give every one his juſt " encomium, honour where honour is due, and as " much as is due, becauſe it is his duty to do ſo; " but the honour of God will ſuffer him to go no " further. Which rule, if it had been obſerved, " a neighbouring prince (who now, God be thank- " ed, needs flattery a great deal more than ever he " did) would have wanted a great deal of that in- " cenſe which hath been offered up to him by his " adorers."

THIS head appears ſcarcely to deſerve any place among the more important topics that naturally preſented themſelves on this ſubject; at leaſt, it had much better have wanted the application which the Author makes of his reaſoning to the flatterers of Louis XIV.; and the thanks which he offers to God, for the affairs of that prince being in ſo low a ſtate, that he now needed flattery more than ever. This political Satire is altogether out of place, and unworthy of the ſubject.

ONE would be inclined to think, upon reviewing our author's arguments, that he has overlooked ſome topics, reſpecting the happy conſequences of this duty, of fully as much importance as any that he has inſerted. Particularly, he ought not to have omitted the happy tendency of praiſe and thankſ- giving, to ſtrengthen good diſpoſitions in the heart; to

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to promote love to God, and imitation of thoſe perfections which we adore; and to infuſe a ſpirit of ardour and zeal into the whole of religion, as the ſervice of our benefactor. Theſe are conſequences which naturally follow from the proper performance of this duty; and which ought not to have been omitted; as no opportunity ſhould be loſt, of ſhowing the good effect of devotion on practical religion and moral virtue; and pointing out the neceſſary connection of the one with the other For certainly the great end of preaching is, to make men better in all the relations of life, and to promote that complete reformation of heart and conduct, in which true Chriſtianity conſiſts. Our Author, however, upon the whole, is not deficient in ſuch views of religion; for, in his general ſtrain of preaching, as he is extremely pious, ſo he is, at the ſame time, practical and moral.

His ſumming up of the whole argument, in the next paragraph, is elegant and beautiful; and ſuch concluding views of the ſubject are frequently very proper and uſeful: "Upon theſe grounds doth "the duty of praiſe ſtand, and theſe are the obli- "gations that bind us to the performance of it. "'Tis the end of our being, and the very rule and "law of our nature; flowing from the two great "fountains of human action, the underſtanding, "and the will, naturally, and almoſt neceſſarily. "It is the moſt excellent part of our religious wor- "ſhip; enduring to eternity, after the reſt ſhall be

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" *done away*; and paid, even now, in the frankeſt
" manner, with the leaſt regard to our own intereſt.
" It recommends itſelf to us by ſeveral peculiar
" properties and advantages; as it carries more
" pleaſure in it, than all other kinds of devotion;
" as it enlarges and exalts the ſeveral powers of
" the mind; as it breeds in us an exquiſite ſenſe
" of God's honour, and a willingneſs to promote
" it in the world; as it teaches us to be humble
" and lowly ourſelves, and yet preſerves us from
" baſe and ſordid flattery, from beſtowing mean
" and undue praiſes upon others."

AFTER this, our Author addreſſes himſelf to two claſſes of men, the Careleſs and the Profane. His addreſs to the Careleſs is beautiful, and pathetic; that to the Profane, is not ſo well executed, and is liable to ſome objection. Such addreſſes appear to me to be, on ſeveral occaſions, very uſeful parts of a diſcourſe. They prevailed much in the ſtrain of preaching before the reſtoration; and, perhaps, ſince that period, have been too much neglected. They afford an opportunity of bringing home to the conſciences of the audience, many things, which, in the courſe of the Sermon, were, perhaps, delivered in the abſtract.

I SHALL not dwell on the Concluſion of the Sermon, which is chiefly employed in obſervations on the poſture of public affairs at that time. Conſidered upon the whole, this Diſcourſe of Biſhop Atterbury's is both uſeful and beautiful, though I have

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have ventured to point out ſome defects in it. Seldom, or never, can we expect to meet with a compoſition of any kind, which is abſolutely perfect in all its parts: and when we take into account the difficulties which I before ſhowed to attend the Eloquence of the Pulpit, we have, perhaps, leſs reaſon to look for perfection in a Sermon, than in any other compoſition.

LECTURE XXXI.

CONDUCT OF A DISCOURSE IN ALL ITS PARTS—INTRODUCTION—DIVISION—NARRATION AND EXPLICATION.

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I HAVE, in the four preceding Lectures, conſidered what is peculiar to each of the three great fields of Public Speaking, Popular Aſſemblies, the Bar, and the Pulpit. I am now to treat of what is common to them all; of the conduct of a Diſcourſe or Oration, in general. The previous view which I have given of the diſtinguiſhing ſpirit and character of different kinds of Public Speaking, was neceſſary for the proper application of the rules which I am about to deliver; and as I proceed, I ſhall farther point out, how far any of theſe rules may have a particular reſpect to the Bar, to the Pulpit, or to Popular Courts.

ON whatever ſubject any one intends to diſcourſe, he will moſt commonly begin with ſome introduction, in order to prepare the minds of his hearers; he will then ſtate his ſubject, and explain the facts connected with it; he will employ arguments

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ments for eſtabliſhing his own opinion, and overthrowing that of his antagoniſt; he may perhaps, if there be room for it, endeavour to touch the paſſions of his Audience; and after having ſaid all he thinks proper, he will bring his Diſcourſe to a cloſe, by ſome Peroration or Concluſion. This being the natural train of Speaking, the parts that compoſe a regular formal Oration, are theſe ſix; firſt, the Exordium or Introduction; ſecondly, the State, and the Diviſion of the Subject; thirdly, Narration or Explication; fourthly, the Reaſoning or Arguments; fifthly, the Pathetic Part; and laſtly, the Concluſion. I do not mean, that each of theſe muſt enter into every Public Diſcourſe, or that they muſt enter always in this order. There is no reaſon for being ſo formal on every occaſion; nay, it would often be a fault, and would render a Diſcourſe pedantic and ſtiff. There may be many excellent Diſcourſes in public, where ſeveral of theſe parts are altogether wanting; where the Speaker, for inſtance, uſes no Introduction, but enters directly on his ſubject; where he has no occaſion either to divide or explain; but ſimply reaſons on one ſide of the queſtion, and then finiſhes. But as the parts, which I have mentioned, are the natural conſtituent parts of a regular Oration; and as in every Diſcourſe whatever, ſome of them muſt be found, it is neceſſary to our preſent purpoſe, that I ſhould treat of each of them diſtinctly.

I BEGIN, of courſe, with the Exordium or Introduction. This is manifeſtly common to all the

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three kinds of Public Speaking. It is not a rhetorical invention. It is founded upon nature, and ſuggeſted by common ſenſe. When one is going to counſel another; when he takes upon him to inſtruct, or to reprove, prudence will generally direct him not to do it abruptly, but to uſe ſome preparation; to begin with ſomewhat that may incline the perſons, to whom he addreſſes himſelf, to judge favourably of what he is about to ſay; and may diſpoſe them to ſuch a train of thought, as will forward and aſſiſt the purpoſe which he has in view. This is, or ought to be, the main ſcope of an Introduction. Accordingly Cicero and Quinctilian mention three ends, to one or other of which it ſhould be ſubſervient, "Reddere auditores benevolos, attentos, dociles."

First, To conciliate the good-will of the hearers; to render them benevolent, or well-affected to the Speaker and to the ſubject. Topics for this purpoſe may, in Cauſes at the Bar, be ſometimes taken from the particular ſituation of the Speaker himſelf, or of his client, or from the character or behaviour of his antagoniſts contraſted with his own; on other occaſions, from the nature of the ſubject, as cloſely connected with the intereſt of the hearers; and, in general, from the modeſty and good intention, with which the Speaker enters upon his ſubject. The ſecond end of an Introduction, is, to raiſe the attention of the hearers; which may be effected, by giving them ſome hints of the importance, dignity, or novelty of the ſubject;

ject; or ſome favourable view of the clearneſs and preciſion with which we are to treat it; and of the brevity with which we are to diſcourſe. The third end, is to render the hearers docile, or open to perſuaſion; for which end, we muſt begin with ſtudying to remove any particular prepoſſeſſions they may have contracted againſt the cauſe, or ſide of the argument which we eſpouſe.

Some one of theſe ends ſhould be propoſed by every Introduction. When there is no occaſion for aiming at any of them; when we are already ſecure of the good-will, the attention, and the docility of the Audience, as may often be the caſe, formal Introductions may, without any prejudice, be omitted. And, indeed, when they ſerve for no purpoſe but mere oſtentation, they had for the moſt part better be omitted; unleſs as far as reſpect to the Audience makes it decent, that a Speaker ſhould not break in upon them too abruptly, but by a ſhort exordium prepare them for what he is going to ſay. Demoſthenes's Introductions are always ſhort and ſimple; Cicero's are fuller and more artful.

The antient Critics diſtinguiſh two kinds of Introductions, which they call "Principium," and "Inſinuatio." "Principium" is, where the Orator plainly and directly profeſſes his aim in ſpeaking. "Inſinuatio" is, where a larger compaſs muſt be taken; and where, preſuming the diſpoſition of the Audience to be much againſt the Orator,

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tor, he muſt gradually reconcile them to hearing him, before he plainly diſcovers the point which he has in view.

Of this latter ſort of Introduction, we have an admirable inſtance in Cicero's ſecond Oration againſt Rullus. This Rullus was Tribune of the People, and had propoſed an Agrarian Law; the purpoſe of which was to create a Decemvirate, or ten Commiſſioners, with abſolute power for five years over all the lands conquered by the Republic, in order to divide them among the citizens. Such laws had often been propoſed by factious magigrates, and were always greedily received by the people. Cicero is ſpeaking to the people; he had lately been made Conſul by their intereſt; and his firſt attempt is to make them reject this law. The ſubject was extremely delicate, and required much art. He begins with acknowledging all the favours which he had received from the people, in preference to the nobility. He profeſſes himſelf the creature of their power, and of all men the moſt engaged to promote their intereſt. He declares, that he held himſelf to be the Conſul of the People; and that he would always glory in preſerving the character of a popular magiſtrate. But to be popular, he obſerves, is an ambiguous word. He underſtood it to import a ſteady attachment to the real intereſt of the people, to their liberty, their eaſe, and their peace; but by ſome, he ſaw, it was abuſed, and made a cover to their own ſelfiſh and ambitious deſigns. In this manner, he begins to draw gradually

dually nearer to his purpoſe of attacking the propoſal of Rullus, but ſtill with great management and reſerve. He proteſts, that he is far from being an enemy to Agrarian Laws; he gives the higheſt praiſes to the Gracchi, thoſe zealous patrons of the people; and aſſures them, that when he firſt heard of Rullus's Law, he had reſolved to ſupport it, if he found it for their intereſt; but that, upon examining it, he found it calculated to eſtabliſh a dominion that was inconſiſtent with liberty, and to aggrandize a few men at the expence of the public; and then terminates his exordium, with telling them, that he is going to give his reaſons for being of this opinion; but that if his reaſons ſhall not ſatisfy them, he will give up his own opinion, and embrace theirs. In all this, there was great art. His eloquence produced the intended effect; and the people, with one voice, rejected this Agrarian Law.

Having given theſe general views of the nature and end of an Introduction, I proceed to lay down ſome rules for the proper compoſition of it. Theſe are the more neceſſary, as this is a part of the Diſcourſe which requires no ſmall care. It is always of importance to begin well; to make a favourable impreſſion at firſt ſetting out; when the minds of the hearers, vacant as yet and free, are moſt diſpoſed to receive any impreſſion eaſily. I muſt add too, that a good Introduction is often found

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found to be extremely difficult. Few parts of the Diſcourſe give the Compoſer more trouble, or are attended with more nicety in the execution.

THE firſt rule is, That the Introduction ſhould be eaſy and natural. The ſubject muſt always ſuggeſt it. It muſt appear, as Cicero beautifully expreſſes it, "Efflоruiſſe penitus ex re de qua tum "agitur*." It is too common a fault in Introductions, that they are taken from ſome common-place topic, which has no peculiar relation to the ſubject in hand; by which means they ſtand apart, like pieces detached from the reſt of the Diſcourſe. Of this kind are Salluſt's Introductions, prefixed to his Catilinarian and Jugurthine wars. They might as well have been Introductions to any other Hiſtory, or to any other Treatiſe whatever; and, therefore, though elegant in themſelves, they muſt be conſidered as blemiſhes in the work, from want of due connection with it. Cicero, though abundantly correct in this particular in his Orations, yet is not ſo in his other works. It appears from a letter of his to Atticus (L. xvi. 6.) that it was his cuſtom to prepare at his leiſure, a collection of different Introductions or Prefaces, ready to be prefixed to any work that he might afterwards publiſh. In conſequence of this ſtrange method of compoſing, it happened to him, to employ the ſame

* "To have ſprung up, of its own accord, from the matter "which is under conſideration."

Intro-

Introduction twice without remembering it; prefixing it to two different works. Upon Atticus informing him of this, he acknowledges the miſtake, and ſends him a new Introduction.

In order to render Introductions natural and eaſy, it is, in my opinion, a good rule, that they ſhould not be planned, till after one has meditated in his own mind the ſubſtance of his Diſcourſe. Then, and not till then, he ſhould begin to think of ſome proper and natural Introduction. By taking a contrary courſe, and labouring in the firſt place on an Introduction, every one who is accuſtomed to compoſition will often find, that either he is led to lay hold of ſome common-place topic, or that, inſtead of the Introduction being accommodated to the Diſcourſe, he is obliged to accommodate the whole Diſcourſe to the Introduction which he had previouſly written. Cicero makes this remark; though, as we have ſeen, his practice was not always conformable to his own rule. "Omnibus rebus conſideratis, tum denique id "quod primum eſt dicendum, poſtremum ſoleo "cogitare, quo utar exordio. Nam ſi quando id "primum invenire volui, nullum mihi occurrit, "niſi aut exile, aut nugatorium, aut vulgare*."

* "When I have planned and digeſted all the materials of my "diſcourſe, it is my cuſtom to think, in the laſt place, of the "Introduction with which I am to begin. For if at any time "I have endeavoured to invent an Introduction firſt, nothing "has ever occurred to me for that purpoſe, but what was trifling, "nugatory, and vulgar."

After

LECT. XXXI. After the mind has been once warmed and put in train, by close meditation on the subject, materials for the Preface will then suggest themselves much more readily.

In the second place, in an Introduction, correctness should be carefully studied in the expression. This is requisite, on account of the situation of the hearers. They are then more disposed to criticise than at any other period; they are, as yet, unoccupied with the subject or the arguments; their attention is wholly directed to the Speaker's style and manner. Something must be done, therefore, to prepossess them in his favour; though, for the same reasons, too much art must be avoided; for it will be more easily detected at that time than afterwards; and will derogate from persuasion in all that follows. A correct plainness, and elegant simplicity, is the proper character of an Introduction; "ut vide-" amur," says Quinctilian, "accuratè non cal-" lidè dicere."

In the third place, Modesty is another character which it must carry. All appearances of modesty are favourable, and prepossessing. If the Orator set out with an air of arrogance and ostentation, the self-love and pride of the hearers will be presently awakened, and will follow him with a very suspicious eye throughout all his progress. His modesty should discover itself not only in his

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expreſſions at the beginning, but in his whole manner; in his looks, in his geſtures, in the tone of his voice. Every auditory take in good part thoſe marks of reſpect and awe, which are paid to them by one who addreſſes them. Indeed the modeſty of an Introduction ſhould never betray any thing mean or abject. It is always of great uſe to an Orator, that together with modeſty and deference to his hearers, he ſhould ſhow a certain ſenſe of dignity ariſing from a perſuaſion of the juſtice or importance of the ſubject on which he is to ſpeak.

The modeſty of an Introduction requires, that it promiſe not too much. "Non fumum ex "fulgore, ſed ex fumo dare lucem *." This certainly is the general rule, that an Orator ſhould not put forth all his ſtrength at the beginning, but ſhould riſe and grow upon us, as his Diſcourſe advances. There are caſes, however, in which it is allowable for him to ſet out from the firſt in a high and bold tone; as, for inſtance, when he riſes to defend ſome cauſe which has been much run down, and decried by the Public. Too modeſt a beginning might be then like a confeſſion of guilt. By the boldneſs and ſtrength of his Exordium, he

* He does not laviſh at a blaze his fire,
Sudden to glare, and then in ſmoke expire;
But riſes from a cloud of ſmoke to light,
And pours his ſpecious miracles to ſight.
Hor. Ars Poet. Francis.

muſt

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muſt endeavour to ſtem the tide that is againſt him, and to remove prejudices, by encountering them without fear. In ſubjects too of a declamatory nature, and in Sermons, where the ſubject is ſtriking, a magnificent Introduction has ſometimes a good effect, if it be properly ſupported in the ſequel. Thus Biſhop Atterbury, in beginning an eloquent Sermon, preached on the 30th of January, the Anniverſary of what is called King Charles's Martyrdom, ſets out in this pompous manner: "This is a day of trouble, of rebuke, and of "blaſphemy; diſtinguiſhed in the calendar of our "Church, and the annals of our nation, by the "ſufferings of an excellent prince, who fell a ſacri-"fice to the rage of his rebellious ſubjects; and, "by his fall, derived infamy, miſery, and guilt "on them, and their ſinful poſterity." Boſſuet, Flechier, and the other celebrated French Preachers very often begin their Diſcourſes with laboured and ſublime Introductions. Theſe raiſe attention, and throw a luſtre on the ſubject: but let every Speaker be much on his guard againſt ſtriking a higher note at the beginning, than he is able to keep up in his progreſs.

In the fourth place, An Introduction ſhould uſually be carried on in the calm manner. This is ſeldom the place for vehemence and paſſion. Emotions muſt riſe as the Diſcourſe advances. The minds of the Hearers muſt be gradually prepared, before the Speaker can venture on ſtrong

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and paſſionate ſentiments. The exceptions to this rule are, when the ſubject is ſuch, that the very mention of it naturally awakens ſome paſſionate emotion; or when the unexpected preſence of ſome perſon or object, in a Popular Aſſembly, inflames the Speaker, and makes him break forth with unuſual warmth. Either of theſe will juſtify what is called the Exordium *ab abrupto*. Thus the appearance of Catiline in the Senate, renders the vehement beginning of Cicero's firſt Oration againſt him very natural and proper: "Quoſque tandem, "Catilina, abutere patientia noſtra?" And thus Biſhop Atterbury, in preaching from this text, "Bleſſed is he, whoſoever ſhall not be offended in "me," ventures on breaking forth with this bold Exordium: "And can any man then be offended "in thee, bleſſed Jeſus?" which addreſs to our Saviour, he continues for a page or two, till he enters on the diviſion of his ſubject. But ſuch Introductions as theſe ſhould be hazarded by very few, as they promiſe ſo much vehemence and unction through the reſt of the Diſcourſe, that it is very difficult to fulfil the expectations of the hearers.

At the ſame time, though the Introduction is not the place in which warm emotions are uſually to be attempted, yet I muſt take notice, that it ought to prepare the way for ſuch as are deſigned to be raiſed in ſubſequent parts of the Diſcourſe. The Orator ſhould, in the beginning, turn the

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minds of his hearers towards thoſe ſentiments and feelings which he ſeeks to awaken in the courſe of his Speech. According, for inſtance, as it is compaſſion, or indignation, or contempt, on which his Diſcourſe is to reſt, he ought to ſow the ſeeds of theſe in his Introduction; he ought to begin with breathing that ſpirit which he means to inſpire. Much of the Orator's art and ability is ſhown, in thus ſtriking properly at the commencement, the key-note, if we may ſo expreſs it, of the reſt of his Oration.

In the fifth place, It is a rule in Introductions, not to anticipate any material part of the ſubject. When topics, or arguments, which are afterwards to be enlarged upon, are hinted at, and, in part, brought forth in the Introduction, they loſe the grace of novelty upon their ſecond appearance. The impreſſion intended to be made by any capital thought, is always made with the greateſt advantage, when it is made entire, and in its proper place.

In the laſt place, the Introduction ought to be proportioned, both in length, and in kind, to the Diſcourſe that is to follow: in length, as nothing can be more abſurd than to erect a very great portico before a ſmall building; and in kind, as it is no leſs abſurd to overcharge, with ſuperb ornaments, the portico of a plain dwelling houſe, or to make the entrance to a monument as gay as that

to

to an arbour. Common ſenſe directs, that every part of a Diſcourſe ſhould be ſuited to the ſtrain and ſpirit of the whole.

These are the principal rules that relate to Introductions. They are adapted, in a great meaſure, equally, to Diſcourſes of all kinds. In Pleadings at the Bar, or Speeches in Public Aſſemblies, particular care muſt be taken not to employ any Introduction of that kind, which the adverſe party may lay hold of, and turn to his advantage. To this inconvenience, all thoſe Introductions are expoſed, which are taken from general and common-place topics; and it never fails to give an adverſary a conſiderable triumph, if, by giving a ſmall turn to ſomething we had ſaid in our Exordium, he can appear to convert to his own favour, the principles with which we had ſet out, in beginning our attack upon him. In the caſe of Replies, Quinctilian makes an obſervation which is very worthy of notice; that Introductions, drawn from ſomething that has been ſaid in the courſe of the Debate, have always a peculiar grace; and the reaſon he gives for it is juſt and ſenſible. "Multum gratiæ "exordio eſt, quod ab actione diverſæ partis ma- "teriam trahit; hoc ipſo, quod non compoſitum "domi, ſed ibi atque e re natum; et facilitate "famam ingenii auget; et facie ſimplicis, ſump- "tique e proximo ſermonis, fidem quoque ac- "quirit; adeo, ut etiamſi reliqua ſcripta atque "elaborata ſint, tamen videatur tota extemporalis

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" oratio, cujus initium nihil præparatum habuiſſe, " manifeſtum eſt*."

In Sermons, ſuch a practice as this cannot take place; and, indeed, in compoſing Sermons, few things are more difficult than to remove an appearance of ſtiffneſs from an Introduction, when a formal one is uſed. The French Preachers, as I before obſerved, are often very ſplendid and lively in their Introductions; but, among us, attempts of this kind are not always ſo ſucceſsful. When long Introductions are formed upon ſome common-place topic, as the deſire of happineſs being natural to man, or the like, they never fail of being tedious. Variety ſhould be ſtudied in this part of compoſition as much as poſſible; often it may be proper to begin without any Introduction at all, unleſs, perhaps, one or two ſentences. Explanatory Introductions from the context, are the moſt ſimple of any, and frequently the beſt that can be uſed: but as they are in hazard of becoming dry, they

* " An Introduction, which is founded upon the pleading of " the oppoſite party, is extremely graceful; for this reaſon, that " it appears not to have been meditated at home, but to have " taken riſe from the buſineſs, and to have been compoſed on " the ſpot. Hence, it gives to the Speaker the reputation of a " quick invention, and adds weight likewiſe to his Diſcourſe, as " artleſs and unlaboured; inſomuch, that though all the reſt of " his Oration ſhould be ſtudied and written, yet the whole Diſ- " courſe has the appearance of being extemporary, as it is " evident, that the Introduction to it was unpremeditated."

ſhould

ſhould never be long. A Hiſtorical Introduction has, generally, a happy effect to rouſe attention; when one can lay hold upon ſome noted fact that is connected with the Text or the Diſcourſe, and, by a proper illuſtration of it, open the way to the ſubject that is to be treated of.

After the Introduction, what commonly comes next in order, is the Propoſition, or Enunciation of the Subject; concerning which there is nothing to be ſaid, but that it ſhould be as clear and diſtinct as poſſible, and expreſſed in few and plain words, without the leaſt affectation. To this generally ſucceeds the Diviſion, or the laying down the method of the Diſcourſe; on which it is neceſſary to make ſome obſervations. I do not mean, that in every Diſcourſe, a formal Diviſion or Diſtribution of it into parts, is requiſite. There are many occaſions of Public Speaking when this is neither requiſite nor would be proper; when the Diſcourſe, perhaps, is to be ſhort, or only one point is to be treated of; or when the Speaker does not chuſe to warn his hearers of the method he is to follow, or of the concluſion to which he ſeeks to bring them. Order of one kind or other is, indeed, eſſential to every good Diſcourſe; that is, every thing ſhould be ſo arranged as that what goes before, may give light and force to what follows. But this may be accompliſhed by means of a concealed method. What we call Diviſion is, when the method is propounded in form to the hearers.

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THE Diſcourſe in which this ſort of Diviſion moſt commonly takes place, is a Sermon; and a queſtion has been moved, whether this method of laying down heads, as it is called, be the beſt method of preaching. A very able judge, the Archbiſhop of Cambray in his Dialogues on Eloquence, declares ſtrongly againſt it. He obſerves, that it is a modern invention; that it was never practiſed by the Fathers of the Church; and, what is certainly true, that it took its riſe from the ſchoolmen, when metaphyſics began to be introduced into preaching. He is of opinion, that it renders a Sermon ſtiff; that it breaks the unity of the Diſcourſe; and that, by the natural connection of one part with another, the attention of the hearers would be carried along the whole with more advantage.

BUT, notwithſtanding his authority and his arguments, I cannot help being of opinion, that the preſent method of dividing a Sermon into heads, ought not to be laid aſide. Eſtabliſhed practice has now given it ſo much weight, that, were there nothing more in its favour, it would be dangerous for any Preacher to deviate ſo far from the common track. But the practice itſelf has alſo, in my judgment, much reaſon on its ſide. If formal partitions give a Sermon leſs of the oratorial appearance, they render it, however, more clear, more eaſily apprehended, and, of courſe, more inſtructive to the bulk of hearers, which is always the main

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object to be kept in view. The heads of a Sermon are great assistance to the memory and recollection of a hearer. They serve also to fix his attention. They enable him more easily to keep pace with the progress of the Discourse; they give him pauses and resting places, where he can reflect on what has been said, and look forward to what is to follow. They are attended with this advantage too, that they give the audience the opportunity of knowing, before-hand, when they are to be released from the fatigue of attention, and thereby make them follow the Speaker more patiently: "Reficit "audientem," says Quinctilian, taking notice of this very advantage of Divisions in other Discourses, "Reficit audientem certo singularum par- "tium fine; non aliter quàm facientibus iter, "multum detrahunt fatigationis notata spatia in- "scriptis lapidibus: nam et exhausti laboris nôsse "mensuram voluptati est; et hortatur ad reliqua "fortius exequenda, scire quantum superfit*." With regard to breaking the Unity of a Discourse, I cannot be of opinion that there arises, from that quarter, any argument against the method I am defending. If the Unity be broken, it is to the nature of the heads, or topics of which the Speaker

* "The conclusion of each head is a relief to the hearers; "just as, upon a journey, the mile-stones, which are set upon "the road, serve to diminish the traveller's fatigue. For we "are always pleased with seeing our labour begin to lessen; "and, by calculating how much remains, are stirred up to "finish our task more cheerfully."

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treats, that this is to be imputed; not to his laying them down in form. On the contrary, if his heads be well chosen, his marking them out, and distinguishing them, in place of impairing the Unity of the whole, renders it more conspicuous and complete; by showing how all the parts of a Discourse hang upon one another, and tend to one point.

In a Sermon, or in a Pleading, or any Discourse, where Division is proper to be used, the most material rules are,

First, That the several parts into which the subject is divided, be really distinct from one another; that is, that no one include another. It were a very absurd Division, for instance, if one should propose to treat first, of the advantages of Virtue, and next, of those of Justice or Temperance; because, the first head evidently comprehends the second, as a Genus does the Species; which method of proceeding involves the subject in indistinctness and disorder.

Secondly, In Division, we must take care to follow the order of nature; beginning with the simplest points, such as are easiest apprehended, and necessary to be first discussed; and proceeding thence to those which are built upon the former, and which suppose them to be known. We must divide the subject into those parts, into which most easily

eaſily and naturally it is reſolved; that it may ſeem to ſplit itſelf, and not to be violently torn aſunder: "Dividere," as is commonly ſaid, "non "frangere."

THIRDLY, The ſeveral members of a Diviſion ought to exhauſt the ſubject; otherwiſe we do not make a complete Diviſion; we exhibit the ſubject by pieces and corners only, without giving any ſuch plan as diſplays the whole.

FOURTHLY, The terms in which our partitions are expreſſed, ſhould be as conciſe as poſſible. Avoid all circumlocution here. Admit not a ſingle word but what is neceſſary. Preciſion is to be ſtudied above all things, in laying down a method. It is this which chiefly makes a Diviſion appear neat and elegant; when the ſeveral heads are propounded in the cleareſt, moſt expreſſive, and at the ſame time, the feweſt words poſſible. This never fails to ſtrike the hearers agreeably; and is, at the ſame time, of great conſequence towards making the Diviſions be more eaſily remembered.

FIFTHLY, Avoid an unneceſſary multiplication of heads. To ſplit a ſubject into a great many minute parts, by Diviſions and Subdiviſions without end, has always a bad effect in ſpeaking. It may be proper in a logical treatiſe; but it makes an Oration appear hard and dry, and unneceſſarily fatigues

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fatigues the memory. In a Sermon, there may be from three to five or ſix heads, including Subdiviſions; ſeldom ſhould there be more.

In a Sermon, or in a Pleading at the Bar, few things are of greater conſequence, than a proper or happy Diviſion. It ſhould be ſtudied with much accuracy and care; for if one take a wrong method at firſt ſetting out, it will lead them aſtray in all that follows. It will render the whole Diſcourſe either perplexed or languid; and though the hearers may not be able to tell where the fault or diſorder lies, they will be ſenſible there is a diſorder ſomewhere, and find themſelves little affected by what is ſpoken. The French writers of Sermons ſtudy neatneſs and elegance in the Diviſion of their ſubjects, much more than the Engliſh do; whoſe diſtributions, though ſenſible and juſt, yet are often inartificial and verboſe. Among the French, however, too much quaintneſs appears in their Diviſions, with an affectation of always ſetting out either with two, or with three, general heads of Diſcourſe. A Diviſion of Maſſillon's on this text, "It is finiſhed," has been much extolled by the French Critics: "This imports," ſays the Preacher, "conſummation, firſt, of juſtice on the part of "God; ſecondly, of wickedneſs on the part of "men; thirdly, of love on the part of Chriſt." This alſo of Bourdaloue's has been much praiſed, from theſe words, "My peace I give unto you:" "Peace," ſays he, "firſt, to the underſtanding, by "ſubmiſſion

" ſubmiſſion to faith; ſecondly, to the heart, by " ſubmiſſion to the law." LECT. XXXI.

THE next conſtituent part of a Diſcourſe, which I mentioned, was Narration or Explication. I put theſe two together, both becauſe they fall nearly under the ſame rules, and becauſe they commonly anſwer the ſame purpoſe; ſerving to illuſtrate the cauſe, or the ſubject of which the Orator treats, before he proceeds to argue either on one ſide or other; or to make any attempt for intereſting the paſſions of the hearers.

IN Pleadings at the Bar, Narration is often a very important part of the Diſcourſe, and requires to be particularly attended to. Beſides its being in any caſe no eaſy matter to relate with grace and propriety, there is, in Narrations at the Bar, a peculiar difficulty. The Pleader muſt ſay nothing but what is true; and, at the ſame time, he muſt avoid ſaying any thing that will hurt his cauſe. The facts which he relates, are to be the groundwork of all his future reaſoning. To recount them ſo as to keep ſtrictly within the bounds of truth, and yet to preſent them under the colours moſt favourable to his cauſe; to place, in the moſt ſtriking light, every circumſtance which is to his advantage, and to ſoften and weaken ſuch as make againſt him, demand no ſmall exertion of ſkill and dexterity. He muſt always remember, that if he diſcovers too much art, he defeats his own purpoſe, and

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and creates a diſtruſt of his ſincerity. Quinctilian very properly directs, "Effugienda in hac præci-"puè parte, omnis calliditatis ſuſpicio; neque "enim ſe uſquam magis cuſtodit judex, quàm cùm "narrat orator; nihil tum videatur fictum; nihil "ſollicitum; omnia potius a cauſa, quam ab ora-"tore, profecta videantur*."

To be clear and diſtinct, to be probable, and to be conciſe, are the qualities which Critics chiefly require in Narration; each of which carries, ſufficiently, the evidence of its importance. Diſtinctneſs belongs to the whole train of the Diſcourſe, but is eſpecially requiſite in Narration, which ought to throw light on all that follows. A fact, or a ſingle circumſtance left in obſcurity and miſapprehended by the Judge, may deſtroy the effect of all the argument and reaſoning which the Speaker employs. If his Narration be improbable, the Judge will not regard it; and if it be tedious and diffuſe, he will be tired of it, and forget it. In order to produce diſtinctneſs, beſides the ſtudy of the general rules of perſpicuity which were formerly given, Narration requires particular attention to aſcertain

* "In this part of Diſcourſe, the Speaker muſt be very "careful to ſhun every appearance of art and cunning. For "there is no time at which the Judge is more upon his guard, "than when the Pleader is relating facts. Let nothing then "ſeem feigned; nothing anxiouſly concealed. Let all that is "ſaid, appear to ariſe from the cauſe itſelf, and not to be the "work of the Orator."

clearly

clearly the names, the dates, the places, and every other material circumſtance of the facts recounted. In order to be probable in Narration, it is material to enter into the characters of the perſons of whom we ſpeak, and to ſhow, that their actions proceeded from ſuch motives as are natural, and likely to gain belief. In order to be as conciſe as the ſubject will admit, it is neceſſary to throw out all ſuperfluous circumſtances; the rejection of which, will likewiſe tend to make our Narration more forcible, and more clear.

CICERO is very remarkable for his talent of Narration; and from the examples in his Orations much may be learned. The Narration, for inſtance, in the celebrated Oration *pro Milone*, has been often and juſtly admired. His ſcope is to ſhow, that though in fact Clodius was killed by Milo, or his ſervants, yet that it was only in ſelf-defence; and that the deſign had been laid, not by Milo againſt Clodius, but by Clodius againſt Milo's life. All the circumſtances for rendering this probable are painted with wonderful art. In relating the manner of Milo's ſetting out from Rome, he gives the moſt natural deſcription of a family excurſion to the country, under which it was impoſſible that any bloody deſign could be concealed. "He remained," ſays he, "in the Senate-houſe "that day, till all the buſineſs was over. He "came home, changed his clothes deliberately, "and waited for ſome time, till his wife had got

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" all her things ready for going with him in his " carriage to the country. He did not ſet out till " ſuch time as Clodius might eaſily have been in " Rome, if he had not been lying in wait for Milo " by the way. By and by, Clodius met him on " the road, on horſeback, like a man prepared " for action, no carriage, not his wife, as was " uſual, nor any family equipage along with him; " whilſt Milo, who is ſuppoſed to be meditating " ſlaughter and aſſaſſination, is travelling in a car- " riage with his wife, wrapped up in his cloak, " embarraſſed with baggage, and attended by a " great train of women ſervants, and boys." He goes on, deſcribing the rencounter that followed, Clodius's ſervants attacking thoſe of Milo, and killing the driver of his carriage; Milo jumping out, throwing off his cloak, and making the beſt defence he could, while Clodius's ſervants endeavoured to ſurround him; and then concludes his Narration with a very delicate and happy ſtroke. He does not ſay in plain words, that Milo's ſervants killed Clodius, but that " in the midſt of " the tumult, Milo's ſervants, without the orders, " without the knowledge, without the preſence of " their maſter, did what every maſter would have " wiſhed his ſervants, in a like conjuncture, to " have done *."

In

* " Milo, cùm in Senatu fuiſſet eo die, quod Senatus dimiſ- " ſus eſt, domum venit. Calceos et veſtimenta mutavit; pau- " liſper,

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In Sermons, where there is ſeldom any occaſion for Narration, Explication of the ſubject to be diſcourſed on, comes in the place of Narration at the Bar, and is to be taken up much on the ſame tone; that is, it muſt be conciſe, clear, and diſtinct; and in a Style correct and elegant, rather than highly adorned. To explain the doctrine of the text with propriety; to give a full and perſpicuous account of the nature of that virtue or duty which forms the ſubject of the Diſcourſe, is properly the didactic

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" liſper, dum ſe uxor (ut fit) comparat, commoratus eſt: de-
" inde profectus eſt, id temporis cùm jam Clodius, ſi quidem
" eo die Romam venturus erat, redire potuiſſet. Obviam fit ei
" Clodius expeditus, in equo, nulla rheda, nullis impedimentis,
" nullis Græcis comitibus, ut ſolebat; ſine uxore, quod nun-
" quam fere. Cum hic inſidiator, qui iter illud ad cædem fa-
" ciendam apparâſſet, cum uxore veheretur in rheda, penula-
" tus, vulgi magno impedimento, ac muliebri et delicato ancil-
" larum puerorumque comitatu. Fit obviam Clodio ante fun-
" dum ejus, hora fere undecima, aut non multo ſecus. Sta-
" tim complures cum telis in hunc faciunt de loco ſuperiore im-
" petum: adverſi rhedarium occidunt; cùm autem hic de rheda,
" rejecta penula deſiluiſſet, ſeque acri animo defenderet, illi
" qui erant cum Clodio, gladiis eductis, partim recurrere ad
" rhedam, ut a tergo Milonem adorirentur; partim, quod hunc
" jam interfectum putarent, cædere incipiunt ejus ſervos qui poſt
" erant; ex quibus qui animo fideli in dominum et præſenti fu-
" erunt, partim occiſi ſunt; partim cum ad rhedam pugnare
" viderunt, et domino ſuccurrere prohiberentur, Milonemque
" occiſum etiam ex ipſo Clodio audirent, et ita eſſe putarent,
" fecerunt id ſervi Milonis (dicam enim non derivandi criminis
" cauſâ, ſed ut factum eſt) neque imperante, neque ſcien-
" neque præſente domino, quod ſuos quiſque ſervos in tali re
" facere voluiſſet."

part

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part of Preaching; on the right execution of which much depends for all that comes afterward in the way of perſuaſion. The great art in ſucceeding in it, is, to meditate profoundly on the ſubject, ſo as to be able to place it in a clear and ſtrong point of view. Conſider what light other paſſages of Scripture throw upon it; conſider whether it be a ſubject nearly related to ſome other from which it is proper to diſtinguiſh it; conſider whether it can be illuſtrated to advantage by comparing it with, or oppoſing it to, ſome other thing; by enquiring into cauſes, or tracing effects; by pointing out examples, or appealing to the feelings of the hearers; that thus, a definite, preciſe, circumſtantial view may be afforded of the doctrine to be inculcated. Let the Preacher be perſuaded, that by ſuch diſtinct and apt illuſtrations of the known truths of religion, it may both diſplay great merit in the way of Compoſition, and, what he ought to conſider as far more valuable, render his Diſcourſes weighty, inſtructive, and uſeful.

LECTURE XXXII.

CONDUCT OF A DISCOURSE—THE ARGUMENTATIVE PART—THE PATHETIC PART—THE PERORATION.

IN treating of the conſtituent parts of a regular Diſcourſe or Oration, I have already conſidered the Introduction, the Diviſion, and the Narration or Explication. I proceed next to treat of the argumentative or reaſoning Part of a Diſcourſe. In whatever place, or on whatever ſubject one ſpeaks, this, beyond doubt, is of the greateſt conſequence. For the great end for which men ſpeak on any ſerious occaſion, is to convince their hearers of ſomething being either true, or right, or good: and, by means of this conviction, to influence their practice. Reaſon and Argument make the foundation, as I have often inculcated, of all manly and perſuaſive Eloquence.

Now, with reſpect to Arguments, three things are requiſite. Firſt, the invention of them; ſecondly, the proper diſpoſition and arrangement of them;

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them; and thirdly, the expreſſing of them in ſuch a ſtyle and manner, as to give them their full force.

THE firſt of theſe, Invention, is, without doubt, the moſt material, and the ground-work of the reſt. But, with reſpect to this, I am afraid it is beyond the power of art to give any real aſſiſtance. Art cannot go ſo far, as to ſupply a Speaker with arguments on every cauſe, and every ſubject; though it may be of conſiderable uſe in aſſiſting him to arrange, and expreſs thoſe, which his knowledge of the ſubject has diſcovered. For it is one thing to diſcover the reaſons that are moſt proper to convince men, and another, to manage theſe reaſons with the moſt advantage. The latter is all that Rhetoric can pretend to.

THE antient Rhetoricians did indeed attempt to go much farther than this. They attempted to form Rhetoric into a more complete ſyſtem; and profeſſed not only to aſſiſt Public Speakers in ſetting off their arguments to moſt advantage; but to ſupply the defect of their invention, and to teach them where to find arguments on every ſubject and cauſe. Hence their doctrine of Topics, or "Loci "Communes," and "Sedes Argumentorum," which makes ſo great a figure in the writings of Ariſtotle, Cicero, and Quinctilian. Theſe Topics, or Loci, were no other than general ideas applicable to a great many different ſubjects, which the Orator was directed to conſult, in order to find out materials

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materials for his Speech. They had their intrinſic and extrinſic Loci; ſome Loci, that were common to all the different kinds of public Speaking, and ſome that were peculiar to each. The common or general Loci, were ſuch as Genus and Species, Cauſe and Effect, Antecedents and Conſequents, Likeneſs and Contrariety, Definition, Circumſtances of Time and Place; and a great many more of the ſame kinds. For each of the different kinds of Public Speaking, they had their "Loci Perſonarum," and "Loci Rerum:" As in Demonſtrative Orations, for inſtance, the heads from which any one could be decried or praiſed; his birth, his country, his education, his kindred, the qualities of his body, the qualities of his mind, the fortune he enjoyed, the ſtations he had filled, &c. and in Deliberative Orations, the Topics that might be uſed in recommending any public meaſure, or diſſuading from it; ſuch as, honeſty, juſtice, facility, profit, pleaſure, glory, aſſiſtance from friends, mortification to enemies, and the like.

The Grecian Sophiſts were the firſt inventors of this artificial ſyſtem of Oratory; and they ſhowed a prodigious ſubtility, and fertility in the contrivance of theſe Loci. Succeeding Rhetoricians, dazzled by the plan, wrought them up into ſo regular a ſyſtem, that one would think they meant to teach how a perſon might mechanically become an Orator, without any genius at all. They gave him receipts for making Speeches, on all manner

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of ſubjects. At the ſame time, it is evident, that though this ſtudy of common places might produce very ſhowy academical declamations, it could never produce uſeful diſcourſes on real buſineſs. The Loci indeed ſupplied a moſt exuberant fecundity of matter. One who had no other aim, but to talk copiouſly and plauſibly, by conſulting them on every ſubject, and laying hold of all that they ſuggeſted, might diſcourſe without end; and that too, though he had none but the moſt ſuperficial knowledge of his ſubject. But ſuch Diſcourſe could be no other than trivial. What is truly ſolid and perſuaſive, muſt be drawn "ex viſceribus cauſæ," from a thorough knowledge of the ſubject, and profound meditation on it. They who would direct ſtudents of Oratory to any other ſources of Argumentation, only delude them; and by attempting to render Rhetoric too perfect an art, they render it, in truth, a trifling and childiſh ſtudy.

On this doctrine, therefore, of the Rhetorical Loci, or Topics, I think it ſuperfluous to inſiſt. If any think that the knowledge of them may contribute to improve their invention, and extend their views, they may conſult Ariſtotle and Quinctilian, or what Cicero has written on this head, in his Treatiſe *De Inventione*, his *Topica*, and Second Book *De Oratore*. But when they are to prepare a Diſcourſe, by which they propoſe to convince a Judge, or to produce any conſiderable effect upon an Aſſembly, I would adviſe them to lay

lay aſide their common places, and to think cloſely of their ſubject. Demoſthenes, I dare ſay, conſulted none of the Loci, when he was inciting the Athenians to take arms againſt Philip; and where Cicero has had recourſe to them, his Orations are ſo much the worſe on that account.

I PROCEED to what is of more real uſe, to point out the aſſiſtance that can be given, not with reſpect to the invention, but with reſpect to the diſpoſition and conduct of Arguments.

Two different methods may be uſed by Orators in the conduct of their reaſoning; the terms of art for which are, the Analytic, and the Synthetic method. The Analytic is, when the Orator conceals his intention concerning the point he is to prove, till he has gradually brought his hearers to the deſigned concluſion. They are led on, ſtep by ſtep, from one known truth to another, till the concluſion be ſtolen upon them, as the natural conſequence of a chain of propoſitions. As, for inſtance, when one intending to prove the being of a God, ſets out with obſerving that every thing which we ſee in the world has had a beginning, that whatever has had a beginning, muſt have had a prior cauſe; that in human productions, art ſhown in the effect, neceſſarily infers deſign in the cauſe; and proceeds leading you on from one cauſe to another, till you arrive at one ſupreme firſt cauſe, from whom is derived all the order

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and design visible in his works. This is much the same with the Socratic method, by which that philosopher silenced the Sophists of his age. It is a very artful method of reasoning; may be carried on with much beauty, and is proper to be used when the hearers are much prejudiced against any truth, and by imperceptible steps must be led to conviction.

But there are few subjects that will admit this method, and not many occasions on which it is proper to be employed. The mode of reasoning more generally used, and most suited to the train of Popular Speaking, is what is called the Synthetic; when the point to be proved is fairly laid down, and one Argument after another is made to bear upon it, till the hearers be fully convinced.

Now, in all arguing, one of the first things to be attended to is, among the various Arguments which may occur upon a cause, to make a proper selection of such as appear to one's self the most solid; and to employ these as the chief means of persuasion. Every Speaker should place himself in the situation of a hearer, and think how he would be affected by those reasons, which he purposes to employ for persuading others. For he must not expect to impose on mankind by mere arts of Speech. They are not so easily imposed on, as Public Speakers are sometimes apt to think. Shrewd-

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Shrewdneſs and ſagacity are found among all ranks; and the Speaker may be praiſed for his fine Diſcourſe, while yet the hearers are not perſuaded of the truth of any one thing he has uttered.

Supposing the Arguments properly choſen, it is evident that their effect will, in ſome meaſure, depend on the right arrangement of them; ſo as they ſhall not juſtle and embarraſs one another, but give mutual aid; and bear with the faireſt and fulleſt direction on the point in view. Concerning this, the following rules may be taken:

In the firſt place, avoid blending Arguments confuſedly together, that are of a ſeparate nature. All Arguments whatever are directed to prove one or other of theſe three things; that ſomething is true; that it is morally right or fit; or that it is profitable and good. Theſe make the three great ſubjects of diſcuſſion among mankind; Truth, Duty, and Intereſt. But the Arguments directed towards any one of them are generically diſtinct; and he who blends them all under one Topic, which he calls his argument, as, in Sermons eſpecially, is too often done, will render his reaſoning indiſtinct and inelegant. Suppoſe, for inſtance, that I am recommending to an Audience Benevolence, or the Love of our Neighbour; and that I take my firſt Argument, from the inward ſatisfaction which a benevolent temper affords; my ſecond,

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from the obligation which the example of Chriſt lays upon us to this duty; and my third from its tendency to procure us the good-will of all around us; my Arguments are good, but I have arranged them wrong: for my firſt and third Arguments are taken from conſiderations of intereſt, internal peace, and external advantages; and between theſe, I have introduced one, which reſts wholly upon duty. I ſhould have kept thoſe claſſes of Arguments, which are addreſſed to different principles in human nature, ſeparate and diſtinct.

In the ſecond place, With regard to the different degrees of ſtrength in Arguments, the general rule is, to advance in the way of climax, "ut augea-"tur ſemper, et increſcat oratio." This eſpecially is to be the courſe, when the Speaker has a clear cauſe, and is confident that he can prove it fully. He may then adventure to begin with feebler Arguments; riſing gradually, and not putting forth his whole ſtrength till the laſt, when he can truſt to his making a ſucceſsful impreſſion on the minds of hearers, prepared by what has gone before. But this rule is not to be always followed. For, if he diſtruſts his cauſe, and has but one material Argument on which to lay the ſtreſs, putting leſs confidence in the reſt, in this caſe it is often proper for him to place this material Argument in the front; to pre-occupy the hearers early, and make the ſtrongeſt effort at firſt; that, having removed prejudices, and diſpoſed them to be favourable, the reſt

reſt of his reaſoning may be liſtened to with more candour. When it happens, that amidſt a variety of Arguments, there are one or two which we are ſenſible are more inconcluſive than the reſt, and yet proper to be uſed, Cicero adviſes to place theſe in the middle, as a ſtation leſs conſpicuous than either the beginning, or the end, of the train of reaſoning.

In the third place, When our Arguments are ſtrong and ſatisfactory, the more they are diſtinguiſhed and treated apart from each other, the better. Each can then bear to be brought out by itſelf, placed in its full light, amplified and reſted upon. But when our Arguments are doubtful, and only of the preſumptive kind, it is ſafer to throw them together in a crowd, and to run them into one another: "ut quæ ſunt natura imbe-"cilla," as Quinctilian ſpeaks, "mutuo auxilio "ſuſtineantur;" that though infirm of themſelves, they may ſerve mutually to prop each other. He gives a good example, in the caſe of one who was accuſed of murdering a relation, to whom he was heir. Direct proof was wanting; but, "you ex-"pected a ſucceſſion, and a great ſucceſſion; you "were in diſtreſt circumſtances; you were puſhed "to the utmoſt by your creditors; you had of-"fended your relation, who had made you his "heir; you knew that he was juſt then intending "to alter his will; no time was to be loſt. Each "of theſe particulars, by itſelf," ſays the Author, "is

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" is inconcluſive; but when they were aſſembled " in one groupe, they have effect."

Of the diſtinct amplification of one perſuaſive Argument, we have a moſt beautiful example, in Cicero's Oration for Milo. The Argument is taken from a circumſtance of time. Milo was candidate for the Conſulſhip; and Clodius was killed a few days before the election. He aſks, if any one could believe that Milo would be mad enough, at ſuch a critical time, by a moſt odious aſſaſſination, to alienate from himſelf, the favour of people, whoſe ſuffrages he was ſo anxiouſly courting? This Argument, the moment it is ſuggeſted, appears to have conſiderable weight. But it was not enough, ſimply to ſuggeſt it; it could bear to be dwelt upon, and brought out into full light. The Orator, therefore, draws a juſt and ſtriking picture of that ſolicitous attention with which candidates, at ſuch a ſeaſon, always found it neceſſary to cultivate the good opinion of the people: " Quo " tempore," ſays he, " (Scio enim quam timida " ſit ambitio, quantaque et quam ſollicita, cupi- " ditas conſolatûs) omnia, non modo quæ repre- " hendi palam, ſed etiam quæ obſcure cogitari " poſſunt, timemus. Rumorem, fabulam fictam " et falſam, perhorreſcimus; ora omnium atque " oculos intuemur. Nihil enim eſt tam tenerum, " tam aut fragile aut flexibile, quam voluntas ergo " nos ſenſuque civium, qui non modo improbitati " iraſcuntur candidatorum, ſed etiam in recte factis

" ſæpe

" ſæpe faſtidiunt." From all which he moſt juſtly concludes, " Hunc diem igitur Campi, " ſperatum atque exoptatum, ſibi proponens " Milo, cruentis manibus, ſcelus atque facinus " præ ſe ferens, ad illa centuriarum auſpicia ve- " niebat? Quam hoc in illo minimum credi- " bile*!" But though ſuch amplification as this be extremely beautiful, I muſt add a caution, LECT. XXXII.

In the fourth place, againſt extending Arguments too far, and multiplying them too much. This ſerves rather to render a cauſe ſuſpected, than to give it weight. An unneceſſary multiplicity of Arguments, both burdens the memory, and detracts from the weight of that conviction, which a few

* " Well do I know to what length the timidity goes of ſuch " as are candidates for public offices, and how many anxious " cares and attentions, a canvaſs for the Conſulſhip neceſſarily " carries along with it. On ſuch an occaſion, we are afraid " not only of what we may openly be reproached with, but of " what others may think of us in ſecret. The ſlighteſt rumour, " the moſt improbable tale that can be deviſed to our prejudice, " alarms and diſconcerts us. We ſtudy the countenance, and " the looks, of all around us. For nothing is ſo delicate, ſo " frail and uncertain, as the public favour. Our fellow-citizens " not only are juſtly offended with the vices of candidates, but " even, on occaſion of meritorious actions, are apt to conceive " capricious diſguſts. Is there then the leaſt credibility that " Milo, after having ſo long fixed his attention on the important " and wiſhed-for day of election, would dare to have any thoughts " of preſenting himſelf before the auguſt Aſſembly of the Peo- " ple, as a murderer and aſſaſſin, with his hands embrued in " blood?"

well-

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well-chosen Arguments carry. It is to be observed too, that in the Amplification of Arguments, a diffuse and spreading method, beyond the bounds of reasonable illustration, is always enfeebling. It takes off greatly from that "vis et acumen," which should be the distinguishing character of the Argumentative Part of a Discourse. When a Speaker dwells long on a favourite Argument, and seeks to turn it into every possible light, it almost always happens, that, fatigued with the effort, he loses the spirit with which he set out; and concludes with feebleness what he began with force. There is a proper temperance in reasoning, as there is in other parts of a Discourse.

After due attention given to the proper arrangement of Arguments, what is next requisite for their success, is to express them in such a Style, and to deliver them in such a manner, as shall give them full force. On these heads I must refer the Reader to the directions I have given in treating of Style, in former Lectures; and to the directions I am afterwards to give concerning Pronunciation and Delivery.

I proceed, therefore, next, to another essential part of Discourse which I mentioned as the fifth in order, that is, the Pathetic; in which, if any where, Eloquence reigns, and exerts its power. I shall not, in beginning this head, take up time in combating the scruples of those who have moved a question,

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queſtion, whether it be conſiſtent with fairneſs and candour in a Public Speaker, to addreſs the paſſions of his Audience? This is a queſtion about words alone, and which common ſenſe eaſily determines. In enquiries after mere truth, in matters of ſimple information and inſtruction, there is no queſtion that the paſſions have no concern, and that all attempts to move them are abſurd. Wherever conviction is the object, it is the underſtanding alone that is to be applied to. It is by argument and reaſoning, that one man attempts to ſatisfy another of what is true, or right, or juſt; but if perſuaſion be the object, the caſe is changed. In all that relates to practice, there is no man who ſeriouſly means to perſuade another, but addreſſes himſelf to his paſſions more or leſs; for this plain reaſon, that paſſions are the great ſprings of human action. The moſt virtuous man, in treating of the moſt virtuous ſubject, ſeeks to touch the heart of him to whom he ſpeaks; and makes no ſcruple to raiſe his indignation at injuſtice, or his pity to the diſtreſſed, though pity and indignation be paſſions.

In treating of this part of Eloquence, the antients made the ſame ſort of attempt as they employed with reſpect to the argumentative part, in order to bring Rhetoric into a more perfect ſyſtem. They enquired metaphyſically into the nature of every paſſion; they gave a definition and deſcription of it; they treated of its cauſes, its

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effects, and its concomitants; and thence deduced rules for working upon it. Ariſtotle in particular has, in his Treatiſe upon Rhetoric, diſcuſſed the nature of the paſſions with much profoundneſs and ſubtilty; and what he has written on that head, may be read with no ſmall profit, as a valuable piece of Moral Philoſophy; but whether it will have any effect in rendering an Orator more pathetic, is to me doubtful. It is not, I am afraid, any philoſophical knowledge of the paſſions, that can confer this talent. We muſt be indebted for it to Nature, to a certain ſtrong and happy ſenſibility of mind; and one may be a moſt thorough adept in all the ſpeculative knowledge that can be acquired concerning the paſſions, and remain at the ſame time a cold and dry Speaker. The uſe of rules and inſtructions on this or any other part of Oratory, is not to ſupply the want of genius, but to direct it where it is found, into its proper channel; to aſſiſt it in exerting itſelf with moſt advantage, and to prevent the errors and extravagancies into which it is ſometimes apt to run. On the head of the Pathetic, the following directions appear to me to be uſeful.

The firſt is to conſider carefully, whether the ſubject admit the Pathetic, and render it proper; and if it does, what part of the Diſcourſe is the moſt proper for attempting it. To determine theſe points belongs to good ſenſe; for it is evident, that there are many ſubjects which admit not

not the Pathetic at all, and that even in thoſe that are ſuſceptible of it, an attempt to excite the paſſions in the wrong place, may expoſe an Orator to ridicule. All that can be ſaid in general is, that if we expect any emotion which we raiſe to have a laſting effect, we muſt be careful to bring over to our ſide, in the firſt place, the underſtanding and judgment. The hearers muſt be convinced that there are good and ſufficient grounds, for their entering with warmth into the cauſe. They muſt be able to juſtify to themſelves the paſſion which they feel; and remain ſatisfied that they are not carried away by mere deluſion. Unleſs their minds be brought into this ſtate, although they may have been heated by the Orator's diſcourſe, yet as ſoon as he ceaſes to ſpeak, they will reſume their ordinary tone of thought; and the emotion which he has raiſed will die entirely away. Hence moſt writers aſſign the Pathetic to the Peroration or Concluſion, as its natural place; and, no doubt, all other things being equal, this is the impreſſion that one would chuſe to make laſt, leaving the minds of the hearers warmed with the ſubject, after argument and reaſoning had produced their full effect: but wherever it is introduced, I muſt adviſe,

In the ſecond place, never to ſet apart a head of a diſcourſe in form, for raiſing any paſſion; never give warning that you are about to be pathetic; and call upon your hearers, as is ſometimes done, to follow you in the attempt. This almoſt never

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fails to prove a refrigerant to paſſion. It puts the hearers immediately on their guard, and diſpoſes them for criticiſing, much more than for being moved. The indirect method of making an impreſſion is likely to be more ſucceſsful; when you ſeize the critical moment that is favourable to emotion, in whatever part of the diſcourſe it occurs; and then, after due preparation, throw in ſuch circumſtances, and preſent ſuch glowing images, as may kindle their paſſions before they are aware. This can often be done more happily, in a few ſentences inſpired by natural warmth, than in a long and ſtudied Addreſs.

In the third place, It is neceſſary to obſerve, that there is a great difference between ſhowing the hearers that they ought to be moved, and actually moving them. This diſtinction is not ſufficiently attended to, eſpecially by Preachers, who, if they have a head in their Sermon to ſhew how much we are bound to be grateful to God, or to be compaſſionate to the diſtreſt, are apt to imagine this to be a pathetic part. Now, all the Arguments you produce to ſhow me, why it is my duty, why it is reaſonable and fit, that I ſhould be moved in a certain way, go no further than to diſpoſe or prepare me for entering into ſuch an emotion; but they do not actually excite it. To every emotion or paſſion, Nature has adapted a ſet of correſponding objects; and, without ſetting theſe before the mind, it is not in the power of any Orator

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Orator to raiſe that emotion. I am warmed with gratitude, I am touched with compaſſion, not when a Speaker ſhows me that theſe are noble diſpoſitions, and that it is my duty to feel them; or when he exclaims againſt me for my indifference and coldneſs. All this time, he is ſpeaking only to my reaſon or conſcience. He muſt deſcribe the kindneſs and tenderneſs of my friend; he muſt ſet before me the diſtreſs ſuffered by the perſon for whom he would intereſt me; then, and not till then, my heart begins to be touched, my gratitude or my compaſſion begins to flow. The foundation, therefore, of all ſucceſsful execution in the way of Pathetic Oratory is, to paint the object of that paſſion which we wiſh to raiſe, in the moſt natural and ſtriking manner; to deſcribe it with ſuch circumſtances as are likely to awaken it in the minds of others. Every paſſion is moſt ſtrongly excited by ſenſation; as anger by the feeling of an injury, or the preſence of the injurer. Next to the influence of Senſe, is that of Memory; and next to Memory, is the influence of the Imagination. Of this power, therefore, the Orator muſt avail himſelf, ſo as to ſtrike the imagination of the hearers with circumſtances which, in luſtre and ſteadineſs, reſemble thoſe of Senſation and Remembrance. In order to accompliſh this,

In the fourth place, the only effectual method is, to be moved yourſelves. There are a thouſand intereſting circumſtances ſuggeſted by real paſſion,

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which no art can imitate, and no refinement can ſupply. There is obviouſly a contagion among the paſſions.

> Ut ridentibus arrident, ſic flentibus adflent,
> Humani vultus.

The internal emotion of the Speaker adds a pathos to his words, his looks, his geſtures, and his whole manner, which exerts a power almoſt irreſiſtible over thoſe who hear him*. But on this point, though the moſt material of all, I ſhall not now inſiſt, as I have often had occaſion before to ſhow, that all attempts towards becoming Pathetic, when we are not moved ourſelves, expoſe us to certain ridicule.

QUINCTILIAN, who diſcourſes upon this ſubject with much good ſenſe, takes pains to inform us of the method which he uſed, when he was a Public Speaker, for entering into thoſe paſſions which he wanted to excite in others; ſetting before his own imagination what he calls "Phantaſiæ," or "Viſiones," ſtrong pictures of the diſtreſs or indignities

* "Quid enim aliud eſt cauſæ ut lugentes, in recenti dolore, "diſertiſſime quædam exclamare videantur; et ira nonunquam in "indoctis quoque eloquentiam faciat; quàm quod illis ineſt vis "mentis, et veritas ipſa Morum? quare in iis quæ veriſimilia "eſſe volumus, ſimus ipſi ſimiles eorum qui vere patiuntur, af-"fectibus; et a tali animo proficiſcatur oratio qualem facere "judicem volet. Afficiamur antequam afficere conemur."
QUINCT. Lib. 6.

which

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which they had ſuffered, whoſe cauſe he was to plead, and for whom he was to intereſt his hearers; dwelling upon theſe, and putting himſelf in their ſituation, till he was affected by a paſſion, ſimilar to that which the perſons themſelves had felt*. To this method he attributes all the ſucceſs he ever had in Public Speaking; and there can be no doubt, that whatever tends to increaſe an Orator's ſenſibility, will add greatly to his Pathetic Powers.

In the fifth place, It is neceſſary to attend to the proper language of the paſſions. We ſhould obſerve in what manner any one expreſſes himſelf who is under the power of a real and a ſtrong paſſion; and we ſhall always find his language unaffected and ſimple. It may be animated, indeed, with bold and ſtrong figures, but it will have no ornament or finery. He is not at leiſure to follow out the play of imagination. His mind being wholly ſeized by one object, which has heated it,

* "Ut hominem occiſum querar; non omnia quæ in re preſenti accidiſſe credibile eſt, in oculis habebo? Non percuſſor ille ſubitus erumpet? non expaveſcet circumventus? exclamabit, vel rogabit, vel fugiet? non ferientem, non concidentem videbo? non animo ſanguis, et pallor, et gemitus, extremus denique expirantis hiatus, inſidet?—Ubi vero miſeratione opus erit, nobis ea de quibus querimur accidiſſe credamus, atque id animo noſtro perſuadeamus. Nos illi ſimus, quos gravia, indignia, triſtia, paſſos queramur. Nec agamus rem quaſi alienam; ſed aſſumamus parumper illum dolorem. Ita dicemus, quæ in ſimili noſtro caſu dicturi eſſemus." Lib. 6.

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he has no other aim, but to repreſent that, in all its circumſtances, as ſtrongly as he feels it. This muſt be the Style of the Orator, when he would be Pathetic; and this will be his Style, if he ſpeaks from real feeling; bold, ardent, ſimple. No ſort of deſcription will then ſucceed, but what is written "fervente calamo." If he ſtay till he can work up his Style, and poliſh and adorn it, he will infallibly cool his own ardour; and then he will touch the heart no more. His compoſition will become frigid; it will be the language of one who deſcribes, but who does not feel. We muſt take notice, that there is a great difference between painting to the imagination, and painting to the heart. The one may be done coolly and at leiſure: the other muſt always be rapid and ardent. In the former, art and labour may be ſuffered to appear; in the latter, no effect can follow, unleſs it ſeem to be the work of nature only.

In the ſixth place, Avoid interweaving any thing of a foreign nature with the pathetic part of a Diſcourſe. Beware of all digreſſions, which may interrupt or turn aſide the natural courſe of the paſſion, when once it begins to riſe and ſwell. Sacrifice all beauties, however bright and ſhowy, which would divert the mind from the principal object, and which would amuſe the imagination, rather than touch the heart. Hence compariſons are always dangerous, and generally quite improper, in the midſt of paſſion. Beware even of rea-

ſoning unſeaſonably; or, at leaſt, of carrying on a long and ſubtile train of reaſoning, on occaſions when the principal aim is to excite warm emotions.

In the laſt place, Never attempt prolonging the Pathetic too much. Warm emotions are too violent to be laſting *. Study the proper time of making a retreat; of making a tranſition from the paſſionate to the calm tone; in ſuch a manner, however, as to deſcend without falling, by keeping up the ſame ſtrain of Sentiment that was carried on before, though now expreſſing it with more moderation. Above all things, beware of ſtraining paſſion too far; of attempting to raiſe it to unnatural heights. Preſerve always a due regard to what the hearers will bear; and remember, that he who ſtops not at the proper point; who attempts to carry them farther, in paſſion, than they will follow him, deſtroys his whole deſign. By endeavouring to warm them too much, he takes the moſt effectual method of freezing them completely.

Having given theſe rules concerning the Pathetic, I ſhall give one example from Cicero,

* "Nunquam debet eſſe longa miſeratio; nam cùm veros "dolores mitiget tempus, citius evaneſcat, neceſſe eſt illa, quam "dicendo effinximus, imago: in qua, ſi moramur, lacrymis "fatigatur auditor, et requieſcit, et ab illo quem ceperat im- "petu, in rationem redit. Non patiamur igitur frigeſcere hoc "opus; et affectum, cum ad ſummum perduxerimus, relinqua- "mus; nec ſperemus fore, ut aliena mala quiſquam diu ploret." Quinct. Lib. 6.

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which will ſerve to illuſtrate ſeveral of them, particularly the laſt. It ſhall be taken from his laſt Oration againſt Verres, wherein he deſcribes the cruelty exerciſed by Verres, when Govenor of Sicily, againſt one Gavius, a Roman citizen. This Gavius had made his eſcape from priſon, into which he had been thrown by the Governor; and when juſt embarking at Meſſina, thinking himſelf now ſafe, had uttered ſome threats, that when he had once arrived at Rome, Verres ſhould hear of him, and be brought to account for having put a Roman citizen in chains. The Chief Magiſtrate of Meſſina, a creature of Verres's, inſtantly apprehends him, and gives information of his threatenings. The behaviour of Verres on this occaſion, is deſcribed in the moſt pictureſque manner, and with all the colours which were proper, in order to excite againſt him the public indignation. He thanks the magiſtrate of Meſſina for his diligence. Filled with rage, he comes into the Forum; orders Gavius to be brought forth, the executioners to attend, and againſt the laws, and contrary to the well-known privileges of a Roman citizen, commands him to be ſtripped naked, bound, and ſcourged publicly in a cruel manner. Cicero then proceeds thus; "Cædebatur virgis, in medio foro "Meſſanæ, civis Romanus, Judices!" every word riſes above another in deſcribing this flagrant enormity; and, "Judices," is brought out at the end with the greateſt propriety; "Cædebatur virgis, in medio foro Meſſanæ, civis Romanus, "Judices!

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" Judices! cum interea, nullus gemitus, nulla " vox alia iſtius miſeri, inter dolorem crepitumque " plagarum audiebatur, niſi hæc, Civis Romanus " ſum. Hâc ſe commemoratione civitatis, omnia " verbera depulſurum a corpore arbitrabatur. Is " non modo hoc non perfecit, ut virgarum vim de- " precaretur, ſed cum imploraret ſæpius uſurpa- " retque nomen civis, crux, crux inquam, infelici " iſto & ærumnoſo, qui nunquam iſtam poteſta- " tem viderat, comparabatur. O nomen dulce " libertatis! O jus eximium noſtræ civitatis! O " Lex Porcia, legeſque Semproniæ!—Huccine " omnia tandem reciderunt, ut civis Romanus, " in provincia populi Romani, in oppido fœdera- " torum, ab eo qui beneficio populi Romani faſces " et ſecures haberet, deligatus, in foro, virgis cæ- " deretur*!"

NOTHING

* " In the midſt of the market-place of Meſſina, a Roman " Citizen, O Judges! was cruelly ſcourged with rods; when " in the mean time, amidſt the noiſe of the blows which he ſuf- " fered, no voice, no complaint of this unhappy man was heard, " except this exclamation, Remember that I am a Roman ci- " tizen! By pleading this privilege of his birthright, he hoped " to have ſtopped the ſtrokes of the executioner. But his hopes " were vain; for, ſo far was he from being able to obtain " thereby any mitigation of his torture, that when he continued " to repeat this exclamation, and to plead the rights of a citizen, " a croſs, a croſs, I ſay, was preparing to be ſet up for the " execution of this unfortunate perſon, who never before " had beheld that inſtrument of cruel death. O ſacred and " honoured name of Liberty! O boaſted and revered privilege " of a Roman Citizen! O ye Porcian and Sempronian Laws!

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NOTHING can be finer, nor better conducted than this paſſage. The circumſtances are well choſen for exciting both the compaſſion of his hearers for Gavius, and their indignation againſt Verres. The Style is ſimple; and the paſſionate Exclamation, the Addreſs to Liberty and the Laws, is well-timed, and in the proper ſtyle of Paſſion. The Orator goes on to exaggerate Verres's cruelty ſtill farther, by another very ſtriking circumſtance. He ordered a gibbet to be erected for Gavius, not in the common place of execution, but juſt by the ſea-ſhore, over againſt the coaſt of Italy. "Let him," ſaid he, "who boaſts ſo much "of his being a Roman citizen, take a view from "his gibbet of his own country.—This baſe in- "ſult over a dying man is the leaſt part of his "guilt. It was not Gavius alone that Verres "meant to inſult; but it was you, O Romans! "it was every citizen who now hears me; in the "perſon of Gavius, he ſcoffed at your rights, and "ſhowed in what contempt he held the Roman "name, and Roman liberties."

HITHERTO all is beautiful, animated, pathetic; and the model would have been perfect, if Cicero had ſtopped at this point. But his redundant and

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"to this iſſue have ye all come, that a Citizen of Rome, in a "province of the Roman Empire, within an allied city, ſhould "publicly, in a market-place, be loaded with chains, and "beaten with rods, at the command of one who, from the fa- "vour of the Roman people alone, derived all his authority "and enſigns of power!"

florid

florid genius carried him farther. He muſt needs intereſt not his hearers only, but the beaſts, the mountains, and the ſtones, againſt Verres: "Si "hæc non ad cives Romanos, non ad amicos noſ- "træ civitatis, non ad eos qui populi Romani no- "men audiſſent; denique ſi non ad homines, "verum ad beſtias; atque ut longius progrediar, "ſi in aliqua deſertiſſima ſolitudine, ad ſaxa et ad "ſcopulos, hæc conqueri et deplorare vellem, "tamen omnia muta atque inanima, tantâ et tam "indignâ rerum atrocitate commoverentur*." This, with all the deference due to ſo eloqueut an Orator, we muſt pronounce to be Declamatory, not Pathetic. This is ſtraining the language of Paſſion too far. Every hearer ſees this immediately to be a ſtudied figure of Rhetoric; it may amuſe him, but inſtead of inflaming him more, it, in truth, cools his paſſion. So dangerous it is to give ſcope to a flowery imagination, when one intends to make a ſtrong and paſſionate impreſſion. LECT. XXXII.

No other part of Diſcourſe remains now to be treated of, except the Peroration, or Concluſion.

* "Were I employed in lamenting thoſe inſtances of an atro- "cious oppreſſion and cruelty, not among an aſſembly of Ro- "man citizens, not among the allies of our ſtate, nor among "thoſe who had ever heard the name of the Roman people, "not even among human creatures, but in the midſt of the "brute creation; and to go farther, were I pouring forth my "lamentations to the ſtones, and to the rocks, in ſome remote "and deſert wilderneſs, even thoſe mute and inanimate beings "would, at the recital of ſuch ſhocking indignities, be thrown "into commotion."

Concerning

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Concerning this, it is needleſs to ſay much, becauſe it muſt vary ſo conſiderably, according to the ſtrain of the preceding Diſcourſe. Sometimes, the whole pathetic part comes in moſt properly at the Peroration. Sometimes, when the Diſcourſe has been entirely argumentative, it is fit to conclude with ſumming up the arguments, placing them in one view, and leaving the impreſſion of them full and ſtrong on the mind of the audience. For the great rule of a Concluſion, and what nature obviouſly ſuggeſts, is, to place that laſt on which we chooſe that the ſtrength of our cauſe ſhould reſt.

In Sermons, inferences from what has been ſaid, make a common Concluſion. With regard to theſe, care ſhould be taken, not only that they riſe naturally, but (what is leſs commonly attended to) that they ſhould ſo much agree with the ſtrain of ſentiment throughout the Diſcourſe, as not to break the Unity of the Sermon. For inferences, how juſtly ſoever they may be deduced from the doctrine of the text, yet have a bad effect, if, at the Concluſion of a Diſcourſe, they introduce ſome ſubject altogether new, and turn off our attention from the main object to which the Preacher had directed our thoughts. They appear, in this caſe, like excreſcences jutting out from the body, which form an unnatural addition to it; and tend to enfeeble the impreſſion which the Compoſition, as a whole, is calculated to make.

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THE moſt eloquent of the French, perhaps, indeed, of all modern Orators, Boſſuet, Biſhop of Meaux, terminates in a very moving manner, his funeral Oration on the great Prince of Condé, with this return upon himſelf, and his old age: "Accept, O Prince! theſe laſt efforts of a voice "which you once well knew. With you all my "funeral Diſcourſes are now to end. Inſtead of "deploring the death of others, henceforth, it "ſhall be my ſtudy to learn from you, how my "own may be bleſſed. Happy, if warned by "thoſe grey hairs, of the account which I muſt "ſoon give of my miniſtry, I reſerve, ſolely for "that flock whom I ought to feed with the word "of life, the feeble remains of a voice which now "trembles, and of an ardor which is now on the "point of being extinct*."

IN all Diſcourſes, it is a matter of importance to hit the preciſe time of concluding, ſo as to

* "Agréez ces derniers efforts d'une voix que vous fut connue. Vous mettrez fin à tous ces diſcours. Au lieu de déplorer la mort des autres, grand Prince! dorenavant je veux apprendre de vous, à rendre la mienne ſainte. Heureux, ſi averti par ſes cheveux blancs, du compte que je dois rendre de mon adminiſtration, je reſerve au troupeau que je dois nourrir de la parole de vie, les reſtes d'une voix qui tombe, & d'une ardeur qui s'éteint."—Theſe are the laſt ſentences of that Oration: but the whole of the Peroration from that paſſage, "Venez, peuples, venez maintenant," &c. though it is too long for inſertion, is a great maſter-piece of Pathetic Eloquence.

bring

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bring our Diſcourſe juſt to a point; neither ending abruptly and unexpectedly; nor diſappointing the expectation of the hearers, when they look for the cloſe; and continuing to hover round and round the concluſion, till they become heartily tired of us. We ſhould endeavour to go off with a good grace; not to end with a languiſhing and drawling ſentence; but to cloſe with dignity and ſpirit, that we may leave the minds of the hearers warm; and diſmiſs them with a favourable impreſſion of the ſubject and of the ſpeaker.

LECTURE XXXIII.

PRONUNCIATION, OR DELIVERY.

HAVING treated of ſeveral general heads relating to Eloquence, or Public Speaking, I now proceed to another very important part of the ſubject yet remaining, that is, the Pronunciation, or Delivery of a Diſcourſe. How much ſtreſs was laid upon this by the moſt eloquent of all Orators, Demoſthenes, appears from a noted ſaying of his, related both by Cicero and Quinctilian; when being aſked, What was the firſt point in Oratory? he anſwered, Delivery; and being aſked, What was the ſecond; and afterwards, What was the third? he ſtill anſwered, Delivery. There is no wonder that he ſhould have rated this ſo high, and that for improving himſelf in it, he ſhould have employed thoſe aſſiduous and painful labours, which all the antients take ſo much notice of; for, beyond doubt, nothing is of more importance. To ſuperficial thinkers, the management of the voice and geſture, in Public Speaking, may appear to relate to Decoration only, and to be one of the inferior

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inferior arts of catching an audience. But this is far from being the caſe. It is intimately connected with what is, or ought to be, the end of all Public Speaking, perſuaſion; and therefore deſerves the ſtudy of the moſt grave and ſerious Speakers, as much as of thoſe whoſe only aim it is to pleaſe.

For, let it be conſidered, whenever we addreſs ourſelves to other by words, our intention certainly is to make ſome impreſſion on thoſe to whom we ſpeak; it is to convey to them our own ideas and emotions. Now the tone of our voice, our looks, and geſtures, interpret our ideas and emotions no leſs than words do; nay the impreſſion they make on others, is frequently much ſtronger than any that words can make. We often ſee, that an expreſſive look, or a paſſionate cry, unaccompanied by words, conveys to others more forcible ideas, and rouſes within them ſtronger paſſions, than can be communicated by the moſt eloquent Diſcourſe. The ſignification of our ſentiments, made by tones and geſtures, has this advantage above that made by words, that it is the language of nature. It is that method of interpreting our mind which nature has dictated to all, and which is underſtood by all; whereas, words are only arbitrary conventional ſymbols of our ideas; and, by conſequence, muſt make a more feeble impreſſion. So true is this, that, to render words fully ſignificant, they muſt, almoſt in every caſe, receive ſome aid from the manner of Pronunciation and Delivery; and he who,

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who, in ſpeaking, ſhould employ bare words, without enforcing them by proper tones and accents, would leave us with a faint and indiſtinct impreſſion, often with a doubtful and ambiguous conception of what he had delivered. Nay, ſo cloſe is the connection between certain ſentiments and the proper manner of pronouncing them, that he who does not pronounce them after that manner, can never perſuade us, that he believes, or feels, the ſentiments themſelves. His Delivery may be ſuch as to give the lie to all that he aſſerts. When Marcus Callidius accuſed one of an attempt to poiſon him, but enforced his accuſation in a languid manner, and without any warmth or earneſtneſs of Delivery, Cicero, who pleaded for the accuſed perſon, improved this into an argument of the falſity of the charge, "An tu, M. Cal-" lidi, niſi fingeres, ſic ageres?" In Shakeſpeare's Richard II. the Ducheſs of York thus impeaches the ſincerity of her huſband:

Pleads he in earneſt?—Look upon his face,
His eyes do drop no tears; his prayers are jeſt;
His words come from his mouth; ours, from our breaſt;
He prays but faintly, and would be denied;
We pray with heart and ſoul.

But, I believe, it is needleſs to ſay any more in order to ſhow the high importance of a good Delivery. I proceed, therefore, to ſuch obſervations as appear to me moſt uſeful to be made on this head.

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THE great objects which every Public Speaker will naturally have in his eye in forming his Delivery, are, firſt, to ſpeak ſo as to be fully and eaſily underſtood by all who hear him; and next, to ſpeak with grace and force, ſo as to pleaſe and to move his Audience. Let us conſider what is moſt important with reſpect to each of theſe*.

IN order to be fully and eaſily underſtood, the four chief requiſites are, a due degree of Loudneſs of Voice; Diſtinctneſs; Slowneſs; and Propriety of Pronunciation.

THE firſt attention of every Public Speaker, doubtleſs, muſt be, to make himſelf be heard by all thoſe to whom he ſpeaks. He muſt endeavour to fill with his voice, the ſpace occupied by the Aſſembly. This power of voice, it may be thought, is wholly a natural talent. It is ſo in a good meaſure; but, however, may receive conſiderable aſſiſtance from art. Much depends for this purpoſe on the proper pitch, and management of the voice. Every man has three pitches in his voice; the High, the Middle, and the Low one. The High, is that which he uſes in calling aloud to ſome one at a diſtance. The Low is, when he approaches to a whiſper. The Middle is, that

* On this whole ſubject, Mr. Sheridan's Lectures on Elocution are very worthy of being conſulted; and ſeveral hints are here taken from them.

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which he employs in common converſation, and which he ſhould generally uſe in Public Diſcourſe. For it is a great miſtake, to imagine that one muſt take the higheſt pitch of his voice, in order to be well heard by a great Aſſembly. This is confounding two things which are different, Loudneſs, or Strength of Sound, with the key, or note on which we ſpeak. A Speaker may render his voice louder, without altering the key; and we ſhall always be able to give moſt body, moſt perſevering force of ſound, to that pitch of voice, to which in converſation we are accuſtomed. Whereas, by ſetting out on our higheſt pitch or key, we certainly allow ourſelves leſs compaſs, and are likely to ſtrain our voice before we have done. We ſhall fatigue ourſelves, and ſpeak with pain; and whenever a man ſpeaks with pain to himſelf, he is always heard with pain by his Audience. Give the voice, therefore, full ſtrength and ſwell of ſound; but always pitch it on your ordinary ſpeaking key. Make it a conſtant rule never to utter a greater quantity of voice, than you can afford without pain to yourſelves, and without any extraordinary effort. As long as you keep within theſe bounds, the other organs of ſpeech will be at liberty to diſcharge their ſeveral offices with eaſe; and you will always have your voice under command. But whenever you tranſgreſs theſe bounds, you give up the reins, and have no longer any management of it. It is an uſeful rule too, in order to be well heard, to fix our eye on ſome

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of the moſt diſtant perſons in the aſſembly, and to conſider ourſelves as ſpeaking to them. We naturally and mechanically utter our words with ſuch a degree of ſtrength, as to make ourſelves be heard by one to whom we addreſs ourſelves, provided he be within the reach of our voice. As this is the caſe in common converſation, it will hold alſo in Public Speaking. But remember, that in public as well as in converſation, it is poſſible to offend by ſpeaking too loud. This extreme hurts the ear, by making the voice come upon it in rumbling indiſtinct maſſes; beſides its giving the Speaker the diſagreeable appearance of one who endeavours to compel aſſent, by mere vehemence and force of ſound.

In the next place, to being well heard, and clearly underſtood, diſtinctneſs of articulation contributes more, perhaps, than mere loudneſs of ſound. The quantity of ſound neceſſary to fill even a large ſpace, is ſmaller than is commonly imagined; and with diſtinct articulation, a man of a weak voice will make it reach farther than the ſtrongeſt voice can reach without it. To this, therefore, every Public Speaker ought to pay great attention. He muſt give every ſound which he utters its due proportion, and make every ſyllable, and even every letter in the word which he pronounces, be heard diſtinctly; without ſlurring, whiſpering, or ſuppreſſing any of the proper ſounds.

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In the third place, In order to articulate diſtinctly, moderation is requiſite with regard to the ſpeed of pronouncing. Precipitancy of Speech confounds all articulation, and all meaning. I need ſcarcely obſerve that there may be alſo an extreme on the oppoſite ſide. It is obvious, that a lifeleſs, drawling Pronunciation, which allows the minds of the hearers to be always outrunning the Speaker, muſt render every Diſcourſe inſipid and fatiguing. But the extreme of ſpeaking too faſt is much more common, and requires the more to be guarded againſt, becauſe, when it has grown up into a habit, few errors are more difficult to be corrected. To pronounce with a proper degree of ſlowneſs, and with full and clear Articulation, is the firſt thing to be ſtudied by all who begin to ſpeak in public; and cannot be too much recommended to them. Such a Pronunciation gives weight and dignity to their Diſcourſe. It is a great aſſiſtance to the voice, by the pauſes and reſts which it allows it more eaſily to make; and it enables the Speaker to ſwell all his ſounds, both with more force, and more muſic. It aſſiſts him alſo in preſerving a due command of himſelf; whereas a rapid and hurried manner, is apt to excite that flutter of ſpirits, which is the greateſt enemy to all right execution in the way of Oratory. "Promptum ſit os," ſays Quinctilian, "non præceps, "moderatum, non lentum."

After theſe fundamental attentions to the pitch and management of the voice, to diſtinct articu-

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lation, and to a proper degree of ſlowneſs of ſpeech, what a Public Speaker muſt, in the fourth place, ſtudy, is, propriety of Pronunciation; or the giving to every word, which he utters, that ſound, which the moſt polite uſage of the language appropriates to it; in oppoſition to broad, vulgar, or provincial Pronunciation. This is requiſite, both for ſpeaking intelligibly, and for ſpeaking with grace or beauty. Inſtructions concerning this article can be given by the living voice only. But there is one obſervation, which it may not be improper here to make. In the Engliſh language, every word which conſiſts of more ſyllables than one, has one accented ſyllable. The accent reſts ſometimes on the vowel, ſometimes on the conſonant. Seldom, or never, is there more than one accented ſyllable in any Engliſh word, however long; and the genius of the language requires the voice to mark that ſyllable by a ſtronger percuſſion, and to paſs more ſlightly over the reſt. Now, after we have learned the proper ſeats of theſe accents, it is an important rule, to give every word juſt the ſame accent in Public Speaking, as in Common Diſcourſe. Many perſons err in this reſpect. When they ſpeak in public, and with ſolemnity, they pronounce the ſyllables in a different manner from what they do at other times. They dwell upon them, and protract them; they multiply accents on the ſame word; from a miſtaken notion, that it gives gravity and force to their Diſcourſe, and adds to the pomp of Public Declamation. Whereas, this is one of the greateſt faults that can be committed in Pronunciation; it makes what is called

called a theatrical or mouthing manner; and gives an artificial affected air to Speech, which detracts greatly both from its agreeableneſs, and its impreſſion.

I PROCEED to treat next of thoſe higher parts of delivery, by ſtudying which, a Speaker has ſomething farther in view than merely to render himſelf intelligible, and ſeeks to give grace and force to what he utters. Theſe may be compriſed under four heads, Emphaſis, Pauſes, Tones, and Geſtures. Let me only premiſe, in general, to what I am to ſay concerning them, that attention to theſe articles of delivery is by no means to be confined, as ſome might be apt to imagine, to the more elaborate and pathetic parts of a Diſcourſe. There is, perhaps, as great attention requiſite, and as much ſkill diſplayed, in adapting Emphaſes, Pauſes, Tones, and Geſtures, properly, to calm and plain ſpeaking; and the effect of a juſt and graceful delivery will, in every part of a ſubject, be found of high importance for commanding attention, and enforcing what is ſpoken.

FIRST, Let us conſider Emphaſis; by this, is meant a ſtronger and fuller ſound of voice, by which we diſtinguiſh the accented ſyllable of ſome word, on which we deſign to lay particular ſtreſs, and to ſhow how it affects the reſt of the Sentence. Sometimes the emphatic word muſt be diſtinguiſhed by a particular tone of voice, as well as by a ſtronger accent. On the right management of the Em-

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phaſis, depend the whole life and ſpirit of every Diſcourſe. If no Emphaſis be placed on any words, not only is Diſcourſe rendered heavy and lifeleſs, but the meaning left often ambiguous. If the Emphaſis be placed wrong, we pervert and confound the meaning wholly. To give a common inſtance; ſuch a ſimple queſtion as this: "Do you ride to town to-day?" is capable of no fewer than four different acceptations, according as the Emphaſis is differently placed on the words. If it be pronounced thus: Do *you* ride to town to-day? the anſwer may naturally be, No; I ſend my ſervant in my ſtead. If thus; Do you *ride* to town to-day? Anſwer, No; I intend to walk. Do you ride *to town* to-day? No; I ride out into the fields. Do you ride to town *to-day?* No; but I ſhall to-morrow. In like manner, in ſolemn Diſcourſe, the whole force and beauty of an expreſſion often depend on the accented word; and we may preſent to the hearers quite different views of the ſame Sentiment, by placing the Emphaſis differently. In the following words of our Saviour, obſerve in what different lights the thought is placed, according as the words are pronounced. "Judas, betrayeſt thou "the Son of Man with a kiſs?" *betrayeſt* thou—makes the reproach turn, on the infamy of treachery. Betrayeſt *thou*—makes it reſt, upon Judas's connection with his maſter. Betrayeſt thou the *Son of Man*—reſts it, upon our Saviour's perſonal character and eminence. Betrayeſt thou the Son of Man *with a kiſs?*—turns it, upon his proſtituting

ing the ſignal of peace and friendſhip, to the purpoſe of a mark of deſtruction. LECT. XXXIII.

In order to acquire the proper management of the Emphaſis, the great rule, and indeed the only rule poſſible to be given is, that the Speaker ſtudy to attain a juſt conception of the force and ſpirit of thoſe ſentiments which he is to pronounce. For to lay the Emphaſis with exact propriety, is a conſtant exerciſe of good ſenſe and attention. It is far from being an inconſiderable attainment. It is one of the greateſt trials of a true and juſt taſte; and muſt ariſe from feeling delicately ourſelves, and from judging accurately, of what is fitteſt to ſtrike the feelings of others. There is as great a difference between a Chapter of the Bible, or any other piece of plain proſe, read by one who places the ſeveral Emphaſes every where with taſte and judgment, and by one who neglects or miſtakes them, as there is between the ſame tune played by the moſt maſterly hand, or by the moſt bungling performer.

In all prepared Diſcourſes, it would be of great uſe, if they were read over or rehearſed in private, with this particular view, to ſearch for the proper Emphaſis before they were pronounced in public; marking, at the ſame time, with a pen, the emphatical words in every Sentence, or at leaſt in the moſt weighty and affecting parts of the Diſcourſe, and fixing them well in memory. Were this attention

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tention oftener beſtowed, were this part of Pronunciation ſtudied with more exactneſs, and not left to the moment of delivery, as is commonly done, Public Speakers would find their care abundantly repaid, by the remarkable effects which it would produce upon their Audience. Let me caution, at the ſame time, againſt one error, that of multiplying emphatical words too much. It is only by a prudent reſerve in the uſe of them, that we can give them any weight. If they recur too often; if a Speaker attempts to render every thing which he ſays of high importance, by a multitude of ſtrong Emphaſes, we ſoon learn to pay little regard to them. To crowd every Sentence with emphatical words, is like crowding all the pages of a Book with Italic Characters, which, as to the effect, is juſt the ſame with uſing no ſuch diſtinctions at all.

Next to Emphaſis, the Pauſes in Speaking demand attention. Theſe are of two kinds; firſt, Emphatical Pauſes; and next, ſuch as mark the diſtinctions of Senſe. An Emphatical Pauſe is made, after ſomething has been ſaid of peculiar moment, and on which we want to fix the hearer's attention. Sometimes before ſuch a thing is ſaid, we uſher it in with a pauſe of this nature. Such pauſes have the ſame effect as a ſtrong Emphaſis; and are ſubject to the ſame rules; eſpecially to the caution juſt now given, of not repeating them too frequently. For as they excite uncommon attention, and of courſe raiſe expectation, if the importance

ance of the matter be not fully anſwerable to ſuch expectation, they occaſion diſappointment and diſguſt. LECT. XXXIII.

But the moſt frequent and the principal uſe of pauſes, is to mark the diviſions of the ſenſe, and at the ſame time to allow the Speaker to draw his breath; and the proper and graceful adjuſtment of ſuch pauſes, is one of the moſt nice and difficult articles in delivery. In all Public Speaking, the management of the breath requires a good deal of care, ſo as not to be obliged to divide words from one another, which have ſo intimate a connection, that they ought to be pronounced with the ſame breath, and without the leaſt ſeparation. Many a ſentence is miſerably mangled, and the force of the Emphaſis totally loſt, by diviſions being made in the wrong place. To avoid this, every one, while he is ſpeaking, ſhould be very careful to provide a full ſupply of breath for what he is to utter. It is a great miſtake to imagine, that the breath muſt be drawn only at the end of a period, when the voice is allowed to fall. It may eaſily be gathered at the intervals of the period, when the voice is only ſuſpended for a moment; and, by this management, one may have always a ſufficient ſtock for carrying on the longeſt ſentence, without improper interruptions.

If any one, in Public Speaking, ſhall have formed to himſelf a certain melody or tune, which requires

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requires reſt and pauſes of its own, diſtinct from thoſe of the ſenſe, he has, undoubtedly, contracted one of the worſt habits into which a Public Speaker can fall. It is the ſenſe which ſhould always rule the pauſes of the voice; for wherever there is any ſenſible ſuſpenſion of the voice, the hearer is always led to expect ſomewhat correſponding in the meaning. Pauſes, in Public Diſcourſe, muſt be formed upon the manner in which we utter ourſelves in ordinary, ſenſible converſation; and not upon the ſtiff artificial manner which we acquire, from reading books according to the common punctuation. The general run of punctuation is very arbitrary; often capricious and falſe; and dictates an uniformity of tone in the pauſes, which is extremely diſagreeable: for we are to obſerve that to render pauſes graceful and expreſſive, they muſt not only be made in the right place, but alſo be accompanied with a proper tone of voice, by which the nature of theſe pauſes is intimated; much more than by the length of them, which can never be exactly meaſured. Sometimes it is only a ſlight and ſimple ſuſpenſion of voice that is proper; ſometimes a degree of cadence in the voice is required; and ſometimes that peculiar tone and cadence, which denote the ſentence finiſhed. In all theſe caſes, we are to regulate ourſelves, by attending to the manner in which Nature teaches us to ſpeak, when engaged in real and earneſt diſcourſe with others.

When we are reading or reciting verſe, there is a peculiar difficulty in making the pauſes juſtly.

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The difficulty ariſes from the melody of verſe, which dictates to the ear pauſes or reſts of its own; and to adjuſt and compound theſe properly with the pauſes of the ſenſe, ſo as neither to hurt the ear, nor offend the underſtanding, is ſo very nice a matter, that it is no wonder we ſo ſeldom meet with good readers of poetry. There are two kinds of pauſes that belong to the muſic of verſe; one is, the pauſe at the end of the line; and the other, the cæſural pauſe in the middle of it. With regard to the pauſe at the end of the line, which marks that ſtrain or verſe to be finiſhed, rhyme renders this always ſenſible, and in ſome meaſure compels us to obſerve it in our Pronunciation. In blank verſe, where there is a greater liberty permitted of running the lines into one another, ſometimes without any ſuſpenſion in the ſenſe, it has been made a queſtion, Whether in reading ſuch verſe with propriety, any regard at all ſhould be paid to the cloſe of a line? On the Stage, where the appearance of ſpeaking in verſe ſhould always be avoided, there can, I think, be no doubt, that the cloſe of ſuch lines as make no pauſe in the ſenſe, ſhould not be rendered perceptible to the ear. But on other occaſions, this were improper: for what is the uſe of melody, or for what end has the Poet compoſed in verſe, if, in reading his lines, we ſuppreſs his numbers; and degrade them, by our pronunciation, into mere proſe? We ought, therefore, certainly to read blank verſe ſo, as to make every line ſenſible to the ear. At the ſame time,

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time, in doing ſo, every appearance of ſing-ſong and tone, muſt be carefully guarded againſt. The cloſe of the line, where it makes no pauſe in the meaning, ought to be marked, not by ſuch a tone as is uſed in finiſhing a ſentence; but without either letting the voice fall, or elevating it, it ſhould be marked only by ſuch a ſlight ſuſpenſion of ſound, as may diſtinguiſh the paſſage from one line to another without injuring the meaning.

THE other kind of muſical pauſe, is that which falls ſomewhere about the middle of the verſe, and divides it into two hemiſtichs; a pauſe, not ſo great as that which belongs to the cloſe of the line, but ſtill ſenſible to an ordinary ear. This, which is called the cæſural pauſe, in the French heroic verſe falls uniformly in the middle of the line. In the Engliſh, it may fall after the 4th, 5th, 6th, or 7th ſyllables in the line, and no other. Where the verſe is ſo conſtructed, that this cæſural pauſe coincides with the ſlighteſt pauſe or diviſion in the ſenſe, the line can be read eaſily; as in the two firſt verſes of Mr. Popes's Meſſiah:

Ye nymphs of Solyma! begin the ſong;
To heavenly themes, ſublimer ſtrains belong.

But if it ſhall happen that words, which have ſuch a ſtrict and intimate connection as not to bear even a momentary ſeparation, are divided from one another by this cæſural pauſe, we then feel a ſort of

of ſtruggle between the ſenſe and the ſound, which renders it difficult to read ſuch lines gracefully. The rule of proper Pronunciation in ſuch caſes is, to regard only the pauſe which the ſenſe forms; and to read the line accordingly. The neglect of the cæſural pauſe may make the line ſound ſomewhat unharmoniouſly; but the effect would be much worſe, if the ſenſe were ſacrificed to the ſound. For inſtance, in the following line of Milton:

——What in me is dark,
Illumine; what is low, raiſe and ſupport—

The ſenſe clearly dictates the pauſe after "illu-" "mine," at the end of the third ſyllable, which, in reading, ought to be made accordingly; though, if the melody only were to be regarded, "illumine" ſhould be connected with what follows, and the pauſe not made till the 4th or 6th ſyllable. So, in the following line of Mr. Pope's (Epiſtle to Dr. Arbuthnot):

I ſit, with ſad civility I read—

The ear plainly points out the cæſural pauſe as falling after "ſad," the 4th ſyllable. But it would be very bad reading to make any pauſe there, ſo as to ſeparate "ſad" and "civility." The ſenſe admits of no other pauſe than after the ſecond ſyllable "ſit," which therefore muſt be the only pauſe made in the reading.

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I PROCEED to treat next of Tones in Pronunciation, which are different both from emphaſis and pauſes; conſiſting in the modulation of the voice, the notes or variations of ſound which we employ in Public Speaking. How much of the propriety, the force and grace of Diſcourſe, muſt depend on theſe, will appear from this ſingle conſideration; that to almoſt every ſentiment we utter, more eſpecially to every ſtrong emotion, Nature hath adapted ſome peculiar tone of voice; inſomuch, that he who ſhould tell another that he was very angry, or much grieved, in a tone which did not ſuit ſuch emotions, inſtead of being believed, would be laughed at. Sympathy is one of the moſt powerful principles by which Perſuaſive Diſcourſe works its effect. The Speaker endeavours to transfuſe into his hearers his own ſentiments and emotions; which he can never be ſucceſsful in doing, unleſs he utters them in ſuch a manner as to convince the hearers that he feels them*. The proper

* "All that paſſes in the mind of man may be reduced to two "claſſes, which I call Ideas and Emotions. By Ideas, I mean "all thoughts which riſe and paſs in ſucceſſion in the mind. By "Emotions, all exertions of the mind in arranging, combining, "and ſeparating its ideas; as well as all the effects produced "on the mind itſelf by thoſe ideas, from the more violent agi"tation of the paſſions, to the calmer feelings produced by the "operation of the intellect and the fancy. In ſhort, thought is "the object of the one, internal feeling of the other. That "which ſerves to expreſs the former, I call the Language of Ideas;

proper expreſſion of tones, therefore, deſerves to be attentively ſtudied by every one who would be a ſucceſsful Orator.

THE greateſt and moſt material inſtruction which can be given for this purpoſe is, to form the tones of Public Speaking upon the tones of ſenſible and animated converſation. We may obſerve that every man, when he is much in earneſt in common Diſcourſe, when he is engaged in ſpeaking on ſome ſubject which intereſts him nearly, has an eloquent or perſuaſive tone and manner. What is the reaſon of our being often ſo frigid and unperſuaſive in Public Diſcourſe, but our departing from the natural tone of Speaking, and delivering ourſelves in an affected artificial manner? Nothing can be more abſurd than to imagine, that as ſoon as one mounts a Pulpit, or riſes in a Public Aſſembly, he is inſtantly to lay aſide the voice with which he expreſſes himſelf in private; to aſſume a new, ſtudied tone, and a cadence altogether foreign to his natural manner. This has vitiated all delivery; this has given riſe to cant and tedious monotony, in the different kinds of modern Public Speaking, eſpecially in the Pulpit. Men departed

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" Ideas; and the latter, the Language of Emotions. Words are " the ſigns of the one, tones of the other. Without the uſe of " theſe two ſorts of Language, it is impoſſible to commu- " nicate through the ear all that paſſes in the mind of man."

SHERIDAN on the Art of Reading.

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from Nature; and ſought to give a beauty or force, as they imagined, to their Diſcourſe, by ſubſtituting certain ſtudied muſical tones, in the room of the genuine expreſſions of ſentiment, which the voice carries in natural Diſcourſe. Let every Public Speaker guard againſt this error. Whether he ſpeak in a private room, or in a great Aſſembly, let him remember that he ſtill ſpeaks. Follow Nature: conſider how ſhe teaches you to utter any ſentiment or feeling of your heart. Imagine a ſubject of debate ſtarted in converſation among grave and wiſe men, and yourſelf bearing a ſhare in it. Think after what manner, with what tones and inflections of voice, you would on ſuch an occaſion expreſs yourſelf, when you were moſt in earneſt, and ſought moſt to be liſtened to. Carry theſe with you to the Bar, to the Pulpit, or to any Public Aſſembly; let theſe be the foundation of your manner of pronouncing there; and you will take the ſureſt method of rendering your delivery both agreeable and perſuaſive.

I HAVE ſaid, Let theſe converſation tones be the *foundation* of Public Pronunciation; for, on ſome occaſions, ſolemn Public Speaking requires them to be exalted beyond the ſtrain of common Diſcourſe. In a formal ſtudied Oration, the elevation of the ſtyle, and the harmony of the ſentences, prompt, almoſt neceſſarily, a modulation of voice more rounded, and bordering more upon muſic, than converſation admits. This gives riſe to what

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is called the Declaiming manner. But though this mode of Pronunciation runs conſiderably beyond ordinary Diſcourſe, yet ſtill it muſt have, for its baſis, the natural tones of grave and dignified converſation. I muſt obſerve, at the ſame time, that the conſtant indulgence of a declamatory manner is not favourable either to good compoſition, or good delivery; and is in hazard of betraying Public Speakers into that monotony of tone and cadence, which is ſo generally complained of. Whereas, he who forms the general run of his delivery upon a ſpeaking manner, is not likely ever to become diſagreeable through monotony. He will have the ſame natural variety in his tones, which a perſon has in converſation. Indeed, the perfection of delivery requires both theſe different manners, that of ſpeaking with livelineſs and eaſe, and that of declaiming with ſtatelineſs and dignity, to be poſſeſſed by one man; and to be employed by him, according as the different parts of his Diſcourſe require either the one or the other. This is a perfection which is not attained by many; the greateſt part of Public Speakers allowing their delivery to be formed altogether accidentally; according as ſome turn of voice appears to them moſt beautiful, or ſome artificial model has caught their fancy; and acquiring, by this means, a habit of Pronunciation, which they can never vary. But the capital direction, which ought never to be forgotten, is, to copy the proper tones for expreſſing every ſentiment from thoſe which Nature

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dictates to us, in converſation with others; to ſpeak always with her voice; and not to form to ourſelves a fantaſtic public manner, from an abſurd fancy of its being more beautiful than a natural one *.

It now remains to treat of geſture, or what is called action in public Diſcourſe. Some nations animate their words in common converſation, with many more motions of the body than others do. The French and the Italians are, in this reſpect, much more ſprightly than we. But there is no nation, hardly any perſon ſo phlegmatic, as not to accompany their words with ſome actions and geſticulations, on all occaſions, when they are much in earneſt. It is therefore unnatural in a public Speaker, it is inconſiſtent with that earneſtneſs and ſerioufneſs which he ought to ſhow in all affairs of moment, to remain quite unmoved in his outward appearance; and to let the words drop from his mouth, without any expreſſion of meaning, or warmth in his geſture.

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* "Loquere," (ſays an Author of the laſt century, who has written a Treatiſe in Verſe, de Geſtu et Voce Oratoris,)

——"Loquere; hoc vitium commune, loquatur
"Ut nemo; at tensâ declamitet omnia voce.
"Tu loquere, ut mos eſt hominum; boat & latrat ille;
"Ille ululat; rudit hic; (fari ſi talia dignum eſt)
"Non hominem vox ulla ſonat ratione loquentem."

JOANNES LUCAS, de Geſtu et Voce,
Lib. II. Paris, 1675.

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THE fundamental rule as to propriety of action, is undoubtedly the ſame with what I gave as to propriety of tone. Attend to the looks and geſtures, in which earneſtneſs, indignation, compaſſion, or any other emotion, diſcovers itſelf to moſt advantage in the common intercourſe of men; and let theſe be your model. Some of theſe looks and geſtures are common to all men; and there are alſo certain peculiarities of manner which diſtinguiſh every individual. A Public Speaker muſt take that manner which is moſt natural to himſelf. For it is here, juſt as in tones. It is not the buſineſs of a Speaker to form to himſelf a certain ſet of motions and geſtures, which he thinks moſt becoming and agreeable, and to practiſe theſe in public, without their having any correſpondence to the manner which is natural to him in private. His geſtures and motions ought all to carry that kind of expreſſion which nature has dictated to him; and unleſs this be the caſe, it is impoſſible, by means of any ſtudy, to avoid their appearing ſtiff and forced.

HOWEVER, although nature muſt be the groundwork, I admit that there is room in this matter for ſome ſtudy and art. For many perſons are naturally ungraceful in the motions which they make; and this ungracefulneſs might, in part at leaſt, be reformed by application and care. The ſtudy of action in Public Speaking, conſiſts chiefly in guarding againſt awkward and diſagreeable motions, and

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in learning to perform ſuch as are natural to the Speaker, in the moſt becoming manner. For this end, it has been adviſed by writers on this ſubject, to practiſe before a mirror, where one may ſee and judge of his own geſtures. But I am afraid, perſons are not always the beſt judges of the gracefulneſs of their own motions; and one may declaim long enough before a mirror, without correcting any of his faults. The judgment of a friend, whoſe good taſte they can truſt, will be found of much greater advantage to beginners, than any mirror they can uſe. With regard to particular rules concerning action and geſticulation, Quinctilian has delivered a great many, in the laſt Chapter of the 11th Book of his Inſtitutions; and all the modern writers on this ſubject have done little elſe but tranſlate them. I am not of opinion that ſuch rules, delivered either by the voice or on paper, can be of much uſe, unleſs perſons ſaw them exemplified before their eyes *.

I SHALL

* The few following hints only I ſhall adventure to throw out, in caſe they may be of any ſervice. When ſpeaking in public, one ſhould ſtudy to preſerve as much dignity as poſſible in the whole attitude of the body. An erect poſture is generally to be choſen; ſtanding firm, ſo as to have the fulleſt and freeſt command of all his motions; any inclination which is uſed ſhould be forwards towards the hearers, which is a natural expreſſion of earneſtneſs. As for the countenance, the chief rule is, that it ſhould correſpond with the nature of the Diſcourſe, and when no particular emotion is expreſſed, a ſerious and manly look is always the beſt. The eyes ſhould never be fixed cloſe

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I SHALL only add further on this head, that in order to ſucceed well in delivery, nothing is more neceſſary than for a Speaker to guard againſt a certain flutter of ſpirits, which is peculiarly incident to thoſe who begin to ſpeak in public. He muſt endeavour above all things to be recollected, and maſter of himſelf. For this end, he will find nothing of more uſe to him than to ſtudy to become wholly engaged in his ſubject; to be poſſeſſed with a ſenſe of its importance or ſeriouſneſs; to be concerned much more to perſuade than to pleaſe. He will generally pleaſe moſt, when pleaſing is not his

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on any one object, but move eaſily round the audience. In the motions made with the hands, conſiſt the chief part of geſture in Speaking. The antients condemned all motions performed by the left hand alone; but I am not ſenſible that theſe are always offenſive, though it is natural for the right hand to be more frequently employed. Warm emotions demand the motion of both hands correſponding together. But whether one geſticulates with one or with both hands, it is an important rule, that all his motions ſhould be free and eaſy. Narrow and ſtraitened movements are generally ungraceful; for which reaſon, motions made with the hands are directed to proceed from the ſhoulder rather than from the elbow. Perpendicular movements too with the hands, that is, in the ſtraight line up and down, which Shakeſpeare in Hamlet calls "ſawing the air with the "hand," are ſeldom good. Oblique motions are, in general, the moſt graceful. Too ſudden and nimble motions ſhould be likewiſe avoided. Earneſtneſs can be fully expreſſed without them. Shakeſpeare's directions on this head are full of good ſenſe; "uſe all gently," ſays he, "and in the very torrent and tem-"peſt of paſſion, acquire a temperance that may give it "ſmoothneſs."

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ſole nor chief aim. This is the only rational and proper method of raiſing one's ſelf above that timid and baſhful regard to an audience, which is ſo ready to diſconcert a Speaker, both as to what he is to ſay, as to his manner of ſaying it.

I CANNOT conclude without an earneſt admonition to guard againſt all affectation, which is the certain ruin of good delivery. Let your manner, whatever it is, be your own; neither imitated from another, nor aſſumed upon ſome imaginary model, which is unnatural to you. Whatever is native, even though accompanied with ſeveral defects, yet is likely to pleaſe; becauſe it ſhows us a man; becauſe it has the appearance of coming from the heart. Whereas a delivery, attended with ſeveral acquired graces and beauties, if it be not eaſy and free, if it betray the marks of art and affectation, never fails to diſguſt. To attain any extremely correct, and perfectly graceful delivery, is what few can expect; ſo many natural talents being requiſite to concur in forming it. But to attain, what as to the effect is very little inferior, a forcible and perſuaſive manner, is within the power of moſt perſons; if they will only unlearn falſe and corrupt habits; if they will allow themſelves to follow nature, and will ſpeak in public as they do in private, when they ſpeak in earneſt and from the heart. If one has naturally any groſs defects in his voice or geſtures, he begins at the wrong end, if he attempts at reforming them only when he is to ſpeak

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in public. He ſhould begin with rectifying them in his private manner of Speaking; and then carry to the Public the right habit he has formed. For, when a Speaker is engaged in a Public Diſcourſe, he ſhould not be then employing his attention about his manner, or thinking of his tones and his geſtures. If he be ſo employed, ſtudy and affectation will appear. He ought to be then quite in earneſt; wholly occupied with his ſubject and his ſentiments; leaving Nature, and previouſly formed habits, to prompt and ſuggeſt his manner of delivery.

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MEANS OF IMPROVING IN ELOQUENCE.

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I HAVE now treated fully of the different kinds of Public Speaking, of the Compoſition, and of the Delivery of a Diſcourſe. Before I finiſh this ſubject, it may be of uſe to ſuggeſt ſome things concerning the propereſt means of Improvement in the Art of Public Speaking, and the moſt neceſſary ſtudies for that purpoſe.

To be an Eloquent Speaker, in the proper ſenſe of the word, is far from being either a common or an eaſy attainment. Indeed, to compoſe a florid harangue on ſome popular topic, and to deliver it ſo as to amuſe an Audience, is a matter not very difficult. But though ſome praiſe be due to this, yet the idea which I have endeavoured to give of Eloquence, is much higher. It is a great exertion of the human powers. It is the Art of being perſuaſive and commanding; the Art, not of pleaſing the fancy merely, but of ſpeaking both to the underſtanding and to the heart; of intereſting the hearers

in ſuch a degree, as to ſeiſe and carry them along with us; and to leave them with a deep and ſtrong impreſſion of what they have heard. How many talents, natural and acquired, muſt concur for carrying this to perfection? A ſtrong, lively, and warm imagination; quick ſenſibility of heart, joined with ſolid judgment, good ſenſe, and preſence of mind; all improved by great and long attention to Style and Compoſition; and ſupported alſo by the exterior, yet important qualifications, of a graceful manner, a preſence not ungainly, and a full and tuneable voice. How little reaſon to wonder, that a perfect and accompliſhed Orator, ſhould be one of the characters that is moſt rarely to be found?

Let us not deſpair, however. Between mediocrity and perfection, there is a very wide interval. There are many intermediate ſpaces, which may be filled up with honour; and the more rare and difficult that complete perfection is, the greater is the honour of approaching to it, though we do do not fully attain it. The number of Orators who ſtand in the higheſt claſs is, perhaps, ſmaller than the number of Poets who are foremoſt in poetic fame; but the ſtudy of Oratory has this advantage above that of Poetry, that, in Poetry, one muſt be an eminently good performer, or he is not ſupportable:

——Mediocribus eſſe Poëtis
Non homines, non Dî, non conceſſêre columnæ *.

* For God and Man, and lettered poſt denies,
That Poets ever are of middling ſize. Francis.

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In Eloquence this does not hold. There, one may poſſeſs a moderate ſtation with dignity. Eloquence admits of a great many different forms; plain and ſimple, as well as high and pathetic; and a genius that cannot reach the latter, may ſhine with much reputation and uſefulneſs in the former.

WHETHER Nature or Art contribute moſt to form an Orator, is a trifling inquiry. In all attainments whatever, Nature muſt be the prime agent. She muſt beſtow the original talents. She muſt ſow the ſeeds; but culture is requiſite for bringing theſe ſeeds to perfection. Nature muſt always have done ſomewhat; but a great deal will always be left to be done by Art. This is certain, that ſtudy and diſcipline are more neceſſary for the improvement of natural genius, in Oratory, than they are in Poetry. What I mean is, that though Poetry be capable of receiving Aſſiſtance from Critical Art, yet a Poet, without any aid from Art, by the force of genius alone, can riſe higher than a Public Speaker can do, who has never given attention to the rules of Style, Compoſition, and Delivery. Homer formed himſelf; Demoſthenes and Cicero were formed by the help of much labour and of many aſſiſtances derived from the labour of others. After theſe preliminary obſervations, let us proceed to the main deſign of this Lecture; to treat of the means to be uſed for Improvement in Eloquence.

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In the first place, What stands highest in the order of means, is personal character and disposition. In order to be a truly eloquent or persuasive Speaker, nothing is more necessary than to be a virtuous man. This was a favourite position among the antient Rhetoricians: "Non posse Oratorem esse nisi virum bonum." To find any such connection between virtue and one of the highest liberal arts, must give pleasure; and it can, I think, be clearly shown, that this is not a mere topic of declamation, but that the connection here alleged, is undoubtedly founded in truth and reason.

For, consider first, Whether any thing contribute more to persuasion, than the opinion which we entertain of the probity, disinterestedness, candour, and other good moral qualities of the person who endeavours to persuade? These give weight and force to every thing which he utters; nay, they add a beauty to it; they dispose us to listen with attention and pleasure; and create a secret partiality in favour of that side which he espouses. Whereas, if we entertain a suspicion of craft and disingenuity, of a corrupt, or a base mind, in the Speaker, his Eloquence loses all its real effect. It may entertain and amuse; but it is viewed as artifice, as trick, as the play only of Speech; and, viewed in this light, whom can it persuade? We even read a book with more pleasure, when we think favourably

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ably of its Author; but when we have the living Speaker before our eyes, addreſſing us perſonally on ſome ſubject of importance, the opinion we entertain of his character muſt have a much more powerful effect.

But, leſt it ſhould be ſaid, that this relates only to the character of Virtue, which one may maintain, without being at bottom a truly worthy man, I muſt obſerve farther, that beſides the weight which it adds to Character, real Virtue operates alſo, in other ways, to the advantage of Eloquence.

First, Nothing is ſo favourable as Virtue to the proſecution of honourable ſtudies. It prompts a generous emulation to excel; it inures to induſtry; it leaves the mind vacant and free, maſter of itſelf, diſencumbered of thoſe bad paſſions, and diſengaged from thoſe mean purſuits, which have ever been found the greateſt enemies to true proficiency. Quinctilian has touched this conſideration very properly: "Quod ſi agrorum nimia cura, et ſollicitior rei familiaris diligentia, et venandi voluptas, & dati ſpectaculis dies, multum ſtudiis auferunt, quid putamus facturas cupiditatem, avaritiam, invidiam? Nihil enim eſt tam occupatum, tam multiforme, tot ac tam variis affectibus conciſum, atque laceratum, quam mala ac improba mens. Quis inter hæc, literis, aut ulli bonæ arti, locus? Non hercle magis quam frugibus,

" frugibus, in terra ſentibus ac rubis occu-
" pata*."

But, beſides this conſideration, there is another of ſtill higher importance, though I am not ſure of its being attended to as much as it deſerves; namely, that from the fountain of real and genuine virtue, are drawn thoſe ſentiments which will ever be moſt powerful in affecting the hearts of others. Bad as the world is, nothing has ſo great and univerſal a command over the minds of men as virtue. No kind of Language is ſo generally underſtood, and ſo powerfully felt, as the native Language of worthy and virtuous feelings. He only, therefore, who poſſeſſes theſe full and ſtrong, can ſpeak properly, and in its own language, to the heart. On all great ſubjects and occaſions, there is a dignity, there is an energy in noble ſentiments, which is overcoming and irreſiſtible. They give an ardour and a flame to one's Diſcourſe, which ſeldom fails

* " If the management of an eſtate, if anxious attention to
" domeſtic œconomy, a paſſion for hunting, or whole days
" given up to public places of amuſements, conſume ſo much
" time that is due to ſtudy, how much greater waſte muſt
" be occaſioned by licentious deſires, avarice, or envy? No-
" thing is ſo much hurried and agitated, ſo contradictory to it-
" ſelf, or ſo violently torn and ſhattered by conflicting paſſions,
" as a bad heart. Amidſt the diſtractions which it produces,
" what room is left for the cultivation of letters, or the pur-
" ſuit of any honourable art? No more, aſſuredly, than there is
" for the growth of corn in a field that is overrun with thorns
" and brambles."

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to kindle a like flame in thoſe who hear; and which, more than any other cauſe, beſtows on Eloquence that power, for which it is famed, of ſeizing and tranſporting an Audience. Here, Art and Imitation will not avail. An aſſumed character conveys nothing of this powerful warmth. It is only a native and unaffected glow of feeling, which can tranſmit the emotion to others. Hence, the moſt renowned Orators, ſuch as Cicero and Demoſthenes, were no leſs diſtinguiſhed for ſome of the high virtues, as public ſpirit and zeal for their country, than for Eloquence. Beyond doubt, to theſe virtues their Eloquence owed much of its effect; and thoſe Orations of theirs, in which there breathes moſt of the virtuous and magnanimous ſpirit, are thoſe which have moſt attracted the admiration of ages.

NOTHING, therefore, is more neceſſary for thoſe who would excel in any of the higher kinds of Oratory, than to cultivate habits of the ſeveral virtues, and to refine and improve all their moral feelings. Whenever theſe become dead, or callous, they may be aſſured, that, on every great occaſion, they will ſpeak with leſs power, and leſs ſucceſs. The ſentiments and diſpoſitions, particularly requiſite for them to cultivate, are the following: The love of juſtice and order, and indignation at inſolence and oppreſſion; the love of honeſty and truth, and deteſtation of fraud, meanneſs, and corruption; magnanimity of ſpirit; the love of liberty, of their country

country and the public; zeal for all great and noble designs, and reverence for all worthy and heroic characters. A cold and sceptical turn of mind is extremely adverse to Eloquence: and no less so, is that cavilling disposition which takes pleasure in depreciating what is great, and ridiculing what is generally admired. Such a disposition bespeaks one not very likely to excel in any thing; but least of all in Oratory. A true Orator should be a person of generous sentiments, of warm feelings, and of a mind turned towards the admiration of all those great and high objects, which mankind are naturally formed to admire. Joined with the manly virtues, he should, at the same time, possess strong and tender sensibility to all the injuries, distresses, and sorrows of his fellow-creatures; a heart that can easily relent; that can readily enter into the circumstances of others, and can make their case his own. A proper mixture of courage, and of modesty, must also be studied by every Public Speaker. Modesty is essential; it is always, and justly, supposed to be a concomitant of merit; and every appearance of it is winning and prepossessing. But modesty ought not to run into excessive timidity. Every Public Speaker should be able to rest somewhat on himself; and to assume that air, not of self-complacency, but of firmness, which bespeaks a consciousness of his being thoroughly persuaded of the truth, or justice, of what he delivers; a circumstance of no small consequence for making impression on those who hear.

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NEXT to moral qualifications, what, in the ſecond place, is moſt neceſſary to an Orator, is a fund of knowledge. Much is this inculcated by Cicero and Quinctilian: "Quod omnibus diſciplinis et "artibus debet eſſe inſtructus Orator." By which they mean, that he ought to have what we call, a Liberal Education; and to be formed by a regular ſtudy of philoſophy, and the polite arts. We muſt never forget that,

Scribendi recte, ſapere eſt & principium & fons.

Good ſenſe and knowledge, are the foundation of all good ſpeaking. There is no art that can teach one to be eloquent, in any ſphere, without a ſufficient acquaintance with what belongs to that ſphere; or if there were an art that made ſuch pretenſions, it would be mere quackery, like the pretenſions of the Sophiſts of old, to teach their diſciples to ſpeak for and againſt every ſubject; and would be deſervedly exploded by all wiſe men. Attention to Style, to Compoſition, and all the Arts of Speech, can only aſſiſt an Orator in ſetting off, to advantage, the ſtock of materials which he poſſeſſes; but the ſtock, the materials themſelves, muſt be brought from other quarters than from Rhetoric. He who is to plead at the Bar, muſt make himſelf thoroughly maſter of the knowledge of the law; of all the learning and experience that can be uſeful in his profeſſion, for ſupporting a cauſe or convincing a Judge. He who is to ſpeak from the Pulpit, muſt apply himſelf cloſely to the ſtudy

ſtudy of divinity, of practical religion, of morals, of human nature; that he may be rich in all the topics, both of inſtruction and of perſuaſion. He who would fit himſelf for being a Member of the Supreme Council of the Nation, or of any Public Aſſembly, muſt be thoroughly acquainted with the buſineſs that belongs to ſuch Aſſembly; he muſt ſtudy the forms of Court, the courſe of procedure; and muſt attend minutely to all the facts that may be the ſubject of queſtion or deliberation.

Besides the knowledge that properly belongs to his profeſſion, a Public Speaker, if ever he expects to be eminent, muſt make himſelf acquainted, as far as his neceſſary occupations allow, with the general circle of polite literature. The ſtudy of Poetry may be uſeful to him, on many occaſions, for embelliſhing his Style, for ſuggeſting lively images, or agreeable alluſions. The ſtudy of Hiſtory may be ſtill more uſeful to him; as the knowledge of facts, of eminent characters, and of the courſe of human affairs, finds place on many occaſions*. There are few great occaſions of Public Speaking, in which one may not derive aſſiſtance from cultivated taſte, and extenſive know-

* "Imprimis verò, abundare debet Orator exemplorum copia, cum veterum, tum etiam novorum; adeo ut non modo quæ conſcripta ſunt hiſtoriis, aut Sermonibus velut per manus tradita, quæque quotidie aguntur, debeat nôſſe; verùm ne ea quidem quæ a clarioribus poëtis ſunt ficta negligere."

Quinct. L. xii. Cap. 4.

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ledge. They will often yield him materials for proper ornament; ſometimes, for argument and real uſe. A deficiency of knowledge, even in ſubjects that belong not directly to his own profeſſion, will expoſe him to many diſadvantages, and give better qualified rivals a great ſuperiority over him.

Allow me to recommend, in the third place, not only the attainment of uſeful knowledge, but a habit of application and induſtry. Without this, it is impoſſible to excel in any thing. We muſt not imagine, that it is by a ſort of muſhroom growth, that one can riſe to be a diſtinguiſhed Pleader, or Preacher, or Speaker in any Aſſembly. It is not by ſtarts of application, or by a few years preparation of ſtudy afterwards diſcontinued, that eminence can be attained. No; it can be attained only by means of regular induſtry, grown up into a habit, and ready to be exerted on every occaſion that calls for induſtry. This is the fixed law of our nature; and he muſt have a very high opinion of his own genius indeed, that can believe himſelf an exception to it. A very wiſe law of our nature it is; for induſtry is, in truth, the great "Condi-"mentum," the ſeaſoning of every pleaſure; without which life is doomed to languiſh. Nothing is ſo great an enemy both to honourable attainments, and to the real, to the briſk, and ſpirited enjoyment of life, as that relaxed ſtate of mind which ariſes from indolence and diſſipation. One that is deſtined to excel in any art, eſpecially in the

the arts of Speaking and Writing, will be known by this more than by any other mark whatever, an enthuſiaſm for that art; an enthuſiaſm, which, firing his mind with the object he has in view, will diſpoſe him to reliſh every labour which the means require. It was this, that characteriſed the great men of antiquity; it is this, which muſt diſtinguiſh the Moderns who would tread in their ſteps. This honourable enthuſiaſm, it is highly neceſſary for ſuch as are ſtudying Oratory to cultivate. If youth wants it, manhood will flag miſerably.

In the fourth place, Attention to the beſt models will contribute greatly towards improvement. Every one who ſpeaks or writes, ſhould, indeed, endeavour to have ſomewhat that is his own, that is peculiar to himſelf, and that characteriſes his Compoſition and Style. Slaviſh Imitation depreſſes Genius, or rather betrays the want of it. But withal, there is no Genius ſo original, but may be profited and aſſiſted by the aid of proper examples, in Style, Compoſition, and Delivery. They always open ſome new ideas; they ſerve to enlarge and correct our own. They quicken the current of thought, and excite emulation.

Much, indeed, will depend upon the right choice of models which we purpoſe to imitate; and ſuppoſing them rightly choſen, a farther care is requiſite, of not being ſeduced by a blind univerſal admiration. For, "decipit exemplar, vitiis

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"imitabile." Even in the moſt finiſhed models we can ſelect, it muſt not be forgotten, that there are always ſome things improper for imitation. We ſhould ſtudy to acquire a juſt conception of the peculiar characteriſtic beauties of any Writer, or Public Speaker, and imitate theſe only. One ought never to attach himſelf too cloſely to any ſingle model; for he who does ſo, is almoſt ſure of being ſeduced into a faulty and affected imitation. His buſineſs ſhould be, to draw from ſeveral the proper ideas of perfection. Living examples of Public Speaking, in any kind, it will not be expected that I ſhould here point out. As to the Writers, antient and modern, from whom benefit may be derived in forming Compoſition and Style, I have ſpoken ſo much of them in former Lectures, that it is needleſs to repeat what I have ſaid of their virtues and defects. I own, it is to be regretted, that the Engliſh Language, in which there is much good writing, furniſhes us, however, with but very few recorded examples of eloquent Public Speaking. Among the French there are more. Saurin, Bourdaloue, Flechier, Maſſillon, particularly the laſt, are eminent for the Eloquence of the Pulpit. But the moſt nervous and ſublime of all their Orators is Boſſuet, the famous Biſhop of Meaux; in whoſe *Oraiſons Funebres*, there is a very high ſpirit of Oratory*. Some of Fontenelle's Harangues

* The criticiſm which M. Crevier, Author of Rhetorique Françoiſe, paſſes upon theſe writers whom I have above named, is,

Harangues to the French Academy, are elegant and agreeable. And at the Bar, the printed Pleadings of Cochin and D'Agueſſeau, are highly extolled by the late French Critics.

THERE is one obſervation, which it is of importance to make, concerning imitation of the Style of any favourite Author, when we would carry his Style into Public Speaking. We muſt attend to a very material diſtinction between written and ſpoken language. Theſe are, in truth, two different manners of communicating ideas. A book that is to be read, requires one ſort of Style; a man that is to ſpeak, muſt uſe another. In books, we look for correctneſs, preciſion, all redundancies pruned, all repetitions avoided, language completely poliſhed. Speaking admits a more eaſy copious Style, and leſs fettered by rule; repetitions may often be neceſſary, parentheſes may ſometimes be graceful; the ſame thought muſt often be placed in different views; as the hearers can catch it only from the mouth of the Speaker, and have not the advantage, as in reading a book, of turning back again, and of dwel-

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is, " Boſſuet eſt grande, mais inégal; Flechier eſt plus égal, " mais moins elevé, & ſouvent trop fleuri: Bourdaloue eſt ſo- " lide & judicieux, mais il neglige les graces legères: Maſſil- " lon eſt plus riche en images, mais moins fort en raiſonnement. " Je ſouhaite donc, que l'orateur ne ſe contente dans l'imitation " d'un ſeul de ces modeles, mais qu'il tache de reunir en lui " toutes leurs differentes vertus." Vol. II. chap. derniere.

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ling on what they do not fully comprehend. Hence the Style of many good authors would appear ſtiff, affected, and even obſcure, if, by too cloſe an imitation, we ſhould transfer it to a Popular Oration. How awkward, for example, would Lord Shaftſbury's Sentences ſound in the mouth of a Public Speaker? Some kinds of Public Diſcourſe, it is true, ſuch as that of the Pulpit, where more exact preparation, and more ſtudied Style are admitted, would bear ſuch a manner better than others which are expected to approach more to extemporaneous ſpeaking. But ſtill there is, in general, ſo much difference between Speaking and Compoſition deſigned only to be read, as ſhould guard us againſt a cloſe and injudicious imitation.

Some Authors there are, whoſe manner of writing approaches nearer to the Style of Speaking than others; and who, therefore, can be imitated with more ſafety. In this claſs, among the Engliſh Authors, are Dean Swift, and Lord Bolingbroke. The Dean, throughout all his writings, in the midſt of much correctneſs, maintains the eaſy natural manner of an unaffected Speaker; and this is one of his chief excellencies. Lord Bolingbroke's Style is more ſplendid, and more declamatory than Dean Swift's; but ſtill it is the Style of one who ſpeaks, or rather who harangues. Indeed, all his Political Writings (for it is to them only, and not to his Philoſophical ones, that this ob-

ſervation can be applied) carry much more the appearance of one declaiming with warmth in a great Aſſembly, than of one writing in a cloſet, in order to be read by others. They have all the copiouſneſs, the fervour, the inculcating method that is allowable, and graceful in an Orator; perhaps too much of it for a writer; and it is to be regretted, as I have formerly obſerved, that the matter contained in them ſhould have been ſo trivial, or ſo falſe: for, from the manner and ſtyle, conſiderable advantage might be reaped.

In the fifth place, Beſides attention to the beſt models, frequent exerciſe both in compoſing and ſpeaking, will be admitted to be a neceſſary mean of improvement. That ſort of Compoſition is, doubtleſs, moſt uſeful, which relates to the profeſſion, or kind of Public Speaking, to which perſons addict themſelves. This they ſhould keep ever in their eye, and be gradually inuring themſelves to it. But let me alſo adviſe them, not to allow themſelves in negligent Compoſition of any kind. He who has it for his aim to write, or to ſpeak correctly, ſhould, in the moſt trivial kind of Compoſition, in writing a letter, nay, even in common diſcourſe, ſtudy to acquit himſelf with propriety. I do not at all mean, that he is never to write or to ſpeak a word, but in elaborate and artificial language. This would form him to a ſtiffneſs and affectation, worſe, by ten thouſand degrees, than the greateſt negligence. But it is

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to be obſerved, that there is, in every thing, a manner which is becoming, and has propriety; and oppoſite to it there is a clumſy and faulty performance of the ſame thing. The becoming manner is very often the moſt light, and ſeemingly careleſs manner; but it requires taſte and attention to ſeize the juſt idea of it. That idea, when acquired, we ſhould keep in our eye, and form upon it whatever we write or ſay.

Exercises of ſpeaking have always been recommended to ſtudents, in order that they may prepare themſelves for ſpeaking in public, and on real buſineſs. The Meetings, or Societies, into which they ſometimes form themſelves for this purpoſe are laudable inſtitutions; and under proper conduct, may ſerve many valuable purpoſes. They are favourable to knowledge and ſtudy, by giving occaſion to inquiries concerning thoſe ſubjects which are made the ground of diſcuſſion. They produce emulation; and gradually inure thoſe who are concerned in them, to ſomewhat that reſembles a Public Aſſembly. They accuſtom them to know their own powers, and to acquire a command of themſelves in ſpeaking; and what is, perhaps, the greateſt advantage of all, they give them a facility and fluency of expreſſion, and aſſiſt them in procuring that "Copia "verborum," which can be acquired by no other means but frequent exerciſe in ſpeaking.

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But the Meetings which I have now in my eye, are to be underſtood of thoſe academical aſſociations, where a moderate number of young Gentlemen who are carrying on their ſtudies, and are connected by ſome affinity in the future purſuits which they have in view, aſſemble privately, in order to improve one another, and to prepare themſelves for thoſe public exhibitions which may afterwards fall to their lot. As for thoſe public and promiſcuous Societies, in which multitudes are brought together, who are often of low ſtations and occupations, who are joined by no common bond of union, except an abſurd rage for Public Speaking, and have no other object in view, but to make a ſhow of their ſuppoſed talents, they are inſtitutions not merely of an uſeleſs, but of an hurtful nature. They are in great hazard of proving ſeminaries of licentiouſneſs, petulance, faction, and folly. They miſlead thoſe, who, in their own callings, might be uſeful members of Society, into fantaſtic plans of making a figure on ſubjects which divert their attention from their proper buſineſs, and are widely remote from their ſphere in life.

Even the allowable meetings into which Students of Oratory form themſelves, ſtand in need of direction in order to render them uſeful. If their ſubjects of diſcourſe be improperly choſen; if they maintain extravagant or indecent topics; if they indulge themſelves in looſe and flimſy declama-

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clamation, which has no foundation in good ſenſe; or accuſtom themſelves to ſpeak pertly on all ſubjects without due preparation, they may improve one another in petulance, but in no other thing; and will infallibly form themſelves to a very faulty and vicious taſte in ſpeaking. I would, therefore, adviſe all who are members of ſuch ſocieties, in the firſt place, to attend to the choice of their ſubjects; that they be uſeful and manly, either formed on the courſe of their ſtudies, or on ſomething that has relation to morals and taſte, to action and life. In the ſecond place, I would adviſe them to be temperate in the practice of Speaking; not to ſpeak too often, nor on ſubjects where they are ignorant or unripe; but only when they have proper materials for a diſcourſe, and have digeſted and thought of the ſubject before hand. In the third place, When they do ſpeak, they ſhould ſtudy always to keep good ſenſe and perſuaſion in view, rather than an oſtentation of Eloquence; and for this end, I would, in the fourth place, repeat the advice which I gave in a former Lecture, that they ſhould always chooſe that ſide of the queſtion to which, in their own judgment, they are moſt inclined, as the right and the true ſide; and defend it by ſuch arguments as ſeem to them moſt ſolid. By theſe means they will take the beſt method of forming themſelves gradually to a manly, correct, and perſuaſive manner of Speaking.

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It now only remains to inquire, of what uſe may the ſtudy of Critical and Rhetorical Writers be for improving one in the practice of Eloquence? Theſe are certainly not to be neglected; and yet, I dare not ſay that much is to be expected from them. For profeſſed Writers on Public Speaking, we muſt look chiefly among the Antients. In modern times, for reaſons which were before given, Popular Eloquence, as an Art, has never been very much the object of ſtudy; it has not the ſame powerful effects among us that it had in more democratical ſtates; and therefore has not been cultivated with the ſame care. Among the Moderns, though there has been a great deal of good criticiſm on the different kinds of Writing, yet much has not been attempted on the ſubject of Eloquence or Public Diſcourſe; and what has been given us of that kind, has been drawn moſtly from the Antients. Such a writer as Joannes Gerardus Voſſius, who has gathered into one heap of ponderous lumber, all the trifling, as well as the uſeful things, that are to be found in the Greek and Roman Writers, is enough to diſguſt one with the ſtudy of Eloquence. Among the French, there has been more attempted on this ſubject, than among the Engliſh. The Biſhop of Cambray's Writings on Eloquence I before mentioned with honour. Rollin, Batteux, Crevier, Gibert, and ſeveral other French Critics, have alſo written on Oratory; but though ſome of them may be uſeful, none of them are ſo conſiderable as to deſerve particular recommendation.

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It is to the original Antient Writers that we muſt chiefly have recourſe; and it is a reproach to any one, whoſe profeſſion calls him to ſpeak in public, to be unacquainted with them. In all the Antient Rhetorical Writers, there is, indeed, this defect, that they are too ſyſtematical, as I formerly ſhowed; they aim at doing too much; at reducing Rhetoric to a complete and perfect Art, which may even ſupply invention with materials on every ſubject; inſomuch, that one would imagine they expected to form an Orator by rule, in as mechanical a manner as one would form a Carpenter. Whereas, all that can, in truth, be done, is to give openings for aſſiſting and enlightening Taſte, and for pointing out to Genius the courſe it ought to hold.

Aristotle laid the foundation for all that was afterwards written on the ſubject. That amazing and comprehenſive Genius, which does honour to human nature, and which gave light into ſo many different Sciences, has inveſtigated the principles of Rhetoric with great penetration. Ariſtotle appears to have been the firſt who took Rhetoric out of the hands of the Sophiſts, and introduced reaſoning and good ſenſe into the Art. Some of the profoundeſt things which have been written on the paſſions and manners of men, are to be found in his Treatiſe on Rhetoric; though in this, as in all his writings, his great brevity often renders him obſcure. Succeeding Greek Rhetoricians, moſt

of whom are now loſt, improved on the foundation which Ariſtotle had laid. Two of them ſtill remain, Demetrius Phalereus, and Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus; both write on the Conſtruction of Sentences, and deſerve to be peruſed; eſpecially Dionyſius, who is a very accurate and judicious Critic.

I NEED ſcarcely recommend the rhetorical writings of Cicero. Whatever, on the ſubject of Eloquence, comes from ſo great an Orator, muſt be worthy of attention. His moſt conſiderable work on this ſubject is that *De Oratore*, in three books. None of Cicero's writings are more highly finiſhed than this Treatiſe. The dialogue is polite; the characters are well ſupported, and the conduct of the whole is beautiful and agreeable. It is, indeed, full of digreſſions, and his rules and obſervations may be thought ſometimes too vague and general. Uſeful things, however, may be learned from it; and it is no ſmall benefit to be made acquainted with Cicero's own idea of Eloquence. The "Orator ad M. Brutum," is alſo a conſiderable Treatiſe; and, in general, throughout all Cicero's rhetorical works there run thoſe high and ſublime ideas of Eloquence, which are fitted both for forming a juſt taſte, and for creating that enthuſiaſm for the Art, which is of the greateſt conſequence for excelling in it.

BUT of all the Antient Writers on the ſubject of Oratory, the moſt inſtructive, and moſt uſeful, is Quinctilian.

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Quinctilian. I know few books which abound more with good ſenſe, and diſcover a greater degree of juſt and accurate taſte, than Quinctilian's Inſtitutions. Almoſt all the principles of good Criticiſm are to be found in them. He has digeſted into excellent order all the antient ideas concerning Rhetoric, and is, at the ſame time, himſelf an eloquent Writer. Though ſome parts of his work contain too much of the technical and artificial ſyſtem then in vogue, and for that reaſon may be thought dry and tedious, yet I would not adviſe the omitting to read any part of his Inſtitutions. To Pleaders at the Bar, even theſe technical parts may prove of ſome uſe. Seldom has any perſon, of more ſound and diſtinct judgment than Quinctilian, applied himſelf to the ſtudy of the Art of Oratory.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.